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ABSTRACT 
 
Access to and use of the media by the public, including public perceptions of media 
credibility, are important elements in grasping the role of the media and why it exists (Wanta 
and Hu, 1994). The mass media play a critical role in socio-economic and political 
transformation of societies in the sense that they significantly contribute to shaping and 
reflecting relations between the State and society and elites and the public (O’Neil, 1998). In 
developing countries like Ethiopia, the media also have a significant role in nation-building 
and political transformation. The success of the mass media, therefore, depends on its 
credibility and believability in the eyes of members of the public. These two pillars of media 
existence constitute the foundation for public trust and confidence (Garrison, 1992). News 
media credibility is considered as an essential element of effective communication (Rayudu, 
1998). In this regard, and as Steyn (1996) observed, credibility is the media's most cherished 
possession which allows them to be worthy of belief.   
Media and society are intertwined with each other (McQuail, 2005) and the issue of trust or 
mistrust is not bound, nor does it exist only in the circle of the media environment. Rather, it 
is mirrored in all facets of society, including the socio-political arena. Mindful of this, my 
thesis focuses on exploring the intertwined relationships between and among social trust 
(particularized and generalized trust), political/institutional trust and news media credibility 
from perspectives of the public. The thesis assesses public trust and confidence in the media, 
media access and media usage patterns within selected independent variables, i.e. region, 
residential area, gender, age, income, education and political affiliation. Given the fact that 
there is no universally-agreed conceptual framework for analyzing levels of social trust, 
political trust and media credibility, including the triangulation of trust or mistrust, I used a 
combination of proven theories and approaches in analyzing respondents perceptions of 
social trust, political trust and media credibility. In assessing public media access, exposure, 
consumption patterns and preferences, I used the integrated model of audience choice, which 
is the new version of the media uses and gratifications theory. My findings revealed that 
ownership of various household media hardware, media exposure, motives for media choice 
and use, including the social context of media use, cannot be not be attributed to any single 
socio-demographic factor. Rather, a combination of multiple factors, such as residence, level 
of education, level of income, availability of communication networks/infrastructure and 
suitability of one type of media hardware against others, all variously influence ownership of 
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household media hardware, media exposure, motives for media choice and use, including the 
social context of media use. I also applied the social and cultural theory and the institutional 
performance theory as a way of determining levels and reciprocity of social trust and political 
trust and media credibility. Findings indicated that there were low levels of social trust and 
political trust in general among respondents. The other finding was that there were variations 
in levels of social trust (particularized trust and generalized trust), political trust and media 
credibility across respondents’ socio-demographic factors.  
In analysing levels of trust or mistrust, political views and ideological orientation of members 
of the public are significant. Political ideas and beliefs of the public are reflected in their day-
to-day life and, invariably, influence their assessment and perceptions of media credibility. 
My findings further indicated that there were relationships between and among social trust, 
political trust and media credibility. Triangulation of trust and mistrust, however, varied 
across variables. Respondents in Tigray, for instance, had highest trust ratings for 
particularized trust, political trust and trust in national news media. Conversely, respondents 
in Addis Ababa had the least particularized trust, political trust and confidence in national 
news media and the highest trust in international news media. These findings may be useful 
in prompting further research in the extent to which social trust, political trust and media 
credibility in Ethiopia are entwined and have reciprocal interrelationships and dependencies. 
Key words: household media hardware, media access, media exposure, social context of 
media use, gratifications of media, social trust, particularized/generalized trust, 
political/institutional trust, news media credibility, triangular trust  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Study  
 
Mass media provide a platform to various professionals to disseminate educational, 
informational, persuasive and influential, including entertainment, messages to the public 
(Golan, 2010). Consequently, public access to and usage of the media and how it 
perceives it in terms of credibility play a key role in underpinning its contribution to 
society and the extent to which it discharges its mandate (Wanta and Hu, 1994). In this 
regard, in an environment in which the media is not easily accessible and does not enjoy 
public credibility, the purpose, let alone usefulness, of the media will be grossly 
compromised and its contribution to societal development gravely diminished. Mass 
media credibility can be understood as believability in media. Scholars and researchers 
have characterised the concept of media credibility as a complex and multi-dimensional 
idea (Berlo, Lemert, & Mertz, 1970). Their characterizations of the media have been 
premised on two main dimensions, i.e. media credibility and source credibility (Hovland, 
Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Sundar, 1996; Greer, 2003) and medium credibility (Gaziano and 
McGrath, 1985; Kiousis, 1991; Newhagen & Nass, 1989). Some have also considered 
message credibility as the third component of media credibility (West, 1994).  
 
In my thesis, I have focused on comparative public attitudes towards and perceptions of 
radio, television and newspapers as credible, believable, trustworthy and competent 
purveyors of news, information and facts within Ethiopia. The mass media play a central 
role in the working and sustenance of democracy in developed countries (Croteau and 
Hoynes, 1997; Herman and McChesney, 1997; O’Neil, 1998). In developing countries 
like Ethiopia, the media have played a significant role in nation-building and political 
transformation. They have positively contributed to the economic and political transitions 
through shaping and reflecting relations between and among the state, society, the elites 
and the public (O’Neil, 1998). The success of the mass media, therefore, depends upon its 
credibility and believability as the twin pillars of the public’s trust and confidence 
(Garrison, 1992). News media credibility is considered as an essential element of 
2 
 
effective communication (Rayudu, 1998). Steyn (1996) also noted that credibility is the 
media's most cherished possession that allows them to be worthy of belief.  
 
Media and society are intertwined with each other (McQuail, 2005). Issues of trust or 
mistrust, credibility and trustworthiness do not, therefore, exclusively relate to the inner 
media environment or circle. Conversely, the media is inexorably part of the network of 
societal ‘social capital’ which has three broad elements (Putnam, 2000: Cappella, 2002). 
These are social or interpersonal trust, political or government trust and civic society 
trust.  The working and interface of these determinants of media trust and credibility have 
mutually contributed to creating and sustaining trustworthy social, political and economic 
relations in societies. These elements work in a reciprocal and mutually-reinforcing 
pattern of interrelationships (Mortensen, 1972, Cappella, 2002). However, the place of 
mass media is crucial in this process precisely because of its mediating role. As 
Silverstone noted, “the media are involved [in society] in two ways: as both institutions 
to deliver trust to the societies in which they are received, and at the same time as a 
process which need […] to be trusted” (1999:121). Similarly, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) emphasized the role that the media play in raising public awareness 
of disease or epidemic outbreaks (2005). WHO explained that the media play a key role 
not only in communicating disease outbreaks but also in restoring trust and confidence in 
institutions tasked with the responsibility of containing and eradicating them. Losing 
public trust and confidence in what the media report and how it reports can have serious 
and damaging health, economic and political implications.  Based on this understanding, 
the WHO came up with the concept of “triangular trust” (WHO, 2005). It used the term 
to describe interrelationships between and among communicators (media), technical 
outbreak response staff and policy-makers. In my thesis, I have borrowed and used the 
term to describe and discuss trust and confidence levels in people (social trust), 
government organizations and civic institutions (institutional trust or political trust) and 
mass media credibility. I have, specifically, explored public confidence in family 
members and strangers, trust in political institutions and confidence in the news media, 
including how all these intertwine and relate to each other.  In analyzing public trust and 
confidence in the media, I have triangulated responses according to various parameters, 
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i.e. regions, residential areas, gender, age, income, education levels and political party 
affiliations.  
1.2 An overview of the Ethiopian mass media landscape 
 
In Ethiopia, mass media were wholly-owned and controlled by the government until the 
beginning of the 1990s. Following the proclamation of the Press Law of 1992 (Negarit 
Gazeta, Proclamation N0. 8/1992), the picture of press ownership and control changed 
dramatically with more than 400 newspapers and magazines coming on the media scene. 
In early 2010, about 30 newspapers and 15 magazines were being published and 
circulated by the government, private enterprises and political organizations. Most of the 
newspapers are published on weekly basis in Amharic, the official language of Ethiopia. 
In 2014, the main newspapers were: Addis Zemen, state-owned daily; The Ethiopian 
Herald, state-owned and published as an English language daily; The Daily Monitor, 
privately-owned English language daily; Addis Admass, private-owned Amharic weekly; 
Reporter, privately-owned Amharic and English bi-weeklies; Capital, privately-owned 
English language business weekly and, Addis Fortune, private-owned English weekly.  
The multiplicity of government and private newspapers is a significant manifestation of 
the robustness of the media in Ethiopia. However, circulation of the same is largely 
confined to the literate in urban areas (BBC, 2017).  
 
As is the case with most developing countries, radio and television in Ethiopia are mainly 
owned by the government. The former Ethiopian Television (ETV) and Radio Agency, 
now the Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation (EBC), were re-established as autonomous 
public entities in 1995 (Negarit Gazeta, Proclamation No.114/1995). The ETV transmits 
in three indigenous languages and in English for about six hours a day. Radio Ethiopia 
transmits programmes in three international and eight local languages.  
 
The Broadcast Law, which allows the private sector to engage in broadcasting through 
radio and television, was proclaimed in June 2000 (Negarit Gazeta, Proclamation No. 
20/2000). Unlike the press, the broadcast sector continues to be monopolised and operated 
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by the State/ruling party. Ethiopian Radio, national radio and Radio Fana, which are 
affiliated to the ruling party, broadcast throughout the country in different languages, 
including Affarigna, Somaligna, Oromigna and Amharic. Apart from this, the Voice of 
Tigray Revolution broadcasts from the Tigray regional state. There are other frequency 
modulation (FM) bandwidth radio stations among which are FM Addis 97.1, FM Fana 
98.1, FM 96.1 (AAMMA) and Sheger 102.1, which broadcast at regional or local levels. 
The State controls most broadcasting outlets, including the sole national television 
network.    
 
Information and communication technologies (cable, satellite, digital, computers and the 
Internet) have made it possible for various media outlets to broadcast beyond 
geographical limitations (Doyle, 2002). Modern communication technologies have 
further seen the mushrooming of legal and illegal satellite television providers.  These 
include, among others, ArabSat, ChristianSat and Direct broadcast satellite service 
(DStv), international television stations such as the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC), Cable News Network (CNN) and Al Jazeera.  International media outlets have 
particularly been useful in complementing local media as sources of news and 
information.  
 
In order to ensure that their broadcasts reach as many local people as possible, 
international media outlets broadcasts in selected major Ethiopian languages. The Voice 
of America (VOA) broadcasts in Amharic, Oromiffa and Tigriegna, while Radio Deutche 
Welle broadcasts in Amharic daily throughout the country. Russian Radio also broadcasts 
in Amharic. Currently, Eritrea broadcasts in Amharic and Tigriegna on daily basis. A 
number of political organizations, such as the Oromo Liberation Front (SBO/VOL), 
broadcast in Oromiffa and Amharic, while the Ethiopian National United Patriotic Front 
(ENUPF) and the Kistdamina (Tinsae) broadcast their underground media from abroad to 
disseminate their views in the country.  
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Some people have criticized media outlets for bias and partial reporting for various 
reasons1. High-ranking government officials, including former Prime Minister Meles 
Zenawi, for instance, often accused the private press of disloyalty and reporting rumours 
and unfounded information to the public. Commercial and the private press have, on their 
part, been labeled as ‘gutter press’ (The Ethiopian Herald, March 25, 2001; 23 May 
2005; The Reporter, 4 April 2001; 18 July 2001). In 2006, correspondents and reporters 
from the VOA and Radio Dutch Welle were charged by the government for treasonous 
acts (The Ethiopian Herald, January 23, 2006:1). Similarly, during the 2005 
Parliamentary and Regional Council elections, the mass media, private and public, were 
condemned by different groups for their alleged poor and biased reporting with regard to 
vote-casting and the post-election situation. The ruling party, the Ethiopian Peoples' 
Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRDF), specifically accused the private print media of 
engaging in sensationalism and violence-provoking news reporting and presenting a 
negative picture of the party (The Ethiopian Herald, 23 May 2005). On their part, 
opposition political parties, such as the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and 
the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF), accused state-owned media of not 
covering their statements on post-election activities (Addis Zena, 16 Ginbot 1997).   
 
The European Union Election Observation Mission criticized state-owned media for 
releasing unofficial results showing mainly partial victories by the EPRDF in a number of 
constituencies and regions while ignoring opposition party press conferences and 
statements about election results (Council of the European Union, Press Release, 25 May 
2005). Franz Krüger, while teaching ethics of journalism at the School of Journalism and 
Communication (SJAC) at Addis Ababa University (AAU), wrote an article on the media 
                                                          
1 For instance, following the split in the Central Committee of the Tigrai People's Liberation Front (TPLF), 
which is a leading and major component of the ruling party (EPRDF), the suspended 12 members of the 
Central Committee expressed their feeling that they had not gotten the kind of access to the government 
media as their opponents to inform the public of their positions and ideas (The Reporter, March 28, 2001). 
The suspended group in their letter dated 27 March 2001 requested the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi 
for the free access of the government media and the party's newspapers and radio. Furthermore, they asked 
for a live TV debate by Ethiopian Television to present their views to the public without any gate keeping 
process. 
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experience of the post-election crisis. He stated that the credibility of both private and 
state media was undermined, while gossip and rumour flourished (Krüger, 2005). 
 
There is evidence that in Ethiopia, ordinary people doubt the credibility of state-owned 
media and private newspapers as purveyors of credible news and information. One 
observer in fact, noted that "[t]he information which is being transmitted since May 15, 
2005 on the state, private and foreign media are confusing us to know the status 
(position) of each party" (The Ethiopian Herald, 28 May 2005:14). When the public feels 
that the media are technically deficient, it tends to rely on other sources to fill the 
information gap. As Herman and McChesney explained: 
if the performance of the media is poor, people will be ignorant, isolated, and 
depoliticized, demagoguery will thrive, and a small elite will easily capture and 
maintain control over the decision-making on society’s most important political 
matters (1997:4).  
In some cases, the media are criticized by members of the public for reporting variously 
accounts of same events. For example, Skjerdal observed that four media outlets, i.e. The 
Ethiopian Herald, The Daily Monitor, The Ethiopian Review and Aigaforum, reported 
different numbers of demonstrators who had gathered outside VOA’s building to protest 
against or in support of its reporting pattern regarding the current situation of Ethiopia 
(November, 2005). 
 
Following the contested national elections in 2005, the Government of Ethiopia has taken 
measures which affect freedom of information, assembly and association. The measures 
have also narrowed political space which has resulted in constrained popular participation 
in setting and leveraging the country’s governance agenda. Restrictions have been 
imposed under the 2009 Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (Negarit Gazeta, Proclamation No. 
652/2009), the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation (Negarit Gazeta, Proclamation 
No. 621/2009) and the 2008 Mass Media and Freedom of Information Proclamation 
(Negarit Gazeta, Proclamation No. 590/2008). The updated media law is a revision of the 
first ever Ethiopian press law of 1992. In the Preamble, the Act indicates that “the role of 
the mass media is ensuring respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed 
7 
 
by the Constitution, and promoting peace, democracy, equality and justice” (Negarit 
Gazeta, Proclamation No. 590/2008:1). It also declares that all obstacles that were 
impediments to the operation of the media in Ethiopia should be removed. However, 
there is controversy with respect to the extent to which the revised law has succeeded in 
removing restrictions on the freedom of expression and stopping the harassment and 
intimidation of media practitioners.  
 
The inability of the Government of Ethiopian to create a truly enabling and supportive 
environment for the media, perhaps, is fueled by its belief that the mass media should be 
supportive, rather than critical, of government in promoting peace and achieving 
economic, social and political development. However, it is important to understand that, 
for the government to value the mandate of the media, it must first and foremost 
appreciate how it contributes to the creation of an informed public on one hand, and 
ventilation of communities with developmental news and information on the other. This, 
other things being equal, will ensure convergence of state and public perceptions of the 
media.   
 
Several studies have regularly been undertaken since the 1950s in the USA, Germany and 
Britain with respect to media credibility, social trust and institutional trust (Schweinger, 
2000, The Pew Research Center, 2004, The American Society of Newspaper Editors, 
2007). Assessing the credibility of the mass media in Ethiopia is also essential in order to 
examine their role in ensuring peace and stability, promoting economic development and 
the democratization process in the country. Some research has been conducted in mass 
media in Ethiopia among which is the one by Abel Adamu (2005) entitled “Audience 
satisfaction with Ethiopian Television evening Amharic program”. He studied 300 
television viewers among Bahir Dar, Dessie and Gondar residents who had television sets 
and paid annual service charges. He used Likert’s scales to find out the audiences’ levels 
of satisfaction. Other studies have dealt with news and other issue coverage with specific 
reference to accuracy, balance and fair reporting (Mearegu, 1996; Tedibabe, 1998; 
Shimels, 2000).  
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With the exception of these studies and research work, my search revealed that there have 
not been any studies or research work that have examined the Ethiopian media with 
respect to its credulity and trustworthiness. My study, therefore, is important and timely 
in terms of filling this gap.  
1.3 Study Rationale  
 
Since the downfall of the Durg regime in the early 1990s, Ethiopia has undertaken three 
levels of generational reforms to fight poverty and enhance the economic and political 
development of the country (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2002). 
According to the Ministry, the first generational reforms included economic policy 
reforms which were aimed at attaining macro-economic stability through a transition 
from a command to a free market economy. The second generational reforms involved 
working on qualitative changes to the justice system and the civil service. The third 
generational reforms consisted of decentralization and capacity-building for civil service 
delivery institutions and the private sector. The Government of Ethiopia has further 
developed the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), a national five-year plan, which is 
aimed at improving the country's economy and entrenching peace and stability through, 
among others, the democratization process. The Growth and Transformation Plan II 
(GTP II) has been in implementation since 2015/16 (Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development, 2015).2  
 
The realization of such enormous government plans and objectives requires, among 
others, mobilization of all key stakeholders, including the general public, whose 
confidence in the capacity of governmental institutions to deliver is requisite for their 
                                                          
2 The main points of the plan are: Encouraging large-scale foreign investment opportunities, primarily in 
the agricultural and industrial sectors. Completing Ethiopia's membership in the World Trade Organization 
and improving the country's commercial regulatory framework. Providing basic infrastructure in four 
industrial cluster zones. Renewing focus on natural resource and raw material industries such as gold, oil, 
gas, potash, and gemstones. Increasing road networks by 10,000 miles throughout the country. Building a 
1,500 mile-long standard gauge rail network and creating manufacturing plants for locomotive engines and 
railway signaling systems. Quadrupling power generation from 2,000 to 10,000 megawatts, building 82,500 
miles of new power distribution lines, and rehabilitating 4,800 miles of existing power transmission lines. 
Seeking investment in renewable energy projects involving hydro, wind, geothermal, and bio fuels to take 
advantage of the global focus on renewable energy. Increasing mobile telephone subscribers from 7 to 40 
million and Internet service subscribers from less than 200,000 to 3.7 million (Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development, 2015:11). 
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eventual success. It is in this regard that the media is expected to play a key role in 
ventilating society with information about what the plans entail on one hand, and the role 
they are supposed to play in realising them, on the other. This expectation is only feasible 
if the media (both print and electronic) enjoy maximum public trust and confidence.  
Currently, this ideal state appears to be elusive largely due to the Government’s 
promulgation of policies and laws some of which tend to undermine the free existence 
and operation of the media. Some government policies and laws have also tended to 
thwart popular participation in setting and leveraging the country’s governance agenda. 
Popular support for and participation in government development policies and 
programmes require inter-personal and institutional trust across all sections of society. 
People should experience trust and confidence between and among themselves as the 
foundation not only for cooperatively working together but also for conscientiously 
buying into government development policies and programmes.  
 
Institutional/organizational trust is contingent upon the extent to which members of the 
public think that public officials perform their functions in a transparent and accountable 
manner, including whether or not they work in the best interest of the public. Similarly, 
public trust and confidence in the media is premised on the extent to which the readership 
and members of the public in general, perceive them as credible and honest purveyors of 
news and information. In the absence of public trust and confidence, media outlets 
become less valuable as sources of news and information and are less likely to be read or 
watched (Islam, 2002). In this regard, Dominick noted that "if a reader or viewer loses 
trust or stops believing what is being reported, the fundamental contract between 
audience and reporter is undermined, and the news organization cannot survive. 
Credibility is paramount" (1999: 367).  
 
It is for this reason that it is imperative to explore the correlation between and among 
social trust, institutional trust and media credibility within the Ethiopian context across 
selected socio-demographic factors. In doing this, it is also vital to record and analyze 
attitudes and perceptions of professionals, as well as the general public with respect to 
trust and confidence in the media. In my thesis, I have analysed perceptions of the media 
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by selected members of the public and professionals with regard to ownership of the 
media (public or private) and whether locally or foreign-owned.  
1.4 Research questions 
 
In order to focus and guide the study, I formulated and used the following conceptual 
questions: 
▪ What are the main sources of information from which people get the majority of 
the local/national news? Are these private or government news media, national 
broadcasting stations or international media? Are there variations in terms of 
audience-based factors? 
▪ How are social, political, civic institution and media credibility and trust in 
Ethiopia entwined in reciprocal interrelationships and dependencies with each 
other? How is the media credibility divorced from other areas of trust? 
▪ Does the perception of media credibility affect the human-media interaction in 
using media for different purposes? 
▪ Are the audiences likely to stop watching, listening to or reading the media that 
they perceive lacks credibility and trust? What is the correlation of perception of 
media credibility vis-à-vis media use? 
▪ What are the crucial ways in which media are able to maintain high levels of 
credibility and concomitant social influence? 
▪ Is media credibility divorced from social trust and political trust? 
 
1.5 Objectives of the study 
 
The main objectives of the study were to: 
• Contribute to the localization/adaptation of research in media access, ownership, 
perceptions of media credibility, media consumption patterns, media trust, 
credibility and confidence from a developing country perspective;  
• Test the applicability of the triangulation method to the analysis of social trust, 
political trust and media credibility within the context of developing country like 
Ethiopia;   
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• Contribute to filling the knowledge gap with respect to public perceptions of 
media trust, confidence and credibility; 
• Contribute to filling the knowledge gap with respect to public trust and 
confidence in the performance of public institutions; and to  
• Contribute to enhancing analytical skills for assessing media trust and credibility, 
including public trust and confidence in the performance of public institutions. 
 
1.6 Conceptual Framework  
 
The thesis as a whole deals with perceptions of the public of social trust, political trust 
and media credibility. Social trust is assessed with trust in society, while political trust is 
assessed with regard to government institutions, and faith-based organisations. There is 
no universally-agreed conceptual framework for analyzing social and political trust. 
Similarly, there is no universally-agreed framework for ascertaining media trust and 
credibility.  Mindful of this challenge, I have used a combination of proven theories and 
approaches in analyzing respondent perceptions of social and political trust and media 
credibility as described below.  
1.6.1. Normative media theories/ Development media theory 
 
Normative media theories focus on the role and functions of the media. They are distinct 
from descriptive theories in that they prescribe the “right” approach for media conduct 
(Irvan, 2006). McQuail shows that normative theories of the media are focused on how 
the media “ought to operate if certain social values are to be observed or obtained” (cited 
in Zelizer, 2004: 146). In this regard, normative media theories advance from the basic 
premise that the media ought to live up to certain accepted rights, norms and obligations. 
 
The relation between press and society was first systematically investigated in 1956 by 
Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956, 1963). They identified the four theories of the 
press on the assumption that the “press always takes on the form and coloration of the 
social and political structures within which it operates” (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 
1956:1). They developed the following four press theories: authoritarian press theory, 
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libertarian press theory, social responsibility press theory and the Soviet Communist 
press theory (1956). The first two theories are regarded as basic press theories and the last 
two are variations. Their book divided the world into three camps: the free world of 
liberal democracy, the soviet-totalitarian system and the non-communist authoritarian 
societies. The main premises of the authors were, as Curran and Park put it, that “Media 
systems … reflect the prevailing philosophy and political system of society in which they 
operate” (2000:3).  
 
McQuail (1987) added to this list of media theories the development media theory and 
the democratic-participation theory. The development theory was developed to 
accommodate the media situation in developing countries. The democratic-participation 
theory incorporated alternative and grass-roots media that served the needs of citizens 
through the participation and interaction of the community to reflect consolidated 
democracies (McQuail, 2000). Since media credibility is the reflection of both 
perceptions of the audience and the performance of media, I have used normative media 
theories.  Normative media theories are relevant for this study as they were for the studies 
of Nordensreng (1997) and McQuail (2005). From my preliminary literature review of 
researches that have been undertaken, media credibility and trust can be classified under 
the normative media theory based on Nordenstreng’s classification of the normative 
theory paradigms, i.e. liberal-pluralist paradigm, social-responsibility paradigm, critical 
paradigm and administrative paradigm (Nordenstreng, 1997). Similarly, McQuail revised 
and proposed four different normative theory models. These include a liberal-pluralist or 
market model, social-responsibility or public interest model, professional model, and 
alternative media model (2005). 
 
Since media credibility is the reflection of both perceptions by the audience and the 
performance of the media, the public expect good quality and authentic media outputs. 
Audiences are sensitive to the content of the media in terms of accuracy, completeness, 
balancing and multiplicity of opinions. The “[n]ormative theory applies primarily to the 
relationship between media and society and deals with claims on the part of the media, 
especially in respect of their freedom, and also claims on the part of the society” 
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(McQuail, 2005). Issues of credibility and trust similarly apply to the media irrespective 
of size.  This is because, as Cahn observed, “[m]edia credibility is a matter of practice 
and of perception” (Cahn, 2003). In practical terms, trust and credibility are contingent 
upon media performance, especially with regard to selection of content and organization 
and presentation of facts and information. Media audience will, ordinarily, trust media 
outlets that accurately and fairly report facts and vice versa.    
 
Media credibility, for its part, is a direct reflection of the extent to which the audience has 
confidence in its performance. In my thesis, this understanding is generally applied to all 
institutions and organizations in assessing public credibility and trust. Media credibility is 
assessed with respect to roles, functions, responsibilities and accountabilities of the 
media. It is on account of this that focus has been on the assessment of the extent to 
which media practitioners discharge these performance attributes.  A number of scholars 
have acknowledged the role that socio-demographic factors play in determining media 
credibility at both personal and communal levels (Golan, 2010). Some of the independent 
variables that have been used in assessing media credibility include age (Bucy, 2003), 
income (Ibelema and Powell, 2001), education (Mulder, 1981), gender (Robinson and 
Kohut, 1988) and political views (Tsfati and Capella, 2003).  
1.6.2. Uses and gratifications theory/Integrated model of audience choice 
 
In assessing relationships between media consumption and media credibility, I have used 
the gratifications theory, especially the integrated model of audience choice which is an 
amended version of the uses and gratifications theory. The uses and gratifications 
approach was first described by Elihu Katz and others at the end of the 1950s (Katz, 
1959; Severin and Tankard, 1997). Most communications research had up to this point 
was directed at the effect of mass media on public attitudes and behaviour. The uses and 
gratifications approach is the transformation of the central media research from ‘what the 
media do to people’ to ‘what people do with media’ (Katz, 1959:1). The gratifications 
theory focuses on needs, wishes and satisfactions of audiences as the main motives for 
media use and consumption (Blumler and Katz, 1974). For example, people watch 
television, listen to radio, or read newspapers and magazines to gratify and satisfy certain 
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needs. The main questions are: why do people use media? What do people do with the 
media? What do they use the media for? and What do they get from their media use? 
Such media utility-related questions are “as old as media research itself” (McQuail, 2005: 
423). 
 
McQuail (2000; 2005) developed an integrated model of audience choice for uses and 
gratifications (Figure 4.5). As he acknowledged, the model was influenced initially by the 
work of Webster and Wakshlag (1983) who sought to explain television viewer choice in 
a similar way (2005:429). The model encompasses a number of factors concerning media 
use patterns from the ‘audience side’ and the ‘media side’. According to McQuail, media 
choice is often informed and guided by personal attributes such as age, gender, family 
position, educational background, work station and level of income, social background, 
religion, culture, family and ethnic origins/race. Others are political orientation, personal 
tastes and preferences, availability and affordability of media and the social context of 
use (McQuail, 2005:429-31). I have used some of these variables in assessing media 
access and use patterns by the public and in ascertaining perceptions of media credibility.  
1.6.3. Theories for links in triangular trust  
 
Selection of appropriate theories for assessing social trust (particularized trust and 
generalized trust), institutional trust and public perceptions of media credibility is 
difficult.  This is because, as Hwang and Park observed, some theories have not been 
conceptually developed or empirically tested in the field (Hwang and Park, 2006).  
1.6.3.1. Social and cultural theory 
The social and cultural theory suggests that the ability to trust others and sustain 
cooperative relations is the product of social experiences and socialization, especially 
through involvement in voluntary associations and activities (Newton and Norris, 2000). 
The concept, as it relates to social interaction, networks and trust, is very old and has 
existed ever since human beings started interacting with each other (Platteau, 1994; 
Woolcock, 1998). Brewer, for instance, observes that Greek philosophers like Aristotle 
mentioned similar concepts in their analysis of civic society and social networks (Brewer, 
2003). They also have deep and widespread roots in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
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centuries in the works of classic sociological, political and economic thinkers such as 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Mill, Toennies, Durkheim, Weber, Locke and Rousseau and 
Simmel (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Putnam, 1995; Brewer, 2003).  
 
The modern notion of social and cultural theory dates back to the late twentieth century 
and the works of Pierre Bourdieu (1979), James Coleman (1988) and Putnam (Putnam et. 
al. 1993, 1995, 2000). Putnam popularized the concept of social capital further by 
emphasizing the significance of association, civic community and trust in societies 
(Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Putnam, 1995; Putnam, 2000). He, further, 
emphasised the importance of social interactions and participation in voluntary 
organizations which play a key role in the creation and maintenance of trust (Putnam et 
al. 1993; Putnam, 1995). Individuals learn to trust through socialization. The theory 
suggests that trust develops ‘from the bottom up’.  
 
Putnam’s core thinking was that social contexts and history are crucial to the existence 
and effectiveness of institutions and civic associations and to the generation of high 
levels of social trust.  He, specifically, argued that “[t]rust is an essential component of 
social capital” (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993: 170). He added that the success of 
an institution is dependent on the character of citizens and the degree of their “civic 
virtue”. In this regard, Putnam emphasises the “virtuous circles” of components of social 
capital, i.e. trust, norms and networks (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:177).  
According to him, these are self-reinforcing and have cumulative effects. The “virtuous 
circles” result in high levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civic engagement and 
collective well-being. In the civic community, associations proliferate, membership 
overlaps, trustworthiness and confidence abound and participation spills over into 
multiple arenas of community life. Specifically: 
Norms of generalized reciprocity and networks of civic engagement 
encourage social trust and cooperation because they reduce incentives to 
defect, reduce uncertainty, and provide models for future cooperation. 
Trust itself is an emergent property of social systems, as much as a 
personal attribute (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:177). 
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Putnam stresses the role of norms, generalized reciprocity and networks of civic 
engagement as the main factors which create and maintain trust as social capital. 
Voluntary associations and social interaction are the most prominent sources of social 
trust. In areas where groups and associations are common, they help to develop 
cooperative values and a high degree of trusting interaction among people. As Rothstein 
states, “Putnam’s explanation is that participation in voluntary associations produces 
social capital through which civil transactions can be based upon trust in other people in 
the society, i.e., that people have the courage to cooperate because they trust that others 
are also going to cooperate” (2005:48). Following Putnam’s interpretation of social 
capital, Fattore, Turbull and Wilson observed that:  
social capital is the community’s stock of civic hardware – including groups, 
associations, and opportunities to participate and learn – that leads us to trust 
others and institutions, to take risks, and to develop (2003:166).  
At the community level, the boundaries of trust become more diffuse and abstract. Trust 
between neighbours and friends (particularized trust) and members of associations 
eventually extends to become trust between strangers (generalized trust). This leads 
ultimately to trust between and among those involved in the broad fabric of social and 
political institutions. Trust becomes “a shared set of values, virtues, and expectations 
within society as a whole”. Without this interaction “trust decays; at a certain point, this 
decay begins to manifest itself in serious social problems” (Smith, 2007:1-2). 
 
According to the social and cultural theory, there is a direct and mutually reinforcing 
relationship between trust in fellow citizens and confidence in social institutions and 
government organizations, and people who possess one of either are likely to have the 
other. For example, people who express confidence in public institutions are likely to 
engage in voluntary associations. Trust or mistrust is reflected not only in the behaviour 
of citizens but also in government organizations and other public and private institutions 
(Yang and Holzer, 2006:119). Newton and Norris (2000) show that there is a correlation 
between the decline of social trust and trust in government organizations, religious 
institutions and commercial firms.  
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One of the criticisms of Putman’s theory focuses on types of trust in society (Hardin, 
1999; Narayan and Cassidy, 2001; Farrell and Knight, 2003; Fattore, Turnbull and 
Wilson, 2003). These emphasize the need to distinguish between particularized trust and 
generalized trust, social trust (trust in individuals, personal friends, neighbours, strangers 
or fellow citizens) and trust in institutions. Putnam used social trust without distinction 
for all kinds of trust. 
 
The second criticism relates to the limitations of measurement indices of social trust and 
trust in government organizations. Putnam failed to distinguish between types of social 
trust and used a single question/yardstick to assess trust in neighbours, strangers, and 
citizens (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993). Fattore, Turnbull and Wilson suggest 
three types of trust: trust in neighbours, trust in other people generally, and trust in 
government (2003:168). They use a measure of civic association as one of independent 
variables to predict trust across the three measures of trust. On his part, Lukatela 
compares the relationship between social trust, membership of voluntary organizations 
and political participation in Western and Eastern Europe (2007). His study showed the 
existence of relationships between trust and civic participation in voluntary organizations 
(2007: 12).  
 
The other criticism relates to the measurement of generalized trust in multi-ethnic and 
multi-cultural societies (Delhey and Newton, 2002; Rothstein, 2005). The argument is 
that generalized trust measurements can apply to western countries since the ‘winners’ or 
‘haves’ in society express a high degree of trust in their fellow-citizens, while the ‘losers’ 
or ‘have-nots’ in society are low trusters. Delhey and Newton question the applicability 
of generalized trust for an ethnically and culturally-diverse society. Another major 
criticism concerns the role of voluntary associations as the most prominent source of 
social trust leading to political trust (Norris and Newton, 2000; Rothstein and Stolle, 200; 
Delhey and Newton, 2002; Rothstein, 2005). In my thesis, I have used some elements of 
this discourse to interrogate the relationship between social trust and engagement of 
people in voluntary organizations and associations.  
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1.6.3.2. Institutional performance theory  
The second theoretical approach that I employed is the institutional performance theory. 
Institutional performance theory is in opposition to the social and cultural theory. The 
theory was advanced by Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris (2000), Bo Rothstein and 
Dietlind Stolle (2001), Delhey and Newton (2005) and Bo Rothstein and Eric Uslaner 
(2006). It focuses on the notion that: 
Government institutions that perform well are likely to elicit the confidence of 
citizens; those that perform badly or ineffectively generate feelings of distrust and 
low confidence (Newton and Norris, 2000: 7).  
The theory recognizes that the reaction of the public depends on whether institutions are 
perceived as performing well or poorly. The performance of institutions serves as an 
important foundation for the building and maintenance of institutional trust and enables 
social trust, especially generalized trust, to develop (Rothstein and Stolle, 2001:3). This 
theory emphasizes the importance of quality institutional setups for generating 
opportunities for trust and voluntary organizations. Political institutions are likely to 
appear first and this encourages social trust and engagement, as well as participation in 
voluntary organizations. The institutional performance theory suggests that trust appears 
‘from the top-down’, rather than from bottom up, which is the assumption of the social 
and cultural theory.  
 
Not all institutions and organizations are expected to produce the desired trust. According 
to Rothstein (2005), institutions are classified into universal institutions and 
particularized institutions. The former are expected to serve the public interest, while the 
latter are expected to promote the interests of certain groups or individuals (Lewin, 1991, 
Rothstein, 2005). The institutional performance theory advocates the development of 
universal institutions which promote the principles of equality and fairness. Due to the 
influence of political institutions on the interaction between individuals and society, 
political institutions play significant roles in the fostering of social trust. Rothstein and 
Stolle (2001:7) advance the idea that the experience of impartial, just social and political 
institutions is responsible for the implementation of public policies and laws, including 
the development of generalized trust. Rothstein and Stolle (2001) argue that people’s 
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perceptions that political institutions are fair and effective are critical determinants of 
social trust. They further suggest that citizens who have directly or indirectly experienced 
institutional unfairness and dishonesty transfer these experiences and views to other 
people in general. Good government has the potential to create favorable conditions for 
social trust. 
 
However, reliable indicators are required for the measurement of the performance of 
institutions vis-à-vis the gaining of citizens’ trust (Watson, 2004; Yang and Holzer, 2006: 
217). Public trust in government organizations, social institutions and political 
organizations, as well as media credibility, are based on perceptions of society of the 
performance of these organizations. The performance of organizations is the determinant 
factor when it comes to public trust or distrust (Bouckaert et al., 2002; Yang and Holzer, 
2006). There are a number of approaches to assessing the performance-trust link, 
especially in the case of citizens’ trust in government organizations (Bouckaert et al 
2002; Watson, 2004). One of the approaches is the public relations approach which refers 
to three dimensions of trust, i.e. integrity (justice and honesty, care for the public 
interest), dependability (dedication to duty) and efficiency (Grunig and Hon, 1999: 3). 
Because of its applicability to all types of organizations, I used this approach to assess the 
trust and confidence the public has in the performance of organizations and institutions. 
Further, I used both social and cultural theory and institutional performance theory to test 
the correlation between the three dimensions of trust or mistrust, i.e. social trust, trust in 
government organizations (political trust) and public confidence in the media. In 
assessing social trust (particularized trust and generalized trust) and the propensity of 
individuals to voluntarily engage in civic associations, I used the social and cultural 
theory.  Conversely, in assessing the association between social trust and political trust, 
as well as media credibility, I used the institutional performance theory. 
 
1.7 Scope and significance of the study  
 
The scope of the study is limited to the investigation of links of between and among 
social trust, political trust and media credibility with respect to media access, exposure 
and usage within socio-demographic factors in the selected areas of Ethiopia. The study 
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includes an assessment of news media credibility (radio, television and newspapers) and 
does not include online media as these would require different analytical approaches.  
Evidence shows that there have been no studies of media credibility in Ethiopia and, 
therefore, my study presents an opportunity to appreciate the importance of credibility in 
relation to the public’s trust in the performance of the media. It also provides media 
practitioners and managers the opportunity for self-interrogation with respect to the 
manner in which they publish news and information and how they relate to the public. It 
is, further, expected that media professionals, broadcasters and publishers will use 
findings of the study to have a clear sense of what the public expects from them and, 
eventually, be able to undertake proactive measures to recalibrate their reporting of news 
and information in tandem with the needs of the public.  
 
In addition, it is expected that the Government of Ethiopia will use findings of this study 
to appreciate the role that the media play not only in informing, educating and 
entertaining citizens but also in ventilating society with information regarding 
government socio-economic development plans, policies, programmes and strategies. 
The Government should further use the study findings to inform and guide policy-making 
with a view to removing exiting impediments to media operations. This is critically 
important since the media is the fourth estate and is inexorably part of the socio-
economic fabric of the nation.  
 
On a broader scale, the findings are expected to assist institutions as schools, colleges and 
universities, to recalibrate their journalism and communications curricula with a view to 
making them relevant to the needs of the public. At research level, the findings have the 
potential to spur improved interest in building bodies of evidence-based knowledge with 
respect to operations of the media and how it relates to the public. Public relations 
officers and advertising practitioners may also benefit from the study in terms of, among 
others, retuning their messages in tandem with what the public expects from their 
institutions.  Lastly, civil society organisations may use findings of the study in their 
advocacy programmes, especially in their use of the media in engaging and leveraging 
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government policy agenda on one hand, and getting their messages to the public on the 
other.   
1.8 Organizational structure of the study/Outline of chapters 
 
The thesis has eight chapters. Chapter one deals with the background to the study, 
rationale of the study, research questions and objectives, conceptual framework of the 
study and the scope and significance of the study. Methodological approaches and data 
collection and analysis methods are presented in Chapter two. Chapter three discusses 
conceptual and theoretical frameworks regarding media access and usage, relations 
between and among social trust, political trust and mass media credibility. Chapter four 
deals with data collection on the composition of respondents’ socio-demographic factors. 
Chapter five analyses media access, exposure and consumption patterns in the social 
context. Chapter six discusses public perceptions of media credibility within selected 
demographic variables. Chapter seven explores relationships between and among social 
trust, political trust and media credibility. Conclusions and recommendations are 
presented in Chapter eight, while tables, figures, references and other relevant Annexures 
are included as appendices.   
1.9 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I briefly discussed the background to the study, rationale of the study, 
research questions and objectives, conceptual framework of the study and the scope and 
significance of the study. Next is chapter two. In chapter two, I describe study 
methodology methodological paradigms/approaches with respect to the study questions, 
subjects of the study, research sites, data collection instruments and data analysis 
techniques, including the main challenges that I have encountered during the course of 
the study.  
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY AND METHODS OF THE STUDY 
 
The dialogue between an official and ordinary person 
Official: “Is there a problem in your region?” 
Ordinary person: “Yes, there is a problem, but there is also another problem to express 
the problem itself” (Anonymous)  
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I shall outline the research methodology and methods of my thesis. The 
thesis as a whole deals with the perceptions of the public towards government, civic and 
social institutions, including the credibility of mass media, in Ethiopia. My research will 
interrogate public confidence on the media, and how this relates to government 
institutions and civic society, as well as the impact of public confidence on media 
consumption patterns in four regions of the country.  
 
My research methodology draws from the objectives, the research questions and the 
theoretical frameworks of my thesis as well as the notion of metatheories of social 
science research vis-à-vis methodological paradigms. The main objective of the study is 
to explore the correlation of the social trust, government organizations trust; and trust in 
civil society, including the issue of media credibility in the Ethiopian context.  
 
The main research questions of my study are: (1) how social trust, political trust and 
media credibility in Ethiopia are entwined in reciprocal interrelationships and 
dependencies with each other? How media credibility is divorced from social trust and 
institutional confidence? (2) Does the perception of the public on these areas of trust and 
media credibility affect the human-media interaction in using media for different 
purposes? (3) Are the audiences likely to stop watching, listening to or reading the media 
that they perceive lacks credibility and trust? What is the correlation of perception of 
media credibility vis-à-vis media use? 
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The theoretical framework of my study includes uses and gratifications theory especially 
the integrated model of audience choice for media consumption and media credibility, 
social and cultural theory for the relationship of social trust with other trusts, and 
institutional performance theory for organizational confidence. The notion and the 
dialogue of the metatheories of the social science (positivism, phenomenology, critical 
theory, post-modernist) vis-à-vis methodological paradigms (the quantitative, qualitative, 
the participatory action approaches, ethnography) is another assumption for the research 
methodology. This chapter focuses on methodological paradigms/approaches of the study 
to address the research problem, the subjects of the study, the research sites, the data 
collection instruments and methods, and data analysis techniques. In the last section of 
the chapter, I will explain main challenges that I have encountered related to research 
methodology and some research pre-planning activities. 
2.2 Methodological paradigms 
 
In the realm of research methodological paradigms or methodological approaches, there 
are three broad categories: the quantitative, qualitative, and the participatory action 
paradigms (Babbie & Mouton, 2008: 49). I will use both the quantitative and qualitative 
research approaches for analyzing and examining the public perceptions of media 
credibility, social trust and institutional confidence. I will combine quantitative and 
qualitative approaches in order to provide a wide and detailed perspective to my 
investigation and findings of my study. I will use ‘QUAN + qual’ typology as illustrated 
by Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) the idea of multimethod approaches. Accordingly, I 
will use both approaches, but as the typology indicates the upper case “quan” refers the 
higher priority of the quantitative orientation and lower case “qual” indicates that the 
qualitative approach has lower priority (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003).  
 
Quantitative research emphasizes on the quantification of topics or issues. The 
quantitative approach is a way of measuring the variables phenomena through 
quantitative measurement (Babbie & Mouton, 2008: 49).  “Quantitative research is aimed 
at gathering relatively large amount of data from a large amount of units by an 
observation instruments that is used in the same way on all unites” (Bulck, 2002: 78). It is 
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aimed at determining the magnitude and frequency of the relationships between variables. 
“The goal of quantitative research is to describe the trends or explain the relationships 
between the variables” (Ivankova, Creswell & Clark, 2007: 255).   
 
The main advantage of the quantitative research in the ideal of quantification and the use 
of statistics is that the responses on beliefs, attitudes and values can be measured in a 
standard way. However, some of the features of quantitative research, for instance, the 
view of objectivity, deductiveness, generalisability, value-neutral and quantifying 
approach to social and behavioral phenomena, are the centre of criticisms (Babbie & 
Mouton, 2008).  
  
In cognizance of the limitations and strengths of each paradigm, the debates about the 
virtues of one research approach over the other and the importance to add depth on the 
research findings, I incorporate a qualitative research approach to my study. I have used 
the quantitative approach as the main approach of my study because as it is clearly 
observed in the structure model of the triangular of trust or mistrust, the determinants of 
the relationships of social trust, institutional confidence and media consumption and 
credibility need more figures than facts.   
 
Qualitative research approach is an inquiry process of understanding the views of 
informants through conducting the study in a natural setting (Creswell, 2007). The goal 
of the research is to explore and understand the central phenomenon of the study topic. 
The approach provides the researcher an opportunity to stay close to the research subject 
“Qualitative researchers attempt always to study human action from the insiders’ 
perspective (also referred to as the ‘emic’ perspective)” (Babbie & Mouton, 2008: 53).  
 
The need for using both these approaches is very important. As Frey and his colleagues 
point out “quantitative evaluations provide a high level of measurement perception and 
statistical power, while qualitative observations provide greater depth of information 
about how people perceive events in the context of actual situation in which they occur” 
(Frey et al. 1991:99). Similarly, Schrøder and others propose that questions-based 
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quantitative methods should be used to investigate more factual aspects of 
communicative behavior while interview-based qualitative methods should be used to 
explore more complex cultural meanings and to understand the information (Schrøder et 
al. 2003:31). 
 
In the quantitative approach, I will apply survey methods to map out and analyze the 
attitude of both the elite and the general population in the selected regions. Surveying is a 
worthy method for collecting and measuring attitudes of a large number of populations. 
According to Babbi and Mouton: “Survey research is probably the best method to the 
social scientist interested in collecting original data for describing a population too large 
to observe directly” (2008: 232). Scale and scope, the dominant methodological tools in 
the survey (Schrøder et al, 2003), will be used appropriately. In the qualitative approach, 
I will use in-depth interview to explore the perceptions of the individuals. 
2.3 Coverage and Sampling 
The study focuses on the perceptions of general public and various occupation groups of 
the society on media credibility, social and political trusts. The study will be conducted in 
urban and rural areas of Ethiopia. It will cover three regional states and the Addis Ababa 
city administration. The three regions are Amahara, Oromia and Tigray. These regions 
have been selected for two reasons. The first one is ethnic dominance. Though Ethiopia's 
population is highly diverse with more than 80 different ethnics groups, the ethnic groups 
of the three regions, Oromia (36.7 per cent), Amhara (23.3 per cent) and Tigray (5.8 per 
cent) and the ethnic makeup is more than two-thirds of the total population (FDRE/PCC, 
2008). The second reason is media language. Most of the national media outlets use the 
three local languages. International broadcasting stations such as Voice of America 
broadcasts using these three languages. The role of these major ethnic groups in the 
political situation of the country is another reason for the selection.  
2.3.1 Research sites 
One of the requirements of the research processes to select the research sites that are 
representative, suitable and feasible (McMillan & Schumacher, 2001). The selection 
practice considers the administrative regions of Ethiopia for sampling survey. Since 
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1995, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) has been divided into nine 
regional states and two city Administrations (the city administration of Addis Ababa and 
Dire Dawa) (FDRE, 1995). The Constitution of FDRE assumes a 5-tier structure: federal, 
regional, Zone (province), Wereda (district) and Kebele. The country is divided into 
regions, the regions into zones, and the zones into Weredas. The Weredas are divided 
into Kebeles. A Woreda may consist of 7 to 22 Kebeles. The Kebele is the lowest 
administrative unit of the country. The Kebele consists of a large number of households 
in rural and urban areas. The main function of the Kebeles is to co-ordinate political, 
social and economic activities at grass-root level. 
Figure 2.1: Research sites at Wereda level  
 
Source: The research sites were pin pointed using scribblemaps.com.  
 
I used a stratified multistage cluster sample to select the research sites from the four 
regions especially for the general public sampling procedure. “Stratified sampling is used 
to address the problem of non-homogenous populations in the sense that it attempts to 
represent the population much better than can be done with simple random sampling” 
(Maree & Pietersen, 2007:175). In the first stage, I focused on selecting one zone from 
each region. Amhara region has 12 zones (three especial zones), Oromia has 20 zones 
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(three especial zones) and Tegray has 6 zones (one especial zone), while Addis Ababa 
has 10 sub-cities. I excluded especial zones and the zones in which I undertook pre-
testing from the list. I used to draw lots to select one zone from each regional state and a 
sub-city from Addis Ababa. Accordingly, I selected South Gondar, Illu Aba Bora, North 
Western Tigray and Kolfe-Keraniyo sub-city from Amhara, Oromia, Tigray and Addis 
Ababa respectively (see table 2.1). In the second stage, I used the multistage stratified 
sample to select two Weredas including the city of the respective zones, from each of the 
zones chosen in the first stage. In considering distance and safety issues, I picked Tachi 
Gayint and Debre Tabor from 11 Weredas of South Gonder, Uka and Metu from 22 
Weredas of Illu Aba Bora and Asgede Tsimbla and Shire Endasilasie from 8 Weredas of 
North Western Tigray. Since the Weredas are not manageable to conduct the survey, I 
applied the third stage of the stratified sampling techniques to select urban and rural 
Kebeles of the selected Weredas. I used simple random sampling to select one urban and 
two rural Kebeles from each selected Wereda. I numbered sequentially on the list of 
urban and rural Kebeles separately and drew a lot out of them. Regarding urban area, 
Kebele 01 and Kebele 03 were selected from Tachi Gayint and Debre Tabor Weredas 
respectively. Kebele 01 and Kebele 03 were selected from the Kebeles of Uka and Metu 
Weredas respectively. Kebele 02 was selected from Asgede Tsimbla while Kebele 04/05 
from Shire Endasilasie. Similarly, Kebele 12 (Kolfie) was selected from 12 Kebeles of 
Kolfie-Keraniyo Sub-city (see Figure 2.1).  
 
Regarding rural Kebeles, I selected two rural Kebeles from each Wereda. Accordingly, I 
selected Agat’ and Žaž from 12 Kebeles of Tach Gayint; Abiyu Kidanemihret and Lemu 
from 11 Kebeles of Halu; and Birhan and Miysewhi from 9 Kebeles of Asgide Tsembila. 
A total of 13 Kebeles, seven urban Kebeles and six rural Kebeles, were selected as 
research sites.  
 
Though Kebeles are the lowest administrative, they are not convenient to manage the 
sampling at this level. Fortunately, Kebele is subdivided into Sefer or Qetana (Village). 
Each Kebele incorporates between 8 and 15 villages. I used stage four to select 3 to 8 
villages from each chosen urban and rural Kebeles in order to get sufficiently small areas 
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for the purposes of the study (see for details table 2.1). In the selection process of 
villages, the stratification of locations into affluent, middle class and slum areas were 
given due attention. The villages were grouped into three categories and one to three 
villages, dependences on the size and population of the villages, were randomly selected 
for each category.   
 
Accordingly, I selected a total of 59 centers from 13 research sites. In accordance with 
the size of the center, one to three interviewers were assigned to fill questionnaire from 8 
to 10 persons per head from among residents who were above 18 years old at the time of 
the survey. The respondents were randomly selected in a convenient sample from the 
residents who were available and willing to participate in the study.  
2.3.2 Professional and occupational sampling  
 
The representative survey is focused the collection of information from experts and elites 
who were engaged in various departments. Regarding the professional and occupational 
groups sampling procedure, the selection was conducted at Zone and Wereda levels. This 
is also based on the structural framework of the regional administration of the country. 
The Zone and Wereda are key local administrative units in the regional government 
structure. There are a number of departments and offices corresponding to executive and 
judiciary bodies to the federal and regional levels. I have prepared a list of organizations 
and civic societies for this purpose (see Annexure 2.1: A list of organizations and 
institutions). About 28 government organizations, 10 private organizations, 10 civic 
societies/associations, 5 religious organizations were involved at zone and Wereda levels. 
Moreover, 21 political organizations were involved in the survey in Addis Ababa because 
other political organizations except the ruling party were not available in the other three 
regional states. Professional and occupational groups who were working in government 
institutions, non-governmental organizations and in civic societies were 
purposively/randomly selected from their respective institutions. Between one and five 
persons were requested to fill the questionnaires. These professionals included, teachers, 
lawyers, health workers, member of parliaments, trade unions, economists, finance 
officers, business persons, police, clergy men/priests and Sheiks, inter alias. 
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Table 2.1: Selected research sites 
 
Region Zone/sub-city Wereda Research sites Village 
Urban  Semi-urban Rural 
Addis Ababa Kolfie-Keraniyo  Kebele 12 (Kolife)   Paris Sefer, 05 Sefer, 07 sefer 
Amhara South Gondar Debre Tabor Debre Tabor, 
Kebele 03 
  Ketena 3, Ketena 4, Ketena  6 
  Tach Gayint  Arb Gebeya, 
Kebele 01 
 Ketena 4 & 5, Ketena 2 & 6, Ketena 
1 & 3 
     Agat Mega, Amaaga, Fasilo, Mena Mesk, 
Azagi, Azane, Amrach. 
     Žaž  Kefo, Weyira, Doro Wenz, Amja, 
Kulkual, Amba Ras, Shelate, Gut 
Orommia Ilu Aba Bora Metu Metu, Kebele 03   Gemechisa, Lelistu, Bontu, Gudina 
  Halu  Uka, Kebele 01  Halu Ber, Bure Ber, Gore Ber, Center 
town 
  Halu   Abiyu 
Kidan 
Mehiret  
Indarigonbo, Mamo, Yebelew, 
Cherake 
     Lemen Goji, Loko, Negre Mechi, Shembe, 
Meka, Sebi, Elike 
Tigray North Western 
Tigray 
Shire 
Endaselasie 
Shire, Kebele 04/05 
Kebele 04 
  Mender 2, Mender 1 & 3, Mender 4 
   Kebele 05   Mender 1, Mender 2 & 4, Mender 3 
  Asigede 
Tsimbela 
 Inda Aba Guna, 
Kebele 02 
 Ketena 1, Ketena 2, Ketena 3 
     Birhan Simret, Betemariam, Adabezza, 
Adikolay 
     Maysewihi Markos, Adi Degol, Adi Goa 
Source: Extrapolated from collected data3 
                                                          
3 All the tables in this thesis are extrapolated from collected data and information. 
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Besides, aimed specifically at the ‘elite’ stratum, mass media practitioners, all the 
newspapers, broadcast stations (television and radio) and news agencies  were included in the 
study (see Annexure 2.2: A list of media outlets). Amongst these media practitioners were: 
chief-editors, programme directors and producers, and reporters. They were selected 
randomly from their respective organizations. Between one and five persons were requested 
to fill the questionnaires. 
2.3.3 Population sample size 
Accordingly, a total population sample of 2200, 550 from each region, was targeted for the 
survey. The sample size is based on technical and mathematical orientations. On the technical 
aspect time and cost are considered as factors. In terms of mathematical frame, the population 
size of each region, the confidence interval and confidence level are given due consideration. 
(I use a confidence interval of +/- 4 and a confidence level of 95 %).  
2.4 Data collection instruments  
Based on my methodological approaches, the major instruments that are used in this study 
were questionnaires and a structured interview.  
2.4.1 Questionnaire  
Questionnaires provide a method of collecting data from large populations. The questionnaire 
is designed for the general public and occupational groups to measure respondents' 
perceptions and attitudes. Since the research incorporates matters on media consumption, 
media credibility, social trust, institutional confidence, I have not found a typical 
questionnaire that can be applied for my study. However, the reports of the media credibility 
surveys of the American Society of Newspapers Editors 
(http://www.asne.org/credibilityhandbook/detailsmatter.htm) and the Pew Research Center 
(2006) (http://people-press.org/methodology/questionnaire/) were used as references 
especially for methodological approach and designing a questionnaire. Though Ethiopia has 
not conducted the value survey, the World Value Survey (2005) 
(http://www.worldvaluessurvey.com/statistics/index.html) methodology and questionnaire 
will be assessed for the same purposes.  
 
As Pew Research Center (2006) asserts that one of the most important parts of the survey 
process is designing of questionnaire and creation of questions that can accurately measure 
the opinions, experiences and behaviors of the target public. The questionnaire was mainly 
designed on the type of data that would be generated by the questions and the statistical 
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techniques that would be used to analyze the data (see Annexure 2.3: Questionnaire). 
Moreover, the guidelines for designing of a questionnaire including appearance of 
questionnaire, question sequence, wording of questions, types of questions, response 
categories and using scales were given emphasis (Maree & Pietersen, 2007: 154-170; Babbie 
& Mouton, 2008: 229-268).  
 
Besides, the designing of the questionnaire depends on the nature of my study. In this study I 
used social and cultural theory, institutional performance theory and uses and gratifications 
theory, especially the integrated model of audience choice to test the correlation between the 
three dimensions of trust or mistrust: social trust, trust in government (political trust or 
institutional trust), and public confidence in news media (see Figure 3.5). In terms of social 
trust, personal trust in neighbours and trust in the general public, together with the propensity 
of individuals voluntarily to engage in civic associations were assessed. For this purpose I 
used social and cultural theory to assess the correlation between voluntary organizations and 
social trust, and between voluntary organizations and institutional trust, as well as the 
correlation between social trust and institutional trust.  
 
Membership and activity in civic organizations and associations were used as a dependent 
variable to assess the correlation between trust and civic associations. My survey 
incorporated questions about membership of different types of civic and voluntary 
organizations (for details see Annexure 2.4: Variables and questions for trust and confidence 
in the analysis). For each organization and association, three categories were used: “active 
member” – “inactive member” and “don’t belong” – to predict the extent of participants’ 
involvement (World Value Survey, 2005).  
 
I used institutional performance theory to assess public confidence in government 
organizations and social institutions. Institutional confidence, in the World Values Survey, is 
generally measured on a four point scale using the following question: “Please tell me, for 
each item, how much confidence you have in …. Is it a great deal (4), quite a lot (3), not very 
much (2) or none at all (1)?”  The satisfaction with the government was also incorporated in 
the variables (see Annexure 2.4) 
 
For public perceptions of media credibility and their media consumption patterns, I applied 
uses and gratifications theory especially the integrated model of audience choice. I used the 
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typology of uses and gratifications (information, personal identity, integration and social 
interaction and entertainment) as dependent variables for media consumption (see Annexure 
3.1: Typology of media uses and gratifications) and 10 ethical dimensions of media for media 
credibility for assessing the correlation of themselves and the link between social trust and 
institutional trust (see Figure 3.5).  
 
In addition, the following socio-demographic factors were used as independent variables for 
social trust; institutional trust, media credibility and media consumption in order to assess the 
degree of correlation. These were: gender, ethnicity, education, religion, income and political 
affiliation. 
 
Accordingly, the questionnaire had five sections. The first section included background 
information of the respondents. Socio-economic and demographic factors were incorporated 
in this part. Some of these factors are applied as independent variables to analyze media 
exposure and consumption, media credibility, social trust and institutional trust. Section two 
dealt with media exposure and consumption patterns of the respondents. This section 
included several questions about respondents’ access and exposure to the mass media 
including radio, television, newspapers and Internet. Section three of the questionnaire 
focused on the perception of the public on media credibility. Section four contained questions 
related to social and institutional trust. The last section comprised general statements on mass 
media credibility and institutional trust in the arena of the Ethiopian context. The respondents 
were asked how much they either agree or disagree with each statement (see Annexure 2.3: 
Questionnaire for “‘Triangular trust or mistrust’?: Public perception on media credibility in 
Ethiopia”). By studying other similar questionnaires, I designed the questionnaire for the 
survey. I submitted it to faculty members and class mates for criticism. I incorporated the 
feedbacks and comments. The English version of the questionnaire was translated into three 
local languages as explained in section 2.8.1 of this chapter. 
2.4.2 In-depth interview 
I used in-depth interviews to collect detail information about the ideas and beliefs of the 
respondents on the relationships of media consumption, social trust and institutional 
confidence. The aim of the interview is to obtain rich descriptive data that helps for the 
researcher to understand the respondent’s construction of social reality (Nieuwenhuis, 
2007:87). It is a means to understand and discover the construction process of meaning of a 
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certain topic or phenomenon to individuals. The process of conversation between the 
researcher and the respondents brings out the way in which the respondent’s opinion or 
believe came into being, rather than the researcher’s opinion. “An in-depth interview is a 
process where the researcher is not at all that interested in the content of the conversation, but 
rather in the process by which the content of the conversation has come into being” (Babbie 
& Mouton, 2008: 291).  
 
I planned to conduct 52 in-depth interviews from 13 selected research sites (see Annexure 2.5 
list of the interviewees). I have managed to conduct 45 interviews with elites and ordinary 
people in the selected target areas randomly on voluntary basis. The interviews were held in a 
respondent’s home or office or on open air. The interviews were recorded and transcribed in 
their respective languages. It is envisaged that the interviews provide in-depth understandings 
of the research questions vis-à-vis survey results. The working questions and tactical 
questions were designed to conduct interviews with the respondents (see Annexure 2.6: In-
depth interview guide for general public). The interviews were mainly focused on the 
respondents’/interviewees’ media exposure and consumption pattern, their perceptions and 
attitudes on social trust, media credibility, and institutional confidence. The checklist was 
designed and employed for the purpose of recording facts obtained through observations and 
discussions. 
2.5 Data collection methods  
 
I used face-to-face encounter and self-administered methods for administering the survey 
questionnaire and semi-structured methods for in-depth interview in order to collect data 
information from the targeted population. 
2.5.1 Face-to-face encounter and self-administered methods 
I used face-to-face encounter and self-administered methods of administering the survey 
questionnaire. I employed self-administered method for elite groups of the society. The 
respondents were asked to complete the questionnaire for themselves on the spot, in their 
residence or working places within two to three days. The questionnaires were dropped off 
and collected in batches at the institutions and organizations. Self-administered encounters 
are more effective for sensitive issues like media credibility and confidence in government 
than face-to-face interviews. It gives respondents an opportunity to answer the questions 
without interviewer’s reactivity effect. As Stephen Gorard (2003) suggests, self-administered 
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questionnaires can help create an atmosphere trust, and therefore lead perhaps to more 
truthful answers.  
 
In low level of literacy society, face to-face interviews are the most common method of data 
collection (Babbie & Mouton, 2008). I utilized face-to face interviews for the general public 
in urban and rural research sites. I assigned interviewers to ask the questions orally and 
record respondent’s answer. The interviewers went from house to house to interview 
residents of the selected study villages.  
 
Accordingly, I intended to distribute 200 questionnaires in rural sites, 175 questionnaires in 
urban sites and 175 questionnaires for the elite groups of Zone and Wereda levels of the three 
regional states. Though Addis Ababa has no rural sites, I planned to allocate 200 for Kebele 
residents and 350 for elite groups including political organizations and news media outlets. 
The survey was conducted between December 26, 2007 and February 16, 2008. 
  
Regarding responses rate, I have managed to collect a total of 1816 (82.54 per cent) 
questionnaires from four regions.  In terms of the modes of data collection, off the 1325 
questionnaires that were planned to be filled through face-to-face encounter, 1157 
questionnaires (87.47 per cent) were collected. About 166 questionnaires were discarded 
because the respondents interrupted the questionnaires by filling a few part of the 
questionnaires. Regarding self-administered, off the total of 875 questionnaires 598 
questionnaires (68.34 per cent) were collected from the elite groups. Though I and the 
research team insisted frequently the persons who received the questionnaires to fill and 
return to us, as the literature reveals the response rate of   self-administered was lower than 
face-to-face encounter (see table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2: Response rate of the survey 
 
Regions Urban and semi-urban 
Kebeles 
Rural Kebeles Elite groups Total  
 Distributed Collected Distributed Collected Distributed Collected Distributed Collected 
Addis 
Ababa 
200 187 - - 350 237 550 424 
Tigray 175 132 200 197 175 120 550 449 
Oromia 175 163 200 174 175 143 550 480 
Amhara 175 158 200 176 175 129 550 463 
         
Total 725 612 600 547 875 598 2200 1816 
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2.5.2 Semi-structured interview 
 
Forty-five in-depth interviews were conducted in the selected research sites. The interviews 
were conducted in face-to-face interactive. I conducted the interview with the people who 
speak Amharic and I selected two interviewers to conduct the interviews in Oromiffa and 
Tigregna. The ability to speak the respondent’s language, Oromiffa or Tigrigna, and the 
ability to conduct semi-structured interviews was used among other criteria for selection of 
the two interviewers. The interviews were held at the respondent’s house, office or on open 
space under the shade of the tree. The interview’s background information such as age, 
gender, occupation and marital status was registered. All the in-depth interviews were 
recorded, transcribed and translated into English.  
2.6 Data analysis 
 
For my data analysis, I collected both numeric information (survey questionnaires) and text 
information (in-depth interviews). I used computer assisted data analysis to capture and code 
data guided by my research questions. My study focused on the relationships between social 
trust and institutional trust, including media credibility, as well as the directional flow of 
these relationships. The following questions and related variables are significant in data 
analysis. Does media consumption pattern link with the perception of media credibility?  Is 
the level of public confidence in institutions similar to social trust? Does social trust foster 
political trust, or is the converse true? Can trustworthy governments promote social trust and 
create trustworthy and dynamic media and civic communities? Is social trust and political 
trust likely to co-exist (see Annexure 2.3: Variables and questions for trust and confidence in 
the analysis)? 
 
Regarding the quantitative data, I conducted the analysis using Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS). In order to analyse the association of variables, I analysed 
descriptive assessment on cross tabulations of the independent and dependent variables.  
After the coding procedure, the data capturing operation was carried out using four data 
encoders. Data entry operation took about 60 days using one computer. Regarding the 
qualitative data, I organized and categorized the data into topics and subtopics identified by 
the researcher. 
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As approaching the mixed methodology, I analyzed and mixed the quantitative and 
qualitative findings of my study. Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) introduce four basic mixed 
methods design: the explanatory design, the exploratory design, the triangulation design and 
the embedded design. Of these methods, I used the explanatory design to explain in detail the 
general picture of the research problem. The purpose of the explanatory design is to use the 
qualitative findings for clarifying the qualitative results (Ivankova, Creswell & Plano Clark, 
2007).  
 
   
2.7 Challenges  
 
I have encountered two major challenges in relation with research methods and techniques.  
2.7.1 Conducting survey in four regions in three local languages 
 
It was a big challenge to conduct a general and representative survey in four regions of 
Ethiopia in three local languages. The survey requires series tasks, procedures, techniques, 
sampling population size and research sites, designing of data gathering instruments and 
methods, administrating data collection instruments, handling of data coding, capturing and 
analyzing data and managing human and financial resources. It also required the involvement 
of a ‘research’ team including translators, supervisors, interviewers, data encoders and 
facilitators. All these issues have directly or indirectly impact on the quality and validity of 
data processing and on the collected data itself. For instance, it was not simple to get 
knowledgeable, capable and committed interviewers who speak the local language. As it was 
Quan data 
collection & 
analysis 
Qual data 
collection & 
analysis 
Quan → Qual 
Interpret how Qual results 
explain the Quan findings 
Figure 2.2 Explanatory mixed methods design 
Source: Creswell and Plano Clark (2007: 47) 
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discussed above, I have taken a number of steps and measures to ensure that the survey is 
successful.    
2.7.2 Willingness of respondents to participate and answer questions 
 
The quantitative and the qualitative research are entirely based on the information of the 
respondents’ perceptions and attitudes. Technically, respondents had to be willing to 
participate and answer questions (Babbi & Mouton, 2008: 236). It is also clearly stipulated in 
the ethical clearance of the research. However, some people were not willing to participate in 
the research while some respondents were reluctant to answer and share their perceptions 
openly and freely. The 2005 election aftermath and the political intensity of the country had 
impact on the interaction of the public. A few respondents were suspicious or afraid as why 
the research was being conducted, even after explaining the purpose of the study and showing 
them legal evidence to conduct the research. People had mixed feelings about the research; 
some thought as a reflection the government’ or ruling party’s sympathy, others thought that 
it was a spying operation. The ground is different from the methodological and technical 
aspects of research. In order to mitigate the challenge, from the beginning of the survey the 
interviewers and I repetitively informed the targeted population on the purpose of the study 
which was entirely academic, the importance of his or her participation on the study, the 
significance of his or her accurate and real responses and attitudes, the anonymity and 
confidentiality of their responses. Though getting individuals’ trust to express their 
perception on social and institutional confidence has been complex, we attempted to help to 
create an atmosphere for the individuals to participate and convey their real attitude rather 
than expressing socially and politically acceptable opinions.      
2.8 Research pre-planning  
 
In this section, I explain the main research pre-planning activities which were essential to 
undertake the actual study in the selected research sites.  
2.8.1 Translation of the questionnaire 
 
Babbie and Mouton (2008) stress the need of translating questionnaires in a multilingual 
society. According to them, respondents should be interviewed and questioned in the 
language they understand and feel comfortable. In line with this, the final English version of 
the questionnaire was translated into three local languages, Amharic, Oromiffa and Tigrigna. 
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The Amharic version was used for Addis Ababa and Amhara regions. The Oromiffa version 
applied for Oromia region, while the Tigrigna version for Tigray region. Incognizant of the 
importance of keeping the accuracy of translation, I gave due attention for the translation 
process. After examining different options, I preferred to provide the translation into three 
languages to the instructors who are independently teaching Amharic, Oromiffa and Tigrigna 
in the Department of Ethiopian Languages and Literature of Addis Ababa University. I also 
assigned two media practitioners to cross check and edit the translated questionnaires to 
ensure accuracy of translation before delivering it to the respondents in their respective 
regions.   
2.8.2 Ethical clearance approval and Permission for research 
 
The research was conducted based on the approval by the Higher Degrees Committee of the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) which gave the required ethical clearance in line with 
ethical clearance Number: HSS/06495A of 2006. As a returning student, the Humanities and 
Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee granted me full approval in 2017 and 
recertification approval in 2018 under protocol reference number: HSS/0495/06D (see 
Annexure 2.8, Annexure 2.9 and Annexure 2.10). 
It is also a requirement to get permission from the offices of Zone, Wereda and Kebele 
administration of Ethiopia in order to conduct research. One cannot gather information from 
the individuals without having permission from these administrative levels. The supervisors 
especially the local once played a significant role to facilitate the authorization and 
permission process. I could not find a written regulation or directive that demanded for 
obeying such kind of act. It is, however, the practice that I faced during my pre-test and main 
field trips. I requested the Faculty of Communications and Journalism of Addis Ababa 
University to provide me support letters to the selected zones and sub-city of the four regions. 
I submitted the letters to the offices of the administrative zones for permission to undertake 
the research in the selected research organizations and sites. The office of the zones wrote 
letters to the offices of the Wereda administrations. Similarly, the offices of the Wereda 
administrations wrote letters to the Kebeles. I did not have problem to get authorization from 
all those administrative bodies. They were very cooperative. I had a small incident in Mettu 
City Kebele 2 on January 15 2008 as I attempted to bypass the Kebele administration and 
started distributing the questionnaire. Two officials of the Kebele stopped me on the street 
and asked me to show them the permit letter. I showed them the letters which I received from 
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the offices of the zone and the Wereda. They told me that those letters alone were not 
sufficient to gather data from the residents and they emphasised the need of approval from 
the chairman of the Kebele. I apologized to them sincerely. I talked to the chairman of the 
Kebele the following day to get permission.  
 
I was asked by the majority of organizations and institutions and by some of individuals to 
show the support or permit letter that I received from their respective administrative offices. I 
cannot thoroughly reject the practice of authorization process at Zone, Wereda, Kebele and 
individual levels as this process does not have any impact on the validity of the data. The 
notion of getting permission from the administrative bodies for conducting research to collect 
information from individual citizens might have impact on the kind of respondents who 
participated voluntary in the study, on the responses and reactions of the respondents. 
Besides, it might gloom the demarcation between individual and public life. This is more 
dynamic when we closely look at the main issues of my research on the perceptions of the 
general public on mass media credibility, social trust and institutional confidence. The 
respondents might not correctly reflect their personal feelings and attitudes towards these 
issues.  
 
One of the respondents when I was collecting the filled questionnaires said the following: 
“The questionnaire challenged me to look into myself critically as a professional person, 
political being or an individual citizen” (a respondent, Tachi Gayint, February 13, 2008). The 
process and the existing atmospheres are likely to challenge the personality of the 
respondents to handle the questions. 
2.8.3 Recruit interviewers  
 
The nature of such kind of survey involves a number of interviewers to administer the 
questionnaire. Active and full participation of the team of the research is crucial for 
enhancing the validity of the data collecting process. Donald Cooper and Pamela Schindler 
(2001) commend that the survey requires ethical compliance from all the team members of 
the research. They also suggest that the team members of the survey are expected to fulfil 
some decent and ethical behaviour. Based on this notion, I prepared a general guideline for 
the interviewers. The guideline incorporated two main issues: ethical behaviour of the team 
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members of the research and the informed consent of the precedents (for detail see Annexure 
2.7: General guideline for interviewers).  
  
Seventy-eight persons (eight supervisors and 70 interviewers) were assigned to work on the 
field of the survey. Three criteria were set for selecting the interviewers. These were: 
speaking the local languages, having similar experiences in survey and completing at least 
secondary high school. They speak the local languages of the specific area. The majority of 
the interviewers have participated in Housing and Population Census and Demographic and 
Health Survey which were conducted in Ethiopia prior to this exercise.  
 
Of those, 45 were males and 33 were females. Two supervisors were assigned for each region 
and one was drawn from Addis Ababa and the other one was selected from the respective 
zone.  
 
I gave the interviewers an orientation session before dispatching them for interviewing 
practice. The main purpose of the orientation was to familiarize them with the informed 
consent guidelines and the questionnaire, and to make them understand the importance of 
recording the respondent’s own answer exactly as given. The orientation included on 
introducing the study, the informed consent guidelines, the questionnaire, approaching and 
contacting respondents, asking and paraphrasing the questions of the questionnaire, 
answering respondents’ questions, recording the answers of the respondents and keeping the 
filled questionnaires confidentially.   
2.9 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I described study methodology methodological paradigms/approaches with 
respect to the study question, subjects of the study.  Both quantitative and qualitative research 
approaches are used for analysing and examining the public perceptions of media credibility, 
social trust and institutional confidence. The combination of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches helps to provide a wide and detailed perspective for catching the triangulation of 
the trust and media uses and exposure patterns.  
Next is chapter three. The chapter deals with theoretical and conceptual framework of my 
study to investigate the relationships between and among social trust, political trust and news 
media credibility in conjunction with media uses and exposure. 
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CHAPTER THREE: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
“Theorizing involves a combination of description, analysis, reflection, and application”   
 Jay Coakley, 2017: 32 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I outline the theoretical framework of my thesis. The thesis as a whole deals 
with the perceptions of the public on social trust, government, civic and social institutions 
and the credibility of mass media. My research interrogates public confidence in the media, 
and how this relates to government institutions and civic society, as well as the impact of 
public confidence on media consumption patterns. In order to investigate these issues in a 
disciplined and systematic manner a concrete theoretical framework is necessary. 
 
I focus on the relationship between media and society in the Ethiopian context. The 
relationships between mass media and society and media roles in society are important in 
terms of public trust in the media, and the public’s confidence in the honesty and frankness of 
the media. Since media credibility is the reflection both of the perceptions of the audience 
and the performance of the media, normative media theories that are relevant to this research 
have been used. These theories reveal how the performance of the media and media 
credibility are perceived by the public, as well as the degree of confidence of the public in 
civic society and government institutions. 
 
In relation to media consumption in relation to media credibility, uses and gratifications 
theory, and especially the integrated model of audience choice that is an amended version of 
uses and gratifications theory has been applied. The selection of appropriate theories 
concerning social trust, institutional trust and public perceptions of media credibility is a 
difficult matter. Hwang and Park (2006) have commented on the fact that some theories have 
not been conceptually developed or empirically tested in the field. Another body of theory on 
which I draw is the social and cultural theory, focusing mainly on Robert Putnam’s 
institutional performance theory (Putnam et al. 1993; Putnam, 1995). The object of the 
theories I use is to predict and explain the triangle of the public’s trust or mistrust of 
government organizations and social institutions and the attitudes of audiences to media 
credibility. My theoretical framework is used to weigh up the ways in which social, political, 
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and civic institutions and media credibility and trust in Ethiopia are entwined in reciprocal 
relationships and dependencies. 
 
The focus in this chapter is on the historical development and the core ideas of the theories, 
their major proponents and their viewpoints as well as their limitations. The chapter is 
divided into three sections. Section one deals with the relationship between media and 
society, viewed in terms of normative media theories. Section two covers uses and 
gratifications theory, and especially the integrated model of audience choice. The social and 
cultural theory with emphasis on social capital and the institutional performance theory, in 
relation to the triangle of trust or mistrust, is explained in the last section of the chapter.    
3.2 Normative media theories 
 
The relationship between media and society, and the roles played by the media in society, can 
be examined in three ways. The first one is through functionalist theory, dealing with the 
‘objective’ angle of media sociology (sociological/real theories). The second way is to use 
the normative approach (normative/ideal media theories) to analyse the tasks of the media in 
society. The third, similar to the first, deals with the overall framework of communication 
norms (the basic principles of freedom, equality and cohesive order for media performance). 
For the purpose of this thesis, emphasis is placed on normative media theories. 
 
Normative media theories are concerned with the obligations of media and institutions: how 
they should behave/conduct themselves in a society at a particular time. The essence of the 
theory is related to the functions and roles of media. It articulates the broad expectations of 
society in relation to the performance of media. As Oosthuizen wrote: “Societal expectations 
about media conduct are articulated by so-called public philosophies of communication. 
These philosophies were initially dubbed social theories of the press and later become known 
as normative media theories” (2002:39). Normative media theories constitute ideal views of 
how media ought to or are expected to operate. 
 
Normative media theories relate to what the media could or should do under specific 
conditions (Fourie, 2001b:269). They are concerned with how the media ought, or are 
expected, to operate to attain certain objectives. These objectives are usually geared to the 
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‘good of society’ (a term which of course requires definition according to particular 
circumstances) as a whole. 
 
Normative theories focus on the role and function of the media. They are distinct from 
descriptive theories in that they prescribe the ‘right’ approach for media conduct (Irvan, 
2006). McQuail showed that normative theories of the media are focused on how the media 
“ought to operate if certain social values are to be observed or obtained” (cited in Zelizer, 
2004: 146). Normative theory requires media to live up to certain rights and obligations. 
 
The relation between press and society was first systematically investigated in 1956 by 
Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956; 1963). They identified the four prevailing theories of 
the press, on the assumption that the “press always takes on the form and coloration of the 
social and political structures within which it operates” (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 
1956:1). They developed the following four press theories: authoritarian press theory, 
libertarian press theory, social responsibility press theory and the Soviet Communist press 
theory (1956). The first two theories are regarded as basic press theories and the last two are 
variations. The book divided the world into three camps: the free world of liberal democracy, 
the soviet-totalitarian system, and the non-communist authoritarian societies. The main 
premises of the authors were, as Curran and Park put it, that “Media systems […] reflect the 
prevailing philosophy and political system of society in which they operate” (2000:3).  
 
To this list Dennis McQuail (1987) added development media theory and democratic-
participation theory. The development theory accommodated the media situation in 
developing countries. The democratic-participation theory incorporated alternative and grass-
roots media that served the needs of citizens through the participation and interaction of the 
community to reflect consolidated democracies (McQuail, 2000). McQuail vigorously 
suggested that development media theory relates to the role of mass media in the third world 
countries (1987). According to this viewpoint, media must be supportive rather than critical 
of government, but assist governments in implementing their policies (Watson, 2008). They 
should be subordinated to the state and guided by the requirements of economic, social and 
political development. 
 
Development media theory combines ideas from different normative media theories. It 
consists of some ideas from authoritarian perspective. The ideas include: government should 
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control and run mass media dominantly. Media are not allowed to print or broadcast anything 
that could undermine the established authority and giving offense to the existing political 
values should be avoided. Media cannot be too critical of government. The Government, if 
pushed, may go as far as punishing anyone who questions the state’s ideology. The 
developmental media theory also encompasses some ideas from the Soviet communist 
perspective.  For instance, media are responsible to serve the interest of the ruling 
party/domain party and mobilize the public to support the political system. There is no 
private ownership of media under this system. Media are used to improve life in rural areas of 
the country. 
Under the rubric of this theory according to McQuail, as the press performs its 
responsibilities, developmental media bear the following tenets in mind: 
• Media must accept and carry out positive development tasks that are in line with the 
policies formulated by the political leadership. Freedom of the press should not be at 
variance with economic priorities of the government and the development needs of 
the citizenry.  
• Media should therefore give priorities to the coverage of those areas that touch on the 
lives of the people. In other words, content should be development-driven and should 
centre on socio-economic and political lives of the people. 
• The state has the right to intervene in media operations by the use of censorship 
devices, especially when the activities of the press are not in consonance with the 
development objectives of the government. Mass media should accord priority to 
politically, geographically and culturally contiguous developing countries in their 
coverage as part of the holistic strategy for less developed societies.  
• The bad news story must be treated very carefully as it can be damaging for nations; 
especially with regard to economic growth and development (Watson, 2008). 
• Journalists in the developing countries give up journalism values and standards for the 
encroachment of development journalism per se (McQuail, 1987 and 2005).  
 
The work of Siebert, Peterson and Schramm had great significance for the development of 
theories of media in relation to society. Theirs’ was pioneering work which augmented 
understanding of the roles and tasks of the media in society and gave special emphasis to the 
relation between media and politics of a given country (Nordenstreng, 1997; 2006b; 
McQuail, 2005). Their theories were applied in the classification of the media systems of 
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particular countries. They published at a critical moment at the beginning of the Cold War 
when politicians in the east and west were seeking to impose their ideology on subject 
nations. As Nordenstreng claims: “[f]our theories was a child of the Cold War era, when the 
world was deeply divided between the capitalist West, socialist East and underdeveloped 
South” (2006b:36). Watson and Hill (2000: 125) have shown that functionalist media theory 
neglected the significance of social, political and cultural factors in the communication 
process this body of theory; normative media theories help to supply these shortcomings. 
 
Normative media theories focus on the nature of ownership and control of the media, the role 
of the media, the restriction or free flow of information, and the diversity of messages and 
information of the media in a given country. Each media system is expected to act according 
to its own media theory.  
 
The authoritarian theory provides an example of one of the original ‘four theories’.  In its 
original conception, it characteried the media in the following way: 
• the media should not undermine the established power and its interests; 
• the media should be subordinate to the established power and authority; 
• the media should avoid acting in contravention of prevailing moral and political 
values; 
• censorship is justified in the application of these principles; 
• editorial attacks on established power, deviations from official policy, and 
violation of accepted moral codes are criminalised; 
• The media serve as instruments/ mouthpieces to publicise and advocate 
government ideology and actions; 
• The absolute power of state and the subservience of the individual are recognized 
– press ‘freedom’ is a right vested in the state (McQuail, 1989: 85-6; Roelofse, 
1996:5). 
 
The main sources of normative obligation are the expectation of society and the political 
system. Normative theory arises from the broad social philosophy or ideology or socio-
political orientation of a given society. It is directed towards the achievement of certain social 
objectives. The objectives and roles of media derive from societal expectations and those of 
the government of a country (Fourie, 2001a; Oosthuizen, 2002). Social expectations impact 
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on media conduct and performances. Society expects the media to respect public interests and 
social norms or values that are considered appropriate and acceptable. They are expected to 
respect traditional media values such as truth, objectivity, fairness and good taste (Christians 
et al., 1993:2; Oosthuizen, 2002:38). Since normative media theory covers a wide range of 
issues in different societal groups, the sources of normative expectations are also many 
(McQuail, 2005:162-63). The sources of the normative are the public as citizens and as 
audiences, the media organisations, the state and its agencies, professionals, and other 
interested parties in society. All these media partners “keep a close eye on media conduct for 
their own protection and seek to influence the conduct and performance of the media” 
(McQuail, 2005:163).  
 
However, due to the existence of strong relationships between political power and the media, 
the government of a country may have a decisive influence over the media. (Christians et al., 
1993:2; Oosthuizen, 2002:38; McQuail, 2005). The political and economic policies and 
strategies derive from the ideology of the political leader; the media structure, conduct and 
performance may be expected to follow the same direction. It is generally government that 
determines the relationships of institutions to the society. Moreover, “a nation’s media, more 
than any other kind of institution, is shaped by the prevailing political power” (Oosthuizen, 
2002:38). Every normative theory is elaborated in terms of the type of the government in 
power. In line with this, McQuail wrote  that “[a] society’s normative theories concerning its 
own media are usually to be found in laws, regulations, media policies, codes of ethics and 
the substance of public debate” (2005:15).  
 
In the 1950s and 1960s normative media theories were considered as norms of institutional 
relationships between the media and politics, as well as between journalists and society 
(Rosengren et al 1985). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and 
the establishment of a new world order, a remarkable convergence of political and economic 
institutions has taken place around the world (Fukuyama, 1995: 3). Fukuyama further states 
that developed countries have adopted liberal democratic regimes together with free market 
economies.  
 
After this process took place, scholars became more critical of normative media 
theories. One of the criticisms is that the theories lack the flexibility to incorporate the 
media system in the world (Merrill and Lowenstein, 1971; Huang, 2003). The second 
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criticism is related to ethnocentrism (McQuail, 1992:66; Nerone, 1995:17). It alleges 
that normative media theories depend culturally and ideologically on classical 
liberalism, a characteristically western body of theory, which was inappropriately 
applied in other parts of the world. As Nerone stated, “Four Theories does not offer 
four theories: It offers one theory with four examples” (1995:18).  
 
Others have challenged theories that assume the interdependence of the media system, the 
theoretical frameworks and the ideology of society (McQuail, 1992; Nordenstreng, 2006b). 
“The problem of the classic analysis was that it collapsed into one level of consideration at 
least three levels of analysis: philosophical doctrines, political systems, and press systems” 
(Nordenstreng, 2006b:37). Normative media theories have also been criticized since they 
tend to be limited to the classification of the role of a media system in a specific country. In 
fact, no national media system should be placed entirely in any of the six categories of 
theories (Nordenstreng et al 1997; Fourie, 2001b:275; Oosthuizen, 2002). Oosthuizen said 
that “these theories are not mutually exclusive; countries rarely reflect all the characteristics 
of one particular theory and often have characteristics in common with other theories” 
(2002:47). South African media under apartheid, for instance, displayed characteristics 
present in the six media theories and the Ethiopian case at the present day seems equally to 
have characteristics belonging in the six categories.  
 
The media normative theory has also been criticized because of the normative tasks of the 
media in society (McQuail, 2002; Fourie, 2001b:275). Media theories deal mainly with the 
tasks and missions imposed on the media by political powerful forces. This body of theory 
“deals with the ‘subjective’ conceptions held by various players (including public opinion 
leaders, government officials, cabinet ministers and so on) about the mission of the media” 
(Fourie, 2001b:275). Normative media theory is not by itself sufficient to analyse the 
structure, manner and performance of media systems critically and objectively. McQuail 
pointed out that “[w]hile normative media theory is not in itself ‘objective’, it can be studied 
by the ‘objective’ methods of the social sciences (2005: 15).  
 
With these criticisms and limitations, normative media theories have been revised by many 
scholars since the 1980s (Nordenstreng, 1997; Nordenstreng, 2006a; 2006b; McQuail, 2006) 
and the reaction against the four theories became stronger in the 1990s. Nordenstreng (1997), 
McQuail (2005), and Curran and Park (2000) have made suggestions for revisions, which can 
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be divided into two main approaches. The first approach (Nordenstreng, 1997, 2006a; Curran 
and Park 2000) focused on classifying media roles in society within the framework of a 
specific paradigm. It was a modification of the six normative theories of the media. 
Nordenstreng outlines five different normative theory ‘paradigms’ (1997). These were the 
liberal-pluralist paradigm, social-responsibility paradigm, critical paradigm, the 
administrative paradigm, and the cultural negotiation paradigm. In terms of these paradigms, 
he also suggested four media roles in a society, of which the media could play one or more. 
The four media roles were: collaboration, surveillance, facilitation and dialectical criticism 
(1997).  
 
More recently, Nordenstreng (2006b) constructed a model of the four normative roles of 
media (see Figure 3.1). The model is based on the relation of the media to the political and 
economic power systems in society. The vertical axis of Institutional vs. People’s power 
shows the placing of power in society, whether it is in the hands of the people or in those of 
government, and to what extent. The horizontal axis of Media Autonomy vs. Dependency 
indicates the degree of freedom of the media to function independently of the political and 
economic forces. Accordingly, the four normative roles of the media are: informational, 
collaborative, facilitative and critical (which Nordenstreng preferred to term ‘radical’). 
 
Curran and Park edited De-Westernizing Media Studies (2000) which attempted to make a 
contribution to the broadening of media theory by incorporating the experience of the media 
system in the transitional societies. Though globalization has some impact, they emphasized 
the role of the nation state in the shaping of the media system of that country. They divided 
the world media systems into five categories. The division rests on the belief that the world 
was divided into authoritarian and democratic political systems, each of which were further 
subdivided into neo-liberal and ‘regulated’ economic systems. In addition, they added the 
category of transitional or mixed societies. Accordingly, China and Russia among others, 
were classified as transitional and mixed societies. Mexico, Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia 
were categorized as authoritarian neo-liberal societies. Zimbabwe and Egypt were classified 
as authoritarian ‘regulated’ societies. They also classified Japan, USA, UK and Australia as 
democratic liberal societies. Sweden, Italy and South Africa were classified under democratic 
regulated societies (2000: v-vii; 13-16). 
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Figure 3.1 Four normative roles of media 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
       
 
 
 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) proposed three models which were applied in a western context, 
based on comparative analysis of systems, in relation to media and political orientation. The 
three models were: liberal democratic, corporatist and polarized pluralist (2004:242). Hallin 
and Mancini identified main features such as the extent and nature of the intervention of the 
state in the media system, the level of political parallelism in society, the development of the 
media market, specially the penetration and circulation of the press, and the 
professionalization of journalism for comparative analysis of the media system in western 
world. They extended the application of the three models, especially the polarized pluralist 
model. Hallin and Mancini did not escape criticism for trying to use a polarized pluralist 
model for other countries (De Albuquerque, 2012). Blum (2005) proposed six models: the 
Atlantic-Pacific liberal model, the clientelism model associated to Southern European 
countries, the Northern European public service model, the Eastern European shock model, 
the Arab-Asian patriot model and the Asian-Caribbean command model (cited in Mellado 
and Lagos, 2013). In accordance with Blum’s media system model: “In the East-European 
People’s power 
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Source:  Nordenstreng, 2006a:5 
Institutional power 
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shock-model (Russia, Turkey Iran), the state is strong and consistently intervenes in media 
freedom. In the Arab-Asian patriotic model (Egypt, Yemen), the government system is 
authoritarian.  
 
In the Asian-Caribbean commando-model (China, Vietnam, Burma, Zimbabwe, Cuba), 
journalists function within totalitarian systems. Basically, their fundamental task is to spread 
the ruling ideology, and everything else falls under censorship. Mostly, the media belong to 
the state, or function among the services of societal organisations – even in China, where they 
are partly financed through the market.” (Prinzing 2006: 11). 
 
McQuail (2005) again proposed four different normative theory models. These are: liberal-
pluralist or market model, social responsibility or public interest model, professional model 
and alternative media model. The second approach, promoted by Nordenstreng (2006b) and 
McQuail (2006), in the recent past, is a radical move against the classical four theories. This 
approach considers separately the politics, philosophy and media systems of particular 
societies. Nordenstreng and McQuail appear to have been influenced by Hallin and Mancini’s 
claim that “It is time to give [normative media theory] a decent burial and move on to the 
development of more sophisticated models based on real comparative analysis” (2004:10). 
Nordenstreng and McQuail propose three separate typologies: philosophical traditions, 
political systems and media roles. Each typology contains four main categories (see Figure 
3.2). The three levels are not expected to correspond to each other, as do the classical 
normative press theories. Nordenstreng emphasizes that:  
 
there is no one-to-one correspondence between types in the three different 
levels. None of the four historical traditions of normative theory corresponds 
exactly with a given type of democratic political model, nor with a given 
media role. To force the correspondence would repeat one of the errors of four 
theories. (Nordenstreng, 2006b:38) 
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Figure 3.2 Three typologies of roles of media in society 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL 
TRADITIONS 
POLITICAL SYSTEMS MEDIA ROLES 
Normative traditions Models of democracy Roles of journalism 
-Corporatist -Pluralist -Monitorial 
-Libertarian -Administrative -Facilitative 
-Socially responsible -Deliberative -Collaborative 
-Popular-participatory -Direct -Radical 
(Source: Nordenstreng, 2006b:38) 
 
Similarly, Mellado and Lagos redefined the dimensions that should be used to characterize 
media systems around the world including non-western countries and emerging democracies. 
They proposed nine factors in categorizing into three big dimensions: the political dimension 
(political regime, national political structure level of political parallelism, political culture, 
freedom of speech); the cultural dimension (cultural values in the societies); and the media 
dimension (participation of the State in the media system, development of media market; and 
professional independence in the journalistic field, on both the individual as well as the 
structural level (2013).  
 
My study will assess the climate of the Ethiopian media on the basis of normative theory as 
modified by the recent (2006) suggestions of Nordenstreng and McQuail, and taking into 
consideration the basic values of media systems, as listed above in general and the 
development media theory in particular. The degree of credibility of the media in the eyes of 
the public will also be assessed. 
 
The government of Ethiopia assumes that the country is a developmental state. The concept 
of developmental state has to do with state oriented economic development of a country. 
There is a wide view that state intervention is necessary to achieve long-term capital 
accumulation and society wide developmental goals.  
 
The main characteristics of a developmental state are: 1) its priority is economic 
development. 2) the state is relatively autonomous in its ability to establish the rules of the 
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game vis-à-vis organised interests within society; 3) the establishment of economic 
bureaucracies is at the heart of the polity; 4) civil society is initially weak or subordinated or 
penetrated by the state; 5) human rights protection is poor even non-existent (Douglass, 1994; 
Leftwich, 2006).    
3.3 Uses and gratifications theory/Integrated model of audience choice  
 
The uses and gratifications approach was first described by Elihu Katz at the end of 1950s 
(Katz, 1959; Severin and Tankard, 1997). Most communication research up to this point was 
directed at the effect of mass media on public attitudes and behaviour. The uses and 
gratifications approach is the transformation of the central media research concern from 
‘what the media do to people’ to ‘what people do with media’ (Katz, 1959:1). The main idea 
of the uses and gratifications theory is that it considers needs, wishes, and satisfactions of the 
audiences as main motives for media use and consumption (Blumler and Katz, 1974). People 
watch television, or listen to radio, or read newspapers and magazines to gratify and satisfy 
certain needs. The main questions are: why do people use media? What do people do with the 
media? What do they use the media for? And, what do they get from their media use? Such 
audience-media relations are “as old as media research itself” (McQuail, 2005: 423).  
 
Empirical studies on radio listeners to soap opera by Herzog in 1941 and on newspaper 
readers by Lazarsfeld and Stanton in 1944 employed the uses and gratifications approach 
(O’Sullivan et al 1994:325; McQuail, 2005:424). Herzog’s study on women listeners to soap 
opera is regarded as a pioneer of the uses and gratifications approach (Williams, 2003:178). 
Neither of these studies however used the term uses and gratifications approach.  
 
Three decades later, in 1974, Jay G. Blumler and Elihu Katz (1974) further developed the 
uses and gratifications model and gave it its present name. The uses and gratification 
approach is an extension of functionalism theory (Wright, 1974; cited in McQuail, 2005: 424) 
of which the main point is to view society as integrated, harmonious and cohesive. Media 
systems are expected to contribute to this integration and harmony. It is assumed that “all 
parts ideally function to maintain equilibrium, consensus and social order” (O’Sullivan et al, 
1994:124). The mass media are seen as part of the social system and should contribute to the 
process of maintaining or enhancing these desirable qualities in society (Fourie, 2001b:265). 
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In terms of functionalism theory, scholars have pointed out a distinction between sociological 
and psychological versions of functions of media (Perry, 1996:49-50; Williams, 2003:49). 
The sociological approach is concerned with the media and the social system, while the 
psychological approach looks into the use of media by individuals in their daily lives. 
Likewise, uses and gratifications theory extend the assumptions of functionalism theory and 
suggest that people use media to gratify personal needs and desires.  
 
Uses and gratifications theory involves a number of prominent assumptions on audience-
media relations (Katz et al 1974:21-22; Williams, 2003:177). The first assumption is that the 
audience is an active and selective media user, instead of being passive or manipulated by 
media messages. The second assumption is that people use the media to fulfil their needs and 
desires. The third assumption is that, though the uses and gratifications differ from person to 
person, it is possible to identify the main trends of media uses and consumption patterns of 
audiences. The fourth assumption is that the media provide to people a certain portion of their 
needs and compete with other sources of human need satisfaction (Katz et al 1974).  
 
Similarly, in the beginning of the 1970s, Denis McQuail, Jay G. Blumler and J. R. Brown 
researched five types of radio and television programmes in Britain and identified four types 
of media-person interactions. These were: diversion (escape from constraints of routine, from 
the burdens of problems; the achievement of emotional release); personal relationships 
(companionship; social utility); personal identity (personal reference; reality exploration; 
value reinforcement); and surveillance (need for information about what is going on in the 
world around them (McQuail, Blumler and Brown, 1972). (For details Annexure 3.1: 
Typology of media uses and gratifications). 
 
The central issue of uses and gratifications theory is personal motivation for media use (the 
rewards that media offer, psychological motives, media gratifications. It is supposed that 
people use media to gratify these needs in some way. McGuire (1974) suggested a 
psychological version of the uses and gratifications theory of audience motivations for media 
use. Based on “the general theory of human needs” (McQuail, 2005:425), McGuire identified 
four types of psychological motivations: ‘cognitive’ versus ‘affective’ needs, ‘active’ versus 
‘passive’ initiation; ‘external’ versus ‘internal’ goal orientation; and ‘growth’ or ‘stability’ 
orientation. 
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Palmgreen (1985) drew on Fishbein’s expectancy-value theory (1972; 1974) to evolve an 
expectancy-value model for analysing personal motivation and attitudes to media use. People 
use media which gratify social and psychological needs by analysing beliefs, values, and 
social circumstances. Individuals evaluate their beliefs and wishes, as well as the likelihood 
of a particular outcome, to select a specific kind of media, programme or content (see Figure 
3.3). The outcome, which may be positive or negative, influences the use or avoidance of that 
media. “[T]he model expresses the proposition that media use is accounted for by a 
combination of perception of benefits offered by the medium and the differential value of 
these benefits for the individual audience member” (McQuail, 2005:427). 
The expectancy-value theory considers the influence of the attitudes and beliefs of 
individuals on their propensity to use media. This theory was an advance on its predecessors, 
in that they were mainly concerned with human needs and gratifications. Media users take 
into account a number of criteria, including gratifications, before deciding to consume a 
specific medium. They may not expect each chosen medium to fulfil all their criteria. If the 
medium met an individual’s major expectations, he or she is likely use that medium. “[T]here 
is no minimum rating on a particular characteristic that must be met, and a high rating on one 
characteristic can compensate for a low rating on another” 
(http://www.answers.com/topic/expectancy-value-model?cat=biz-fin, 2007:1). 
 
The model also differentiates between gratifications sought and gratifications obtained from 
media use. Based on four types of media-person interactions, McQuail identified the 
following media gratifications sought or obtained: information and education; guidance and 
advice; diversion and relaxation; social contact; value reinforcement; cultural satisfaction; 
emotional release; identity formation and confirmation; lifestyle expression; security and 
reassurance; sexual arousal and filling time (McQuail, 2005:428).  
 
This thesis will use this list of uses and gratifications as dependent variables for media 
consumption and use pattern. Respondents were requested to select the motives behind their 
media use and choices.  
 
The uses and gratifications theory has been criticized by David Morley (1992), Ang (1994), 
McQuail (2002) and Williams (2003) for failing to take up many issues. The first criticism is 
that the theory concentrates only on the individual psychological make-up and consumption 
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patterns of media users, rather than the social context (Morley, 1992; Williams, 2003:177). 
The second criticism concerns the length of the list of audiences’ gratifications as well as the 
researchers’ assumption that audiences are unanimous in their desires. The third criticism 
advances the idea that people do not always choose media for the gratification of particular 
needs. They may do so for other reasons, such as the reputation of the media or programme, 
or because of lack of choices (McQuail, 2005). Another criticism is related to methodology: 
it was suggested that the theory lacks a theoretical basis to explain the complex cognitive 
processes of individual motivation and its interpretation in the case of media choices (Fourie, 
2001a:297). Another criticism arises from reception theory. This is that the approach 
concentrates solely on why people use media rather than investigating what meanings are 
produced and in what circumstances (O’Sullivan. et al 1998:131). 
 
Webster and Wakshlag (1983) developed a model for explaining patterns of television viewer 
choice and consumption that relate to both structural and individual determinants. These 
concern the media side (supply) and the audience side (demand). Ferguson concluded that 
“Webster and Wakshlag created the first useful model, which focused on audience 
availability, program type preference, and the structure of available options” (2001:2). 
Structural determinants include availability to viewers and demographic variables in the 
audience, as well as, programme content and schedules on the side of television services. 
Individual determinants are viewer gratifications and preferences (expectations/needs/tastes), 
viewing situations and viewer awareness on the demand side as well as the availability and 
use of television equipment on the supply side.  
 
Webster and Wakshlag’s media factors and audience factors model was developed further 
and refined by many researchers (Webster and Lichty, 1991; Webster and Phalen, 1977; 
Ferguson, 2001; McQuail 2002, 2005). McQuail (2005) especially was influenced by 
Webster and Wakshlag’s model and he developed the so-called integrated model of audience 
choice which applies to all media use and consumption rather than for television only. The 
model will be explained at the end of this section.  
 
Renckstorf (1996) developed a model which defined media use as social action. He adapted a 
reference model used in mass communication research to function as a framework for a 
model of media use as social action. This latter model focused on the process, considerations 
and steps in which people choose mass media. Renckstorf claimed that members of the public 
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received ‘mediated messages’ and responded to them in terms of external action (overt 
behaviour) or internal action (covert behaviour) (1996:29).  
According to the model, the social action approach considers the definition and interpretation 
of surrounding society (including the mass media and other social, political and economic 
institutions) and interacts with the individual and social characteristics of the human actor 
(including plans, goals and values). It identified the situations and its problems and evaluates 
the relationship of the outcomes to the desired goals (Renckstorf, 1996:28). Ruggiero (2000) 
argued that uses and gratifications theory is a precise approach for mass communication 
theory; researchers should continue to use the traditional tools and typologies, with 
modification to answer questions about media use. He claimed that the “uses and 
gratifications [theory] has always provided a cutting-edge theoretical approach” (Ruggiero, 
2000: 3).  
McQuail (2000; 2005) developed an integrated model of audience choice for uses and 
gratifications. As he acknowledged, the model was influenced initially by the work of 
Webster and Wakshlag (1983), who “sought to explain television viewer choice in a similar 
way” (2005:429). The model encompassed a number of factors concerning media use 
patterns from ‘audience side’ and ‘media side’. The main factors for audience side choices 
are: personal attributes, social background and milieu, media-related needs (gratifications), 
personal tastes and preferences, availability and accessibility, awareness, specific context of 
use, and chance. On the ‘media side’, the main factors for choice include the media system, 
the structure of media provision, the available content options, and timing and presentation. 
Since this study is entirely focused on public perception, my research will take into 
consideration only the ‘audience side’ factors (see Figure 3.3). In this area the factors are 
explained as follows (McQuail, 2005:429-31). 
 
1. Personal attributes: These include age, gender, family position, educational 
background, work station and level of income. 
2. Social background and milieu: these refer to the background of individuals in terms of 
social class, religion, culture, and family, ethnical and political orientation. 
3. Media-related needs: Media-related needs include personal expectations and 
motivations for media use, usually called gratifications (see above for the list of 
gratifications sought and gratifications obtained, used as dependent variables). 
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4. Personal tastes and preferences: Individuals’ tastes and preferences for genres, 
formats or subject matters of the media content can have an impact on media use. It is 
also important to incorporate as a variable people’s perception of media credibility. 
The issue of media credibility is not yet clear: Kifati and Capella (2003) claimed that 
people give attention to news media in which they don’t have confidence. Other 
authorities (Gaziano and McGrath, 1987; McQuail, 2005:508-9) consider the 
credibility of a news channel as a factor associated with learning from news 
programmes. “Essentially, some trust is required for a news source to be effective” 
(McQuail, 2005:508). 
5. Availability: This refers to the availability of different media channels in a specific 
place and time as well as the economic possibility for individuals to buy media 
products (like newspapers, television sets, radios, magazines). 
6. Awareness: The awareness of individuals of the available media and their 
programmes influence media use and consumption patterns. 
7. Social context of use: This refers to social patterns and the location of media use. 
Where and with whom do individuals use media? Do they use media alone or with 
family, friends or neighbours? Where do they use media? At home, work place, 
clubs? 
 
These and other factors will be used as variables to assess the media use pattern of the public, 
together with their perceptions of media credibility. The main independent variables are: 
• Personal attributes (age, gender, family position, educational background, work 
station and level of income); 
• Social background, religion, culture, family, ethnical origins/race; political 
orientation; 
• Personal tastes and preferences;  
• Availability and affordability of media; and  
• The social context of use. 
 
3.4 Theories on the links between social trust, political trust and media credibility 
 
This section deals with the relationship between social trust and institutional trust, including 
media credibility, as well as the directional flow of these relationships. The following 
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questions are significant in an analysis of trust. Is the level of public confidence in 
institutions similar to social trust? Does social trust foster political trust, or is the converse 
true? Can trustworthy governments promote social trust and create trustworthy and dynamic 
media and civic communities? Are social trust and political trust likely to co-exist? The 
researchers Delhey and Newton, (2005) and Hwang and Park (2006) claim that there is no 
general theory of social trust and institutional trust. I will nevertheless use two relevant 
theoretical suggestions among the three theories outlined by Newton and Norris (2000). 
These theories are: social and cultural theory and institutional performance theory. 
 
3.4.1 Social and cultural theory 
 
This section focuses on Robert Putnam’s research work on social capital as a component of 
norms, social networks, trust, which is related to social trust and trust in organizations 
(Putnam et al. 1993; Putnam, 1995). Social and cultural theory suggests that the ability to 
trust others and sustain cooperative relations is the product of social experiences and 
socialization, especially through the involvement of voluntary associations and activities 
(Newton and Norris, 2000).  
 
The concept in relation to social interaction, networks and trust is very old and has existed 
ever since members of communities have interacted with each other (Platteau, 1994; 
Woolcock, 1998). Brewer (2003) stated that Greek philosophers like Aristotle mentioned 
similar concepts concerning civic society and social networks. The theme has also deep and 
wide spreading roots in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the work of classical 
sociological, political and economic thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Mill, Toennies, 
Durkheim, Weber, Locke, Rousseau and Simmel (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Putnam, 
1995; Brewer, 2003). De Tocqueville attributed great importance to the function of civil 
associations in a modern democracy (1968). He uses the ‘art of association’ to describe the 
trend to form civic organizations and associations on a basis of trust in the members’ pursuit 
of common desires and interests. 
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Figure 3.3: An Integrated model of the process of media 
choice (Source: McQuail, 2005:429) 
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The modern notion of social and cultural theory dates back to the late twentieth century, and 
the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1979), James Coleman (1988), and Putnam (Putnam et al. 1993; 
Putnam, 1995; Putnam, 2000). Putnam popularized the concept of social capital further by 
emphasizing the significance of association, civic community and trust in societies (Putnam, 
Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Putnam, 1995; Putnam, 2000). He and his research team focused 
on the effects of administrative decentralization undertaken in Italy in the early 1970s. They 
assessed the process and outcome of the political reforms undertaken by the central 
government to delegate power over a period of 20 years to 27 regional governments (Putnam, 
Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993). 
 
Putnam emphasised the importance of social interactions and participation in voluntary 
organizations, which play a key role in the creation and maintenance of trust (Putnam et al. 
1993; Putnam, 1995). Individuals learn to trust through socialization. The theory suggests 
that trust develops ‘from the bottom up’. 
 
The core of Putnam’s thinking was his belief that social contexts and history are crucial to the 
existence and effectiveness of institutions and civic associations and to the generation of high 
levels of social trust. “Trust is an essential component of social capital” (Putnam, Leonardi 
and Nanetti, 1993: 170). The success of an institution is dependent on the character of the 
citizens and the degree of their “civic virtue”.  
 
Putnam emphasised the “virtuous circles” of the components of social capital, such as trust, 
norms, and networks (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:177). They are self-reinforcing 
and have cumulative effects. The “virtuous circles” result in high levels of cooperation, trust, 
reciprocity, civic engagement, and collective well-being. In the civic community, 
associations proliferate, membership overlaps, trustworthiness and confidence abound, and 
participation spills over into multiple arenas of community life. 
Norms of generalized reciprocity and networks of civic engagement encourage 
social trust and cooperation because they reduce incentives to defect, reduce 
uncertainty, and provide models for future cooperation. Trust itself is an 
emergent property of social capital, as much as a personal attribute (Putnam, 
Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:177). 
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In less civic or ‘non-civic’ communities, norms and networks of civic engagement are 
inadequate or lacking and the outlook for collective action is bleak. The weakness or lack of 
these in the society is self-reinforcing and ‘vicious circles’, as Putnam calls them, result in 
defection, distrust, shirking, isolation, and stagnation. 
 
Putnam stresses the role of norms, generalized reciprocity and networks of civic engagement 
as the main factors which create and maintain trust as social capital. Voluntary associations 
and social interaction are the most prominent sources of social trust. In areas where groups 
and associations are common, they help to develop cooperative values and a high degree of 
trusting interaction between people. As Rothstein states, “Putnam’s explanation is that 
participation in voluntary associations produces social capital through which civil 
transactions can be based upon trust in other people in the society, i.e., that people have the 
courage to cooperate because they trust that others are also going to cooperate” (2005:48). 
Putnam’s assumption concerning social capital has been paraphrased as follows by Fattore, 
Turbull and Wilson: “[s]ocial capital is the community’s stock of civic hardware – including 
groups, associations, and opportunities to participate and learn – that leads us to trust others 
and institutions, to take risks, and to develop” (2003:166).  
 
The central idea is that social trust is a by-product of attitudes towards others based on norms 
of reciprocity and civic association. Civic associations and organizations create binding 
cement in the form of social norms of trust. Putnam states that “[s]ocial trust in complex 
modern settings can arise from two related sources – norms of reciprocity and networks of 
civic engagement” (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:171).  
 
Regarding trust and mass media, two issues are relevant. The first one, as Putnam stresses, is 
the connection between trust in civic engagement and associations, and media use (Putnam, 
Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993: 92). Putnam elaborates on de Tocqueville’s notion concerning 
the connection in modern societies between the vitality of civic associations, and the 
existence and popularity of local newspapers. The degree of civic engagement in a society is 
likely to manifest itself in the patterns of mass media use in general and of newspaper reading 
in particular. Newspaper readership is high in a civic society with high degrees of 
engagement and social trust and lower in ‘disengaged’ civic society. 
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The second issue is the degree of public confidence in the reliability of information provided 
(Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993: 174). The greater public confidence in the accuracy of 
information provided, the greater the mutual trust and cooperation between information 
gatherers and receivers. 
 
Social capital theory reveals that there is a correlation between social trust and the education 
and income levels of citizens (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Putnam, 1995:72). The 
highest degree of social trust is found among people who are highly educated and have high 
incomes. Low levels of social trust and civic engagement may be expected in social groups 
with relatively low incomes and little education. 
 
At the community level, the boundaries of trust become more diffuse and abstract. Trust 
between neighbours and friends (particularized trust) and members of associations eventually 
extends to become trust between strangers (generalized trust). This leads ultimately to trust 
between those involved in the broad fabric of social and political institutions. Trust becomes 
“a shared set of values, virtues, and expectations within society as a whole. Without this 
interaction … trust decays; at a certain point, this decay begins to manifest itself in serious 
social problems” (Smith, 2007:1-2). 
 
According to the social and cultural theory, there is a direct and mutually reinforcing 
relationship between trust in fellow citizens and confidence in social institutions and 
government organizations, and people possessed of the one are likely to have the other. Such 
people, who express confidence in public institutions are engaged in voluntary associations. 
 
Putnam was involved in the formulation of indicators and the undertaking of empirical 
research concerning social trust. He developed the widely applied measure called the 
‘Putnam instrument’ (Adam and Roncevic, 2003). This instrument included a number of 
indicators, such as institutional performance; trust in people and institutions, networking, 
membership and participation in voluntary associations (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; 
Putnam, 2000).  
 
Putnam’s empirical work indicated a correlation between the strength of civic associations 
and engagement and the level of trust in the north and south of Italy (Putnam, Leonardi and 
Nanetti, 1993:115). The contrast between more civic-minded and less civic-minded regions 
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of Italy shows the correlation clearly. The north of Italy had many choral societies, 
associations and clubs. Most citizens in this region were engaged in civic activities and public 
issues and they trusted one another to act fairly and obey rules and norms. They also had 
confidence in the government (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:115).  
 
The dominant relations of trust among individuals and society in the north of Italy are 
generalized into trust of government and government organizations. Putnam confirmed that 
“[c]itizens in civic regions expressed greater social trust and greater confidence in law-
abidingness of their fellow citizens than did citizens in the least civic regions” (Putnam, 
Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:111).  
 
Public life in the south of Italy, however, was organized hierarchically, rather than 
horizontally. Most citizens’ participation in and engagement with social and cultural 
associations was meagre (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:115). They were more cynical 
about norms of reciprocity and trust. “Mutual suspicion and corruption were regarded as 
normal” (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:182). It was difficult to overcome these 
barriers of suspicion (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:174).  
 
The frequency of newspaper reading indicated the connection between civic engagement and 
newspaper reading in the regions of Italy. Accordingly, 80 per cent of households took a 
daily newspaper in the north, while 35 per cent in the south did so (Putnam, Leonardi and 
Nanetti, 1993: 92-3, 222). 
 
The research of Fukuyama (1991:13), Seligman (1992:282); and Misztal (1996:196) reveals 
that similar trends in social trust and involvement in civic organizations appeared in the 
former Soviet Union and other former Communist countries in the twentieth century. 
Horizontal trust between individuals eventually weakened as a result of the increasing 
centralization of power on the state (Fukuyama, 1991:13). The communist party consciously 
weakened all forms of horizontal association in favour of vertical ties between party-state and 
the individual (Seligman, 1992:182). As Misztal stated “The comparison of the former Soviet 
bloc countries and Italy reinforces the observation that low levels of trust correspond with a 
lack of civil society” (1996:196).  
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Putnam began to focus on social capital and trust in the United States at the beginning of 
1990s. He published an influential article (1995) and later produced a book, Bowling Alone 
(2000). Here he stressed that the quality of public life and the performance of social 
institutions are powerfully influenced by social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness which give rise to civic engagement (Putnam, 1995:66; Putnam, 2000:16). 
Putnam assured his readers that:  
 
The casual arrows among civic involvement, reciprocity, honesty, and social 
trust are as tangled as well-tossed spaghetti. Only careful, even experimental, 
research will be able to sort them apart definitively. For present purposes, 
however, we need to recognize that they form a coherent syndrome. 
(2000:137). 
 
Putnam mentions that in contemporary America, civic and political engagement, social ties 
and social trust and institutional trust have declined since the 1970s. Membership and activity 
in local clubs, civic and religious organizations (while there are some counter trends) have 
been declining at alarming rate. As a result, he argued that Americans do not trust each other 
as much as they used to. Social trust has fallen from 58 per cent in 1960 to 35 per cent in the 
mid-1990s (Putnam, 1995:67; 2000:139). Moreover, public trust and confidence in 
government has fallen steadily within these three decades. “The proportion of Americans 
who reply that they ‘trust the government in Washington’ only ‘some of the time’ or ‘almost 
never’ has risen steadily from 30 per cent in 1966 to 75 per cent in 1992” (Putnam, 1995:68). 
The available evidence confirms that the decline of civic associations and organizations 
correlates with the decline of social and political trust. “People who trust others are more 
likely to participate in almost all of these activities, so the decline in trust is strongly linked to 
the fall in civic engagement” (Uslaner, 1998: 2). As Hardin stated, “[t]he main correlation, 
for Putnam and others, who are worried about the possible decline of government 
effectiveness over time, is a putative and simultaneous decline in so-called generalized trust 
and in trusting government over the past few decades in the United States” (Hardin, 2003: 3). 
Public trust in the media declined from 65 per cent in 1970 to 33 per cent in 1998 (Putnam, 
2000). Putnam (2000) finds that both trust and membership of associations are in decline in 
the United States, and confirmed the idea of a link between the two phenomena: membership 
is in decline and leads to declining social trust and confidence in institutions.  
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The relation of trust or mistrust is reflected not only in the behaviour of citizens but also in 
government organizations and other public and private institutions (Yang and Holzer, 
2006:119). Newton and Norris (2000) showed that there is a correlation between the decline 
of social trust, and trust in government organizations, religious institutions and commercial 
firms. 
 
One of the criticisms of Putman’s theory focuses on types of trust in society (Hardin, 1999; 
Narayan and Cassidy, 2001; Farrell and Knight, 2003; Fattore, Turnbull and Wilson, 2003). 
These authorities emphasized the need to distinguish between particularized trust and 
generalized trust social trust – trust in individuals (personal friends, neighbours, and stranger 
or fellow citizens) and trust in institutions. Putnam, however, used social trust without 
distinction for all kinds of trust. Narayan and Cassidy (2001) distinguish between trust of 
family, trust in people in the neighbourhood, trust in people from other tribes or groups, trust 
in owners of businesses, trust in government officials, trust in judges, trust in government 
service providers and trust in government itself. Stone classified relationships into those 
dependent on norms of trust and those dependent on norms of reciprocity (Stone, 2001:7). 
According Stone, norms of trust refer to social trust (personal and generalized) and 
institutional trust. Putnam, however, since his work in the 1990s has further clarified 
distinctions between social trust, trust in government organizations, or other social 
institutions (2000:137). 
 
The second criticism is focused on the limitations of measurement indices of social trust and 
trust in government organizations. Putnam, failing at this point to distinguish between types 
of social trust, used a single question to assess trust in neighbours, strangers, and citizens 
(Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993). Fattore, Turnbull and Wilson suggested three types of 
trust: trust in neighbours, trust in other people generally, and trust in government (2003:168). 
They tested explanatory variables by developing regression models based on the Middle 
Australia Project data. Fattore, Turnbull and Wilson use a measure of civic association as one 
of independent variables to predict trust across the three measures of trust. Lukatela compares 
the relationship between social trust, membership of voluntary organizations and political 
participation in Western and Eastern Europe (Lukatela, 2007). His study showed the 
existence of relationships between trust and civic participation in voluntary organizations 
(Lukatela, 2007: 12).  
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Another criticism is related to the measurement of generalized trust in multi-ethnic and 
multicultural societies (Delhey and Newton, 2002; Rothstein, 2005). The argument is that 
generalized trust measurements can apply to western countries since the ‘winners’ or ‘haves’ 
in society express a high degree of trust in their fellow-citizens, while the ‘losers’ or ‘have-
nots’ in society are low trusters. Delhey and Newton questioned the applicability of 
generalized trust for an ethnically and culturally diverse society. Another major criticism 
concerns role of voluntary associations as the most prominent source of social trust, leading 
to political trust (Norris and Newton, 2000; Rothstein and Stolle, 200; Delhey and Newton, 
2002; Rothstein, 2005). This argument is presented in following section. 
3.4.2 Institutional performance theory  
 
Institutional performance theory is in opposition to the notion of social and cultural theory, 
and especially to Putnam’s idea of social capital. The theory is advanced by Kenneth Newton 
and Pippa Norris (2000), Bo Rothstein and Dietlind Stolle (2001), Delhey and Newton 
(2005), and Bo Rothstein and Eric Uslaner (2006). The theory focuses on the idea that 
“Government institutions that perform well are likely to elicit the confidence of citizens; 
those that perform badly or ineffectively generate feelings of distrust and low confidence” 
(Newton and Norris, 2000: 7). The theory recognizes that the reaction of the public depends 
on whether the institutions are perceived as performing well or poorly. The performance of 
institutions serves as an important foundation for the building and maintenance of 
institutional trust and enables social trust especially generalized trust to develop (Rothstein 
and Stolle, 2001:3). This theory emphasizes the importance of quality institutional setups for 
generating opportunities for trust and voluntary organizations. Political institutions are likely 
to appear first, and this encourages social trust and engagement as well as participation in 
voluntary organizations. Institutional performance theory suggests that trust appears ‘from 
the top-down’, rather than from bottom up, which is the assumption of social and cultural 
theory.  
 
Not all institutions and organizations are expected to produce the desired trust. According to 
Rothstein (2005) institutions are classified into universal institutions and particularized 
institutions. The former are expected to serve the public interest while the later promote the 
interests of certain groups or individuals (Lewin, 1991, Rothstein, 2005). Institutional 
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performance theory advocates the development of universal institutions which promote the 
principles of equality and fairness. 
 
Different arguments have been advanced concerning the relationship between political trust 
and social trust. In realizing the importance of social trust in the building of social capital 
which will in turn strengthen political institutions, Newton and Norrris (2000) claim that 
there may be a significant indirect relationship between social trust and confidence in 
political institutions. They suggested that if social trust helps build social capital, and social 
capital helps strengthen political institutions, government performance may improve, 
inspiring citizens’ confidence. Conversely, if social trust declines and stores of social capital 
diminish, then political institutions will perform less well, government performance will 
suffer, and citizens’ confidence in government will decline (2000: 7-8).  
 
Institutional performance theory does not predict a very strong relationship between social 
trust and confidence in institutions at the individual level. It predicts the existence of strong 
relationships at the aggregate level. Newton and Norris (2000, 2005), for instance, suggest 
that the theory offers an indirect relationship between confidence in political institutions and 
social trust at aggregate level rather than at individual level. They observe that “[we] would 
not expect to find a strong individual-level relationship between the two; we would expect to 
find a stronger set of relationships at the aggregate level of societies or nation-states” 
(Newton and Norrris, 2000:7). This is mainly because on the one hand confidence in 
institutions is the product of the performance of institution and on the other hand government 
performance affects individuals according to personality or social status in the society. This 
does not mean however that the confidence of citizens in institutions does not vary; 
individual levels of trust in government and in people in general are likely to correlate 
(Allum, Patulny and Sturgis, 2007). 
 
Due to the influence of political institutions on the interaction between individuals and 
society, political institutions play significant roles in the fostering of social trust. Rothstein 
and Stolle (2001:7) advanced the idea that the experience of impartial, just social and 
political institutions, responsible for the implementation of public policies and law, is more 
important for the development of generalized trust. Rothstein and Stolle (2001) argued that 
people’s perceptions that political institutions are fair and effective are critical determinants 
of social trust. They suggest that citizens who have directly, or indirectly experienced 
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institutional unfairness and dishonesty transfer these experiences and views to people in 
general. Good government has the potential to create favourable conditions for social trust.  
 
The results of empirical research on the link between social trust and political trust differ. 
Newton and Norris (2000), using the World Value Survey (WVS), examine the relations 
between social trust and political trust, by measuring political trust as confidence in 
government. They find that aggregate confidence links positively with social trust. Similarly, 
Zmerli and Newton (2006) examined the relations between social and political trust using 
European Social Survey (ESS) and find positive relations. Other research indicates no casual 
connection, showing that confidence in institutions produces social trust. Research findings in 
Sweden indicated no strong correlation between political and social trust (Rothstein, 2002; 
2005:107). Trust in political institutions has dramatically declined since the mid-1980s, while 
social trust remains at a high and stable level. 
 
To understand clearly the degree of public confidence in organizations, it is important to 
classify them properly. Newton and Norris (2000) categorised ten institutions as public-sector 
institutions (including parliament, the civil service, the legal system, the police, and the 
army), and private and non-profit-making sectors (the educational system, the church, trade 
unions and the press – and, more controversially, major companies).  
 
Rothstein and Stolle (2002) allocated the institutions to three groups. The first is formed by 
political or biased institutions, that is, representative institutions with elected officials: 
political parties, such as parliament and the government. The second group is formed by 
‘neutral or ordering’ institutions (the courts, the army, the police,). The third group is control 
or checking institutions (civic society and the media). Rothstein (2005) also classified 
institutions into implementational, representative, and controlling institutions. 
Implementational institutions encompass everything from law enforcement to courts to 
unemployment offices, public health care, social services offices and public schools. 
Representative institutions include parliament, the cabinet, city councils, trade unions, and 
political parties. Control institutions include newspapers, radio and television. Caínzos et al. 
(2006) divided the institutions into two groups. These are: political institutions (parties, 
parliament, government, civil service, courts, newspapers and television) and social order 
institutions (army, police, church). For the purpose of my study Rothstein’s latest 
classification is applied to classify democratic institutions. Moreover, for the purposes of this 
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thesis, big business and large companies, including banks and financial institutions, will be 
added.   
 
Reliable indicators are required for the measurement of the performance of institutions vis-à-
vis the gaining of citizens’ trust (Watson, 2004; Yang and Holzer, 2006:217). Public trust in 
government organizations, social institutions, and political organizations as well as media 
credibility is based on the perceptions of society of the performance of these organizations. 
The performance of organizations is the determining factor when it comes to public trust or 
distrust (Bouckaert et al., 2002; Yang and Holzer, 2006). To address the performance-trust 
link, especially in the case of citizens’ trust in government, Bouckaert et al (2002) 
distinguished two approaches: macro-performance theory and micro-performance theory. 
Macro-performance theory emphasised factors such as the unemployment rate, economic 
growth, inflation, and the stability of government. Micro-performance theory refers to the 
perception of citizens concerning service delivery and outcomes from government 
organizations. The latter is more appropriate to assessment of citizens’ trust in organizations.  
 
Institutional trust can be measured from management, organizational, marketing and public 
relations perspectives (see Watson, 2004). The public relations approach refers to three 
dimensions of trust: integrity (justice and honesty, care for the public interest,), dependability 
(dedication to duty), and efficiency (Grunig and Hon, 1999:3). I will use this approach to 
assess the confidence the public to the performance of the organizations and institutions. 
Rothstein and Stolle (2001) suggest three dimensions of confidence in institutions that are 
responsible for the implementation of public policies. The dimensions are: fairness, 
impartiality and efficiency. Based on these principles, the public is likely to trust or distrust 
the institutions.   
 
Institutional confidence, in the World Values Survey is generally measured on a four-point 
scale using the following question: “Please look at this card and tell me, for each item, how 
much confidence you have in….Is it a great deal (4), quite a lot (3), not very much (2) or 
none at all (1)?”  In addition to this, questions on satisfaction with the performance of 
government and the general state of the country’s economy are included in the variables 
(Rubal, Voces, Ferrín and  Caínzos, 2007; Kuenzi, 2008).  
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One of the criticisms of the institutional performance theory is that it is based on the idea that 
public confidence is mainly derived from the performance of social and governmental 
organizations. The theory holds that trust and confidence are neither personality traits nor the 
direct products of social conditions. These factors, however, have some impact on public 
confidence in institutions (Bouckaert et al., 2002; Yang and Holzer, 2006). Socio-
demographic variables, such as education, income, employment, political sympathies and 
ethnicity have been seen by Hetherington (1999) Allum, Patulny and Sturgis (2007) and 
Kuenzi (2008) as influencing social trust and confidence in institutions. Allum, Patulny and 
Sturgis (2007) re-examined the correlation between social trust, institutional trust and civic 
association on a range of individual sociological and personality characteristics. Another 
criticism relates to the measurement of performance. There is no consistent index for 
measuring confidence in social institutions and government organizations. The same 
measurements are applied to organizations which have different duties and responsibilities. 
Measurements including satisfaction with the economy and satisfaction with government 
performance are too general and do not assess trust or confidence, but rather the confidence 
in economic or political policies.  
 
Delhey and Newton (2005) developed a cross-national model to explain the origins of social 
trust in sixty countries across the world. They consider that political, economic and social 
conditions are the potential sources of social trust. This assumption is in opposition to social 
and cultural theory and institutional performance theory. Delhey and Newton identified six 
major indicators: political and social estrangement and conflict, economic development and 
modernization, democracy and good governance, voluntary associations and civil society, 
and religion and culture. In the case of each of these indicators, they appended a list of more 
than thirty independent variables. The findings indicate that ‘high trust’ countries are 
characterized by ethnic homogeneity, Protestant religious traditions, good governance, wealth 
(gross domestic product per capita), and a high degree of parity between incomes (Delhey 
and Newton, 2005). 
 
This model overcomes in a systematic way the limitations of other theories in the 
classification of the origins of social trust in different countries. However, I have two issues 
with the model: the first concerns indicators, as the model applies most of the economic and 
political indicators used by different institutions to evaluate the political and economic 
systems of countries. There is a tendency to efface important distinctions and divide the 
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nations into two or three broad categories. Developed countries have evidently fulfilled most 
of the measurements in their category and tend to have high social trust, and the assumption 
is that social trust in developing countries will tend to be less. The dual economy, however, 
such as exists in South Africa and elsewhere, cannot comfortably be included in either of 
these categories.  
 
The second issue is that the model, by its character, which involves only social and economic 
indicators, is inadequate. I believe that conditions such as demographics, including religion, 
ethnic group, educational achievements, are also relevant in the determination of social trust 
in a given country.  
 
My study applied both social and cultural theory and institutional performance theory to test 
the correlation between the three dimensions of trust or mistrust: social trust, trust in 
government organizations (political trust), and public confidence in the media (see Figure 3.4 
and Figure 3.5). In terms of social trust, personal trust in neighbours and trust in the general 
public, together with the propensity of individuals voluntarily to engage in civic associations 
was assessed. For this purpose I used social and cultural theory to assess the correlation 
between voluntary organizations and social trust, and between voluntary organizations and 
institutional trust, as well as the relationship between social trust and institutional trust. 
Membership and activity in civic organizations and associations is used as a dependent 
variable to assess the correlation between trust and civic associations. My survey incorporates 
questions about membership of different types of civic and voluntary organizations 
(Annexure 2.4: Variables and questions for trust and confidence in the analysis). For each 
organization and association, three categories will be used: “active member” – “inactive 
member” and “don’t belong” – to predict the extent of participants’ involvement (World 
Value Survey, 2000).  
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Source: Extrapolated from collected data and information 4 
 
Institutional performance theory is used to assess public confidence in government 
organizations and social institutions. The general question of WVS will be used to measure 
confidence in institutions. The satisfaction with the government is incorporated in the 
variables.  
 
For public perceptions of media credibility, as discussed in chapter three, I consider the 
following dependent variables: accurate – inaccurate; balanced – unbalanced; thoroughly 
researched – under-researched; critical – non-critical; neutral – partial, clear – obscure; 
trustworthy – untrustworthy; factual – unreliable; complete– incomplete; concerned with the 
public interest – unconcerned with the public interest (Miller, 2003). The public’s media 
consumption pattern and media interaction are considered as variables for assessing the link 
between social trust and institutional trust (see Figure 3.5).  
 
                                                          
4 All the figures in this thesis, except those sources are explicitly stated, are extrapolated from collected data and 
information. 
Social 
Trust 
Media Credibility   
Political 
Trust 
Public perceptions  
Figure 3.4: Triangular of Trust or Mistrust 
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As Figure 3.5 illustrates, the following demographic factors were used as independent 
variables for social trust; institutional trust and media credibility in order to assess the levels 
of the relationships and media uses and consumption patterns. These are: gender, ethnicity, 
education, religion, income and political affiliation. 
3.5 Conclusion  
 
Chapter three deals with the theoretical and conceptual framework of the study which I used to 
investigate relationships between and among social trust, political trust and news media credibility in 
relation to media uses and exposure.  The thesis as a whole deals with perceptions of public 
social trust in government, civic and social institutions, including the credibility of the mass 
media. My research, specifically, interrogated public confidence in the print and electronic 
media and how the same relates to government institutions and civic society organisations, as 
well as the impact of public confidence on media consumption patterns. In order to 
investigate these issues in a disciplined and systematic manner, a number of theories were be 
used. 
 
We are now ready to move to chapter four. In chapter four, I explain the composition of the 
study population based on respondents’ regions, residential areas, gender, age, income levels, 
educational attainment and political affiliations. These demographic factors were used as 
independent variables in the determination of social trust, institutional trust and media 
credibility with a view to ascertaining media consumption and exposure patterns. The 
exercise also helped in determining relationships between and among social trust, political 
trust and media credibility. 
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Figure 3.5: The relationships between and among social trust, 
institutional confidence and media credibility* 
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CHAPTER FOUR: COMPOSITION OF RESPONDENTS’ SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This research has employed survey methods to map out and analyze the perception and 
attitude of the general population on issues relevant to the study. I believe that survey is 
worthy method for collecting and measuring attitudes of a large number of populations. 
The questionnaire was designed and administered for this purpose in Addis Ababa 
administration, Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regional states. The questioner had four main 
sections. The first section composes the questions about the socio-demographic factors of 
the respondents. In this chapter, I will explain the composition of the study population 
based on respondents four staying regions (Addis Ababa, Tigray, Amhara and Oromia), 
respondents three staying areas (urban, semi-urban and rural), gender (male and female),  
respondents three age groups [young (18-39 ages), middle aged (40-59 ages) and old (60 
and above)], respondents three income levels (low, middle and high income), respondents 
four educational levels (no formal education, primary and high school, certificate and 
diploma and first degree and above) and respondents four political affiliations (ruling 
party, oppositions, neutral and “Don’t know”).   
4.2 Composition of respondents 
 
A total of 1816 questionnaires were gathered from the survey. As table 4.1 shows almost 
each of the four regions consisted of one fourth of the respondents. The respondents were 
represented from Addis Ababa 424 (23.3 per cent), Tigray 449 (24.7 per cent), Amhara 
480 (26.4 per cent) and Oromia 463 (25.5 per cent). Regarding respondents’ home area, 
slightly more than half of the respondents (53 per cent) were resident in urban areas, 
about 16 per cent in semi-urban and nearly one third of them lived in rural areas (31 per 
cent). The share of the urban respondents was high because of all the respondents of 
Addis Ababa lived in the city. The remaining three regions had an equivalent share on the 
vicinity of the respondents. 
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Table 4.1: Respondent's Region 
 
  Frequency Valid Percent 
 Addis Ababa 424 23.3 
  Tigray 449 24.7 
  Amhara  480 26.4 
  Oromia  463 25.5 
  Total 1816 100.0 
 
 
About 1757 respondents (96.8 per cent) of the total study population of 1816 reported 
their residential areas.  More than half of the respondents were from urban areas, while 
15.9 per cent from semi-urban and 31.1 per cent from rural areas. About 1750 
respondents (96.4 per cent) identified their gender. The composition of the respondents’ 
gender was that of the respondents who indicated their gender 1092 (62.4 per cent) were 
male and 658 (37.6 per cent) were female (see Figure 4.1).   
 
 
 
 
 
The composition of the respondents’ age categorized as 1229 young (18-39 ages) 68.7 
per cent, 474 middle aged (40-59 ages) 26.5 per cent and 87 old (60 and above) 4.9 per 
cent. The composition of the age of the respondents reflects the population structure of 
the country (see Figure 4.2).  
  
Figure 4.1: Respondents gender (in percentage)
Male
Female
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Regarding the respondents’ marital status, about 60 per cent of the respondents were 
married, 31 per cent not married, about 5 per cent of each were single or widowed when 
the survey was conducted. Since the regional administrative of Ethiopia is divided based 
on ethnic groups, the composition of respondents’ ethnic group reflected this fact. Out of 
1750 respondents who reported their ethnics 37.3 per cent were Amhara, 29.5 per cent 
were Oromo, 27.5 per cent were Tigrei, 5.4 per cent were Gurage and 0.2 per cent were 
other tribal groups.  As the cross tabulation table shows that the three dominant ethnic 
groups accounted more than 92 per cent in their respective regions. The variation created 
because of Addis Ababa administration in which various ethnic groups are staying in the 
city (Figure 4.3).  
  
 
 
In terms of level of education, slightly more than one third of the respondents 35.6 per 
cent) had no formal education. About one tenth of the respondents (9.1 per cent) had 
primary and high school education. Forty per cent of the respondents were certificate and 
68.7
26.5
4.9
Figure 4.2: Compsition of respondents in age 
groups (in percentage)
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Figure 4.3: Respondent's ethnic group (in percentage) 
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diploma holders. About 15 per cent of the respondents reported that graduated first 
degree and above (Figure 4.4).    
 
 
About 1200 respondents (66.4 per cent) indicated their profession or occupation. More 
than one quarter of the respondents were engaged in the agriculture sector. About one 
eighth of the respondents and one tenth of the respondents were involved in education, 
and management and administration respectively. The respondents were involved in 
different sectors including banking and financial service, construction, engineering, 
health, legal, communication and media, performing arts, armed forces and security.   
 
Followers of different religion were participated in the survey. About 80 per cent of the 
respondents were Orthodox Christian. Of the respondents Protestant, Muslim, Catholic, 
traditional and other accounted for 10.6 per cent, 7.8 per cent, 1.4 per cent, 0.3 per cent 
and 0.6 per cent respectively (see Figure 4.5). These figures, especially the Muslim, were 
not exactly in line with the recent result of the census of the country (Commission of the 
National Housing and Population Census, 2007). The main reasons were mentioned in 
the methodology chapter under constraints in conducting the research. In realizing the 
nature of the survey questions and the political tension of the country, a number of people 
were reluctant to take part in the survey in all regions except in Tigray. In general, the 
participation of the intended informants varied from region to region. The participants in 
Tigray region were highly encouraged and self-motivated to participate in the research; 
while the intended informants of other regions did not show an interest in taking part in 
the research fully and actively. My assistants and I made relentless efforts to create 
35.6
9.1
40.4
14.9
Figure 4.4: Respondent's educational background (in 
percentage)
No Formal Education
Primary and High School
Certificate and Diploma
First Degree and Above
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common ground and convince them to involve in the study which requires their full 
participation. 
 
As noted above, the participation of Muslim respondents was very low. There were two 
main reasons. Firstly, I realized that the Muslim communities of the selected research 
sites were not fully involved in political and other similar sensitive issues. They preferred 
to take safe attitude and be stayed as outsiders. Besides, in some sites such as Shire 
Endasellasie, Kebele 03 and Tachi Gayint Woreda, Kebele 01, the surveyors were told 
that the participation of Muslim housewives in the survey depended on the permission of 
their respective husbands. They did not immediately respond positively or negatively on 
the spot to the questions posed by the administrators from the questionnaire, nor did they 
immediately agree to be one of the subjects of the survey after our briefing on the 
objective and the nature of the research. The women told us to come back later once they 
had discussed the decision with their husbands. In most cases we received a negative 
response, as it was anticipated. Even their husbands themselves were not happy to engage 
in the study. A second factor that might contribute to the low participation of Muslim 
people was the low rate of Muslim professional and occupational in the government 
organizations and civil society institutions.  
 
 
Regarding respondents’ income, about 80 per cent of the participants of the survey 
responded for the question “In which income group are you categorized? (per month)”. 
79.2
1.4
10.6
7.8
0.3 0.6
Figure 4.5: Religion of the respondents (in percentage)
Orthodox
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Protestant
Muslim
Traditional
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Accordingly, 896 respondents (62.5 per cent) could be categorized under low income 
group and 482 respondents (33.6 per cent) under middle income group. The remaining 55 
respondents (3.8 per cent) could be categorized under high income group (see Figure 
4.6). Ethiopian household is characterized with low income and poor social indicators as 
a result of long years of civil war, devastating droughts, inappropriate policies and 
strategies (World Bank, 1998).  
 
 
 
In realizing the importance of political proximity and the political intensity of the 
country, the respondents were requested to indicate their inclination towards a certain 
political party. A sum of 1719 respondents (94.7 per cent of the total respondents) 
indicated their political affiliations. Off the total respondents, 1177, respondents or about 
69 per cent of the respondents, noted that they were inclined to the ruling party, Ethiopian 
People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), 4.5 per cent of the respondents leaned 
to opposition parties. About 22 per cent reported as independent and another 5.1 per cent 
of respondents responded that they ‘Don’t know”.  
 
62.5
33.6
3.8
Figure 4.6: Respondents income level (in percentage)
Low income
Middle income
High income
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In terms of ethnic groups, of the respondents 60 per cent were Amhara, 44 per cent were 
Gurage, 68 per cent were Oromo, 87 per cent were Tigrie and 50 per cent of other ethnic 
group inclined to the ruling party, EPRDF (see figure 4.8). As figure 4.9 indicates, 
slightly more than 90 per cent of respondents of Tigray were inclined towards the ruling 
party while slightly more than 7 out of ten of respondents from each region of Amhara 
and Oromia and slightly more than one third of respondents of Addis Ababa reported for 
association with the ruling party.  
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Figure 4.7: Respondents political affiliations in rlation to 
ethnics cross tabulation (in percentage)
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Figure 4.8: Respondents political affiliation in staying 
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4.3 Conclusion  
 
In this Chapter, I explained the composition of the study population based on 
respondents’ regions, residential areas, gender, age, income levels, educational attainment 
and political affiliations as considering as independent variables in the determination of 
social trust, institutional trust and media credibility with a view to ascertaining media 
consumption and exposure patterns. The composition of the study population was 
determined on the basis of socio-demographic factors with a view to ascertaining the 
significance of independent variables. A total of 1,816 questionnaires were successfully 
administered in the four regions.   
  
In the proceeding chapter, I examine respondents’ news media access, exposure and 
consumption patterns from the perspective of media audiences in various social contexts 
with a view to identifying determinants of public media consumption patterns. Analysis 
of media consumption patterns and media preferences of the public was done using the 
integrated model of audience choice.   
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 CHAPTER FIVE: MEDIA ACCESS, EXPOSURE AND CONSUMPTION PATTERNS IN THE 
SOCIAL CONTEXT OF ETHIOPIA 
“Together media use or other behaviors produce gratification (or nongratification) that 
has an impact on the individual or society, thereby starting the process anew.”  
     - Thomas E. Ruggiero 
5. 1. Introduction   
 
This Chapter examines the urban, semi-urban and rural sampled dwellers’ access, 
exposure and consumption of mass media and the social contexts in which media 
exposure and consumption occur. It assesses the use of radio, television and newspapers 
in society. The analysis is focused on the socio-demographic characteristics of the society 
of mass media users. In this regard, the factors that influence the public’s exposure and 
media consumption in Ethiopia are examined. Specifically, the chapter examines whether 
socio-demographic characteristics influence urban, semi-urban and rural populations’ 
exposure and use of the mass media. Analysis of media access, exposure and 
consumption from the perspective of the audience has received a great deal of attention in 
media and communication research. Testing of the relationship between media exposure 
and consumption helps to identify the determinants of media consumption patterns of the 
public. Consequently, the media consumption patterns and preferences of the public 
based on an integrated model of audience choice for uses and gratifications which was 
initiated by Webster and Wakshlag (1983) and developed by McQuail (2000; 2005; 
2010), are assessed. The model encompasses a number of factors concerning media use 
patterns from ‘audience side’ and ‘media side’ (see chapter three: theoretical and 
conceptual framework of the thesis).  
The analysis has been limited to the audience side of the media with particular focus on 
personal attributes and social background (age, gender, educational background, level of 
income, political orientation) and availability and affordability of media, motives for 
media use and the social context of media use. The personal attribute and social 
background are used to analyze the availability and affordability of media, the main 
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sources of communication/information, the motives of media use and the trends of media 
socialization/social context (see Figure 5.0 below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The chapter focuses on the data and results of the survey of issues regarding media 
availability, media exposure and media consumption patterns. The results of the survey 
with multivariate models are presented and the implications of the findings are discussed 
in detail. Outputs from the in-depth interviews and my observations are included 
alongside quantitative data. Conclusions from the analysis are suggested in the final 
section of the chapter. The survey questionnaire included several questions about 
respondents’ access and exposure to contemporary mass media such as radio, television, 
newspapers, internet and magazines.  
I explored the relationships of variables and the strength of relationships among the same. 
Further, the application of sample results for the general population have been discussed 
Independent 
variables 
Media 
availability 
Sources of 
information 
Social 
context 
Motives 
of media 
use
Figure 5.0: Media consumption 
patterns in relation to 
independent and dependent 
variables 
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by examining the statistical significance of the relationship among independent and 
dependent variables. I preferred to use non-parametric tests rather than parametric tests 
because they are more appropriate for the nature of dependent and independent variables, 
the level of measurement of the variables and the assumption that the population is not 
evenly distributed in terms of regions, residential areas and gender of the respondents. 
Though some people believe that non-parametric tests have less power than parametric 
tests (Field, 2005: 521), the fact of the matter is that “[n]on-parametric techniques are 
ideal for use when you have data that are measured on nominal (categorical) and ordinal 
(ranked) scales” (Pallant, 2007: 210). 
 
I used Phi and Cramer’s V for variables with nominal measurement level (nominal vs. 
nominal) to detect the strength of association between two categorical variables (Analyze 
> Descriptive statistics > Crosstab. Put in the variables into row and column, and then 
click Statistics and check in Phi and Cramer’s V). I used Phi for 2X2 contingency tables 
in which two categorical variables are available and each variable has only two 
categories. I used Cramer’s V for two categorical variables that contain more than two 
categories. In a 2 by 2 table, the Pearson Chi-Square value is the value in the continuity 
correction row in considering the notion of Yates’ Correction for continuity (Field, 2005: 
521; Pallant, 2007: 217). For tables larger than 2 by 2, the value is Cramer’s V which 
considers the degree of freedom (DF). In the case of two dichotomous variables (resulting 
in a 2 by 2 table) I used a Phi co-efficient or a Pearson correlation. Or I use Spearman 
Correlation coefficient to determine monotonic relationship between variables (Analyze 
> Correlation > Bivariate > Spearman)   
 
Different criteria are recommended for judging the size effect for larger tables (Pallant, 
2007: 217). Accordingly, the value is: 
• For R-1 or C-1 equal to 1 (two categories): small=.01, medium=.30, large=.50. 
• For either R-1 or C-1 equal to 2 (three categories): small=.07, medium=.21, 
large=.35. 
• For either R-1 or C-1 equal to 3 (four categories): small=.06, medium=.17, 
large=.29. 
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There are no negative correlations in the nominal variable’s tests (Sarantakos, 2007: 90).  
Nominal level measures association, therefore, offer only information about the strength 
but not the direction of the association. Loglinear analysis or model is a bit like an 
ANOVA for categorical data and helps to look at relationships between several 
categorical variables (see Field, 2005: 681, 694-719). Regarding variables with ordinal 
measurement level (for two ordinal variables), I used Gamma, Somers’d and Spearman’s 
rho to examine whether ordinal variables are associated in some way or some degree. For 
two ordinal variables, a Spearman correlation or Kendall’s tau or Somers’d are 
preferable. Gamma, Somers’d and Kendall’s tau-b (τb) are only suitable for cross 
tabulated frequency distributions, while Spearman’s rho is measured based on 
correlation. According to Laerd statistics, “Somers' d is appropriate when you want to 
distinguish between a dependent and an independent variable” (Laerd statistics, 
2018).  For two ordinal variables, a Spearman correlation or Kendall’s tau are preferable 
over Cramér’s V. (Ruben Geert van den Berg, 2014). Concordant pairs are those where 
the two respondents are ranked the same way in both variables, while discordant pairs are 
those that are ranked differently (Sarantakos, 2007: 90).  
 
The ordinal level tests provide information about the strength of the relationship between 
the variables in question and the direction of the association (Sarantakos, 2007: 90). The 
correlation coefficients of the ordinal level tests can be positive or negative in indicating 
the direction of the association. Moreover, for nominal and ordinal variables (one 
nominal and the other ordinal), I considered Kruskal-Wallis (Analyze > Non-parametric 
> Legacy dialog > K-independent samples. Put the Likert variables into Test variable list 
and put the nominal variable into Grouping variable.  
 
5.2 Household media availability and affordability  
 
One of the ways to evaluate the importance of mass media in the lives of the people is to 
assess the availability of hardware in their homes for receiving media products (Rayner, 
Wall and Kruger, 2004). The availability of domestic media has impact on media use. 
Some scholars believe that “[d]omestic media hardware has become an intrinsic part of 
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our homes and our lives” (Rayner, Wall and Kruger, 2004:10). Consequently, 
respondents were asked if they had domestic media hardware such as radio, television, 
tape player, satellite dish, computer, telephone land line and others in their home for 
accessing mass media. As Table 5.1 shows nearly eight out of ten, or 78 per cent, of 
respondents reported having a radio.  Slightly less than half of the population, 48 per 
cent, reported having a tape player, while 47 per cent reported having a television.  These 
figures indicate that the most dominant domestic media hardware is radio. The tape 
player5 and television occupied second and third places, respectively.  
 
Only 2.2 per cent of respondents had a satellite dish, while 3 per cent had laptops. Figures 
for the desktop computer, free-to-air-time and satellite dish were 4.4 and 6 per cent, 
respectively. Nearly three out of ten respondents, or 28 per cent, each reported having a 
land line, while 29.5 per cent reported as owning a cell phone (Table 5.1). Though not all 
homes of respondents had radio sets, the radio was, nevertheless, the most dominant 
media hardware.  In fact, most of the respondents were solely dependent on radio for 
accessing media products. Less than half of the respondents had television sets in their 
homes. Less than 5 per cent of respondents can be considered as ‘multi-channel’ homes 
that are able to access regional or international television stations through satellite dish 
and/or/ free-to-air satellite dish.  
 
 
 
                                                          
5 The high prevalence of tape players can be attributed from its main features. The first attribution is it has 
dual functions, a tape player and radio receiver. The second reason is it can also operate with dry cells 
unlike television which requires electric power supply. People uses the player to listen to the radio 
transmissions and music and songs cassettes on ordinary and special occasions and celebrations such as 
during baptisms, weddings, Christmas, Meskel festival, Finding of the True Cross). The music industry 
published different types of songs and music with tape cassettes before the introduction of DVD and other 
products. Tape players were widely used to play for celebration of religious and public holidays. I 
remember one of my cousins mainly bought a tape player to listen to spiritual songs (menzuma) in the 
beginning of 1970s. It was a prestigious to possess such modern media like tape player. He did not have 
any secular music at his home and he did not allow any of such music to be played in his tape player. He 
has not changed his position after almost four decades as a grandfather. He used to play the tape day and 
night especially when he was reciting prayers with chat and coffee ceremony. I listened to the songs when I 
was attending his shop and the prayers; I have still memorized some of the lyrics and stanzas of the songs. 
My cousin complained the consumption of dry cell to play the tape player as there was no supply of 
electricity in the town on those days. 
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Table 5.1: Frequency of media availability in respondents’ homes 
 
Source: Extrapolated from collected data. 
5.2.1 Media availability within selected independent variables  
 
The levels of respondents’ access to media varied in terms of region, gender, income and 
educational background. In most cases, except radio, the availability of media at the 
respondents’ home varied at regional level. Of the total 1,411 respondents who reported 
having radio in their homes, each of the respondents of the three regional administrations 
accounted for slightly more than one quarter. Addis Ababa, Oromia and Amhara, for 
instance, accounted for 26.6, 25.9 and 25.3 per cent, respectively, while respondents of 
Medium  Frequency Percent 
Radio 
  
Yes 1411 77.7 
No 358 19.7 
Total 1769 97.4 
Television 
  
Yes 830 45.7 
No 939 51.7 
Total 1769 97.4 
Tape player 
  
Yes 843 46.4 
No 922 50.8 
Total 1765 97.2 
 VCR player 
  
Yes 245 13.5 
No 1522 83.8 
Total 1767 97.3 
DVD player 
  
Yes 436 24.0 
No 1332 73.3 
Total 1768 97.4 
Satellite Dish 
  
Yes 39 2.1 
No 1728 95.2 
Total 1767 97.3 
Free-air- satellite dish  Yes 104 5.7 
No 1664 91.6 
Total 1768 97.4 
 Desk top computer  Yes 69 3.8 
No 1696 93.4 
Total 1765 97.2 
Lap top 
  
Yes 52 2.9 
No 1715 94.4 
Total 1767 97.3 
Land line   
  
Yes 499 27.5 
No 1269 69.9 
Total 1768 97.4 
Cell phone 
  
Yes 521 28.7 
No 1245 68.6 
Total 1766 97.2 
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Tigray scored less than one quarter (22.3 per cent). In other words, the percentage range 
of radio availability within respondent’s region was between 72 to 88 per cent (i.e. Addis 
88 per cent, Tigray 72 per cent, Amhara 80 per cent and Oromia 79 per cent).  Addis 
Ababa was the highest and Tigray the least in terms of radio availability in the home of 
the respondents, while Amhara and Oromia were second and third, respectively. 
However, the figures indicate that there are no significant differences with regard to the 
availability of radio within the regions (see Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2).  
 
 
 
Regarding television sets, as Table 5.2 indicates, less than half of total respondents (47 
per cent) responded having television sets in their homes. There were substantial 
differences between and among regional administrations with respect to television set 
availability. Eight out of ten respondents in Addis Ababa, or 81 per cent, had television 
sets as against 46 per cent of the respondents of Tigray.  In contrast, less than one third of 
the respondents of Amhara (32 per cent) and Oromia (31 per cent) had television sets. 
The share of the four regional administrations in television set ownership also varies. 
Addis Ababa accounted for 40 per cent of total television sets and the other three regions 
accounted for the remaining 60 percent. 
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Figure 5.1: Media availability within the respondents' 
homes in different variables of cross tabulation (in 
percentage) 
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Only about two per cent of the total number of respondents had satellite dishes. Nearly 
half of the respondents, or 49 per cent, who said they had satellite dishes were from 
Addis Ababa.  The other half were from the three regions, Tigray (20 per cent), Amhara 
(18 per cent) and Oromia (13 per cent). There was also a high regional variation with 
regard to the ownership of free-to-air satellite dishes. About three quarters of the 
respondents (76 per cent) who reported as having free-to-air satellite dishes were from 
Addis Ababa, while the remaining one quarter were from the three regions of Tigray (16 
per cent), Amhara (5 per cent) and Oromia (3 per cent).  
 
Regarding land line and cell phone availability, Addis Ababa counted more than half of 
the respondents and the other three regions (Tigray, Oromia and Amhara) accounted for 
less than 50 per cent.  Most of hardware media were highly concentrated in Addis Ababa. 
Respondents in Addis Ababa accounted for between 41 and 76 per cent of ownership of 
the seven media hardware, i.e. television (41 per cent), satellite dishes (49 per cent), free-
to-air satellite dishes (76 per cent), desk top computers (67 per cent), lap tops (60 per 
cent), land lines (53 per cent) and cell phones (55 per cent). The share of the three regions 
in ownership of hardware media was less than half of the total reported media ownership. 
The highest score for each region was less than 27 per cent of all reported media 
ownership. Tigray, for instance, accounted for 24 per cent of television ownership, while 
Amhara accounted for 25 per cent of radio ownership Oromia 27 per cent of tape player 
ownership. There was no significant difference in media ownership between the two 
regions of Amhara and Oromia. The Tigray region scored higher than Amhara and 
Oromia with respect to ownership of media hardware such as televisions, satellite dishes, 
free-to-air dishes, lap tops and desk top computers.  
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Regarding respondents’ residential areas, there were significant differences with regard to 
media ownership between and among urban, semi-urban and rural areas. Except for the 
radio, the prevalence of media ownership was noticeably rare as one moved further from 
urban and peri-urban to rural areas. In fact, except for the radio, more than 70 per cent of 
all media hardware were concentrated in urban areas (see Figure 5.3). However, despite 
the predominance of urban areas in media ownership, not all respondents in urban areas 
had all the media hardware.  Eight out of ten, or 80 per cent, and seven out of ten (or 
seventy per cent) of urban respondents, for instance, had radios and television sets, 
respectively. Scores for radio ownership were about 18 per cent and 25 per cent for peri-
urban and rural areas, respectively. Prevalence of ownership of satellite dishes, free-to-air 
dishes, desk top computers and lap top computers by respondents was below 10 per cent 
in urban areas, while none of the respondents in rural areas had any. Land lines were also 
not available in rural areas (Figure 5.3).  
 
The radio was the most dominant form of media hardware in urban, semi-urban and rural 
areas. In contrast, ownership of the tape player is widespread in peri-urban areas (56 per 
cent) and in rural areas (19 per cent).  The percentage of ownership of the media by males 
is higher than that of females across all media types. Out of 1,356 total respondents, 868 
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Figure 5.2: Media availability in regions cross tabulation (in 
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males, or 64.0 per cent, reported having radios in their homes. In contrast, 488 females, 
or 36.0 per cent, reported having radios in their homes. The response rate for males that 
were included in the study sample was about 81 per cent, while that of females was about 
77 per cent. Regarding television set ownership, 504 males, or 63.5 per cent, and 290 
females, or 36.5 per cent, reported that they had sets in their homes. About 7 per cent of 
males and 5 per cent of female respondents reported owning free-to-air satellite dishes.   
 
The pattern seemed almost similar to that of other media channels except for laptops, 
computers and cell phones. For instance, out of 49 respondents who reported owning 
laptops, 35, or 71.4 per cent, and 14, or 28.6 per cent, were males and females, 
respectively.  A total of 342 male (68.5 per cent) and 157 females (31.5 per cent) reported 
that they possessed cell phones during the survey period. Within respondents’ gender, 
32.1 per cent and 24.7 per cent males and females reported having cell phones, 
respectively. This indicates that there was a 7.4 per cent gap between the two gender 
categories and this was the highest difference in ownership across all media categories.  
The lowest difference was 0.2 per cent for ownership of video players, i.e. 13.7 per cent 
for males and 13.5 per cent for females. This signifies that the variation in media 
ownership within respondent’s gender was nominal (see Figure 5.3).  
 
Ownership of media is sensitive to the income level of respondents. Ethiopia is 
categorized as a low-income country. It is also one of the poorest countries in the world 
with a per capita income of $660 (The World Bank in Ethiopia, 2018). In 2000, 55.3 per 
cent of Ethiopians lived in extreme poverty (World Bank, 2016), while the results of the 
2004/05 studies revealed that about 39 percent of the total population were living below 
the poverty datum line (CSA, 2012). Poverty is acute in rural and hard-to-reach areas 
(39.3 per cent) compared to urban areas (35.1 per cent). However, in 2011the Central 
Statistical Agency (CSA) of Ethiopia indicated that poverty levels had somewhat 
declined with about one third of the population living under poverty datum line.  
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It is evident from Figure 5.4 that no media hardware was possessed by all members of 
any income group.  However, the percentage of radio ownership in all income categories 
was higher than that of other media hardware and stood at 78 per cent, 85 per cent and 87 
per cent for low, middle and high-income groups, respectively. In fact, radio was the 
most dominant form of media for respondents in the three income categories. Ownership 
of television was the second most dominant form of media hardware ownership at 67 per 
cent and 72 per cent for middle and high-income groups, respectively, while the tape 
player at 43 per cent was predominant among respondents in the low income group.  
 
The percentage of ownership of media hardware, except satellite dishes, increased 
modestly in accordance with the level of income. For instance, about 22 per cent, 51 per 
cent and 64 per cent of respondents in low, middle and high-income groups, respectively, 
reported having cell phones. However, the increment in media ownership in line with 
income was not impressive. An insignificant 3.8 per cent of respondents, for instance, 
reported having satellite dishes. In contrast, 24.5 per cent reported owning free-to-air 
dishes, 19 per cent having, lap top computers and 11 per cent having desk top computers. 
Regarding respondent’s age, possession of the radio was highest among all the three age 
groups (Table 5.6 and Figure 5.0). The percentage of ownership of satellite dishes was 
lowest among young respondents (2.5 per cent) and the middle-aged (1.2 per cent). There 
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were no reports of ownership of desktops and laptops among aged respondents. However, 
ownership of media hardware, except land lines and free-to-air dishes, was highest 
among young respondents and declined as the age of respondents increased. Young 
people, for example, accounted for 81 per cent of radio ownership against 78 per cent and 
65 per cent for the middle-aged and old people, respectively. The percentage for land line 
ownership was highest among the middle-aged group (31 per cent) compared to 28 per 
cent for the young and 24 per cent for old persons. No old person reported owning a 
desktop or laptop computer.  
 
All in all, young respondents accounted for ownership of more than 70 percent of radio 
sets, television sets, tape players, satellite dishes, desk top computers, lap top computers 
and cell phones. Figure 5.0 shows that ownership of domestic media hardware varied 
according to the level of education of respondents. The study further revealed that the 
percentage of ownership of all media hardware, except for the radio, proportionately 
increased with educational attainment. For instance, the percentage ownership of 
television sets was about 21 per cent for no formal education and 40 per cent for those 
with primary school education. In contrast, certificate and diploma holders accounted for 
60 per cent, while those with degrees accounted for 78 per cent.  However, no single 
educational group reported owning all forms of media hardware. This was surprising 
especially for respondents with highest educational attainments.  
 
The television set was the second most widespread media hardware for the highly 
educated respondents, while the tape player was the most prevalent among other 
educational groups of respondents. Generally, accessibility to satellite dishes, free-to-air 
dishes, desktop computers and laptop computers in survey areas was very low and was 
directly reflected in the educational levels of respondents. Media ownership also varied 
according to respondent’s political affiliation. However, the radio was the most prevalent 
among the four categories of respondents.  Only two-thirds of respondents affiliated to 
the ruling party reported having radios, while eight out of ten respondents affiliated to 
opposition parties had radios. Tape player ownership scored the second highest 
percentage among respondents of the ruling party. In terms of ownership of media 
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hardware, (except for satellite television dishes and desk top computers) politically-
neutral respondents scored the highest percentage. Respondents associated with the ruling 
political parties scored the least percentage. In all, ownership of satellite dishes at 
household level was least among respondents affiliated to political parties.  
5.2.2 The association of media availability and variables  
 
The media world is constantly changing in tandem with advances in information and 
communications technology (ICT). With the world ceaselessly going digital, access to 
and use of the media have been revolutionalised for industrial, commercial and domestic 
users. Facilitated media access across all consumer sectors has been assisted by media 
convergences and synergies that facilitate access to information almost in real time. In the 
case of less industrialised countries such as Ethiopia, advances in ICTs have offered 
unprecedented windows of opportunities and fueled rapid human development.  
  
Ownership of media hardware varied by regions and residential areas of respondents.  
Results of the Chi-square test for media ownership in the four regions revealed that6 there 
was a significant association between region of residence and ownership of a particular 
media hardware, i.e. radios, televisions, satellite dishes, desktop and laptop computers. 
However, the strength of the relationship varied across media hardware. There was, 
                                                          
6 Chi-square test for independence is used to explore the relationship between media hardware availability and the 
four regional administrations as well as the three living areas. The results of the phi coefficient and Cramer’s V on the 
relationships between the four regions and media hardware availability are: 
Radio: X²(3, n = 1769) = 37.70, p = .000, phi = .15 
Television: X²(3, n = 1769) = 279.14, p = .000, phi = .40 
Tape player: X²(3, n = 1765) = 159.69, p = .000, phi = .30 
Satellite dish: X²(3, n = 1767) = 14.05, p = .003, phi = .09 
Free-air-time dish: X²(3, n = 1768) = 168.68, p = .000, phi = .31 
Desk top: X²(3, n = 1768) = 74.37, p = .000, phi = .21 
Lap top: X²(3, n = 1767) = 40.65, p = .000, phi = .15 
Land line: X²(3, n = 1768) = 310.96, p = .000, phi = .42 
Cell phone: X²(3, n = 1766) = 385.23, p = .000, phi = .47. 
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nevertheless, a low association between ownership of tape players and free-to-air dishes 
in the regions compared to television sets, land lines and cell phones.  
 
Similarly, results of the test using Phi co-efficient and Cramer’s V of the relationships 
between the three residential locales and media hardware ownership7  showed that the 
results of the tests of the correlation of the four regions and media ownership and 
residential areas of respondents and the media hardware were very similar. Invariably, 
there were substantial and significant differences between and among urban, semi-urban 
and rural areas in terms of ownership of televisions, land lines and cell phones. The 
correlation between and among ownership of radios, satellite dishes, desk top computers 
and lap top computers and residential areas of respondents was very low. However, the 
radio was widely spread among the regions and among urban, semi-urban and rural areas, 
while satellite dishes, desktop and laptop computers were not widely dispersed across the 
regions. It is, therefore, evident that there was no significant association between and 
among ownership of the radio, regions and residential areas of respondents.  
 
Currently, a typical urban home would not just have one television set, one radio and one 
telephone. Some respondents in Addis Ababa, Mettu, Shire and Debre Tabor, for 
example, had most of domestic media hardware. A respondent in Addis Ababa, in fact, 
said out that “I have all kinds of media systems, including satellite dish, especially Arab 
channels. I use them properly whenever I need them” (Interview 14, May 20, 2009: 1). 
Similarly, a respondent in Mettu said “I have all household media. To tell you the fact 
most of the time I watch satellite Television” (Interviewee 27, May 28, 2009: 28). 
                                                          
7 Radio: X²(2, n = 1712) = 71.13, p = .000, phi = .20 
Television: X²(2, n = 1712) = 542.90, p = .000, phi = .56 
Tape player: X²(2, n = 1708) = 252.21, p = .000, phi = .38 
Satellite dish: X²(2, n = 1710) = 24.57, p = .000, phi = .12 
Free-air-time dish: X²(2, n = 1711) = 74.4, p = .000, phi = .21 
Desk top: X²(2, n = 1708) = 44.79, p = .000, phi = .16 
Lap top: X²(2, n = 1710) = 40.86, p = .000, phi = .16 
Land line: X²(2, n = 1711) = 432.83, p = .000, phi = .51 
Cell phone: X²(2, n = 1709) = 382.58, p = .000, phi = .47. 
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Another respondent in Debre Tabor also said “I have radio and television. I have also 
satellite dish. I listen to radio and watch television to follow news” (Interviewee 45, June 
8, 2009:51). Yet another respondent from Indabaguna noted that “I have radio, television 
and satellite dish” (Interviewee 5, May 14, 2009: 17).  
 
Although most urban areas have telecommunications infrastructure such as mobile phone 
communication towers, not all residents own media hardware. One quarter of urban 
respondents, for example, did not have televisions and one out of ten respondents did not 
have radio sets. The major reason that was sighted for not owning these media hardware 
was lack of money to acquire them. In Ethiopia household media hardware are subject to 
pay customs duty, payable excise tax, value added tax (VAT), surtax and withholding tax 
(Hunachew, 2014). These customs duty, tariff and taxes have massive impact on the price 
of the television set, radio set, and other media hardware. It can, therefore, be seen that, 
despite the availability of telecommunications infrastructure, some residents were 
constrained from benefiting from the same due to their poor income levels. One lesson 
that may be learnt from this is that it is not good enough to bring telecommunications 
infrastructure, such as mobile phone communication towers, close to the people without 
also ensuring that they have income levels that would permit them access to and use of 
the facilities. In echoing this concern, a young female job-seeker in Addis Ababa said: “I 
have a radio set. I do not have television. I would like to have television, but I don’t have 
enough money to buy it”. Similarly, an old and low-income informant man from North 
Western Tigray Zone said “I do not have radio and television because I cannot afford to 
buy them now” (Interviewee 1, May 13, 2009:5). A farmer from Tachi Gayint Woreda 
also said “I do not have radio now. It was burnt down along with my house. I have not 
bought another one since then because of lack of money” (Interviewee 41, June 6 2009: 
32).  
The other challenge is that some people have the financial capacity to buy and own 
certain media hardware but are constrained from doing so by the absence of media 
infrastructure in their areas. One respondent, for example, said that “There is no 
television here and we depend on the radio”, while another said “I have only radio. There 
is no television in our area” (Interviewee 20, May 27, 2009:1).  It was also noted that 
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people in certain residential areas do not watch Ethiopian Television, either due to poor 
network or simply because the network does not reach them. Consequently, even if they 
own television sets, they are unable to access and watch it. In the event, those who can 
afford buy and install free-to-air satellite dishes. One respondent, in fact, said “We cannot 
follow television in this town because there is no Ethiopian television network and 
system in this town. We use the satellite from the dish receiver to get access to it, and 
only few people can afford it. The government should provide the service” (Interviewee 
5; May 14, 2009:18).  It was, however, learnt that the Government of Ethiopia has 
realised this challenge and decided to incorporate Ethiopian Television into free-to-air 
satellite transmission, especially the Arab Sat that will provide 24-hour transmission 
services. 
 
In certain towns such as Uka (Oromia Region), Indabaguna (Tigray Region) and Arb 
Gebeya (Amhara Region), lack of electricity was said to be the major reason for not 
having television services. In the event, those who can afford buy and use generators. The 
non-availability of electric power in these towns has limited residents to using television. 
An informant from Indabaguna, for instance, said that “Most of the people in this Woreda 
use the radio since there is no electricity for television” (Interviewee 5, May 14, 2009: 
18). In the towns of Tachi Gayint and Arb Gebeya, the Dolphin Hotel uses generators for 
accessing free-to-air-satellite transmission services. However, Tachi Gayint town got 
connected to the electricity grid during the time that the survey was underway.  
 
A typical rural home, in some cases, would not have a radio. This was attested to by one 
respondent who said that “I don’t have radio and television. I am simply a 
peasant/farmer” (Interviewee 42; June 6, 2009: 38).  A female respondent in Indabaguna 
town also said that “I do not have a radio or television at home and I do not often get out 
from the house. I can say I do not often follow programmes from the television or the 
radio but I sometimes read newspaper for myself. I have found very important 
information from the newspapers for myself” (Interviewee 6; May 14, 2009:24). Some 
respondents in urban, semi-urban and rural areas had only a radio in their homes. A 
respondent in Addis Ababa, for example, said that “I have a radio; I don’t have television. 
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I sometimes listen to news from the radio when I have time for it” (Interviewee 21; May 
27, 2009: 4).  |As has been said already, the most dominant form of media ownership in 
homes was radio with the tape player and television occupying second and third 
positions, respectively.  
 
Results of the study, however, showed that not all homes of respondents had a radio set. 
Similarly, not all respondents had a television set at home. In fact, more than half of the 
respondents did not have a television set at home. Respondents’ access to media varied in 
terms of region, gender, income level and educational attainment. Most hardware media 
were highly concentrated in the Addis Ababa region and other urban areas. The highest 
percentage of media ownership was scored among urban respondents, including those in 
Addis Ababa, and declined noticeably (except radio) as one moved from urban and semi-
urban to rural areas.  
 
Ownership of media hardware among males and females was striking in several respects. 
This is evident from the statistical data8 indicated by Pearson Chi-Square (p) values of 
radio .06, television.52, tape player .63, satellite dish .23, free-to-air  dishes, .29, desk top 
computers .26, lap top computers .20 and land lines .91 which are all larger than the alpha 
value of .05. This shows that there is no significant association between media hardware 
ownership and gender. The proportion of males who had television sets, tape players, 
satellite dishes, free-to-air dishes, desk top computers, lap top computers and land lines 
                                                          
8The results of the phi coefficient (with Yates Continuity Correction) on the relationships between gender and media 
hardware availability are: 
Radio: X²(1, n = 1704) = 4.79, p = .06, phi = .02 
Television: X²(1, n = 1704) = .48, p = .52, phi = .02 
Tape player: X²(1, n = 1700) = .235, p = .63, phi = .01 
Satellite dish: X²(1, n = 1702) = 1.45, p = .23, phi = .03  
Free-air-time dish: X²(1, n = 1703) = 1.13, p = .29, phi = .03 
Desk top: X²(1, n = 1700) = 1.25, p = .26, phi = .03 
Lap top: X²(1, n = 1702) = 1.67, p = .20, phi = .03 
Land line: X²(1, n = 1703) .04, p = .91, phi = .00 
Cell phone: X²(1, n = 1701) = 10.4, p = .00, phi = .08 
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media hardware is not significantly different from the proportion of females who 
possessed the same. The survey, therefore, shows that gender is not a determinant factor 
in as far as ownership of media hardware is concerned. In contrast, it was established that 
there was very low association between possession of radios and cell phones and gender. 
All in all, the association between gender and ownership of domestic media hardware 
was very weak. 
  
Possession of cell phones was, however, closely associated with gender which could, 
perhaps, be explained by the propensity by males to use cell phones more regularly than 
females. Another interesting finding was that, in some cases, one cell phone could be 
accessed and used by all members of the family. This was found to be mostly the case in 
rural areas, and in poor households in general, where one cell phone could be accessed 
and used by not only family members but also members of the community.  
 
The generation gap has impact on the possession of household media hardware. Results 
of the Phi co-efficient and Cramer’s V on the relationships between age and ownership of 
various types of media hardware9are shown below. More than 70 per cent of cell phones, 
                                                          
9 The results of the Phi coefficient and Cramer’s V on the relationships between the age group of respondents and 
media hardware availability are: 
Radio: X²(2, n = 1743) = 13.49, p = .001, phi = .09 
Television: X²(2, n = 1743) = 12.43, p = .002, phi = .08 
Tape player: X²(2, n = 1739) = 31.14, p = .000, phi = .13 
Satellite dish: X²(2, n = 1741) = 2.15, p = .34, phi = .04 (one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected 
account should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not ‘a’ indicated that 1 cells (16.7 per cent) have expected count 
less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.77).  
Free-air-time dish: X²(2, n = 1742) = 3.9, p = .14, phi = .05 (one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected 
account should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not ‘a’ indicated that 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less 
than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.74). 
Desk top: X²(2, n = 1739) = 3.56, p = .17, phi = .05 (one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected account 
should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not ‘a’ indicated that 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 3.12). 
Lap top: X²(2, n = 1741) = 2.98, p = .23 0, phi = .04 (one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected account 
should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not ‘a’ indicated that 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 2.37). 
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lap top computers and desk top computers were owned by young people aged between 18 
and 39 years. However, there was a very low association between respondent’s age and 
ownership of radios, televisions, tape players and cell phone, including land lines.   
 
Percentage ownership of all media hardware, except satellite dishes, was highest among 
high-income respondents and declined as the level of income decreased. However, there 
was no 100 per cent media hardware ownership that was recorded among all income 
groups.  Ownership of radio was 78 per cent among the low-income group, 85 per cent 
among the middle-income group and 87 per cent among the high-income group. 
Statistically, there was a significant association between radio, television, tape player, 
land line and cell phone ownership and income level. The results10 indicated that there 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Land line: X²(2, n = 1742) = 2.84, p = .24, phi = .04 
Cell phone: X²(2, n = 1740) = 8.15, p = .02, phi = .07. 
 
10The results of the phi coefficient and Cramer’s V on the relationships between the income categories and media 
hardware availability are: 
Radio: X²(2, n = 1394) = 11.07, p = .004, phi = .09 
Television: X²(2, n = 1394) = 100.3, p = .000, phi = .27 
Tape player: X²(2, n = 1393) = 54.00, p = .000, phi = .20 
Satellite dish: X²(2, n = 1392) = 10.39, p = .006, phi = .09 (one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected 
account should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not ‘a’ indicated that 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less 
than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.37).  
Free-air-time dish: X²(2, n = 1393) = 57.50, p = .000, phi = .20 (one of the chi-square assumptions, the number 
expected account should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not ‘a’ indicated that 1 cells (16.7%) have expected 
count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.46). 
Desk top: X²(2, n = 1391) = 33.38, p = .000, phi = .16 (one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected 
account should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not ‘a’ indicated that 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less 
than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.36). 
Lap top: X²(2, n = 1392) = 49.82, p = .000, phi = .19 (one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected account 
should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not ‘a’ indicated that 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 1.87). 
Land line: X²(2, n = 1393) = 56.70, p = .000, phi = .21 
Cell phone: X²(2, n = 1391) = 139.03, p = .000, phi = .32. 
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was a significant association between media hardware (radio, television, tape player, land 
line and cell phone) ownership and income category.  
 
The association of cell phone and income was very significant when compared to other 
media channels.  The utility of media hardware is dependent on the availability of media 
products such as communication networks, telephone transmitter towers and other 
services. In the absence of these, the availability or ownership of media hardware will be 
of no value to the user. Availability of electricity to operate media hardware such as 
television sets, mobile phones and other electricity-dependent communication gadgets is 
also key to ensuring effective communication and utility.  There is no single determinant 
of media ownership. Rather, the decision to buy and own any of the media hardware, 
such as television, radio and similar others, may be influenced by multiple factors. These 
may include educational background and attainment, level of income and whether or not 
one lives in an urban, semi-urban or rural area.  
 
Regarding educational attainment, results11 of tests relating to lap top computers and 
satellite dishes were discarded because of one of the chi-square assumptions, i.e. the 
number expected should be greater than 5, was violated.  There was very low, or almost 
negligible, association between radio ownership and educational attainment. In other 
                                                          
11 Moreover, the results of the Phi coefficient and Cramer’s V on the relationships between the educational 
background and media hardware availability are: 
Radio: X²(3, n = 1688) = 59.70, p = .000, phi = .20 
Television: X²(3, n = 1688) = 292.06, p = .000, phi = .42 
Tape player: X²(3, n = 1684) = 248.07, p = .000, phi = .38 
Satellite dish: X²(3, n = 1686) = 27.92, p = .000, phi = .13 (one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected 
account should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not ‘a’ indicated that 1 cells (12.5%) have expected count less 
than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.42).  
Free-air-time dish: X²(3, n = 1687) = 87.50, p = .000, phi = .23  
Desk top: X²(3, n = 1684) = 102.50, p = .000, phi = .25  
Lap top: X²(3, n = 1686) = 64.94, p = .000, phi = .20 (one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected account 
should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not ‘a’ indicated that 1 cells (12.5%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 4.32). 
Land line: X²(3, n = 1687) = 171.70, p = .000, phi = .32 
Cell phone: X²(3, n = 1685) = 362.04, p = .000, phi = .46.  
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words, the level of educational attainment was not associated with the decision to buy 
and own a radio set. In fact, it was discovered that there was only a minor difference 
between formally uneducated and educated persons in terms of radio ownership. 
However, there was an appreciable association between ownership of free-to-air dishes, 
desk top computers and land lines and educational attainment. Similarly, there was a 
substantial and significant relationship between ownership of televisions, tape players 
and cell phones and educational level. Though the Phi co-efficient and Cramer’s V did 
not show the direction of the relationship, the increment in ownership of television sets 
and cell phones was associated with an increase in the level of education.   
 
Results of the Phi co-efficient and Cramer’s V regarding the relationship between media 
hardware ownership and the respondents’ political affiliation indicated a low relationship 
with respect to certain media hardware. There was, for instance, a low association 
between ownership of radios, television sets, tape players, land lines and cell phones and 
membership of political parties. Possession of these media hardware, however, varied 
across respondents in tandem with their political affiliations. Statistically, there were no 
differences in ownership of satellite television dishes, free-to-air satellite dishes, desk top 
computers and lap top computers among respondents affiliated to either the ruling parties 
or opposition political parties, including those who said they were politically neutral.  
 
Generally speaking, ownership of media hardware could not be attributed to any single 
factor such as income, gender, residential area, educational level of respondents or 
respondents’ political affiliation. On the contrary, ownership of media hardware was 
influenced by a combination of several factors. Ownership of satellite televisions, for 
instance, was largely prevalent among high-income respondents whereas radio ownership 
was most common among low-income respondents in both rural and urban areas. 
However, in rural areas, even radio ownership was only prevalent among more affluent 
than poor households.  
 
In Addis Ababa, Shire Inda Selassie, Mutu and Debre Tabor, public officials, influential 
businessmen and eminent professionals predominated in the ownership of television sets, 
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land line phones, cell phones, desktop computers and lap top computers. Access to and 
ownership of radios, televisions and telephones was found not to be generally available to 
lower and uneducated households in the cities and towns of Mutu, Huka, Indabaguna, 
Irob Gebeya and Debre Tabor. Similarly, people in rural and remote parts of Astigde 
Tsimbla, Halu and Tachi Gayint districts, including the socially and economically-poor, 
live without access to modern communication and technology facilities. The same pattern 
was found to be applicable to villages and towns such as Birhan, Maysewhi, Zaz, Agat, 
Abiyu Lemoon, Kidane Mihret, Uka and Irob Gebeya. It would appear that this is what 
Abdul Qadeer meant when he aptly said that “it is obvious that new technologies spread 
along socially defined pathways” (Abdul Qadeer, 2006:137).  
 
According to Abdul Qadeer, the possession of radios, televisions, and other modern 
household media, follows socio-cluster lines: from upper to lower class; from high and 
middle-income to working class; from urban and moderns to rural areas and peasants; 
from young to old; and from men to women. When all is said and done, the expansion of 
radio services, television networks, telecommunication and electric power in towns and 
villages leads to the improvement of the socio-economic well-being of the people. It also 
highly stimulates the possession of modern household media hardware which facilitates 
access to information and knowledge in general.  
5.3 Media use and sources of information    
 
Mass media provide information on the goings-on at both local and international levels.  
Audiences use the media for various purposes, including obtaining information and news. 
Apart from information, audiences use the media for education and entertainment. 
Indeed, as Rayner, Wall and Kruger aptly noted, “mass media are an important and 
central part of the lives of the people” (Rayner, Wall and Kruger, 2004: 8-9). Despite the 
fact that not all people access the media, what is said and reported, invariably, either 
directly or indirectly affects everyone in society.  
 
Given this background, respondents were asked whether they used radio, television, 
newspaper, internet or other persons to obtain information and news. Figure 5.5 shows 
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that 85 per cent of the respondents used radio as source of information and news. Slightly 
more than two third of respondents (68 per cent) reported using television for the same 
purpose. Of the total study population, 681 respondents, or 37.5 per cent, and 800 
respondents, or 44.1 per cent, did not reply to print media and internet consumption 
questions. Out of those who responded, nearly four out of ten, or 40 per cent,   used 
newspapers and magazines for information.  
 
In terms of numbers, only 79 respondents reported using the internet. Among these, 63 
respondents (79.7 per cent) were from Addis Ababa. Based on the calculation of multiple 
responses, only 42.1 per cent used radio as the source of information which was the 
highest response, while the second highest was 29.0 per cent who reported using 
television.  Newspapers came in third place with about 15 per cent of respondents 
reporting them as sources of information. This pattern was corroborated by one survey 
finding that reported that “Only 13% of the respondents said they received information 
from newspapers” (Electoral Reform International Services and Ward with Ayalew, 
2011: 10). The list percentage of as expected using Internet 2.4 per cent compared to 11.7 
per cent using other persons (See Figure 5.4).  
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Figure 5.4: Respondents' use of media as sources of information by 
multiple responses tabulation (in percentage) 
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About nine out of ten respondents reported that they listened to radio, watched television, 
read newspapers and magazines and/or browsed the internet to obtain international and 
local news. They also reported that they were exposed to at least one of the four mass 
hardware media and social media in their daily lives. However, the proportion of 
respondents who reported that they were exposed to all the four media channels i.e. radio, 
television, newspapers, magazines and browsed the internet was only 2.4 per cent. A little 
more than one-third, or 37 per cent, of respondents reported using the three common 
mass media, i.e. radio, television and print media. Slightly less than two-thirds, or 64 per 
cent, of respondents reported using only the radio and television as sources of news and 
information.  
 
The high percentage of print media usage/consumption was paradoxical in light of the 
low reach of newspapers, low educational levels and low incomes of some respondents. 
However, the low percentage of internet access12 was expected due to its inadequate 
connectivity across the country, the low level of availability of devices such as smart 
phones, tablets, desk top computers, and lap top computers, including the prohibitive 
costs associated with ICT skills acquisition and training.  Freedom House was 
corroborating this challenge when it concluded that:   
Ethiopia […] has one of the lowest rates of internet and mobile phone 
connectivity in the world. Telecommunication services, in general, and the 
internet, in particular, are among the most unaffordable commodities for the 
                                                          
12 An "Internet User" is therefore defined as an individual who can access the Internet, via computer or mobile 
device, within the home where the individual lives. Internet Live Stats.  http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-
users/#definitions   
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Figure 5.5: Respondents' media use as source of news and 
information (in percentage)
107 
 
majority of Ethiopians, as poor telecom infrastructure, the government’s 
monopoly over the information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
sector, and obstructive telecom policies have significantly hindered the 
growth of ICTs in the country, making the cost of access prohibitively 
expensive (Freedom House, 2015:2) 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2015/ethiopia).  
  
Ethiopia had 4.5 million internet users which, as at June 2016, amounted to nearly 4.4 per 
cent of the total population (Internet World Stats, 2016). The high exposure to radio 
relative to television and print media was expected because of the prevalence of the radio 
throughout the regions in which the study was conducted.  However, it would appear that 
exposure rates for newspapers, magazines and the internet were somewhat exaggerated. 
This is based on the fact that a fairly high number of respondents did not answer the 
question relating to exposure to newspapers, magazines and the internet and the 
misconception of media technology, including the practice of ‘newspaper reading forum’ 
in some areas.  
 
Despite listening to radio, watching television, reading print media and surfing the 
internet for news and current affairs, some respondents reported that they used other 
persons as sources of news and information. Specifically, four out of ten, or 40 per cent, 
of respondents reported that they used other persons for obtaining news and information. 
This indicated the significance of verbal communication as a source of news and 
information which is common in most less industrialised countries. All in all, listening to 
the radio for news and information was dominant among respondents, while browsing the 
internet was nominal.   
5.3.1 Media use in different variables   
 
Media usage varied in terms of independent variables. As shown in Figure 5.6, use of 
media also varied by regional administrations. Though there were high levels/percentages 
of radio consumption in each regional administration, respondents in Addis Ababa scored 
the highest percentage in all kinds of media consumption. Figures for radio usage were 
108 
 
81 per cent for Amhara, 82 per cent for Tigray, 87 per cent for Oromia and 90 per cent 
for Addis Ababa. The proportion of exposure to the other three media, i.e. television, 
print media and internet, also varied across regions. In terms of scores, respondent 
exposure to television, print media and the internet in Tigray, was next to that of Addis 
Ababa. These percentages were higher than those for respondents in Amhara and Oromia. 
For instance, percentages for newspaper and magazine usage were 64.7 per cent for 
respondents in Addis Ababa, 44.1 per cent for respondents in Tigray, 33.1 per cent for 
respondents in Amhara and 34.6 per cent for respondents in Oromia. Regarding the 
internet, 24.0 per cent of respondents in Addis Ababa and 3.6 per cent of respondents in 
Tigray used it as a source of news and information as against 1.4 per cent for Amhara and 
1.6 per cent for Oromia respondents.  Use of other persons as sources of news and 
information was recorded at 61 per cent for Addis Ababa, while Tigray scored the lowest 
at 21 per cent.  Amhara and Oromia scored 35 per cent and 46 per cent, respectively. 
Addis Ababa’s high score signifies the fact that respondents used other persons as 
sources of news and information more often than respondents in the other regions.  
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The percentage use for each of the four media hardware use was higher among male than 
female respondents as shown in Figure 5.6. Use of radio and television was slightly 
higher among male respondents than their female counterparts. For instance, percentages 
of television consumption were 72.4 per cent for males and 61.5 per cent for females, 
while that for radio was 87.4 per cent and 80.8 per cent, respectively. About half of males 
and one-third of females used newspapers or magazines as sources of news and 
information. Regarding internet browsing, 57 male respondents, or 77 per cent, and 17 
female respondents, or 23 per cent, reported as using the internet for obtaining news and 
information. Internet usage varied largely by sex. One out of ten males, or 10 per cent, 
and one out of twenty females, or 5 per cent, used the internet.  Regarding use of other 
persons as sources of news and information, about 50 per cent and 34 per cent of males 
and females responded in the affirmative.   
 
Urban dwellers reported the highest consumption rate in terms of watching television, 
reading newspapers and magazines, browsing the internet and using other persons as 
sources of news and information (Figure 5.6).  Television is the most popular source of 
news and information in the main cities of the country (Electoral Reform International 
Services and Ward with Ayalew, 2011). Meanwhile, rural respondents showed the lowest 
consumption rates of these media channels. About 91 per cent of urban respondents, 67 
per cent of semi-urban respondents and 22 per cent of rural respondents used television 
for obtaining news and information. Similarly, percentages for using newspapers and 
magazines were 58.4 per cent for urban, 45.1 per cent for semi-urban and 14.6 per cent 
for rural dwellers.  
 
Oral sharing of news and information with other people was highest among urban 
respondents (54 per cent) and declined as one moved towards semi-urban and rural areas. 
For instance, only 19 per cent of respondents in rural areas used other people to obtain 
news and information as against 46 per cent for semi-urban dwellers. There are several 
newspapers but their circulation is low and are only available in Addis Ababa and the 
main towns of the country (Electoral Reform International Services and Ward with 
Ayalew, 2011). Use of radio for obtaining news and information was very high among 
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semi-urban respondents with a score of 95.4 per cent in comparison with 92.2 per cent for 
urban respondents and 67.9 per cent for rural respondents.  
 
Regarding age groups, the usage of media and other people for obtaining news and 
information was very high among young people and lowest among elders. It was also 
found out that the percentage of media consumption decreases as age increases. 
Corresponding percentages for radio usage were 88.3 per cent for respondents aged 18-39 
years, 80.0 per cent for 40-59 years and 68.8 per cent for respondents aged 60 years and 
above. In the case of television usage, young, middle and old respondents scored 73.3 per 
cent, 61.4 per cent and 43.3 per cent, respectively. The percentage regarding use of other 
persons as sources of news and information was highest among the 18-39 year-olds (48 
per cent) and declined with increasing age.  Middle-aged and older persons recorded 28 
per cent and 15 per cent, respectively. This pattern was consistent with respect to the use 
of the internet. Use of the internet as a source of news and information was high among 
young respondents (8.7 per cent) and lowest among old people (1.8 per cent). All in all, 
use of the internet as a source of news and information was generally low across all 
respondent age groups. For instance, out of the total study sample, only a total of 78 
respondents reported using the internet for obtaining news and information. Out of these, 
the 18-39 year olds accounted for 78.2 per cent, while the 40-59 year olds scored 20.5 per 
cent, and the 60-years and above 1.8 per cent.  
  
When analysed against income levels, respondents in the high-income category scored 
the highest number of users of television, radio, internet and other persons as sources of 
news and information, while the middle-income category reported the highest percentage 
for use of the radio. Low-income respondents scored the least in terms of use of all media 
channels and other people as sources of news and information. About 93 per cent of 
middle- income respondents, 82 per cent of low-income respondents and 90.4 per cent of 
high-income respondents used radio for obtaining news and information. Percentages for 
newspaper and magazine consumption were 35.4 per cent for low-income, 66.3 per cent 
of middle-income and 66.7 per cent of high-income respondents. Internet usage was 
recorded at 3.0 per cent for low-income, 18.7 per cent for middle-income and 21.6 per 
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cent for high-income respondents. At 32 per cent, low income-respondents were the least 
users of other persons as sources of news and information. Seventy per cent and 60 per 
cent of high and middle-income groups said they also relied on other people for news and 
information.  
 
With regard to education levels, respondents with first degrees and above scored the 
highest consumption rates in terms of use of television, print media, internet and other 
persons as sources of news and information, while those with certificates and diplomas 
accounted for the highest usage of the radio. Respondents with no formal education, 
unsurprisingly, scored the least percentage in terms of usage of all media news and 
information sources, including use of other people.  
 
In general, use of media hardware, except the radio, increased proportionately with the 
level of education.  For example, slightly more than one-third, or 35.2 per cent, of 
respondents with no formal education, a little bit less than two-thirds, or 65.2 per cent, 
with primary and secondary education, slightly more than eight out of ten respondents 
with certificates and diplomas and slightly more than 93.8 per cent with first degrees and 
above, watched television for obtaining news and information. Corresponding 
percentages for internet use as a source of news and information were 0.0 per cent for 
those with no formal education, 4.7 per cent for those with primary and secondary 
education, 6.1 per cent for those with certificates and diploma and 27.7 per cent for those 
with degrees and above.   
 
According to Figure 5.6, media consumption and usage varied according to respondent’s 
political orientation. Respondents who considered themselves as politically-neutral, 
scored the highest consumption rate for radio, television and print media, while 
respondents associated with opposition political parties scored the highest in terms of 
internet usage and use of other people as sources of news and information. Respondents 
aligned to ruling political parties scored the least percentage use of all media except 
radio.  
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Percentages for using the radio were 81.7 per cent for respondents in the “Don’t know” 
response category, 83.5 per cent for those affiliated to ruling political parties, 88.6 per 
cent for respondents aligned to opposition political parties and 90.5 per cent for neutral 
respondents. Regarding internet consumption, percentages were 3.9 per cent, 11.1 per 
cent, 14.1 per cent and 27.0 per cent for respondents affiliated to ruling political parties, 
respondents in the “Don’t know” response category, neutral respondents and respondents 
affiliated to opposition political parties, respectively. This pattern is similar for obtaining 
news and information from other persons with the scores of 33.7 per cent, 50.0 per cent, 
56.1 per cent and 60.0 per cent, respectively. Respondents affiliated to ruling political 
parties scored the least percentage in terms of watching television, reading newspapers 
and magazines, browsing the internet and using other people as sources of news and 
information.  
 
According to Fourie, “…in countries like Ethiopia where most of the people are illiterate, 
where there are little or no ‘modern’ mass media, person to person flow of information or 
oral public communication is dominant” (Fourie, 2001: 255).  Oral communication, 
according to Eaman, “…is a face-to-face communication that helps the people to 
exchange information, feelings and thoughts” (Eaman, 2010). The power of oral 
communication was corroborated by Gulilat when he said that “Oral dissemination of 
information is common in many regions of Ethiopia and especially in the Afar region 
where the Afar people use ‘Dagu’, a traditional tool of communication, to exchange and 
update information among themselves (Gulilat, 2006). Gulilat further said that:  
The Afar community highly values and invariably employs Dagu as a primary 
channel of information exchange. The people share every important accounts (sic) 
of life through Dagu. Thus most people consider it more than a mere means of 
information exchange” (Gulilat, 2006: ix).  
The ERIS also observed that “…many people in the countryside simply rely on word of 
mouth, particularly what they hear at community meetings or through their local church 
or mosque” (Electoral Reform International Services and Ward with Ayalew, 2011:13).  
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Usage of other persons as sources of news and information was, however, very low in 
Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regions compared to Addis Ababa. The rate was even lower 
in semi-urban and rural areas in comparison with urban areas. Oral communication as a 
source of news and information varied according to income groups, age categories, 
educational attainment and political party affiliation of respondents. It was higher among 
high-income respondents than middle-income or low working-class people.  
 
The practice of oral communication, or using other persons as sources of news and 
information inversely declined with the level of print media and television availability 
and consumption. In other words, the more available newspapers, television and internet 
were available, the less was oral communication used as a form of obtaining news and 
information. Nevertheless, despite variations in the use of oral communication as a form 
of obtaining news and information, it still remains the most naturally-preferred form of 
social engagement. This fact was also supported by Eaman who said that “Face-to-face 
communication is still important at any occasion and any place. It is also essential for 
creating connection, trust and loyalty (Eaman, 2010). Verbal face-to-face communication 
is emotionally engaging and promotes a sense of belonging and social inclusion. 
However, multiple factors can inhibit effective verbal communication. Among factors 
that might frustrate verbal communication are reluctance to express oneself for fear of 
possible embarrassment, disapproval, low self-esteem or fear of consequences.  Some 
people would also not feel free to express themselves due to experiences during their 
childhood. Abused and oppressed children, for instance, face high prospects of growing 
into reclusive persons. Other people would also not freely express themselves in the face 
of elders due to certain cultural prohibitions. It is also true that some people are naturally 
introverts. Some studies have also reported that some people would not feel comfortable 
to share information with others out of distrust. For example, one study reported that: 
“The reticence of most Ethiopians to speak their mind openly in the presence of people 
who they do not know and trust has served to weaken traditional communications 
networks that operate through community structures” (Electoral Reform International 
Services and Ward with Ayalew, 2011).  
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This apt observation was corroborated by a number of respondents who also said that 
some people do not feel comfortable to communicate with people they do not know 
(Interviewee 35, June 3, 2009: 2; Interviewee 38, June 5, 2009: 19). In some traditional 
societies, effective verbal communication is stymied by certain behavioural etiquette 
which, for instance, do not permit the young to dominate discussions with the elderly.  
 
News and information in Ethiopia are also obtained through the system of Kebele 
meetings. This is especially true with respect to getting information regarding 
community, regional and national development. One respondent, in fact, reported that he 
often attends Kebele meetings in person and gets very useful information regarding 
developments in his area (Interviewee 22, May 27, 2009:9).  However, some respondents 
were concerned that the flow of information gets weak and distorted as it percolates down 
to communities. This perception was particularly expressed in Wereda (district). The 
legal framework for Kebeles is fine and functional. However, in the case of Wereda, there 
are challenges with respect to accountability. For instance, it was reported that it was 
difficult to differentiate between who was and who was not working hard. In this regard, 
it was strongly recommended that verifiable systems should be put in place for ensuring a 
sustainable flow of information to the people (Interviewee 10, May 15, 2009: 41).  
 
One respondent, specifically, recommended that information should pass from the Kebele 
to Wereda, to the zone and finally to the region” (Interviewee 10, May 15, 2009: 41). A 
farmer from Huka Wereda said that she got local information through letters and 
meetings. “We also get information through letters or meetings,’’ she said, and added, 
‘’If they write to us or if they call us to attend a meeting we will know through that” 
(Interviewee 19, 27, 2009:1).  Another respondent said that “I usually get information 
from radio. In addition to that we get information through the Kebele leaders. They 
sometimes call us to the meeting and give us information” (Interviewee 22, May 27, 
2009:9). Yet another respondent said he obtained news and information from 
development agents. “I get information through development agents, they are here, and 
they come to our area. That is the way I get development information,” he said 
(Interviewee 21, May 27, 2009:4).   
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5.3.2 Association of media usage with independent variables  
 
Social and cultural backgrounds of the people have impact on media use and usage. 
Socio-cultural backgrounds are reflected in social class, education, religious and political 
orientation. In fact, according to McQuail, “… our social background has a strongly 
orienting and dispositional influence on our choice behaviour” (McQuail, 2010: 429).  
The Chi-square test for independence is used to explore the relationship between media 
usage and personal and social backgrounds and variables of respondents. The main 
variables that were used for the survey were regional administrations, residential areas, 
gender, income level, age, educational attainment and political affiliation. Results of 
associations between the respondents’ media usage and the four regional areas indicated13 
that there was a determinant relationship for media usage and regions of the respondents, 
but these varied across media channels.  
 
There was a low determinant relationship between radio usage in the four regions and, 
therefore, there were no significant differences in, for instance, the usage of the radio 
among respondents in Addis Ababa, Tigray, Oromia and Amhara. The radio was reported 
as the main source of news and information among respondents in all the regions which 
were included in the study sample. However, there was no association between area of 
residence and usage of the radio in Addis Ababa, Tigray, Oromia and Amhara regions. 
There was, nevertheless, a significant relationship between usage of television, 
newspapers, magazines and the internet, including usage of other people, as sources of 
news information and regions of respondents. It was found that there were significant 
differences across the four study regions with respect to watching television, reading 
                                                          
13 The results of the phi coefficient and Cramer’s V on the relationships between the four regions and media 
consumption were: 
Radio: X²(3, n = 1656) = 17.93, p = .000, phi = .10 
Television: X²(3, n = 1411) = 168.72, p = .000, phi = .35 
Newspaper and magazines: X²(3, n = 1135) = 72.22, p = .000, phi = .25 
Internet: X²(3, n = 1016) = 131.27, p = .000, phi = .36 
Other persons: X²(3, n = 955) = 74.77, p = .000, phi = .28 
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print media, browsing the internet and using other people for obtaining news and 
information.  
 
Results14 of the Phi co-efficient and Cramer’s V regarding relationships between and 
among urban, semi-urban and rural areas and media consumption showed that there were 
significant differences. However, the relationship between and among listening to the 
radio, reading newspapers, browsing the internet and using other people as sources of 
news and information and residential areas of respondents was very low. This 
corroborates with the conclusion of one research that noted that “Radio is the main source 
of news and information in Ethiopia, especially in the rural areas where 80% of the 
population lives” (Electoral Reform International Services and Ward with Ayalew, 
2011:10).  
 
There was a strong relationship between watching television and residential areas of 
respondents, especially in the main cities of the country. According to statistical results15 
of the study, there was a low relationship between media usage and gender of 
respondents.  For example, there was no significant difference between male and female 
respondents with respect to listening to the radio, watching television, reading 
                                                          
14 The results14 of the phi coefficient and Cramer’s V on the relationships between the three staying areas and media 
consumption were: 
Radio: X²(2, n = 1605) = 173.11, p = .000, phi = .33 
Television: X²(2, n = 1363) = 547.31, p = .000, phi = .63 
Newspaper and magazines: X²(2, n = 1102) = 165.56, p = .000, phi = .39 
Internet: X²(2, n = 994) = 68.44, p = .000, phi = .26 
Other persons: X²(2, n = 931) = 97.3, p = .000, phi = .32 
 
15 The statistical results on the relationships between gender and media consumption were: 
Radio: X²(1, n = 1596) = 12.73, p = .000, phi = .09 
Television: X²(1, n = 1359) = 17.42, p = .000, phi = .11 
Newspaper and magazines: X²(1, n = 1103) = 21.33, p = .000, phi = .14 
Internet: X²(1, n = 914) = 6.9, p = .01, phi = .08 
Other persons: X²(1, n = 928) = 10.53, p = .00, phi = .11 
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newspapers and magazines, surfing the internet and using other people as sources of local 
and international news and information.     
 
Statistical results16 further indicated that there was low association between usage of the 
radio, television, print media and other persons and the age of respondents. In other 
words, usage of radio, television and print media for obtaining news and information did 
not significantly vary across the young, middle-aged and elderly people. Usage of the 
internet was discarded as it was not statistically valid. Out of the total of 78 respondents 
who reported using the internet for obtaining news and information, for instance, only 
one elderly respondent answered in the affirmative. This was mainly a reflection of the 
fact that less than one per cent of Ethiopians have access to the internet (Electoral Reform 
international services and Ward with Ayalew, 2011). Meanwhile, statistical results 
regarding the relationship between income category of the respondents and media 
consumption17 revealed that there was low relationship between listening to the radio and 
income level. However, there was a significant association between watching television, 
                                                          
16 The statistical results on the relationships between respondent’s age groups and media consumption were: 
Radio: X²(2, n = 1633) = 33.79, p = .000, phi = .14 
Television: X²(2, n = 1392) = 38.87, p = .000, phi = .17 
Newspaper and magazines: X²(2, n = 1120) = 35.37, p = .000, phi = .18 
Internet: X²(2, n = 1006) = 4.43, p = .11, phi = .07 [one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected account 
should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not ‘a’ indicated that 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 4.34].   
Other persons: X²(2, n = 944) = 42.89, p = .00, phi = .21 
 
17The statistical results on the relationships between the income category of the respondents and media 
consumption were: 
Radio: X²(2, n = 1317) = 26.91, p = .000, phi = .14 
Television: X²(2, n = 1144) = 99.11, p = .000, phi = .29 
Newspaper and magazines: X²(2, n = 921) = 84.18, p = .000, phi = .30 
Internet: X²(2, n = 815) = 59.89, p = .00, phi = .27 [one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected account 
should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not ‘a’ indicated that 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 3.40].   
Other persons: X²(2, n = 752) = 59.34, p = .00, phi = .28 
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reading print media and using other persons as sources of news and information and 
income level.   
 
Oral conversation, or use of other people as sources of news and information, varied 
across low, middle and high-income respondents. It was higher among high-income 
respondents than middle-income and low-income workers. However, there was no 
association between internet usage and income levels of respondents for low, middle and 
high-income groups. Again, this was a reflection of the low internet connectivity 
throughout the country. Results of the Phi co-efficient and Cramer’s V regarding 
relationships between educational attainment of respondents and media consumption18 
illustrated varying relationships across media channels. For example, there was a low 
relationship between radio consumption and attainment, while, there was significant 
relationship between print media, internet usage and use of other persons as sources of 
news and information across all educational levels of respondents.  
 
Results19 of the Phi co-efficient and Cramer’s V regarding the relationship between 
political affiliation of respondents and media consumption indicated a fairly strong 
relationships but these varied across respondents. However, there was low relationship 
between respondents’ political affiliation and listening to the radio, watching television, 
                                                          
18 The results of the phi coefficient and Cramer’s V on the relationships between the educational background of the 
respondents and media consumption were: 
Radio: X²(3, n = 1589) = 136.48, p = .000, phi = .29 
Television: X²(3, n = 1357) = 354.65, p = .000, phi = .51 
Newspaper and magazines: X²(3, n = 1091) = 249.58, p = .000, phi = .48 
Internet: X²(3, n = 980) = 132.53, p = .000, phi = .37 
Other persons: X²(3, n = 918) = 162.71, p = .000, phi = .42 
 
19The results of the phi coefficient and Cramer’s V on the relationships between the political line of the respondents 
and media consumption were: 
Radio: X²(3, n = 1579) = 11.68, p = .01, phi = .09 
Television: X²(3, n = 1337) = 66.16, p = .00, phi = .22 
Newspaper and magazines: X²(3, n = 1088) = 32.17, p = .00, phi = .17 
Internet: X²(3, n = 966) = 47.07, p = .00, phi = .22 [one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected account 
should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not ‘a’ indicated that 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 2.83].   
Other persons: X²(3, n = 919) = 40.70, p = .00, phi = .21 
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reading print media and using other people as sources of news and information. All in all, 
usage of radio, television, newspapers and other persons as sources of news and 
information varied based on the political affiliation of respondents.   
 
Respondents in Addis Ababa and other urban respondents, males, young age-groups, 
high-income respondents and respondents with first degrees and above scored the highest 
percentages with respect to using television, newspapers and magazines, internet and 
other persons as sources of news and information. In contrast, female respondents, 
respondents from rural areas, 60-year-olds and above, low-income groups and 
respondents with no formal education reported the least percentages for all media 
channels, including use of other people as sources of news and information.  Statistically, 
there was no relationship between the usage of the internet and political affiliation of 
respondents.  
 
Study results showed that the higher the socio-economic status of respondents, the higher 
the likelihood that they will use other persons as sources of news and information and 
vice versa. The percentages use other persons as sources of news and information was 
highest among 18-39 year-olds and declined with increasing age. Regarding surfing the 
internet for news and information, there were no significant differences between male, 
female, and low, middle and high-income respondents, including educational level.    
5.3.3 Overtone/association of media availability and media usage  
 
In media usage, there are issues which need to be addressed. These include whether or 
not there is any association/relationship between physical accessibility of media and 
media usage. Do respondents only use own media or other people’s media too or both? 
Does possession of more than one media hardware encourage actual access to multiple 
media news and information?  Are there shifts in use across different types of media use? 
If there are, what kind of shifts are they?  How people who do not have media hardware 
get news and information? The following section addresses these questions.  
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Media usage varied across respondents (Figure 5.7) with more than nine out of ten, or 90 
per cent, of respondents regularly using various types of media. Three quarters, or 75 per 
cent, of radio owners, slightly more than eight out of ten, or 80 per cent, of tape player 
owners and more than nine out of ten, or 90 per cent, of respondents that owned other 
media hardware also reported as regular users of television for obtaining news and 
information. However, the highest percentage of usage for all media was scored among 
respondents who had lap top computers. Percentages for radio and television usage were 
98 per cent and 96 per cent, respectively. Usage of newspapers, magazines and the 
internet were reported at 73 per cent and 62 per cent, respectively. Similarly, respondents 
who possessed lap top computers scored highly (83 per cent) when it came to usage of 
other people as sources of news and information.  The second highest percentage for 
media consumption was scored among respondents who had desk top computers. 
Meanwhile, the least percentages were scored among respondents who had radio sets. 
Recorded percentages for usage of radio, television, newspapers, internet and other 
persons as sources of news and information were 95 per cent, 76 per cent, 49 per cent, 9 
per cent and 47 per cent, respectively.  
 
 
The percentage of television consumption was lowest among respondents who owned 
radio (76 per cent) and the second lowest was among respondents that owned tape players 
(84 per cent). Newspaper and magazine consumption was lowest among respondents who 
0.00%
20.00%
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60.00%
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Figure 5.7: Respondents media access with different media 
usage cross tabulation (in percentage)
Radio usage
Television usage
Newspaper & magazine
Internet
Other persons
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owned radio and highest among respondents who owned desk top computers (74 per 
cent) and lap top computers (73 per cent). Internet usage was highest among lap top 
computers owners (62 per cent) and lowest among radio owners (9 per cent).  The second 
highest internet usage was recorded among desk top computer owners (39 per cent). 
Internet usage was very low among respondents that owned land lines (13 per cent) and 
cell phones (18 per cent).   
 
Results of the Phi co-efficient and Cramer’s V regarding relationships between media 
hardware ownership and media usage indicated that, although the strength of 
relationships varied, there was a fairly strong association between media hardware 
ownership and media usage in most cases. It was, however, discovered that there was no 
significant association between ownership of the radio and internet usage. Similarly, 
there was no significant association between ownership of satellite dishes and radio 
usage, including usage of the internet and using other persons as sources of news and 
information. Likewise, there was no significant association between ownership of desk 
top computers and listening to the radio and browsing the internet for news and 
information. Similarly, there was no significant association between lap top computer 
ownership and internet usage. Further, ownership of land lines, lap top computers, desk 
top computers and cell phones was not directly related to using the internet. This means 
that usage of these media hardware was limited to conventional uses. The other 
significant finding was that internet access through cell phones was almost non-existent. 
Generally speaking, therefore, ownership of media hardware such as land line phones, 
desk top computers, lap top computers or cell phones was not associated with use of the 
internet for obtaining news and information.  
 
Multiple use of media hardware was reported by informants in Kolfie-Keranio, Mettu, 
Debretabor and Shire Endaslasie who owned radios, televisions and satellite dishes 
(Interviewee 5, 14, 15, 18,27, 31, 32, 33, and 45). At household level, these media were 
used in a flexible manner without preferring one over others.  A middle-income 
respondent in Indabaguna, for instance, stated that: “I have radio, television and a satellite 
dish. I use all of them, but my family and children mainly prefer to watch television. The 
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main reason is you can witness it with your eyes. Apart from this the television presents 
more recent and valuable information” (Interviewee 5, May 14, 2009:18).    
 
Another middle-income informant in Debre Tabor said that “Yes I have radio and 
television. I have also satellite dish. I listen to radio and watch television to follow news 
and other programmes” (Interviewee 45, June 8, 2009: 51). A young middle-income male 
respondent in Kolfie-Keranio also said that:  
I have all kinds of media systems including satellite dish, especially Arab 
Sat. I use them properly whenever I need them. I look for channels that 
supply me the information I need. I use them by turns, which means that 
what I tuned in to on Monday, I don’t use on Saturday. I watch the channels 
I need at the times I want. For instance, I go to the stadium on Saturdays 
and Sundays. During the rest of the week, I watch CNN and BBC and 
supply timely news and information. I also listen to local and international 
transmission, especially in the evenings (Interviewee 14, May 20, 2009: 1). 
 
Yet a middle-aged man in Mettu said “I have all media systems. To tell you the truth, 
most of the times I watch the satellite dish. But I rarely watch Ethiopian Television but I 
listen to Ethiopian Radio” (Interviewee 27, May 28, 2009: 28). In Addis Ababa, an old 
pensioner said “I get information from radio, television and satellite dish” (Interviewee 
15, May 20, 2009: 10). These statements demonstrate that in some areas, it is common 
for households to own multiple media hardware depending on their ability to purchase 
them and the place where the people stay. The usage of media depends on the choice and 
preference of the audiences.   
5.4 Social narration of news and information  
 
In this section, the use of media hardware will be discussed with specific reference to 
watching television, listening to radio and reading newspapers and magazines within the 
social context. Discussion of media usage within the social context is very important 
because “Patterns of choice-making are, of course, always adapted according to changes 
in circumstances and experience with the media” (McQuail, 2010: 430). 
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5.4.1 Social television-watching 
 
Two issues are very important in social television-watching. The first one is the places 
where people watch television. For instance, do they watch television at home or 
somewhere else? The second is how people watch television. Do they watch alone or 
with other people?  These topics are discussed in the following sections.  
5.4.1.1 Places where people watch television  
 
About 1,100 respondents, or 60 per cent of the study population, reported that they 
watched television. These were requested to indicate the places in which they watched 
television.  As shown in Figure 5.8, the majority of respondents, nearly 70 per cent, who 
had access to television, watched it at home. Slightly more than a quarter reported that 
they watched television in the restaurant. Nearly two out of ten respondents, or 20 per 
cent, reported that they watch television at the workplace, clubs and/or in their 
neighbours’ homes. The pattern of watching television in cafes, bars, restaurants or in 
neighbours’ homes is explained by the fact that most Ethiopians do not have television 
sets in their own homes (Electoral Reform International Services and Ward with Ayalew, 
2011). 
 
 
Television-watching places varied across different variables. Watching television at home 
was the highest among respondents in all regions irrespective of gender, age group, 
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Figure 5.8: Places where people watch television (in percentage) 
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income and educational attainment of respondents. Nine out of ten respondents, or 90 per 
cent, in Addis Ababa, six out of ten respondents, or 60 per cent, in Tigray, Amhara and 
Oromia reported that they watched television at home. The least percentage was scored in 
Addis Ababa by those who watched television in restaurants and for those who watched 
television at workplaces in the three regions of Tigray, Amhara and Oromia.  
 
Due to the fact that the television is an urban phenomenon, urban and semi-urban 
respondents scored the highest rate at 83.7 per cent and 46 per cent, respectively. In 
contrast, rural respondents scored 15 per cent.  Watching in restaurants was highest 
among rural respondents, which is explained by the fact that many households cannot 
afford to buy television sets. Watching television in clubs was 13.5 per cent for urban 
areas, 7.5 per cent for semi-urban areas and 6.6 per cent for rural areas. There was also a 
pattern among people in rural areas of watching television in restaurants and hotels 
whenever they visited urban areas either for shopping or to attend political engagements 
or social functions. Watching television in restaurants was found to be particularly 
popular among people with no formal education (more than three out of ten respondents).  
 
Places where people watch television varied slightly by sex and socio-economic status. 
Female respondents were more likely than male respondents to watch television at home 
(79 per cent compared to 65 per cent for males). Watching television at workplaces, 
restaurants and clubs was higher among male than female respondents. About one third 
of males, or 32 per cent, and slightly more than one in ten females watched television in 
restaurants. There was no difference in watching television in neighbours’ homes by sex 
as about 19.2 per cent of males and 19.9 per cent of females watched television in their 
neighbours’ homes (see Figure 5.9). 
 
Watching television at home was highest by respondents’ age groups. The percentage of 
respondents who watched television at home increased in tandem with the increase in the 
age of respondents. These were calculated at 68 per cent for the young, 77 per cent the 
middle-aged and 81 per cent for old persons.  Watching television at home was relatively 
high among old people. On the contrary, the proportion of respondents that watched 
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television at workplaces, restaurants and clubs inversely declined with the increase in 
age. For instance, nearly three out of ten respondents aged between 18 and 39 years 
watched television in restaurants as compared to about two out of ten for those aged 
between 40 and 59 years and nearly one out of ten for those aged 60 and above. This 
trend was, however, not observed among those who watched television in their 
neighbours’ homes. Corresponding percentages for watching television in neighbours’ 
homes were 21 per cent for the young, 14 per cent for adults and 16 per cent for the 
elderly. There was very low statistical differences among age groups with respect to 
watching television at home or in restaurants.  
 
 
 
Watching television at home was relatively high among the high socio-economic class 
with the percentage increasing proportionately with the level of income and education 
status.  About 64 per cent of low-income respondents watched television at home 
compared to 78 per cent and 89 per cent of middle and high-income respondents, 
respectively. Close to 80 per cent of respondents with higher degrees watched television 
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at home. Respondents with no formal education, as expected, scored the least percentage 
in terms of watching television at home. Watching television in neighbours’ home 
inversely declined with the increase in income. For example, 23.4 per cent, 15 per cent 
and 4.5 per cent of low, middle and high-income respondents reported watching 
television in their neighbours’ homes, respectively.  
  
Regarding watching television at workplaces, the proportion varied by income and 
education levels. One out of ten, or 10 per cent, of low income respondents watched 
television at workplaces. Corresponding percentages for middle and high-income 
respondents were 30 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively. There was a strong 
relationship between level of education and watching television at the workplace. For 
instance, 15 per cent of diploma holders and 31 per cent of higher degree holders watched 
television at workplaces compared to only 6 per cent of respondents with no formal 
education. Watching television at home scored the highest among respondents affiliated 
to political parties. Corresponding percentages were 14.3 per cent for supporters of ruling 
political parties, 16.1 per cent for supporters of opposition political parties, 16.8 per cent 
for politically-neutral respondents and 3.9 per cent for “Don’t know” respondents. 
Watching television in restaurants recorded the second highest scores among politically-
affiliated respondents at 27.8 per cent of respondents. Respondents aligned to opposition 
political parties scored 28.1 per cent, while corresponding scores were 21.4 per cent and 
30.0 per cent for neutral and ‘’Don’t know’’ respondents, respectively.   
 
The correlation between place for watching television and different variables were 
assessed based on the p-value and r-value. Results indicated that there were associations 
between them. There was also a significant relationship between respondents’ regions of 
residence and watching television at home and in clubs, but the association with watching 
television in restaurants and workplaces was very low. There was no significant 
difference between and among respondents in Addis Ababa, Tigray, Amhara and Oromia 
in terms of watching television in neighbours’ homes.  There was, however, a significant 
difference in terms of watching television at home among urban, semi-urban and rural 
respondents.  In regard to watching television at workplaces, in clubs and restaurants, 
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including in neighbours’ homes, there a very low relationship with areas of residence of 
respondents. In line with the p-value and correlation co-efficient (statistical significance), 
there was a very low association between the respondents’ sex and watching television at 
home and at the workplace. In contrast, there was no association between respondents’ 
sex and watching television in restaurants, clubs and neighbours’ homes.  
 
As the p-value and r-value showed, there was a statistically low association among 
income group and educational level and watching television at home and workplaces. 
However, there was a significant relationship among income levels and watching 
television in neighbours’ homes and this varied across low-income, middle-income and 
high-income respondents. There was also an association between watching television in 
restaurants and educational levels. However, there was no relationship among income 
level and watching television in restaurants or clubs. Similarly, there was no relationship 
between educational level and watching television in neighbours’ homes. The p-value 
and r-value showed that there was low association between the respondents’ political 
orientation and watching television at home. In contrast, there was no relationship 
between the respondent’s political affiliation and watching television in neighbours’ 
homes, clubs, restaurants (tea and coffee houses and Tejj bet) and at the workplace.  
5.4.1.2 Watching television alone or with other people   
 
Apart from being asked where they watched television, respondents were asked to 
indicate whether they watched television alone or with other people. Out of the total 
study population, 1,095 respondents responded with nearly a quarter, or 24.7 per cent, 
reporting that they watched television alone, while the remaining three quarters watched 
television with others. Out of the respondents who watched television with others, 
slightly more than three-quarters watched with their families, about one-third with friends 
and nearly one-fifth with neighbours (Figure 5.10). 
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The proportion of social television-watching varied by region, sex, age, residential area 
and other variables (Figure 5.11). Watching television with family members scored the 
highest among respondents within various variables such as regions of residence. Almost 
90 per cent of respondents in Addis Ababa watched television with their families unlike 
respondents of other regions.  Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regions scored 71 per cent, 70 
per cent and 73 per cent, respectively. Respondents in Addis Ababa, however, scored the 
lowest, 25 per cent, percentage in terms of watching television with friends. Slightly 
more than one-third of respondents in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regions watched 
television with friends. Watching television in neighbours’ homes and with other people 
recorded the least scores within all respondent parameters and ranged between 14.7 per 
cent and 23.6 per cent.  
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The trend of social watching of television varied between men and women. Among 
respondents who watched television with others, more female respondents, 84 per cent, 
watched television with family members than male respondents at 72 per cent. In regard 
to watching television in neighbours’ homes, male respondents scored higher, 23 per 
cent, than their female counterparts who scored 19 per cent. Watching television with 
other family members was highest, 83 per cent, among high-income respondents and 
moderately declined with decreasing levels of income. About three quarters of 
respondents in each income group watched television with family members. The 
percentage of watching television in neighbours’ homes declined with increasing levels 
of income. For instance, low income, middle and high-income respondents scored 22 per 
cent, 17 per cent and 13 per cent, respectively. Middle-income respondents scored the 
highest percentage, 34 per cent, in terms of watching television with friends compared to 
29 per cent and 25 per cent for low income and high income respondents, respectively. 
There were no significant statistical differences among the three income categories of 
respondents with respect to watching television with others. 
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Regarding age groups, watching television with family members was highest among 
respondents aged 60 and above olds (88 per cent). Those aged between 18 and 39 years, 
scored 73 per cent compared to 86 per cent of respondents aged between 40 and 59 years 
and 88 per cent for those aged 60 and above.  The young, 18 to 39 years, also scored 
highest in both watching television with friends and in neighbours’ homes.  Watching 
television with others was highest among respondents resident in semi-urban areas (86 
per cent) compared to 78 per cent and 59 per cent for urban and rural respondents, 
respectively. Due to the compactness of residential homes in semi-urban areas and the 
limited number of television sets, most respondents watched television with their families 
and/or/ friends. Watching television with friends was highest among respondents in semi-
urban areas (52 per cent). Similarly, respondents in semi-urban areas scored fairly highly 
(27 per cent) with respect to watching television in neighbours’ homes compared to 18 
per cent and 27 per cent for urban and rural respondents, respectively).  
 
There were no significant differences across all educational groups with regard to 
watching television with other people.  For instance, almost three quarters of respondents 
said that they watched television with others. Percentage scores ranged between 73 per 
cent for higher degree holders and 76 per cent for certificate and diploma holders. About 
73 per cent of respondents with no formal education watched television with family 
members, while more than 77 per cent of respondents in other educational categories 
watched television with their family members. People with first degrees and above 
reported the highest percentage for watching television with friends (38 per cent). In 
contrast, they scored the lowest (16 per cent) in terms of watching television in 
neighbours’ homes. This was against the 26 per cent that was scored by respondents with 
no formal education. Watching television in neighbours’ homes increased in tandem with 
decreasing educational levels.   
 
Concerning watching television with family members, respondents affiliated to political 
parties, scored the highest. Half of respondents associated with ruling political parties 
scored slightly better than respondents associated with opposition political parties, while 
politically-neutral respondents reported that they watched television with their families. 
131 
 
About a quarter of politically-affiliated respondents reported that they watched television 
with friends. Watching television in neighbours’ homes scored 16.4 per cent, 13.0 per 
cent, 11.5 per cent and 14.3 per cent of respondents from ruling political parties, 
opposition political parties, politically-neutrals and the “Don’t know” category, 
respectively.  
5.4.1.3 Who decides which programme to watch? 
 
The basic questions, among others, in social television watching are who decides which 
programme(s) to watch? Who controls the Remote Control for television? These 
questions are important because answers to them have a bearing on the nature and quality 
of news and information that television viewers access. As Figure 5.12 shows, all family 
members, friends and neighbours had variously made decisions regarding which 
programme(s) to watch. The highest numbers of decisions were made by fathers, 35 per 
cent, as against the 20 per cent for mothers. About three out of ten respondents reported 
that their friends decided the kind of programme(s) to watch. Slightly more than one 
quarter of respondents indicated that children made decisions regarding which 
programmes to watch. The percentage of husbands in deciding which television 
programme to watch was 22.6 per cent compared to 19.8 per cent for wives. Nearly 15 
per cent of respondents reported that their neighbours decided which programmes to 
watch.  
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Statistical analysis and the correlation co-efficient indicated that there was no association 
between and among social television viewing, especially watching with families and 
friends, and educational attainment, income level and political affiliation. Income level 
and educational attainment and social television viewing were independent. Respondents 
with high educational attainments, income groups and the lowly-educated did not 
significantly differ in their social television-watching practices. It was also discovered 
that there was a very low relationship between respondents’ regions of residence, age and 
sex and watching television with family members and friends. Study results further 
showed that social television-watching by females, males, the young, adults and old 
people was not associated with residential areas, i.e. regions, urban, semi-urban and rural 
areas.  
5.4.2 Places where people listen to radio  
 
Respondents reported that they listened to radio at home, at workplaces, in restaurants, in 
cars and in their neighbours’ homes (Figure 5.13). Among respondents who listened to 
radio, eight out of ten, or 80 per cent, did so at home. A quarter of respondents listened 
radio at workplaces. The majority of respondents in urban areas listened to radio at 
workplaces during week-days, while respondents in rural areas listened to radio on week-
ends and holidays in the flat-topped mountain (field and farm lands) with their friends. In 
Ethiopia, it is a practice to listen to the radio while holding it on the shoulder when one is 
walking along a street or in the field. Listening to the radio in the field is particularly 
popular in rural areas.  Another popular tradition, especially in rural areas, is social-
listening to radio in the evening, during holidays and week-ends.   
 
The practice of listening to the shortwave broadcaster is variously popular in Ethiopia in 
different parts of the country. Listeners prefer to buy portable world-brand radio 
(Shortwave radio, also known as High Frequency (HF) radio) to access national and 
international shortwave bands such as the National Ethiopian Radio, Voice of America 
for Amharic, Tigrigna and Oromiffa Programmes and Deutsche Welle Radio for the 
Amharic Programme. The location/place where one is and the technical aspects of radio 
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reception (along with internal antenna) are crucial for optimum and clear reception of 
shortwave signals. Shortwave listening was especially popular during periods of internal 
conflicts and unrest. People were desperate to get latest, balanced and accurate news and 
information from outside broadcasters. Households with shortwave radio receivers 
attracted people without them who were eager to listen to latest developments in the 
country.   
 
The study found out that 20 per cent of respondents listened to radio in restaurants and 
hotels. Another 15 per cent reported that they listened to radio inside in private and public 
transport vehicles. One out of ten respondents reported that they listened to the radio in 
their neighbours’ homes. Some respondents reported that they purposely went to their 
neighbours’ homes to listen to the radio, while others reported that they went to their 
neighbours’ homes for other purposes and in the process chanced the opportunity to listen 
to the radio.  It was also discovered that social and forum-listening to the radio are 
popular in Ethiopia.    
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One respondent, for instance, said that “I visit my friends, I listen to their radio.  I visit 
them on public holidays.  I listen to their radio on such occasions and also on Shengo 
(assembly) when people come with their radio sets.  So, I listen on such occasions” 
(Interviewee 40, June 5, 2009: 28). 
 
Shifting from radio to television: The nature of the news and information medium can 
be considered as one of the factors for the selection and condition for audiences’ media 
consumption (Rayner, Wall and Kruger, 2004: 217). Characteristics or the strengths and 
weaknesses of each medium have an impact on media consumption patterns. The 
strengths and weaknesses of media include their portability, their cost, their interactivity, 
their demands on attention and choices available (Rayner, Wall and Kruger, 2004: 217). 
The more strengths a news and information medium has, the more audiences will use it.  
In light of this, the radio has more strengths that any other news and information medium. 
The main threat to the popularity of the radio is the print media and not the television. 
However, this threat is ameliorated in Ethiopia by the limited number and distribution of 
newspapers. Distribution of newspapers, for instance, is largely limited to urban areas.  
 
Despite the general popularity of the radio, some respondents reported that there was a 
noticeable migration from it to the television. It was explained that some people prefer 
the television because it shows them pictures of what is being talked about or reported. In 
this regard, one respondent said: “Look, you see television and believe it. It helps you to 
look and believe it. For this reason I like television. Some news or information that I 
could not get from television or could not get time to do I can look them in newspapers, 
Magazines and radio. That is why I use both of them” (Interviewee, 28, May 28, 2009: 
32). 
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Another one added: 
 I use mainly the television. I prefer to watch the television. The main 
reason is you can witness it with your eyes. Every mass media has its own 
value with regard to the information they pass. But I say the best is the 
television and then the radio. So personally I think it would be best for 
people to follow the television programs and if they cannot afford, the radio. 
Box 1: Conversation between a farmer, Shire, and I 
Question: Why are you carrying this radio?  
Answer: I like to listen to radio very much everywhere every time. I don’t want to 
leave the radio at home behind me. It gives me great satisfaction to hold it on my 
shoulder and listen to it; I have been using radio for the past 10 years. I got a lot of 
information from this habit so I have no reason to stop it now. 
Question: Do you listen to radio alone or with others? 
Answer: I usually listen to radio with other people. I listen to radio with my family 
when I am at home and with friends and others including visitors and strangers 
when I am outside my home. I use it on the street and in the field. Of course I 
don’t use it when I am ploughing the land. I use to listen to radio with my friends 
on weekends and holidays in the garden. 
Question: What kind of programmes do you listen to mostly? 
Answer: I usually listen to news and current affairs. I do not want to miss the news 
programme in Tigrigna. I like to listen to any radio programmes such as 
agriculture, culture, talk show, music.  
Question: I am assuming you use dry cell for your radio. If it is true how you do 
afford to buy dry cells? 
Answer: Yes, my radio uses only dry cell. There is no electricity in my area so dry 
cell is my only means. As you know the cost of dry cell is very expensive especially 
for a farmer like me but I have already considered the cost of dry cells as part of 
my living expenses. I include it in my budget so I have to buy four dry cells every 
two months. 
Question: Do you charge the persons whom listen to your radio with you as 
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I prefer the television because I can not only hear it but, I can also watch the 
program (Interviewee 5, May 14, 2009:18). 
Some respondents also reported that they shifted from radio to television because they 
found it more attractive than radio. A lady in Shire Endaslasie said that “I used to follow 
radio programmes during the morning and the evening section. I use television now; the 
television programme is nice and I stick to that. And it attracts me” (Interviewee 9, May, 
15, 2009: 37).  Yet another respondent said that “We prefer to use television, because it 
gives us recent news accompanied by picture. It gives us detailed information” 
(Interviewee 11, May 15, 2009:47). In terms of foreign media, it was reported that there 
was a noticeable shift from BBC Radio to BBC Television. In this regard, one respondent 
said that “My favorite information source used to be BBC Radio. I used to listen to this 
even during the night. But I now stopped this in favor of BBC Television that I now 
access after securing a satellite dish” (Interviewee 14, May 20, 2009: 2). 
5.4.3 Reading newspapers and magazines  
Respondents were requested to indicate the frequency with which they read newspapers 
and magazines. A total of 1,732 respondents, or 95 per cent, of the study population, 
responded to the question. Close to one out of ten respondents, or 8.5 per cent,  reported 
that they read newspapers regularly and less than half reported that they read newspapers 
from time to time (Figure 5.14). About 40 per cent of the respondents reported that they 
did not read newspapers. 
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Reading newspapers varied across respondents. The highest percentage for reading 
newsapers regularly was reported among respondents in Addis Ababa (22 per cent) and 
the second highest was scored by respondents in Tigray (8 per cent). Respondents in 
Amhara and Oromia regions scored 3.4 per cent and 2.5 per cent, respectively (Table 
5.15 and Figure 5.15). In Addis Ababa,  two out of ten respondents and nearly half in the 
the other three regions reported that they never read newspapers.  
 
 
Reading newspapers among male respondents was higher (10 per cent) than among 
female respondents (5 per cent). One-third of male and about half of female respondents 
had never read newspapers. Urban respondents accounted for 84 per cent of the total 
newspaper readers, while semi-urban and rural respondents accounted for 8 per cent and 
7 per cent, respectively. The highest percentage of newspaper readership was scored 
among urban respondents (14 per cent) and declined as one travelled from urban and 
semi-urban to rural areas (5 per cent in semi-urban and 2 per cent in rural areas). About 
one quarter of urban respondents, slightly more than one-third of semi-urban respondents 
and nearly two-thirds of rural respondents had not read any newspapers. In terms of age, 
readership of newspapers was highest among respondents aged betweeen 18 and 39 (the 
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young) and declined with increasing age of respondents. The young scored  9 per cent, 
while the middle-aged and  old respondents scored 8 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively. 
About one-third of  the young , half of the middle-aged and slightly more than three 
quarters of old respondents had never read any newspapers. At 7 per cent, low-income 
respondents scored the lowest percentage  in terms of  newspaper readership compared to  
middle and high-income respondents who scored close to 15 per cent. Nearly half of low-
income respondents and one out of five respondents in middle and high-income groups 
reported that they had not read any newspapers in their life time.  
 
Respondents with the highest education level (22 per cent) reported the highest 
newspaper readership compared to 10 per cent of diploma holders, 6 per cent of high-
school leavers and 2 per cent of those with no formal education. Slightly more than two-
thirds of those with no formal education, one-third of high-school leavers, one fifth of of 
diploma holders and one out of ten first degree holders reported that they had not read 
any newspapers. Generally, the young and respondents in urban areas and those in the  
middle and high-income groups, including those with highest education levels, reported 
the highest percentages for newspaper readership.  
5.4.3.1. Places where people read newspapers 
 
The study revealed that respondents read newspapers from multiple locations (Figure 
5.16). The highest proportion of respondents (38 per cent) said that they read newspapers 
from their homes, while 19 per cent said they read newspapers from offices. Reading 
newspapers from inside cars and in coffee houses was scored at 10.8 per cent and 10.4 
per cent, respectively.   The practice of reading newspapers in coffee houses especially by 
men while drinking coffee, tea, or caputuno in the morning is very common in towns and 
cities. It was reported that sometimes readers pay about 50 cents as rent to read a 
newspaper. This is an unwritten mutual agreement between readers and newspaper 
vendors who have regular and specific customers. After one has finished reading a 
newspaper, the vendor collects and passes it on to another reader. This kind of readership 
arrangement has a positive multiplier effect on the number of newspaper readers and 
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helps in ensuring that even those who may not be able to buy newspapers have access to 
them.  
   
 
 
Places from which people read newspapers varied within variables (Figure 5.16). 
However, reading newspapers at home scored the highest percentage across all groups of 
respondents regardless of residence, regions, gender, age and income and educational 
levels. Scores ranged between 28 per cent and 63 per cent in all respondent groups. 
Reading newspapers in offices had the second highest score across all respondent groups, 
except for respondents in the Tigray region where scores ranged between 7 and 23 per 
cent. Tigray scored the second highest percentage (13 per cent) in terms of reading 
newspapers in coffee houses whereas the other three regions scored the highest in terms 
of newspaper-reading in offices. In regard to reading newspapers on the street, Tigray, 
Amhara and Oromia regions scored the least percentage.  Reading newspapers at school 
was scored the highest by respondents in Addis Ababa. Addis Ababa scored 44 per cent 
and 46 per cent of respondents who reported that they read newspapers from offices and 
coffee houses, respectively.   
 
Women respondents scored 43 per cent in terms of reading newspapers at home against 
37 per cent for their male counterparts. In contrast, male respondents scored a higher 
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percentage (12 per cent) in terms of reading newspapers in coffee houses compared to 
their female counterparts who scored 6 per cent.  Nearly two-thirds of rural respondents 
(63 per cent) reported that they read newspapers at home compared to 35 per cent of 
urban and 32 per cent of semi-urban respondents, respectively. Respondents who read 
newspapers from offices scored 8 per cent compared to 7 per cent for those who said they 
read newspapers from reading rooms/libraries. Rural respondents reported that they read 
newspapers from time to time. Older people (16 per cent) and people with the highest 
education levels (14 per cent) indicated that coffee houses were the third most favourable 
places to read newspapers next to homes and offices. Reading newspapers while 
travelling and in cars scored the third highest among urban, semi-urban, young and high-
income respondents. 
5.4.3.2. Newspaper reading forum 
 
There is a practice in Ethiopia of reading newspapers in groups and is dominant in rural 
areas of the country. Newspaper-reading forum is, at times, used to generate debate of 
current affairs among members of the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF), Oromo 
People Democratic Organisation (OPDO), Amhara People Democratic Organisation 
(APDO) and the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Each of 
these political parties publishes its periodical newspaper. TPLF publishes Woyin in 
Tigrigna, APDO publishes Bekur in Amharic, OPDO publishes Kallacha in Oromiffaa 
and EPDRF publishes Abiyotawi Democracy in Amharic. These newspapers are 
distributed to respective regions and, especially, targeted at party members.  Leaders of 
each political party selects current topics for publication.  
 
A typical newspaper reading forum consists of 15 to 20 members of the party at cell level 
(Hiwas). They meet fortnightly or once in a month over week-ends or religious holidays 
like Saint Michael, Gabriel, Lucas, Saint Mary days.  One respondent said “We meet on 
the 29th of the month to read Bekur newspaper. Someone who can read well is chosen and 
reads for us and we discuss the message” (Interviewee 43, June 6, 2009). After reading 
the article, members discuss it and make decisions which are later passed on to 
authorities in the party hierarchy. Political party newspapers are valued by members. One 
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APDO member, for example, said: “I read Bekur newspaper. It covers news and issues 
related to our monthly Kebele meetings. It highlights development activities in Amhara 
region. We read this newspaper and conduct our monthly meetings based on the 
comments and feedback we receive from this” (Interviewee 39, June 5, 2009).   
 
Forum-reading of newspapers by respective political party members is designed to build 
and consolidate internal democracy within political parties with respect to topical social, 
economic and political issues. During forum newspaper-reading, members are expected 
to discuss and take stands on identified issue areas. In reference to this, one respondent 
said “We hold free discussions. When we face problems, we seek collective solutions. 
Where the problems are beyond our capacity to solve, we refer the issue to higher bodies 
of APDO/TPLF at Woreda level to help us for solutions”.  As mentioned earlier, 40 per 
cent of the study population reported that they had never read any newspaper. Out of 
these percentages, 620 respondents, or 92 per cent, explained why. Figure 5.17 shows 
percentages of respondents’ main reasons for not reading newspapers. The main reasons 
were lack of time, lack of newspapers in their areas, inability to read or illiteracy, lack of 
interest and lack of money to buy newspapers.  
 
 
Newspaper consumption, or readership, can easily be affected by many factors. These 
might include number of newspapers published, kind of newspapers published, number 
of copies issued, channels of circulation, prices of newspapers, number of literate people, 
capacity of potential readers to buy newspapers, intimidation of readers, especially for 
27.7
15.1
20.4
23.2
13.7
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Lack of time Lack of interest Unable to read Not available Unable to buy
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
Figure 5.17: Main reasons for not reading newspapers (in 
percentgaes)  
142 
 
opposition political party-inclined newspapers, and reading habits. The number of daily, 
tri-weekly, bi-weekly or weekly newspapers is very small and adversely affects their 
distribution and availability to potential readers. In addition, the distribution of most 
newspapers is limited to major towns of the country. There were, for example, no 
newspaper vendors or dispensers in the study towns of Mettu, Ukka, Debre Tabor, Arb 
Gebeya, Shere Indaslasie and Indabagu. In response to the question “What newspapers do 
you read?” a young man in Debre Tabore answered “We don’t have access to newspaper 
here. I would like to read but I don’t find them here. I buy them whenever I go to Baher 
Dar” (Interviewee 35, June 3, 2009: 1). Similarly, an informant in Halu said that “In our 
area it is difficult to get newspapers. We don’t have newspapers that are in Finfinne. Due 
to this we only use Kallacha Oromia. We have problems in this regard” (Interviewee 23, 
May 27, 2009:13). 
5.5. Motives behind media use: Media uses and gratifications  
 
One of the motivations for studies of media dynamics “…seeks to understand why people 
seek out the media that they do and what they use it for” (David, 2016:3). Integrated 
model of audience choice or media uses and gratifications theory helps to explain how 
individuals use mass communication to gratify their needs and to discover underlying 
motives for individuals’ media use. It assumes that individuals have power over their 
media usage, rather than positioning individuals as passive consumers of media 
(McQuail, 2000; 2004). The theory explores how individuals deliberately seek out media 
to satisfy certain individual needs such as information, personal identity, socialisation and 
entertainment. It is a tool for understanding how individuals connect with technologies 
around them and how they use them. For instance, people seek a number of gratifications 
from their radio or television which might include affection, diversion, relaxation, social 
interaction, value reinforcement, cultural satisfaction, entertainment, mobility, 
recognition, passing time, information, arousal, escape and similar others.   
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Respondents were asked to indicate reasons for using television, radio and newspapers in 
line with the typology of media uses and gratifications.20 More than half, or 56 per cent, 
were for television, 67 per cent for radio and 58 per cent for newspapers. Seeking 
information and gratifications scored the highest as the major reasons for media usage 
across all three media channels. About 17 per cent, 16 per cent and 14 per cent of 
respondents used television, radio and newspapers, respectively, for information 
regarding current events and developments in their immediate surroundings and the 
world (Figure 5.18).  The second and the third highest were learning (self-education), 
guidance and advice. Usage of the media for sexual arousal scored the lowest, while 
television scored 1.8 per cent, newspapers 1.9 per cent and radio 2.6 per cent.  The 
second lowest reason for using the media was filling time which scored 5.4 per cent, 5.2 
per cent and 5.1 per cent for television, radio and newspapers, respectively. As Figure 
5.18 shows, the pattern of motives for media usage was similar across television, 
newspaper and radio.  
 
However, the four broad categories of reasons for media use and gratification varied 
among the three news media (Figure 5.20). Use of and gratification from media were 
classified to fit into four categories; seeking information, personal identity, integration 
and social interaction, and relaxation (McQuail, 1987:73).21 Seeking information consists 
of finding out about relevant events and conditions in immediate surroundings and the 
world at large, seeking advice on practical matters or opinion and choices, satisfying 
curiosity and general interest and learning, as well as self-education.  
 
                                                          
20 According McQuail (1987: 73) the typology of common reasons for media use are: seeking information, 
learning (self-education), guidance and advice, diversion and relaxation, social contact, value 
reinforcement, cultural satisfaction, emotional release, identity formation and confirmation, lifestyle 
expression, security and reassurance, sexual arousal and filling time 
21The four broad categories of media use motives are a. Information (seeking information, learning (self-
education), and guidance and advice); b. Personal identity (identity formation and confirmation, lifestyle 
expression, security and reassurance); c. Social interaction (social contact, value reinforcement and cultural 
satisfaction); and d. Entertainment (emotional release, diversion and relaxation, sexual arousal and filling 
time)  
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Personal identity pertains to finding reinforcement for personal values, finding models of 
behavior, identifying with acceptable values and gaining insight into oneself. Integration 
and social interaction include gaining insight into circumstances of others, identifying 
with others and gaining a sense of belonging, finding a basis for conversation and social 
interaction, having a substitute for real-life companionship, helping to carry out social 
roles and enabling one to connect with family, friends and society. Entertainment 
comprises escaping, or being diverted, from problems, relaxing, getting intrinsic cultural 
or aesthetic enjoyment, filling time, sexual arousal and emotional relief.  
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As Figure 5.19 shows, the proportion of usage of media for news and information was 
highest across all three media. Scores were 36.8 per cent for television, 41 per cent for 
radio and 45 per cent for newspapers. Using newspapers for getting news, information 
and current affairs scored the highest, while television scored the least. Using television 
for entertainment such as relaxation, aesthetic enjoyment, filling time, sexual arousal and 
emotional relief, scored fairly high at 27.4 per cent across all the three media. Motives for 
using the radio and newspapers for entertainment scored 10.5 per cent and 7.9 per cent, 
respectively. In contrast, respondents reported that they least used the radio and 
newspapers for relaxation and relief of tension. Respondents used more of the radio and 
newspapers for personal integration and social interaction than for entertainment. The 
second highest percentage was using media for integration and social interaction. Usage 
of newspapers for personal identity, such as identity formation and confirmation needs, 
was recorded at 24 per cent, while the percentage for using media for social interactive 
needs was recorded at 25 per cent among radio listeners. Nearly half of respondents 
agreed that they needed radio and newspaper for personal identity or social integration 
and interaction.  
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Figure 5.19: Typology of media uses and gratifications for using television, 
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Motives for use of the three news media varied across different variables. However, the 
use of television, radio and newspapers for getting news and information was fairly high 
across all variables irrespective of region, gender, residence, age, income level, 
educational attainment and political orientation (figures 5.20, 5.21 and 5.22). There were, 
nevertheless, some variations within variables. Respondents in Addis Ababa, urban 
respondents, the middle-aged group, middle-income respondents, high educational level 
respondents and people who didn’t know their political affiliation, scored highest 
percentages with respect to using television for seeking news and information. 
Respondents in Tigray, rural respondents, old people, low-income group, individuals with 
no formal education and people associated with ruling political parties, scored the least 
for using television for news and information needs.  For instance, Tigray, Amhara and 
Oromia scored 32.1 per cent, 36.8 per cent and 37.5 per cent, respectively, compared to 
the 42.9 per cent scored by respondents in Addis Ababa. Percentages for watching 
television for acquiring news and information were 38.6 per cent for urban, 35.9 per cent 
for semi-urban and 32.7 per cent for rural respondents. Using television for entertainment 
scored the second highest percentage across all variables.  
 
Respondents in Oromia, low-income respondents, low education level persons and 
respondents affiliated to opposition political parties scored highest percentages for using 
television for relaxation, effective needs, tension relief and time-break needs. Similarly, 
respondents in Amhara, the middle-aged, high- income group, respondents with high 
educational attainment and respondents associated with ruling political parties scored the 
lowest percentages across variables for using television for entertainment. For instance, 
scores were 31.0 per cent for Oromia, 24.2 for Amhara, 28.7 per cent for low-income 
group and 17.0 per cent for high-income respondents. More than a third of respondents 
reported that they used television for personal identity and social interaction needs within 
all independent variables. Regarding gender, there were no significant differences 
between male and female respondents with respect to motives for using television (Figure 
5.20).  
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Scores for using television for news and information needs were 36.8 per cent for male 
and 36.5 per cent for female respondents. In regard to using television for entertainment 
purposes, male respondents scored 27.1 per cent against 27.4 per cent for their female 
counterparts. Similarly, there were no significant differences between the two sexes in 
regard to using television for personal identity and social interaction needs. Again, no 
significant differences were noticed between the two sexes in terms of motives behind 
using television for seeking news and information, personal identity, social interaction 
and entertainment needs.   
 
 
 
Using radio for seeking news and information was scored the highest across different 
variables, especially among respondents in Addis Ababa who recorded a score of 58.4 
per cent. In contrast, respondents in Amhara, Tigray and Oromia recorded 37.1 per cent, 
38.3 per cent and 40.1 per cent, respectively.  A little more male respondents, 40.7 per 
cent, than female respondents, 40.1 per cent, used radio for the same purpose. Regarding 
using the radio for surveillance purposes, urban respondents scored 48 per cent compared 
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to 45.1 per cent and 34 per cent, for semi-urban and rural respondents, respectively. 
Middle-income and high educational level respondents and respondents in the “Don’t 
know’’ response category scored the highest percentages with respect to using the radio 
for news and information. Using radio for entertainment scored the least across all 
variables. Respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, male respondents, young 
respondents, middle-income respondents, respondents with certificates and diplomas and 
neutral respondents scored the least in all response categories. Meanwhile, respondents in 
Amhara, females, rural area dwellers, the middle-aged and low-income respondents, 
scored the highest percentages for using radio for fun. Similarly, the percentage was 
highest among respondents with no formal education and those associated with the ruling 
political parties. Using the radio for personal identity and social interaction scored in the 
range of 17 to 26 per cent.  
    
 
One of the sources of news and information is the printed page in newspapers and 
magazines. Respondents therefore, were asked about the motives for using printed 
newspapers. As it was expected, the highest percentages were reported for using 
newspapers for gratifying news and information needs. Using newspapers for seeking 
news and information was highest among respondents in Addis Ababa (67.6 per cent) 
compared to 37.4 per cent, 42.2 per cent and 43.6 per cent for respondents in Tigray, 
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Amhara and Oromia, respectively (Figure 5.22). Respondents in urban areas (55.6 per 
cent), males (45.6 per cent), middle-income group (54 per cent), respondents with first 
degrees and above (53.6 per cent) and respondents affiliated to opposition political 
parties (59.5 per cent), scored the highest percentages with respect to using newspapers 
for seeking news and information and current affairs. Meanwhile, respondents in Tigray, 
female respondents, the low-income group, respondents with no formal education and 
respondents associated with ruling political parties, scored the least for using newspapers 
for news and information needs.   
 
Using newspaper for purposes of entertainment was very low across all demographic 
variables. The lowest percentages were scored among respondents in Addis Ababa, male 
respondents, adults between the ages of 40 and 59, the middle-income group, people with 
certificates and diplomas and respondents associated with opposition political parties. In 
contrast, respondents in Tigray, female respondents, rural inhabitants, old people, low-
income populations, respondents with no formal education and supporters of ruling 
political parties, scored the highest percentages with respect to motives for using 
newspapers for relaxation and relief. For instance, percentages for using newspapers for 
entertainment were 1.1 for Addis Ababa and 11. 9 for Tigray respondents, while the 
middle-income and low income populations scored 3.10 per cent and 9.3 per cent, 
respectively.   
 
Figure 5.22 shows that a considerable number of respondents reported using newspapers 
for personal identity and social integration needs. For instance, more than half of 
respondents in Tigray and Oromia, rural residents, low-income populations, low 
education level respondents, respondents associated with ruling political parties used 
newspapers to gratify personal identity, lifestyle expression, security, social contact and 
for value reinforcement motives. Oromia region scored 25.8 per cent each for social 
interaction and personal identity, while rural respondents scored 26.9 per cent and 28.5 
per cent for the same motives. The importance of newspaper forum reading in some study 
sites cannot be disregarded for motives of social interaction and social integration.  
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The core assumption of media uses and gratifications is that individuals often actively 
choose a particular media to meet their special needs and interests. Choices are frequently 
linked to important personal and social background characteristics. Results of decades of 
research and survey data indicate that socio-demographic variables are associated with 
the media that people choose to consume (Schoenbach, Lauf, McLeod and Scheufele, 
1999; Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2011; Pew Research Center for 
the People and the Press, 2012). Using television, radio and newspapers for acquiring 
news and information varied across socio-demographic variables.  In other words, 
seeking news and information was the main motive for using the three news and 
information media among respondents in Addis Ababa, Tigray, Amhara and Oromia, 
female and male respondents, rural and urban respondents, the aged and income group 
respondents, including respondents with no formal education, highly educated and 
partisan and non-partisan respondents. In fact, the majority of the study population said 
that they used all the three news media for seeking news and information.  
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Using television for entertainment, such as escaping from problems, relaxing and 
emotional relief, scored the highest percentage among respondents. Television is 
dominant in major cities and urban parts of the country. This was reflected in the media 
uses and gratifications assessment. Respondents in Addis Ababa, urban residents, elderly 
people, middle class respondents, respondents with high level education and respondents 
in the “Don’t know” response category scored high percentages for using television for 
information. However, these groups scored the lowest for using television for 
entertainment. Conversely, low- income working groups and individuals with no formal 
education used television for entertainment more than other respondent groups. However, 
these groups scored the least for using television for news and information needs.  
 
Similarly, using radio for news, information and surveillance motives was higher among 
Addis Ababa respondents, urban respondents, middle-income respondents, highly-
educated groups and neutral respondents. These groups, on the other hand, scored the 
least for using radio for entertainment purposes. Respondents in Addis Ababa, urban 
respondents, the middle-income group, high education level group and respondents 
associated with opposition political parties regularly used newspapers for news and 
information needs more than other categories of respondents. In contrast, respondents in 
Addis Ababa, urban respondents, the middle-income group, high education level 
respondents and respondents associated with opposition political parties scored the least 
percentages with regard to reading newspapers for entertainment.   
 
Previous research evidence suggests that individuals with higher incomes and higher 
education qualifications are more likely to read newspapers, whereas individuals who are 
less well-off and have lower levels of education are more likely to use television news 
sources (Schoenbach, Lauf, McLeod and Scheufele, 1999; Pew Research Center for the 
People and the Press, 2011; Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2012). 
This view was not directly reflected in the study findings. However, it is hypothetically 
true that individuals with high incomes and educational levels have better opportunities to 
access and read newspapers for news and information than individuals with low incomes 
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and low educational attainment. What needs to be done is a critical analysis of the 
association between income and literacy and the habit of reading newspapers22.  
 
In terms of television, there is the issue of affordability. People with low incomes have to 
think twice before spending the little they have on buying a television set; and this fact 
partially explains the low scores among low-income groups relative to high-income 
groups with respect to television ownership. For example, percentages for using 
television for seeking news and information were 34.0 per cent and 30.3 per cent for the 
low- income and respondents with low education, respectively, compared to 42.6 per cent 
for high-income and 40.7 per cent for high level education individuals. There are clear 
trends that education, income and age are positively related to the general tendency to 
prefer news over entertainment compared to the young who prefer entertainment over 
news (Pew Research Center, 2004). Liberals are more likely to watch left-leaning 
programmes and conservatives are more likely to watch right-leaning programmes 
(Stroud, 2011). However, these general trends of media uses and gratifications were not 
exactly reflected in the Ethiopian media consumption pattern.  
 
Theoretically, needs of audiences should be considered as critical determinant factors for 
media choice. “Explaining media consumption as a function of individual needs has been 
the hallmark of uses and gratifications research. Despite the intuitive appeal of this 
approach, viewer needs alone seem inadequate for predicting specific programme choice 
(McQuail et. al., 1972). We would argue that needs are not a direct determinant of choice 
but rather operated through a number of intervening variables to affect choice behavior” 
(Webster and Washlag, 1983: 439).  
5.6. From communal to social narration of information and then individualisation of news 
and information  
Both individual and societal patterns of media use change over time (Eveland and 
Cooper, 2013). Radio, television and other modern communication products had strong 
impact in changing modes of information dissemination and ways of consumption. These 
                                                          
22 The history of tabloid and broadsheet newspaper illustrates that the broadsheet newspaper was 
established to gratify in terms of content and format the interest of the high class society.   
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changes can be ascertained in the Ethiopian context. There are generally three modes of 
information dissemination and media consumption. The first one is ‘communal narration’ 
of news or information exchange (Abdull Kadir, 2006:138), the second is social narration 
of news and the third is personal/individualization access to news and information.   
 
Communal narration of news and information was introduced in the early days of radio 
and later television. It was based on oral dissemination of information and constituted the 
cradle of communal ethos in many traditional African societies. According to Agawu, 
“every domain of performance is conditioned by a desire on the part of participants to 
join rather than divide, to bring together rather than set apart, to unify rather than 
splinter”  (Agawu, 2007:1). The ritual, narrative, dance, singing and the beating of drums 
and other instruments have shown the working of a communal ethos. A communal ethos 
informs the beliefs, customs, or practices of a group or society. It is the values, identities, 
bondages, beliefs, commitments of the society. “It is the ethos of communities to which 
we belong that generates shared hopes and commitments, that undergirds altruism and 
sharing, and that binds people together in trustful community relationships” (Fortune and 
Marshall, 2009). Communal poetry recitation, tale narration, listening to drums and flute, 
dance performance paved ways for new technology to share news, information and 
entertainment.  
 
In communal narration of news and information, people gathered around community 
leaders or some other influential person’s radio set or television set for news and 
information. They also gathered in tea houses, coffee houses, bars, Tejj houses (Tejj bet) 
or local beer houses to listen to radio and to watch television. People also gathered to 
listen to radio in the square in towns and cities where microphones were placed to 
distribute sound. Enormous numbers of people went to the square in towns and cities to 
watch television too. It was also common for people in villages to watch films from 
mobile cinemas with projector.  
 
Social narration of news and information through social-watching television, social-
listening to the radio and social-reading of newspapers and magazines is also popular in 
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Ethiopia. Social television-watching is predominant and popular in Ethiopia for multiple 
reasons. Firstly, it is an excellent social activity that brings people together. Secondly, the 
fact that it brings families, friends and neighbours together means that it contributes to 
building, strengthening and sustaining the sense of communality, belonging/cohesion and 
inclusion.  Thirdly, it presents rare opportunities for discussion of issues of contemporary 
concern to the community and providing consensually-agreed solutions to the same.  
 
The tendency of individuals to watch television in groups can be utilised to analyse 
audience behaviour in media uses and consumption patterns. One of the audience 
behaviours relates to the selection of what to watch without compromising individual 
preferences of the audience.  The selection of specific television channels and 
programmes is not, therefore, a free and independent decision that is made by a single 
individual. According to Webster and Wakshlag, the choice is not “a function of 
unfettered individual preference” (Webster and Wakshlag (1983:440). Based on their 
own research and research by other scholars, Webster and Wakshlag (1982; 1983) and 
Mutsaers (1996) argued that people's television programme choices depend on the 
programme preferences of the group of people with whom they watch. According to 
McDonal (1986), when people are engaged in the selection of what programmes to 
watch, the process is called peer co-viewing. He further explained that previous research 
had revealed that, in some cases, household members had influenced the choice of what 
programmes to watch.  
 
As already indicated elsewhere in this chapter, social listening to the radio and social-
watching of television are popular among low-income populations in Ethiopia 
(Interviewee 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 40, 41, 42 and 43).  For instance, a low-income respondent in 
Shire Endaslasie watched television from other places. Specifically, he said: “I do not 
have radio and television. I get information from entertainment places and from 
televisions. I watch and get information in different places, like in local beer houses, in 
workplaces etc. Most of the time, the transmission is good” (Interviewee 10, May 15, 
2009:41). 
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Similarly, a farmer in Tach Gayint said “When I visit my friends, I listen to their radio. I 
visit them on public holidays. I listen to their radio on such occasions and also in Shengo 
(assembly) when people come with their radio sets. So I listen on such occasions. We 
listen to sports news, music and irrigation development news.” (Interviewee 40, June 5, 
2009: 28).   
 
Some respondents who reported that they watched television and listened to radio from 
neighbours or with other persons said they did not have any say over the selection of 
channels. Rather, they watched what others were watching or listening to. When asked 
the question “Where and how do you get news and information?” a farmer in Tach 
Gayint responded by saying “When I visit my friends, I listen to their radio. [...] They 
tune it for their own sake, not for me. I listen with them. I listen to whatever they listen 
to” (Interviewee 40, June 5, 2009:28).   When further asked the question “Do you know 
which station you were listening to with them?” he said “No, I don’t know. Just listen to 
what is spoken. Listening to radio or watching television under such conditions is a 
matter of ‘follow it or leave it’”. 
 
Forum-reading of newspapers and information flow therefrom is a multi-step process. 
Firstly, there is a choice of a reader. Secondly, the reader or public opinion leader, 
chooses a relevant newspaper section, or sections, to read. Thirdly, news, information, 
ideas and messages flow from the reader to listeners. Fourthly, members of the forum 
react to and discuss contents of what has been read to them. Lastly, consensus is built 
around discussed issues. Later, what has been discussed and agreed is passed on to the 
community. The practice of choosing which sections of newspapers to read by the reader 
may imply that other members of the forum have no leverage on what is eventually read 
and discussed.  It may also mean that leaders personally select and filter messages in line 
with what they want to hear and discuss. This might, invariably, imply the probability of 
selective exposure of media users to biased news and information.  
 
It also might occasion biased and selective perceptions and interpretations of the meaning 
of media messages. Members of the newspaper reading forum might, therefore, be 
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constrained in perceiving and interpreting news and information content in tandem with 
their own social characteristics and preferences. This is in addition to the likelihood of 
accusing leaders of political party organs of pushing undesirable news and information 
‘down the throats’ of members of the forum. Such probability will, invariably, face the 
prospect of unshared discussion outcomes and visions.  This challenge was corroborated 
by Suresh who aptly observed that informal social groups and group leaders “… have 
some degree of influence on people and mould the way they select media content and act 
on it” (Suresh, 2003:2).  
 
Social television-viewing and social-listening to the radio are a powerful cultural source 
of news and information and public debate on matters of national and international 
importance. Social narration of news and information can function to solidify the bonding 
capacity of the community. It can also reinforce and nurture the much-needed social 
capital that has the incredible potential to underpin and ring-fence sustainable people-
level development.  However, social television-watching, social radio-listening and social 
newspaper-reading fora might have two negative consequences.  
 
Firstly, and has already been said, they have the potential to promote the notion of 
selective exposure to and selective perception of news and information. In this regard, the 
pluralist approach notes that the audience is normally engaged in three processes: 
selective exposure, selective perception and selective retention (Jones and Emma, 1999: 
55-56). Selective exposure means that audiences decide which papers to read, which 
television programmes to watch and which radio stations to listen to; selective perception 
means that they interpret the messages from the media according to their own social 
characteristics; and selective retention means that they are only able to remember a small 
part of what they see, read and so on” (Jones and Emma, 1999: 56). Implied in this 
challenge is the fact that, ideally, audiences are expected to select and decide the type of 
media, the type of programme or article to follow or read. Unfortunately, social 
television-watching, social radio-listening and social newspaper-reading fora do not give 
opportunities for audiences to decide which programme to watch or which article to read. 
This was clearly observed during in-depth interview sessions, especially in rural areas.  
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The second challenge relates to the invasion of media user’s personal space. An audience 
needs to watch television, listen to radio or read a newspaper within specific and 
convenient time, space and place without the interference of others. However, given 
current practices in television social-watching, listening to radio and reading newspapers, 
opportunities for consideration of personal convenience and space are extremely limited.  
 
Individualisation of news and information, or personalised access to news and 
information, has tended to displace communal and social narration of news and 
information. This trend has the potential to irretrievably and negatively affect the age-old 
inherent ability of communities to grow and sustain community bonds and relations. It 
also has the potential to socially-exclude certain community members, especially those 
with no financial capacity to buy news and information media hardware, from accessing 
news and information. Fortunately, in the case of Ethiopia, individualisation of news and 
information, or personalised access to news and information, is not yet dominant. 
Individualisation of news and information, or personalised access to news and 
information, is assisted by individual ownership and use of household media hardware, 
especially radio, television, and above all cell phones, tablets and other mobile 
communication gadgets. In modern society way of life people sit down in the dining 
room and everybody is busy with using her/his mobile/laptop. The family members do 
not depend in one television set or radio in the house instead a number of television sets 
and other devises are available for guaranteeing the specific needs of the individuals. 
However, the full negative impact of this trend is enhanced by the fact that the Ethiopian 
media access is not yet amenable to individualised use of the media due to high poverty 
levels and limited availability of media hardware in some areas.  
5.7. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I mainly examined ownership of and access to house hold media 
including newspapers and magazines within the social context of Ethiopia. The 
assessment of ownership of and access to the media also included the extent to which 
respondents used the internet, oral and communal narration of news and information. 
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Possession of and access to the media varied across households, urban, semi-urban and 
rural areas, income levels, educational attainment, gender and age. In terms of prevalence 
of ownership and access, urban areas, and especially Addis Ababa, scored the highest 
percentages across all media hardware. This finding was expected as urban areas are 
normally associated with availability of employment and business opportunities which 
enable people to buy media products.  
 
Young people scored the highest in terms of ownership and use of computers, radios, tape 
recorders, televisions, satellite dishes and cell phones. Again, the finding was not 
surprising as the young are naturally ICT-savvy, i.e. easily understand modern 
information and communication technologies. Media use was high among men compared 
to women and this finding applied across all hardware media channels. In contrast, 
female respondents scored higher than their male counterparts in form of watching 
television, listening to the radio and reading newspapers at home. This was not surprising 
in light of the fact that women normally spend more time at home than men. Men also 
scored higher percentages than women in terms of watching television at places of work, 
in bars, restaurants, tea and coffee houses and at clubs. Again, this was not surprising as 
men frequent bars, restaurants, tea and coffee houses and clubs more than their female 
counterparts. Watching television in bars and at clubs by women is,  in a way, 
constrained by cultural norms and practices according to which women are not expected 
to patronise bars and club houses as these are associated with beer-drinking and bad 
behaviour.  Like men in general, poor, low-income and no formal education respondents 
scored highly in form of watching television in bars, restaurants, tea and coffee houses, 
clubs and Tej bet. One major explanatory factor is the inability of these groups to buy 
their own television sets. Access to and ownership of media hardware was, however, 
constrained/limited by several other factors. 
 
 Firstly, some media hardware, such as televisions, satellite dishes and cell phones, are 
not readily available in some parts of the country, especially rural and hard-to-reach 
areas. Secondly, even in instances where people can afford to buy some media hardware, 
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such as televisions and cell phones, they may not be able to do so due to the non-
availability of communication transmission infrastructure. For instance, some areas that 
were included in the study sample were not served by mobile telephone transmitter 
towers, while others suffered from very poor television and radio signals. Another finding 
was that some areas were within range of mobile phone transmitter towers but people 
were so poor that they could not afford to buy requisite hardware gadgets to enable their 
use. The lesson from this mismatch is that it is not good enough to provide 
communication infrastructure without also creating an enabling environment that would 
allow communities to use it.  
 
The other key finding was that most of the respondents reported that oral communication 
and other people were predominantly used as sources of news and information. Some 
respondents, however, reported that these sources of news and information were limited 
by a number of factors. Among them were that some people are naturally shy or fear to 
openly communicate for fear of embarrassment. In the case of politically-inclined news 
and information, some people fear reprisals, especially if the news and information is 
perceived to be inimical to the ruling political party. Forum-reading of news is a popular 
source of news and information, especially in rural areas and poor communities. 
However, the practice of choosing what to read, shared and debated by the reader was 
said to be prone to stifling individual inputs in the selection of newspaper content. 
Invariably, this had a tendency to compromise perception, discussion and digestion of 
news and information based on personal understanding.  
 
Similarly, the practice of communal narration of news and information in groups at, for 
instance, a community leader’s or influential neighbour’s home, while good as a medium 
for ventilating communities with news and information, was said to be fraught with a 
number of challenges.  In most cases, the choice of which television channel to watch or 
radio station to listen to is monopolised by the owner of the television or radio; which 
limits personal choice of the nature of news and information. It also tends to bias news 
and information towards preferences of the owner of the television or radio. The study 
also observed a rising trend in the personalisation or individualisation of media 
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ownership and use. While this trend might not have any negative impact on mass 
dissemination of news and information among communities with regular disposable 
incomes such as urban and semi-urban areas, poor populations stand to be excluded from 
media products due to their inability to buy them.    
 
All in all, a general pattern of improved access to media hardware was observed to 
varying degrees across all regions which were captured in the study sample. Improved 
access to media presents rare opportunities for Ethiopia’s drive to attain all-round, 
inclusive and sustainable human development. This is especially true given the fact that, 
in contemporary human development dynamics, timely access to the rapidly-changing 
information and communications technology plays a key role in availing key knowledge 
and information. In this regard, the Government of Ethiopia will do well to create an 
enabling economic policy environment for the acquisition, development and provision of 
the necessary information and communication technology to as many of its citizens as 
possible. 
 
Next is chapter six. Chapter six deals with public perceptions of news media credibility. 
The assessment has two major components. The first focuses on news media system 
credibility comparisons between and among newspaper, radio and television within the 
parameters of ownership (private or public) and geographical setting, i.e. local, national 
or international. The second component of the assessment deals with the level of public 
confidence in media houses.  
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CHAPTER SIX: PUBLIC PERCEPTION ON MEDIA CREDIBILITY IN DEMOGRAPHICS AND 
POLITICAL VIEWS/POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF AUDIENCES  
"Whether you love me or hate me, you're still watching."  
- Tomi Lahren, one of Facebook's most popular 
conservatives, the young right-wing star breaking 
the internet 
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I will assess the public trust in news media in the quest to obtain news and 
information fully, accurately and fairly. The assessment has two major components. The 
first one focuses on news media system credibility comparisons between and among 
newspaper, radio and television within the parameters of ownership (private or public) 
and geographical setup, i.e.  local, national or international. The second component of the 
assessment is the level of public confidence in media houses with respect to Ethiopian 
Radio, Ethiopian Television, Voice of America (VOA), etc. Over the years, there has 
been a shift in the modality of studying media credibility from uni-dimensional to multi-
dimensional measures and approaches (Metzger et al., 2003:310). However, I will, as is 
necessary, use other dimensions and approaches of media credibility assessment in 
ascertaining practical experiences and judgements of media credibility and trust among 
audiences. The ten dimensions of media credibility, i.e. accuracy, believability, lack of 
bias, completeness, clarity, neutrality, and others, are often used in measuring and 
assessing factors that influence the judgement of media credibility (Johnson and Barbara, 
2002:625). These media credibility elements are assessed within independent variables of 
respondents’ region, sex, residence, age, income, educational background and political 
affiliation, including demographic factors and political views and affiliation.  
 
Quite often, the assessment of media credibility is focused on and limited to mainstream 
mass media, i.e., radio, television, newspapers and magazines to the exclusion of the web 
and the internet. However, web credibility has increasingly been included in media 
credibility studies. For instance, a number of scholars have argued that: Web credibility 
needs to be discussed independently of other types of credibility on the grounds that 
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conventional methods for assessing credibility may not be feasible on the Web. The 
complex characteristics of Web such as the speed, hyperlink, interaction, lack of 
referencing and organizational conventions make the Web different from other 
mainstream media (Metzger et al., 2003; Rieh and Danielson, 2007; Sundar, 2008; Kang, 
2010). 
Given this background, I used the following questions in assessing the credibility of and 
trust in the media:  
▪ Which media are most trusted for obtaining news and information? Are they 
national, international, government or private news media?  
▪ Which media are most trusted? Is it television, radio or newspaper?  
▪ Which news media houses do respondents trust most? Is it Ethiopian Radio or 
BBC or VOA or Addis Admass, etc.? 
▪ What is the relevance of dimensions of media credibility in the level of trust in 
media?  
▪ Does respondents’ perception of media credibility and dimensions of media 
credibility vary among demographic factors or independent variables?    
Some researchers have attempted to use dimensions of media credibility by using the 
statistical method of factor analysis (Gaziano & McGrath, 1986; Lee, 1978, Meyer, 1988; 
West, 1996; Rieh and Danielson, 2003). They have used these to measure media 
credibility factors with the application of the reliability measurement analysis for 
credibility (Cronbach’s alpha =.72 to =.83).  Because of the nature of the survey, data and 
characteristics of the study population, I apply the descriptive approach for analysing 
media credibility and dimensions of trust in news media. 
6.2. Level of trust in news media as sources of news and information  
 
Currently, the world is influenced by what people hear almost in real time. This has been 
made possible by rapid developments in information and communications technology 
(ICT) which have enabled access to news and information as and when one wants them. 
In singing and celebrating the positive and welcome developments in ICT, it is also 
important to address and take cognisance of challenges relating to media credibility 
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(Fogg and Tseng, 1999). This is extremely important if only because of the need to 
ensure that media audiences consume credible and verifiable news and information. 
Media credibility is, in fact, all the more critical and important given the rising trends of 
media abuse and misinformation.  
In light of the foregoing, respondents were asked to rate the level of trust in the news 
media for obtaining credible news and information. Out of the total study population, 36 
per cent responded in the case of international television, while 72 per cent responded in 
the case of the national television. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show that over a third of 
respondents had a lot of trust in the national television, 37 per cent, followed by the 
national radio, 36 per cent.   International television stations came third at 33.5 per cent 
as preferred sources of credible news and information.  Government newspapers posted 
32.1 per cent as sources of credible news and information. A quarter and slightly above a 
quarter of respondents expressed a lot of trust in local newspapers and international radio 
stations as sources of credible news and information, respectively. Other forms of media 
scored less than a quarter. Private media scored just 10 per cent as credible sources of 
news and information.  
 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Government newspapers
Private newspapers
Local newspapers
National radio
Commercial radio
Regional radio
International radio
International TV stations
National television
Figure 6.1: Respondents' level of trust in news media for getting news 
and information (in percentage) 
A lot of trust
Some trust
Not much trust
No trust at all
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In contrast, international television stations scored the highest percentage as sources of 
credible news and information (just over a third of respondents) closely followed by 
private newspapers, commercial and national radio and television stations. The number of 
respondents who at least expressed some trust and confidence in the media was evenly 
spread across various groups of respondents.  However, government newspapers had the 
least number of respondents who said that they had confidence and trust in them. 
Similarly, a third of respondents said they had no trust in private newspapers followed by 
local newspapers at 25 per cent of respondents. When bundled together, private or 
commercial radio and local radio accounted for about a fifth of respondents who said they 
had confidence and trust in them as sources of credible news and information. Separately 
assessed, local radio, international radio, commercial radio and local newspapers, all 
scored an average of 20 per cent in terms of confidence and as sources of credible news 
and information.  
 
 
 
Generally, national radio was the most trusted source for news and information with a 
threshold of 70 per cent of respondents expressing trust with some saying they had a lot 
of trust and others saying they had some trust. As Figure 6.2 indicates, national television 
and international television closely followed, while international radio, local radio, 
commercial radio and local newspapers scored in the neighboured of 50 per cent. Private 
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International television
National television
Figure 6.2: Respondents who had a lot of trust or some trust in 
media for obtaining information and news (in percentages)
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newspapers were the least trusted with less than half of respondents (45 per cent) 
expressing trust in them as sources of credible news and information. 
 
The data on level of trust in media systems was converted into numeric values (single 
numbers) to facilitate comparison across different levels of trust. Levels of trust were 
coded as 1 for ‘no trust at all’, 2 for ‘not much trust’, 3 for ‘some trust’ and 4 for ‘a lot of 
trust’. The response of respondents for national television, international television, 
government newspapers, private newspapers, local newspapers, national radio, 
private/commercial radio, local radio and international radio were measured using 
numeric values of descriptive significance rather than Likert-type scale to avoid 
reliability analysis and Cronbach’s alpha. Table 6.1 and Figure 6.3 indicate that national 
radio had the highest level of trust among respondents as a source of credible news and 
information with a score of 2.9127. It was followed by national television which scored 
2.8964. International television and international radio ranked third and fourth, 
respectively. Private newspapers were the least trusted media system with a score of 
2.3056.  
Table 6.1: Respondents’ level of trust in media (Descriptive 
Statistics) 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
Government newspapers 1228 2.7573 1.09889 
Private newspapers 1155 2.3056 .95529 
Local newspapers 1051 2.5852 1.07665 
National radio 1237 2.9127 1.04609 
Commercial radio 1039 2.5409 1.07432 
Local radio 1001 2.5425 1.09108 
International radio  992 2.6613 1.12229 
National television  1313 2.8964 1.06993 
International television  663 2.8703 1.03769 
Valid N (listwise) 480   
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Public trust in the three mainstream media, i.e., television, radio and newspaper, varied 
across respondents. About 70 per cent of respondents had a lot of trust or some trust in 
television, while 60 per cent and 54 per cent had trust in the radio and newspapers, 
respectively. In contrast, 15 per cent of respondents reported that they had no trust at all 
in television. Regarding the radio and newspapers, 21 per cent and 22 per cent said they 
had no confidence in them as sources of credible news and information, respectively. 
Generally, the television was reported as the most credible source of news and 
information followed by radio and newspapers.  
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Government newspapers
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Figure 6.3: Respondents' level of trust in media for obtaining 
news and information (numeric values, descriptive statistics)
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Figure 6.4: Respondents' levels of trust in the three news media 
comparison (in percentages compiled data) 
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The level of trust in news media system was further analysed within independent 
variables. It was found that there were variations in levels of trust in news media in terms 
of respondent’s region, sex, residential area, age, income, educational background and 
political affiliation (Figure 6.5). Regionally, Tigray had the highest percentage of 
respondents with a lot of or some trust in the media as sources of credible news and 
information. For example, close to 85 per cent of respondents expressed trust in the 
national television, 83 per cent in the national radio and 80 per cent each for government 
newspapers and local radio. Local newspapers and international television stations 
closely followed with 68 per cent and 66 per cent, respectively. Commercial radio and 
international radio fell behind at 50 per cent, while private newspapers scored the least, 
27 per cent.   
 
Oromia ranked second with 72 per cent of respondents expressing some or a lot of trust in 
national radio and national television. Government newspapers, international television 
stations and local newspapers all scored under 60 per cent trust in the regional radio. 
International radio scored a 50 per cent trust level, while the rest of the media scored 
within the range of 47 per cent and about 40 per cent. At nearly 40 per cent, private 
newspapers scored the least.  
Addis Ababa came third with 79 per cent of respondents expressing some or a lot of trust 
in international radio and 78 per cent in international television stations. Private 
newspapers and national radio were all in the 60 percentage range, while local 
newspapers were the least at 45 per cent. 
 
In terms of regions, the least number of respondents who expressed some or a lot of trust 
in the media as sources of credible news and information was from Amhara. The majority 
of respondents had some or a lot of trust in national radio and commercial radio with the 
score of 63 per cent and 62 per cent, respectively. National television, international 
television and international radio all scored in the range of 50 per cent with local radio 
being the least at only 26 per cent. Among the four regions, respondents in Tigray scored 
the highest percentage in terms of having a lot of trust or some trust in national television, 
national radio, local radio and government newspapers with scores ranging between 80 to 
168 
 
85 per cent. Over a quarter (27 per cent) of respondents in Tigray either said that they had 
a lot of trust or some trust in private newspapers.  Respondents in Addis Ababa scored 
highest percentages in terms of having a lot of trust or some trust in international radio 
and international television with scores of 80 per cent and 78 per cent, respectively. 
These were contrasted with 45.2 per cent who said that they had a lot of trust or some 
trust in the local radio and 48.2 per cent who said they had a lot of trust or some trust in 
private radio.  
 
 
Respondents in Oromia and Amhara showed a lot of trust or some trust in national radio 
with scores of 73 per cent and 63 per cent, respectively. The least scores were recorded 
for private newspapers in Oromia and local radio in Amhara. Respondents of Amhara 
scored the highest percentage, 50 per cent, in terms of having no trust at all in many 
media systems, including local radio against 18 per cent for Addis Ababa, 8 per cent for 
Tigray and 16 per cent for Oromia. Levels of trust in government-owned newspapers 
were 28 per cent for Amhara, 23 per cent for Addis Ababa, 9 per cent for Tigray and 13 
per cent for Oromia. Scores for no trust at all in local newspapers as sources of credible 
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news and information were 32 per cent, 24 per cent, 15 per cent and 13 per cent for 
Amhara, Addis Ababa, Oromia and Tigray, respectively. In regard to other media 
systems, respondents in Tigray, at 35 per cent, scored the highest for no trust at all in 
private newspapers. This was against 26 per cent and 22 per cent for Addis Ababa and 
Oromia for commercial radio, respectively.  In Amhara, 50 per cent of respondents said 
that they had no trust at all in the regional radio station.  
 
Figure 6.5 shows that male respondents had more trust in media as sources of news and 
information than females. Nearly three quarters of male respondents expressed some or a 
lot of trust in international television stations, national radio and national television in 
that order. International radio stations and government newspapers scored in the range of 
62 and 66 per cent. Local newspapers, local radio and commercial radio scored in the 
neighboured of 50 per cent. Private newspapers scored the least in terms of trust. In 
comparison, male respondents scored higher (65 per cent) than female respondents (63 
per cent) in terms of having some or a lot of trust in national radio and national television. 
International television stations and government newspapers fell behind with percentage 
scores in the neighbourhood of 50 per cent. Trust levels for the rest of the media fell 
within the range of 49 and 43 per cent with private newspapers scoring the least. More 
female than male respondents had no trust at all in all media systems. For instance, 21 per 
cent of female compared to 13 per cent of male respondents had no trust at all in media 
systems. Similarly, female respondents scored higher (24 per cent) than their male 
counterparts (16 per cent) in terms of having no trust in government-owned newspapers.     
 
Out of all respondents, those residing in semi-urban areas had the most trust (three 
quarters) in both the national television and the national radio as sources of news and 
information. Government newspapers, local newspapers and commercial radio stations 
follow closely at 70 per cent, 62 per cent and 59 per cent, respectively. International 
television stations and local newspapers ranked next at slightly over 60 per cent and 
regional radio at over half, while private newspapers at 25 per cent, were the least trusted.  
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Trust in the other media systems was highest among urban dwellers and declined as one 
moved from urban and semi-urban to rural areas. For instance, nearly three quarters of 
urban respondents had trust in both international radio and international television. This 
compared to about two-thirds of semi-urban respondents and slightly more than half of 
rural respondents. Trust levels in private newspapers were 54 per cent, 47 per cent and 25 
per cent for respondents in urban, semi-urban and rural areas, respectively. More than 
half of urban respondents had trust in all media systems with international radio scoring 
73 per cent against 52 per cent for private newspapers. 
 
In the case of rural respondents, 66 per cent and 62 per cent said they had trust in national 
radio and government newspapers, respectively. National television fell behind at 58 per 
cent and was followed by international television stations at 52 per cent and local 
newspapers at 50 per cent. The rest of the media scored within the range of 25 and 49 per 
cent with private newspapers being the least trusted. In terms of residence, respondents in 
rural areas reported the highest lack of trust in all media systems. With regard to age in 
general, the young were more trusting of all media than the middle-aged and the elderly. 
The majority of those between 18 and 39 years of age had trust in national radio, 
international television stations and national television in that order with percentage 
scores slightly below 70 per cent. On average, international radio and government 
newspapers scored around 60 per cent. Regional radio and local newspapers followed 
behind with scores in the neighbourhood of 50 per cent. Private newspapers apparently 
were the least trusted by the young as credible sources of news and information. 
 
The middle-aged, i.e. 40-59 years, scored 70 per cent and 69 per cent trust levels for 
national radio and national television, respectively. International television stations and 
government newspapers were next at 63 and 62 per cent, respectively. The rest of the 
media scored in the neighbourhood of 50 per cent. Private newspapers scored the least 
trust among the middle-aged with just 36 per cent saying they trusted them as sources of 
credible information. Elderly respondents said that they had trust in the national radio, the 
national television and commercial radios in that order. When bundled together, 
international radio at 36 per cent, had the lowest trust level among respondents.  
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Generally speaking, the youth were more trusting of different news media than middle-
age and aged respondents, especially with respect to the national radio and national 
television. However, private newspapers and international radio were the least trusted by 
respondents in all age groups. Distrust of the media was highest among old people and 
declined with decreasing age. This trend was similar for all media systems except the 
national radio. Percentages for “No trust at all” for national television were 14 per cent, 
16 per cent and 29 per cent for young, middle-aged and elderly respondents, respectively. 
Similarly, about 44 per cent of old people had no trust at all in local radio, compared to 
21 per cent of young and 28 per cent of middle-age respondents. About 60 per cent of old 
people had no trust in international radio, while 34 per cent of middle-aged and 20 per 
cent of young respondents had no trust in private newspapers.  More than three quarters 
of high-income respondents expressed trust in international radio, national television and 
international television stations. In contrast, most middle-income respondents trusted 
international television stations, international radio and national television with an 
average score of 70 per cent. Among low-income respondents, national radio was the 
most trusted followed by national television and international television stations. 
Conversely, trust in national television, commercial radio, local radio, international 
television, international radio and private newspapers was highest among high-income 
respondents and declined with decreasing income levels.  For instance, trust levels for 
international radio were 83 per cent, 77 per cent and 56 per cent for high, middle and 
low-income respondents, respectively.  
 
Income groups scored differently in terms of trust in various media. Low-income 
respondents, for instance, scored the lowest trust level, 30 per cent, for private 
newspapers. Twenty per cent of high-income respondents had no trust at all in private 
radio station, 18 per cent of middle-income respondents had no trust in local radio 
broadcasting stations. Local newspapers and private newspapers were the next least 
trusted among high-income respondents.  Local radio and private radio stations were the 
least trusted among middle-income respondents. Low-income respondents ranked second 
international radio and local radio stations among the least trusted.  
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Among respondents with no formal education and those with only primary and high 
school education, national radio was the most trusted with 67 and 85 per cent, 
respectively. For certificate and diploma holders, international radio and national 
television were the most trusted in that order, whereas for respondents with first degrees 
or higher, international television stations and international radio stations were the most 
trusted with percentage scores of 86 per cent and 83 per cent, respectively. However, the 
least trusted media for the four levels of education varied. For respondents with no formal 
education and for those with primary and high school level education, private newspapers 
were the least trusted closely followed by international radio. Respondents with 
certificate and diplomas trusted least private radio stations as sources of news and 
information. For first degree holders and higher, the least trusted media were commercial 
radio and local newspapers. Overall, all three educational attainment level respondents 
reported that private newspapers were the least trusted media for getting news and 
information. 
 
Respondents affiliated to different political parties varied in their levels of trust in 
different media system as illustrated in Figure 6.5. More than three quarters of those 
aligned to opposition political parties reported that they had a lot of trust or some trust in 
private newspapers. Specific trust levels were 86 per cent for private newspapers, 82 per 
cent for international radio and 77 per cent for international television. Similarly, over 
three quarters of the non-partisan respondents expressed trust for international radio and 
international television. As for respondents who did not know, the majority had trust in 
international radio, international television and private newspapers. In contrast, three 
quarters of respondents affiliated to ruling parties highly scored national radio, national 
television and government newspapers with percentages ranging between 71 per cent and 
76 per cent. Nearly a third of respondents of associated with ruling political parties 
ranked private newspapers as the lowest trusted media and seconded by international 
radio stations. Respondents who were not sure voted local newspapers (29 per cent) as 
the lowest in terms of trust followed by local radio, government newspapers and 
commercial radio stations which scored slightly over a third. Opposition political party 
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respondents ranked government newspapers at the bottom as the least trusted media. In 
all, members of opposition political, neutrals and those who didn’t know had one 
similarity, i.e. they all responded that government newspapers and local newspapers were 
the least trusted media.  
 
Respondents aligned to the ruling party, the EPRDF, said they had no trust at all in 
private newspapers and scored them at just above a third followed by local radio stations 
at 25 per cent. In contrast, opposition party-aligned respondents expressed no trust at all 
in commercial radio stations (40 per cent), government newspapers (32 per cent), national 
radio (28 per cent) and national television (25 per cent). Independent respondents had no 
trust at all in government newspapers (24 per cent), commercial radio stations (21 per 
cent) and local newspapers (20 per cent).  
Generally, aggregated percentage data indicated that national radio was the most trusted 
source of news and information followed by national television. Half of the respondents 
had trust in international radio and television stations for obtaining news and information. 
The level of trust in media systems varied in terms of independent variables. Among the 
four regions, national television, national radio and government newspapers were the 
most trusted media by respondents in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia. In contrast, private 
newspapers were the least trusted media among respondents in Tigray and Oromia, while 
the least trusted media were local radio stations in the case of respondents in Amhara. 
Respondents in Addis Ababa had the highest trust in international radio, international 
television and private newspapers. Local newspapers were the least trusted media among 
respondents in Addis Ababa.  
Male respondents had more trust in all media systems for getting news and information 
than their female counterparts. International television, national television and national 
radio stations in this order were the most trusted media by male respondents, while the 
national radio, national television and international television in this order were the most 
trusted media by female respondents. Private newspapers had the least percentage scores 
among male and female respondents in terms of having a lot of trust or some trust. 
Regarding respondent’s residential areas, respondents residing in semi-urban areas had 
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most trust in national television and national radio, while urban dwellers had most trust in 
international radio and international television and respondents in rural areas had trust in 
national radio and government newspapers. Private newspapers were the least trusted 
among the three staying areas residents. All in all, respondents in rural area reported the 
highest lack of trust in all media systems. 
 
The youth were most trusting of different media among the three age groups. However, 
out of all the different media, national radio and national television were highly scored by 
the youth, while private newspapers were the least trusted by the three age groups. Old 
people scored the highest in terms of no trust at all in media and scored declined with 
decreasing age for all media systems except government newspapers. Regarding income 
level of respondents, national television, national radio, international radio and 
international television were highly trusted by different income groups. High-income 
respondents had more trust in national television and international television, while 
middle-income respondents trusted international television stations and international 
radio and low-income respondents had the highest trust for national radio stations and 
national television. The least trusted media among all three income groups were private 
newspapers.  
 
Trust in media systems varied among the four levels of education. Respondents with the 
lowest education levels, no formal education and those with only primary and high school 
education, national radio was the most trusted media followed by national television. For 
respondents with certificates and diplomas, international radio and national television 
were the most trusted media. Respondents with first degrees or higher, international 
television stations, international radio stations were the most trusted, while newspapers 
were the least trusted.  Respondents affiliated to different political parties varied in their 
levels of trust in different media systems. Respondents categorised under opposition 
political parties, neutrals and respondents who didn’t know, had the more trust in private 
newspapers, international radio stations and international television. These groups of 
respondents had one similarity, i.e. they all had government newspapers and local 
newspapers among the least trusted media.  
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Respondents affiliated to the ruling party had the highest trust in national radio, national 
television and government newspapers. Private newspapers were the least trusted media 
among respondents aligned to the EPRDF. Respondents in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia 
regions, female respondents, respondents with the lowest education levels (no formal 
education and those with only primary and high school education), had more trust in 
national radio stations and national television. Respondents in Addis Ababa, male 
respondents, respondents with the highest education levels and independent respondents 
had the most trust in international television and international radio stations. Meanwhile, 
respondents affiliated to opposition political parties had the most trust in private 
newspapers and international radio stations.  
6.3. Level of trust in news media houses 
 
Respondents were asked the level of trust they had in different media houses. National 
and international media outlets were categorised as television stations, radio stations and 
newspapers. Figure 6.6 compares the levels of trust in different types of media houses. 
The results show that, generally, television and radio stations were more trusted as 
sources of news and information than newspapers. Notable ones were Ethiopian Radio 
with 60 per cent, Ethiopia Television with 58 per cent, BBC radio with 59 per cent, BBC 
television with 58 and CNN with 51 per cent trust levels. On average, the rest of the 
media houses scored less than 50 per cent (Figure 6.7). 
Regarding television, the most trusted television station was Ethiopian Television with 58 
per cent of respondents who indicated that they believed or almost believed all news and 
information contents of the station. The other television outlet which had a high 
percentage of respondents who believed or almost believed all news and information 
contents was BBC TV (57 per cent) which was followed by CNN with 52 per cent.  Al 
Jazeera only managed a small number of respondents who trusted it. In fact, it was 
among the least trusted media outlet with 42 per cent of respondents who said they had 
trust in it. Zami Connection and ETV Channel 2 were the two out of the six television 
stations surveyed that scored the lowest.  Zami Connection, at 25 per cent of respondents 
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who said they believed or almost believed all of its news and information contents, was 
the least trusted. About half of respondents reported that they did not trust the station at 
all (Figure 6.6). ETV 2 scored 36 per cent of respondents who said that they had trust in 
it.  
 
 
 
Radio broadcasting, as expected, had the highest number of respondents and respondent 
trust levels were split among domestic and foreign stations. The national radio station, 
Ethiopian Radio, was the most trusted radio station apart from the BBC. Ethiopian Radio 
and BBC Radio had most respondents who reported that they believed, or almost 
believed, all their news and information contents. About 60 per cent of respondents 
indicated that they believed, or almost believed, most of Ethiopian Radio news and 
information content. BBC Radio scored the same percentage, 59 per cent, of respondents 
who said that they believed, or almost believed, all of its news and information content.  
Radio Fana, a local station, scored 48 per cent of respondents who said they believed, or 
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almost believed, all of its news and information content followed by VOA with 46 per 
cent. 
 
Radio FM 96.1 (AAMMA) was the radio station which had the least number of 
respondents who trusted it. These represented slightly more than one third, or 38 per cent, 
of respondents. FM Fana scored marginally higher than Radio 96.1 at 39 per cent. 
Similarly, FM Addis 97.1, a local radio station, and Deutsche Welle Radio, scored almost 
the same percentages at 41 per cent and 42 per cent, respectively.   
 
Deutsche Welle Radio was the least trusted foreign international radio station. In the 
category of newspapers, the analysis revealed that the rates of trust were not as high as 
those for TV and radio stations. Figures 6.6 and 6.7 indicate that, among all newspapers, 
the most trusted was Addis Admass with 39 per cent of respondents who reported that 
they believed, or almost believed, most of its news and information content. The second 
most trusted newspaper was Addis Zemen which beat The Ethiopian Herald by just 1 per 
cent. The Ethiopian Herald had 35 per cent of respondents who said that they believed, or 
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Figure 6.7: Respondents' who believed all or almost believed most 
of the content of media houses (in percentage) 
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almost believed, most of its news and information content. The Addis Fortune posted 24 
per cent against 32 per cent for the Reporter. Capital was the least trusted newspaper as it 
posted just slightly more than one fifth of respondents who said that they believed, or 
almost believed, most of its news and information content.  
 
Generally, among all TV stations, Ethiopia TV was the most trusted and Zami 
connections was the least trusted. For radio stations, the most trusted was Ethiopian 
Radio and the least trusted was FM 96.1. Less than one third of respondents expressed 
trust in newspapers, while over half of them indicated that they did not believe them. A 
cross-tabulation was made between respondents’ level of trust in media houses and 
region, sex, area of residence, age, income level, education level and political party 
affiliation (Figure 6.9).  
 
A comparison of respondents’ levels of trust in different regions revealed that over 83 per 
cent of those from Tigray, 56 per cent from Amhara and 57 per cent from Oromia 
reported that they believed, or almost believed, most of the news and information content 
from Ethiopian Television. However, only slightly over a third of respondents in Addis 
Ababa reported that they believed, or almost believed, most of the news and information 
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Figure 6.8: Respondents' level of trust in media houses (in descriptive 
statistics, numeric values)
179 
 
content from Ethiopian Television. Over 60 per cent of respondents in Addis Ababa 
trusted international television stations, i.e. CNN (71 per cent), BBC television (70 per 
cent) and Al Jazeera (60 per cent). BBC TV was the second most trusted television 
station among respondents in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regions with scores of 53 per 
cent, 42 per cent and 56 per cent, respectively.  
 
Ethiopian Television was the most trusted television station among respondents in 
Tigray, female respondents, semi-urban and rural residents, middle and old people and 
low-income respondents. Trust in Ethiopian Television was also very high among 
respondents with no formal education and those with primary and high school level 
education, as well as respondents affiliated to the EPRDF. The percentage of those who 
reported that they believed, or almost believed, most of the news and information content 
from the BBC was highest among male, urban, young, middle-income, certificate and 
diploma holders and independent respondents. CNN was the most trusted television 
station among Addis Ababa respondents, high-income group and respondents affiliated to 
opposition political parties. Zami Connection as the least trusted television station among 
Addis Ababa respondents, 22 per cent, while Al Jazeera was the least trusted in the other 
three regions. Al Jazeera was also the least trusted television stations across some 
variables such as sex, residential area, age and income levels. Among television stations 
that had nation-wide coverage, Ethiopian Television was the least trusted among 
respondents in Addis Ababa, higher degree holders, respondents affiliated to opposition 
political parties and independent respondent respondents.  
 
In terms of radio stations, respondents within all variables reported that they believed, or 
almost believed, most of their news and information. Ethiopia Radio was the most trusted 
station among Tigray and Oromia respondents with 77 per cent and 65 per cent trust 
levels, respectively. Ethiopian Radio was also the most trusted radio among female 
respondents, people in semi-urban and rural areas, low-income, people with the lowest 
education level and respondents affiliated to EPRDF. A very high percentage of 
respondents in Amhara, males, urban residents, high-income group, higher degree 
holders, opposition political party members, politically-neutrals and undecided 
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respondents, including those who were not sure about their political alignment, reported 
that they believed, or almost believed, most of the news and information content from 
BBC Radio. Deutsche Welle Radio was the most trusted radio station among respondents 
in Addis Ababa with 64 per cent. The second most trusted radio stations were VOA, 
Radio Fana, Ethiopian Radio and BBC for respondents in Addis Ababa, Tigrai, Amhara 
and Oromia, respectively. 
 
The least trusted radio stations that have nation-wide coverage varied across different 
independent variables. Radio Fana was the least trusted for respondents in Addis Ababa, 
urban residents, middle-income group, those with the highest level of education and 
respondents affiliated to opposition political parties, including politically-neutrals and 
those who said that they were not sure about their political affiliation. The least trusted 
radio station for respondents in Tigray was VOA. Deutsche Welle Radio was the least 
trusted for respondents in Amhara and Oromia regions, male and female respondents, 
rural residents, all the three age groups, low-income group and respondents with lowest 
educational attainment. Overall, these radio stations were the least trusted media among 
respondents affiliated to the ruling party.  
  
The proportion of male respondents who reported that they believed, or almost believed, 
most of the news and information content from all media outlets was higher than that for 
female.  Percentages of males and females who trusted Ethiopian TV were 58 per cent 
and 56 per cent, respectively. About 45 per cent of male respondents trusted Deutsche 
Welle Radio against 35 per cent for female respondents. Levels of trust in Ethiopian 
Radio by residence of respondents were close. Urban respondents posted 29.3 per cent, 
semi-urban respondents 36.7 per cent and rural respondents 37.3 per cent.  Regarding the 
age variable, a third of those aged 39 years and below and those aged 59 and below 
trusted Ethiopian Radio.  Low and middle-income respondents had a slightly higher trust 
rate than high-income respondents. Regarding political party orientation, individuals 
associated with the ruling parties had the highest rate of trust (43.6 per cent) in Ethiopian 
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Television station, while respondents associated with opposition political parties had the 
least trust. 
 
Of all the television stations, Zami Connection had the least trust across all variables. 
Close to two-thirds of respondents in Tigray indicated that they did not trust the station. 
There were more males (56 per cent) than females (44 per cent) who did not trust news 
and information contents of Zami Connection. An overwhelming 85.7 per cent of urban 
and semi-urban respondents and those aged over 60 did not trust the station. Regarding 
political affiliation, close to 60 per cent of respondents associated with ruling parties did 
not trust the station.  BBC TV had, however, more people from opposition political 
parties (44 per cent) that reported that they believed all, or almost believed, most of its 
news and information content (Figure 6.9).  
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Among all the international radio stations, Deutsche Welle Radio was the least trusted by 
all politically-affiliated respondents. Slightly more than half of respondents associated 
with EPRDF, and a third of undecided respondents, reported that they did not believe in 
its news and information contents. Trust levels in the station among respondents 
associated with opposition political parties and politically-neutrals were 15 per cent and 
13 per cent, respectively. The VOA, with a trust level of 40 per cent, was the second least 
trusted international radio station by all politically-affiliated respondents. The most 
trusted was BBC radio with many respondents who reported that they believed, or almost 
believed, most of its news and information contents. Close to half of respondents 
affiliated to ruling political parties trusted BBC Radio. However, the highest number of 
respondents who trusted the radio station belonged to opposition political parties who 
posted an 86 per cent trust level.   
  
Regarding newspapers, Addis Admass was the most trusted newspaper among 
respondents of Addis Ababa, male and female respondents, young and aged groups, all 
the income groups and people with the highest education level, including respondents 
who said they were not affiliated to the EPRDF (figure 6.10). For example, 58 per cent of 
respondents in Addis Ababa and 41 per cent of young respondents reported that they 
believed, or almost believed, most of the news and information contents of the 
newspaper. Addis Zemen was the most trusted newspaper among respondents in the other 
three regions of Tigray, Amhara and Oromia. The percentage of trust was, however, 
highest in Tigray and lowest in Oromia, i.e. 46 per cent and 29 per cent, respectively. 
Addis Zemen was also the most trusted among respondents in semi-urban and rural areas, 
the middle-aged, people with no formal education and respondents aligned to ruling 
parties.  
 
Within different variables, study data revealed that there were four least trusted 
newspapers. These were The Ethiopian Herald, Addis Zemen, Addis Fortune and the 
Reporter. Respondents in Addis Ababa and those aligned to opposition political parties 
and independent respondents characterised The Ethiopian Herald as the least trusted 
media. Addis Admass was the least trusted among rural respondents, while the Reporter 
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scored the least among old people. Addis Zemen was the least believable newspaper 
among respondents with high-incomes and highest educational attainments, while Addis 
Fortune was the least trusted among the other groups of respondents. 
 
The study remarkably revealed that the percentage of trust in most newspapers decreased 
or increased with the level of urbanisation, age, income level and educational background 
(Figure 6.10). The percentage was highest among urban respondents and declined as one 
moved from urban to semi-urban and rural areas. Similarly, the percentage was highest 
among young people and declined with increasing age.  In contrast, the percentage score 
was highest among respondents with high-income and those with high educational 
attainment and declined with decreasing income levels and educational attainment. 
Regarding newspapers, analysis of responses within the variables of region, sex, area of 
residence, age, income level, education level and political affiliation, revealed that there 
were more people who did not trust these forms of media houses than those who did. For 
example, there were more people in all the four regions (40 per cent) who did not trust 
Addis Zemen than those who trusted it (15 per cent). In the case of newspapers, results 
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indicated that respondents from urban areas and, those with first degrees or more, trusted 
them as sources of credible news and information. For instance, on average, 60 per cent 
of urban respondents and 50 per cent of those with first degrees indicated that they 
believed contents of most newspapers. Percentage scores for male and female 
respondents did not differ much with respect to trust in all the newspapers. However, 
male respondents posted a higher percentage (22.9 per cent) than their female 
counterparts (16 per cent) in terms of trust in Addis Fortune as a source of credible news 
and information.  
 
Analysed within variables, those who trusted radio stations as sources of credible news 
and information generally scored above 33 per cent. The highest number of respondents 
(40 per cent) who reported that they believed, or almost believed, most of the news and 
information contents from Ethiopian Radio was from Tigray, while the lowest was from 
Addis Ababa. Trust levels for Ethiopian Radio within other variables ranged from 45 per 
cent to 74 per cent.  Among all local FM radio stations, FM Addis 97.1 was the most 
trusted, or believed, within most variables. The least believed was Addis FM 96.1 
(AAMMA). For foreign radio stations, BBC Radio was the most trusted and Deutsche 
Welle Radio was the least trusted across all variables. 
6.4. Perspectives of respondents on the ten dimensions of media credibility  
 
One of the approaches for assessing public perceptions of media credibility involves the 
use of dimensions of media credibility. This approach helps to shift the focus of media 
credibility research from characteristics of individuals and personal sources to 
characteristics of media behaviours in terms of accuracy, objectivity, fairness and other 
measurements referred to as the ten dimension of media credibility (Gaziano and 
McGrath, 1986). This approach permits the analysis of perceived media credibility based 
on judgments that are informed by broadly-agreed parameters which, in the end, 
amplifies the magnitude of trust in media.  
 
Respondents were asked to rate media outlets against the ten dimensions of media 
credibility with response options of belief ranging from 1 (very poor) to 5 (very high). All 
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items were measured using the 5 Likert-type scales. The ten dimensions are accurate, 
balanced, thoroughly researched, critical, neutral, clear, trustworthy, factual, 
completeness and watch public interest. For purposes of this study, I only used the 
questionnaire related to radio stations to compare respondents’ perceptions of media 
credibility in general and, in particular, their observations regarding some aspects of 
media credibility. 
   
The percentage of respondents varied across media outlets. Out of the total study 
population, about two-thirds answered the question relating to Ethiopian Radio. About 
half of the respondents answered the question relating to Radio Fana, VOA and Deutsche 
Welle, while about one-third answered the one relating to BBC Radio.  Figures 6.11 and 
6.12 show that, out of all the radio stations, BBC Radio scored the highest percentage 
among respondents in terms of credibility across all media credibility dimensions except 
watch public trust. Ethiopian Radio scored the second highest percentage in all 
dimensions of media credibility except watching public interest. The Radio ranked the 
highest in watching public interest with a score of 51 per cent. Deutsche Welle Radio had 
the lowest percentage in terms of credibility across dimensions of media credibility 
except neutrality. VOA followed Deutsche Welle Radio with the second least percentages 
across all dimensions of media credibility.  
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The BBC Radio had the lowest percentage as poor or very poor performance in all 
dimensions of media credibility except accuracy (Figure 6.12). Meanwhile, about 38 per 
cent of respondents reported that Radio Fana had poor or very poor believability in 
neutrality.   
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Figure 6.11: Respondents who said they had high or very high, 
belief in radio stations within the 10 dimensions of media 
credibility (in percentage) 
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In addition to percentages, numeric values were used in assessing media credibility. All 
items were measured using the 5 - point Likert-type scales ranging from 5 (very high) to 
1 (very poor). One of the questions was “How much can you trust Ethiopian Radio in 
terms of media credibility dimension - accurate vis à vis inaccurate?” As Figures 6.13 
shows, scores for radio stations against the ten dimensions of media credibility were very 
close within the range of 3.0 and 3.66.  Most respondents reported that they had the 
highest trust in Ethiopian Radio and BBC Radio within the ten dimensions of media 
credibility. Ethiopian Radio scored highest within five dimensions of media credibility, 
i.e. accuracy, balance, clarity, trustworthiness and watching the public interest. 
Meanwhile, BBC scored the highest in another five dimensions of media credibility, i.e. 
thoroughly researched, critical, neutral, factual and completeness. However, based on 
average scores, Ethiopian Radio had the highest trust among respondents within the 
dimension of media credibility. For instance, the average scores for accuracy were 3.67 
for Ethiopian Radio and 3.52 for BBC Radio. The least average was Deutsche Welle 
Radio with 3.18 and Radio Fana and VOA with 3.40 and 3.23, respectively. All in all, 
Deutsche Welle Radio was the least trusted compared to other radio stations within seven 
dimensions of media credibility, i.e. accuracy, balanced, thoroughly researched, critical, 
clear, trustworthy and factual. VOA had the least average with regard to completeness of 
the story and watching the public interest.  In terms of neutrality, Radio Fana scored the 
least (2.96 mean) among radio stations.  Ethiopian Radio scored highly in terms of trust, 
while BBC Radio scored the highest in terms of believability within all dimensions of 
media credibility. Radio Fana came third within all dimensions of media credibility 
except neutrality. Deutsch Welle Radio was the least trusted radio station and scored the 
lowest average in most dimensions of media credibility. 
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As figures 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.11, 6.12 and 6.13 show, results of perceptions of trust in radio 
stations by respondents within the 10 dimensions of media credibility were almost 
similar.  Ethiopian Radio was the most trusted radio station followed by BBC Radio. 
Radio Fana came next to BBC Radio as a source of credible news and information. 
Deutsche Welle Radio was the least trusted radio station, while the VOA was the second 
least trusted radio station.   
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Figure 6.13: Comparison of respondents' trust in radio ststions in 10 
dimensions of media credibility (mean scores in descriptive statistics)
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The two of the ten dimensions of radio credibility (accurate vs inaccurate and balanced vs 
unbalanced) within different variables are presented in figures 6.14 and 6.15 respectively. 
Figure 6.14 shows that trust in radio stations within the dimension of accuracy varied 
across different variables. BBC Radio scored the highest among Addis Ababa 
respondents, respondents in the middle and high-income group, respondents with high 
level education and undecided respondents. Meanwhile, Ethiopian Radio scored the 
highest in terms of accuracy among respondents in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regions. 
It also scored highly among male and female respondents, low and middle income 
groups, the aged, lowly educated and respondents affiliated to ruling political parties. 
Radio Fana was rated the least credible in terms of reporting news accurately by 
respondents in Addis Ababa, middle and high-income groups, the highly educated, 
members of opposition political parties, politically-neutrals and respondents who said 
they didn’t know their political affiliation. Respondents in Tigray and Oromia, male and 
female respondents, the young, low-income group, respondents with certificates and 
diplomas rated Deutsche Welle Radio as the least credible in accuracy. VOA was rated 
highest for lacking accuracy in news reporting among respondents in rural areas and 
those with no formal education and respondents associated with the EPRDF.    
 
Regarding balanced reporting, Figure 6.15 shows that respondents in Tigray and Oromia, 
female respondents, respondents from semi-urban and rural areas, the low-income group 
and those with low educational attainments, including respondents affiliated to ruling 
political parties, expressed the highest trust in Ethiopian Radio reporting. In contrast, 
respondents in Addis Ababa, male respondents, urban dwellers, middle and high-income 
respondents, the highly educated, and those who said they were not sure about their 
political orientation, highly rated BBC Radio for balanced and fair reporting.  Ethiopian 
Radio was rated as the least credible in terms of balanced reporting by respondents in 
Addis Ababa, respondents with high-level education and those who said they were not 
sure about their political orientation. Radio Fana was rated the least trusted in terms of 
balanced news by urban respondents and respondents in Amhara, respondents aligned to 
opposition political parties and politically-neutral respondents. Respondents in Oromia, 
rural respondents, low and high-income respondents, the low education level group and 
those affiliated to with the EPRDF rated VOA as the least trusted media. 
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Generally, Ethiopian Radio was the most trustworthy radio station in almost all of the ten 
dimensions of media credibility among respondents in Tigray, rural areas, low-income 
respondents, elders and respondents affiliated to ruling political parties. Respondents in 
Oromia, instead, rated either Ethiopian Radio or Radio Fana as the most trustworthy 
rather than international radio stations. In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa and 
Amhara, urban respondents, middle and high-income respondents, high education level 
respondents and respondents who were not affiliated to ruling political parties variously 
rated BBC Radio, VOA and Deutsche Welle Radio as the most trusted within the 10 
dimensions of media credibility. Comparisons of levels of trust in media houses within 
the ten dimensions of media credibility revealed no major differences. Ethiopian Radio 
was the most trustworthy radio station in terms of trustworthiness and almost in all the 
ten dimensions of media credibility among respondents in Tigray, rural residents, low-
income respondents, elders and respondents affiliated to ruling political parties. 
Respondents in Oromia rated either Ethiopian Radio or Radio Fana, rather than 
international radio stations, as the most trustworthy. This pattern was reflected in most 
respondent perceptions of media credibility of radio broadcasting. 
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The BBC Radio, VOA or Deutsche Welle Radio variously scored the highest trust within 
most dimensions of media credibility among respondents in Addis Ababa and Amhara, 
urban respondents, middle and high-income respondents, high education level group and 
respondents who were said they were not affiliated to ruling political parties. This was 
also the result of the analysis of perceptions of media credibility with respect to obtaining 
credible news and information. 
6.5. Stopping consuming media for losing credibility 
 
The relationship of media consumption and media credibility was investigated during the 
study. Table 6.2 shows that out of the studied population 1749 respondents (96 per cent) 
responded the question whether the respondents had stopped using a specific media or 
not for losing trust. About 20 per cent respondents (347) stopped consuming a certain 
media by losing trust and 80 per cent did not stop using the media for losing confidence 
in the media.  
Table 6.2: Respondents who stopped using a specific news media for losing trust 
  
 
  
 
The percentage of respondents stopped using a specific media for losing trust varied 
across all the variables as figure 6.16 of the cross tabulation analysis reveals. Regarding 
regional administration, Addis Ababa took the highest share with 41 per cent and Tigray 
contained the least at 14 per cent of the total respondents who claimed for stopping using 
media for luck of confidence in media. Amhara and Oromia seized 27 per cent and 17 per 
cent respectively. In line with this one third of the respondents of Addis Ababa and one 
fifth of the respondents of Amhara stopped consuming a specific media for losing 
believe. The percentages for respondents of Tigray and Oromia were very close 12 per 
cent and 13 per cent respectively. More males stopped using media for losing trust than 
females compared to 22 per cent and 16 per cent respectively.   
 Frequency Per cent Valid per cent  
Yes  347 19.1 19.8 
No 1402 77.2 80.2 
Total 1749 96.3 100.0 
Missing system 67 3.7  
Total 1816 100.0  
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Stopping media was highest among urban respondents (27 per cent) and declined with 
moving from semi-urban to rural areas (22 per cent and 7 per cent respectively). There 
seems to be a relationship between age and educational level and the proportion of people 
subject to stop using media for losing trust. There was a contrary movement or negative 
relationship between the age groups of respondents and the percentage of respondents to 
stop consuming a specific media for luck of credibility. As the age group increased, the 
proportion of respondents stopping the media reduced. The percentages for 18-39 year 
olds, the 40-59 age group and the 60 and above group were 24 per cent, 13 per cent and 9 
per cent respectively. In contrary, there was positive relationship between educational 
level and the proportion of respondents stopped using a specific media for losing 
credibility. As the level of education increased, the proportion of respondents stopping to 
use a specific media for losing trust increased. For example the percentage for no formal 
education was 8 per cent while for the primary and secondary was 14 per cent. The 
figures reached 24 per cent and 42 per cent for respondents of certificate and diploma and 
higher degree holders respectively. The proportion for stooping to consume a specific 
media source for losing credibility was higher among middle income respondents at 30 
per cent and it was fairly similar for low and high income respondents (compared to 18 
per cent and 20 per cent respectively). 
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With regard to political affiliation, those affiliated with the opposition had the highest 
proportion of respondents (47 per cent) to stop using a specific media for losing 
credibility. While about a third of neutral respondents and about a quarter of those who 
didn’t know their affiliation stopped using media because of credibility. Respondents 
affiliated with the EPRDF, at 13 per cent, had the lowest percentage of respondents for 
stopping the media with related to mistrust.  
The respondents were asked to mention the name of the media that have been stopped by 
respondents to use because of lack of credibility. Most respondents mentioned specific 
media outlets such as Ethiopian Television, Ethiopian Radio, Radio Fana, Eritrean Radio, 
Deutsche Welle, Keste Daminna, VOA, African Voice from Cairo, Addis Zemen, 
Reporter, Voice of Tigray’s People, and BBC Radio. Others mentioned the media system 
in general like government newspapers and private newspapers.  
There are four main views aired regarding stopping news media for lack of credibility 
among the interviewees. The first one was they stopped reading newspaper, watching 
television or listening to radio because for losing trust. One of the interviewees from 
Addis Ababa stated that she stopped reading private newspapers because “You know, 
during 2005 election, these newspapers had been reporting information that terrorized or 
destabilized the people. I stopped reading these because I did not want to disturb myself 
at this advancing age” (Interviewee 15, May 20, 2009:16). But she had continued using 
other media even if she has a doubt of trust in them.  
The second one never stopped using media for lack of trust. Most of the interviewees 
classified in this category.  Some interviews mentioned that using media was their habit 
and their part of routine/day to day activity. “No, I may have my own reservation but I 
neither stop reading newspapers nor listening to the radio or watching TV.  Newspapers 
are just like breakfast for me. I cannot do without the media, whether they are credible or 
incredible” (Interviewee, 18, May 21, 2009). Similarly, an interviewee from Oromia 
region: “I like media. I don’t have anything to far away from them. I listen to them. If I 
got chances, when I go to cities I can watch television even I can read newspapers” 
(Interviewee 20, May 27 2009: 2). I asked an informant from Oromia region “Are you 
likely to stop watching, listening to or reading the media that you perceive lacks 
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credibility and trust?” she answered the question very strongly and briefly “I will never 
stop. I will continue listening” (Interviewee 24, May 27, 2009:19).  
I had a long discussion with one of the interviewees from Addis Ababa (Interviewee 14, 
May 20, 2009: 5). I asked the person: “Have you ever thought of abandoning a media that 
you find altogether not credible?” He replied that he did not abandon any media rather he 
said he used all of them when he had time. However, through our discussion he 
mentioned ‘stopping media use temporarily’. He stated that when some had lost interest 
with certain media the individual can stop using that media and switch to another medium 
or there was also some occasion instead of following the news some people prefer to 
attend only other program of the station. Similarly, interviewee 26 stated that “I may lose 
credibility in one particular programme for that particular moment I can stop it. However, 
I do not hate the media and stop using that media” (Interviewee, 2 Interviewee 26, May 
27, 2009: 26).   
Lack of option was one of the reasons forwarded by the interviewees. Individuals want to 
abandon the medium that lost trust, but they cannot because they do not have another 
choice alternative to consume. People know that some of the news stories of the media 
are not reliable but they listen to radio or watch television to obtain information. One of 
the interviewees said that “I have to listen to Ethiopian Radio because I get information 
about what is taking place in the government.  There are proclamations and declaration 
you have to know.  I have to know things even if they are not true. I have no option” 
(Interviewee 18, May 21, 2009:35).     
6.6. Demographics and political views/political ideology of audiences in media credibility  
 
In this section, I will discuss trust in news media in line with demographic factors and 
political views or partisanship, and ideological orientations of respondents.  
6.6.1. Demographic factors regarding media credibility  
 
The study of media credibility has a long history and has traditionally involved several 
comparative assessments of media credibility among television, radio and newspapers 
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(West, 1994; Rieh and Danielson, 2007; Golan, 2010). Work by early researchers on 
media credibility tended to focus on comparisons between and among various types of 
media and especially newspapers and television. Some of the findings indicated that the 
main characteristic of the medium itself has a strong influence on the perception of media 
credibility among the public (Gaziano and McGrath, 1985 cited in West; Newhagen, and 
C 1989).  Consequently, this led Gaziano and McGrath to the conclusion that the majority 
of people find television more credible than newspapers because “seeing is believing” 
(West, 1994).  
 
According to Golan (2010), perceptions by media audiences have great influence on 
media credibility assessment outcomes within the context of media credibility 
dimensions.  Some studies and assessments of media credibility have used demographic 
factors and socio-economic status for analysis (Gaziano and McGrath, 1985; Newhagen, 
and C 1989; Pew Research Center, 1998, 2012, 2015), while others have used specific 
variables such as age (Bucy, 2003), income (Ibelema & Powell, 2001), education 
(Mulder, 1981), gender (Robinson & Kohut, 1988) and race (Beaudoin & Thorson, 
2005). Trust in media varies by audience demographics, socio-economic status and 
political views or orientation. Researchers have shown that respondents with higher 
socio-economic status and urban dwellers tend to trust newspapers more than television 
(Westly and Sevein, 1989). Other studies (Lewis, 1981) found that people with higher 
educational achievement are less trusting of the media as a whole than other respondents.   
 
Gaziano and McGrath (1985) found that those at the opposite ends of the socio-economic 
and educational spectra find both print and electronic media less credible than do those 
with moderate amounts of education. The credibility of mass media has also been shown 
to make a difference in the persuasive effect of the media (Hovland and Weiss, 19). 
Research has also suggested that credibility and newspaper readership are correlated 
(American Society of Newspapers Editors, 1985). 
 
In the Ethiopian case, aggregated data regarding the level of public trust in the three 
mainstream media indicated that the television was perceived as the most credible source 
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of news and information followed by radio and newspapers. A number of respondents 
highly rated the television for providing colourful visual images accompanied by sound 
which makes it preferable among media consumers.  One respondent, for instance, said 
that “I trust ETV programmes which are supported by picture and video illustrations.  I 
travel much and when I compare what I see myself with what TV says yes, I believe they 
are credible (Interviewee 15, May 20, 2009:11). Another respondent said “I trust 
television for the main reason is that you can witness it with your eyes” (Interviewee 5, 
May 14, 2009: 19). Yet another reported that “Previously I used to follow radio, but now 
I use television. Television is nice and attractive. I stick to that” (Interviewee 9, May 15, 
2009: 38).  
 
The level of trust in national, international and government media systems, including and 
private media systems, as sources of credible news and information varied across socio-
demographic factors. Among the four regions that were captured in the study, national 
television and national radio stations were the most trusted media by respondents in 
Tigray, Amhara and Oromia. National television and national radio had also the highest 
trust among female respondents, rural residents, all age groups, low-income groups, 
respondents with the lowest education levels, no formal education respondents, including 
those with only primary and high school education and respondents affiliated to ruling 
political parties. In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, male 
respondents, middle-income respondents and respondents with the highest level of 
education had the most trust in international television stations or international radios for 
obtaining credible news and information. Respondents affiliated to opposition political 
parties had the most trust in private newspapers and international radio stations. Local 
newspapers were the least trusted media among respondents in Addis Ababa. 
 
Newspapers in general were the least trusted media within different variables. Private 
newspapers were the least trusted media among respondents in Tigray and Oromia 
regions, male and female respondents, the young, middle-age groups, all income levels, 
respondents with first degrees and higher and respondents associated with ruling political 
parties. Local newspapers were the least trusted among respondents in Addis Ababa, 
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while government newspapers were the least trusted among opposition political party 
respondents. Among Amhara respondents, local radio stations were the least trusted 
media. Interestingly, the level of trust in most newspapers decreased or increased with the 
level of urbanisation, age, income and educational level. The level of trust in newspapers 
was highest among urban respondents and declined as one moved from urban to semi-
urban and rural areas. The level of trust in newspapers was highest among young people 
and declined with increasing age. It was also highest among respondents with high 
incomes and high education levels and declined with decreasing levels of income and 
education.  
 
Male respondents, the young and urban respondents had more trust in all media systems 
for getting news and information than other groups of respondents. In rural areas, 
respondents said that they did not have any trust in all media systems at all. The youth, 
however, were more trusting of different media systems than old people but trust 
decreased with increasing age. Regarding income level of respondents, national 
television, national radio, international radio and international television were variously 
trusted by different income groups. High-income level respondents had more trust in 
national television and international television, while low-income respondents had the 
highest trust in national radio and national television. The least trusted media among 
many respondents in all the three income levels were private newspapers. Respondents 
affiliated to the ruling political parties had the highest trust in national radio, national 
television and government newspapers. Private newspapers were the least trusted media 
among respondents aligned to the EPRDF. Respondents affiliated to opposition political 
parties, politically-neutrals and respondents who said they were not sure about their 
political orientation had the most trust in private newspapers, international radio and 
international television. These groups of respondents had one similarity, i.e. all rated 
government newspapers and local newspapers among the least trusted media.  
 
Regarding trust in media houses, Ethiopian Television was the most trusted television 
station among respondents in Tigray, female respondents, semi-urban and rural residents, 
middle and old people and low-income respondents. Ethiopian Television was also highly 
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trusted by respondents with no formal education and those with primary and high school 
level education, including respondents affiliated to the EPRDF. In terms of being a 
source of credible news and information, the BBC and CNN were highly trusted by many 
respondents in Addis Ababa, males, urban residents, the young, middle-income groups, 
certificate and diploma holders and independent respondents, including respondents 
affiliated to opposition political parties.  
 
Among the radio stations, Ethiopia Radio was the most trusted station among respondents 
in Tigray and Oromia. It was also the most trusted radio station by female respondents, 
people in semi-urban and rural areas, low-income groups, people with the lowest 
education level and respondents affiliated to the EPRDF. Respondents in Amhara, males, 
urban residents, high-income groups, higher degree holders, members of opposition 
political parties and politically-neutrals, including those who said that they were not sure 
about their political inclinations, highly trusted BBC Radio and Deutsche Welle Radio as 
sources of credible news and information. In regard to radio stations that have nation-
wide coverage, trust levels varied across different independent variables. Radio Fana was, 
for example, the least trusted by respondents in Addis Ababa, urban residents, middle-
income group, the highest education level group and respondents affiliated to opposition 
political parties, including politically-neutrals and those who said they were not sure 
about their political orientation. The least trusted radio station for respondents in Tigray 
was VOA. Deutsche Welle Radio was the least trusted by respondents in Amhara and 
Oromia regions with male and female respondents, all three age groups, people in the 
low-income group and those with the lowest educational attainments all reporting that 
they did not trust it as a source of credible news and information. The radio station was 
also the least trusted among respondents affiliated to the ruling political parties.  
 
Based on the 10 dimensions of media credibility, Ethiopian Radio was the most 
trustworthy radio station among respondents in Tigray, rural residents, low-income 
respondents, elders and respondents affiliated to the ruling political parties. Similarly, 
respondents in Oromia preferred Ethiopian Radio or Radio Fana to international radio 
stations. However, the BBC Radio, VOA or Deutsche Welle Radio were, in some cases, 
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highly trusted within most of the 10 dimensions of media credibility among respondents 
in Addis Ababa and Amhara, urban respondents, middle and high-income respondents 
and diploma and degree holders, including respondents who said they were not affiliated 
to ruling political parties. 
 
The national Amharic newspaper, Addis Admass, was the most trusted newspaper among 
respondents in Addis Ababa, male and female respondents, urban residents, the young 
and the aged, across all income groups, people with the highest education level and 
respondents not affiliated to the EPRDF.  Meanwhile, Addis Zemen was the most trusted 
newspaper among respondents in the three regions of (Tigray, Amhara and Oromia, 
respondents in semi-urban and rural areas, middle-aged group, people with no formal 
education and respondents aligned to ruling political parties. 
 
Various interview sessions reveal interesting views and opinions regarding perceptions of 
media credibility. Some respondents mentioned they trusted different media houses for 
different reasons. For some respondents, the national radio and television were the most 
credible in providing information and news. One respondent, for instance, said “National 
radio is believable especially nowadays.  Yes, it is true previously we were saying that 
the radio is a liar and they do not know everything but now I don’t say that the radio is 
lying because everything is visible on the ground” (Interviewee 3, May 14, 2009: 10).   
Another one added “I trust Radio Ethiopia that gives wide coverage to cultural issues” 
(Interviewee 39, June 5, 2009: 25). Yet others said that they trust both Ethiopian 
Television and Ethiopian Radio because they believe that the stations present the 
situation as it is (Interviewee 15, May 20, 2009:11; Interviewee 44, June 8 2009: 47; 
Interviewee 45, June 8 2009: 52), while another one said, “I believe them; I do not have 
any suspicion” (Interviewee 8, May 15, 2009: 33).   
 
It would appear that the majority of respondents trust national media as opposed to 
international media because of the underlying suspicion that the latter tend to present bad 
news about Ethiopia. On the contrary, national media is perceived to be nationalistic and 
inclined to present good news and information about the country. National media was 
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said to be good for transmitting peace and development messages and activities by the 
government, while foreign and other media were said to have a tendency to only cover 
the negative side of the government and are often critical of it. Some respondents, 
specifically, said that they supported and believed in national media because “national 
media are ours” and the “international media are theirs”. One respondent emphatically 
said that: 
Our national media present similar information about development or peace 
all the time. But external media presents bad things. If we listen to German 
Radio or Voice of America, they tell you that what happened here did not 
happen at all.  Especially the German radio lies most of the time. For me, I 
don’t listen to them and I don’t believe them (Interviewee 23, May 27, 2009: 
13). 
In most interviews, it emerged that the majority preferred national media to foreign media 
based on the perception that the latter had an intrinsic bias against developments in the 
country. Foreign media was said to only be interested in highlighting the negative side of 
Ethiopia to the exclusion of the positive development strides the country was making. 
One informant stated that “Although at some places, I don’t think they are trustworthy, in 
most cases I believe our national media are believable” (Interviewee 26, May 27, 
2009:25). Other informants expressed that the national radio and national television 
broadcasts domestic development news and international news and information correctly 
(Interviewee 4, May 14, 2009: 13; Interviewee 11, May 15 2009:47; Interviewee 12, May 
15, 2009: 55; Interviewee 29, May 28, 2009:36). Individuals trusted national media and 
distrust international media.  
 I do not trust Shabiya news among others.  Then German Radio and VOA 
transmit different stories.  So far, I have not heard unreliable news on Radio 
Ethiopia. I used to be EPRDF combatant myself. I have full trust in everything 
said on Radio Ethiopia (Interviewee 37, June 5, 2009: 14).  
 
In addition to national media the local media had also mentioned by some interviewees as 
the most trusted channel. Respondents from Addis Ababa reported for having the most 
trust in Shager Radio, FM 102.1 (Interviewee 18, May 21, 2009: 34).  “I trust most 
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Dimetsi Weyane because it transmits a very clear and accurate message in our language” 
(Interviewee 4, May 14, 2009:15). In the same token “I want to say the Dimetsi Weyane. 
It is more honest because it is visible in the ground” (Interviewee 7, May 14, 2009:29). 
Dimetsi Weyane radio presents a very interesting programme about the past history, the 
problems they had passed through. It attracts them and it is very nice. They really enjoy 
the programmes (Interviewee 10, May 15, 2009: 42).  From Amhara region respondents 
stated that they trusted Bahir Dar Radio. “I trust most Bahir Dar Radio. I also trust Radio 
Fana although I don’t listen to it regularly” (Interviewee 38, June 5, 2009: 20). 
 
Respondents were asked to rate media in terms of credibility or believability. In response, 
some respondents reported that they had the most trust among international media. one 
respondent said: “Well, I think it is German Radio. I have tuned into this station for a 
long time, in fact since my childhood days. I listen to this station to follow local news 
events. But nowadays, people say the credibility level has slightly dropped” (Interviewee 
14, May 20, 2009: 2). In agreeing with this sentiment, another respondent said: “I like 
German Radio, although it gives more coverage to international than national news. I 
prefer listening to all and then take whatever I want and discard the rest.  Otherwise, I 
cannot say this is the best and that one is the worst” (Interviewee 16, May 21 2009: 19). 
 
In contrast, some respondents had trust in the VOA. For instance, one respondent said “I 
think VOA is the most trustworthy for its accuracy. I can give you my rating by 
percentage; this is between 80 per cent and 90 per cent” (Interviewee 35, June 3, 2009: 
2). Some respondents had reservation to rate the credibility of the news media as the best 
or worst.  One informant stated that “I watch both ETV and ETV2. But I prefer ETV2 for 
its various programs and ETV for its news coverage. Both have their individual merits” 
(Interviewee 16, May 21 2009: 19). While another said “You cannot say everything right 
or everything wrong. Even when you take some national media they are sometimes 
unbelievable” (Interviewee 27, May 28, 2009:29). 
 
Some respondents noted that media operations, especially news reporting, should be 
guided by core values. In this regard, they emphasised the importance of the values of 
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truthfulness and accuracy in media news reporting. Based on this understanding, an 
informant in the Oromia region said that “Most of the time I listen to news. I have trust in 
Ethiopian Radio. I believe lies are not transmitted in a national radio. The radio station is 
big and I always accept it as true” (Interviewee 21, May 27 2009: 5). He added that:  
I have a comment on this as a nation what is said and what is actually done 
should be the same. I always think about this. I don’t have to guess to say, 
why is this? Why that happened this or that way? I like if what is said and 
what has actually happened are the same. Even as a nation, as a region and 
as an individual, what is said and what is actually taking place should be the 
same. I like it that way (Interviewee 21, May 27 2009: 5). 
 One respondent said that in assessing credibility levels of media, there is need to 
compare one media outlet to others. He specifically said that “You cannot accept 
whatever information you get from the media.  You have other media like newspapers 
and magazine to cross-check with, especially on burning issues. You don’t trust whatever 
information you get on FM or ETV or Radio Fana” (Interviewee 19, May 22, 2009: 43). 
In contrast, one respondent said “They are the same for me. No difference they are the 
same. I trust all of them” (Interviewee 20, May 27 2009: 2). He was supported by another 
respondent who said “All of them are somehow credible” (Interviewee 25, May 27, 2009: 
21).    
 
Some respondents had partial trust in certain media for obtaining news and information. 
For instance, one respondent said he partially trusted Ethiopian Radio. Specifically, he 
said: 
I trust the radio partially. They tell us something that is not actually 
happening in our locality. I do suspect the radio because they told us once 
that the rain is coming but it did not rain. How can I believe what I don’t 
see? (Interviewee 41, June 6 2009: 34). 
A few respondents said that they had never trusted the media because they don’t reflect 
the existing reality on the ground. “What is being transmitted in the radio and the actual 
fact does not resemble here” (Interviewee 1, May 13, 2009: 2). One respondent noted as 
another said “I don’t trust them. They don’t have any differences. Their thoughts are the 
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same” (Interviewee 22, May 27 2009: 10). Yet another added that “No I don’t trust 
media. You know, there are truths and falsehoods. You take what you trust and reject 
what you don’t believe” (Interviewee 17, May 22, 2009: 27). 
The major worry among respondents was perceived variances between what is reported 
and reality on the ground. In reference to this, one respondent said “What the mass media 
present and what is actually on ground are sometimes different. Everything that passes is 
not exactly the same as what actually is. I believe what they actually get and present to 
the public are not always the same. This is what makes me personally feel bad” 
(Interviewee 6, May 14, 2009: 25). 
Perceived disparities between what is reported in the media and what is existing on the 
ground consistently kept coming up in discussions with respondents. In one interview, for 
instance, a respondent strongly argued that: 
I do not believe them always. They transmit true information as well as false 
information. I do not accept all the information they transmit as true 
information. They can sometimes transmit good programs and bad ones as 
well. Some of them may talk about things which are not real which are not 
done or heard of. That is why I cannot believe them (Interviewee 9, May 15, 
2009: 40).    
Private media was particularly said to be a culprit in as far as misreporting was 
concerned with one respondent saying “I usually do not trust the private media. This 
is because I don’t think that they cover issues seriously and correctly based on the 
reality. Most of them are engaged in defamatory activities frequently” (Interviewee 
13, May 15 2009: 62). 
 
The important role that advertisement plays in news and information dissemination was 
also assessed by respondents. News media credibility, some respondents noted, can be 
affected not only in the way it reports news and information to the public but also in the 
manner it promotes and advertises goods and services.  In this regard, one respondent 
said that “I don’t like Amharic programs because they are full of non-credible 
advertisements. They tell you to buy a product which is not good.  They tell you that it is 
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good and when you buy it, it is not good.  Then we hate the media” (Interviewee 25, May 
27, 2009: 21).     
 
In one discussion, a respondent noted that the issue of assessing the credibility of the 
media was personal which should not be revealed to other persons (Interviewee 41, June 
6 2009: 34). To illustrate his point, he likened assessment of media credibility to the 
ballot paper which is secretly used to vote for preferred candidates. Consequently, he 
noted that asking respondents the question “Which news media do you perceive as most 
credible or believable as a source of information?” was not appropriate.  However, one 
respondent rebutted this view by saying “I listen to Radio Fana, Ethiopian Radio, VOA 
and Deutsche Welle. All news may be credible or may be not credible, but it is me who 
should filter and see which is credible and which is not” (Interviewee 24, May 27, 
2009:17). Another philosophically said “Well I cannot say with certainty which medium I 
trust most. You know we have FM Radio, Ethiopian Radio and Radio Fana.  All of these 
operate within the boundaries of their aims and objectives” (Interviewee 19, May 22, 
2009: 42). 
 
Ownership and/or use of media hardware allows one to assess media credibility. In other 
words, it is almost impossible to assess the credibility of a media hardware without 
having read or listened to it.  Some respondents were, therefore, reluctant to answer the 
question regarding media credibility. One said “I don’t listen to the radio. I do not own a 
radio. So, I cannot tell you exactly” (Interviewee 1, May 14, 2009: 2; Interviewee 42, 
June 6 2009: 39). Not only reluctant there were also resistance from some respondents to 
express their trust in media.  
Box 2: The conversation with one of the interviewees was: 
“Question: Which media house do you consider most reliable? 
Answer: As I said earlier, I have greater trust on Shager Radio, FM 102.1.  I like its 
news and all its programs. But I also listen to ETV news for 2 to 3 hours 
every day. 
Question: What kinds of news attract you most? 
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Answer: News related to the country’s objective conditions.  I want to know what is 
going on all over my country.  So I watch ETV to get the information 
whether local or international. 
Question: Do you believe news transmitted by ETV is credible?  
Answer: As a government media, it has something to say. 
Question: Is it credible to you as a listener or individual? 
Answer: Well, I have to watch it because I get information about what is taking 
place in the government.  There are proclamations and declarations you 
have to know.  I have to know things even if they are not true.  I have no 
option.  
Question: So you listen because you have no option.  What is the level of your trust, 
100%, or 50% or none at all?  
Answer: I cannot say either 100% or 50%.  The media transmits whatever it thinks 
is beneficial for the peace of the country.  What it believes is not, well it 
won’t transmit.  So I can’t say 100% or partial trust.  But on the whole I 
have trust. But not 100%” (Interviewee 18, May 21, 2009: 34).   
 
There was also sidestepping to answer the question “Which media do you personally 
consider most credible?” A number of respondents were not answered for the question 
directly. They gave answer, but it was not direct (Interviewee 31, May 28, 2009; 
Interviewee 33, May 29, 2009). For instance, one of the interviewees replied that “Well, 
do you know why. The focus on women is very good and I am happy with it. Although as 
a woman I do not face difficult problems in my life, as far as I live I want to lead my life 
properly and handle my family” (Interviewee 28, May 28, 2009:32). Another informant 
also responded: “Radio is very important. In our country, if there were no radios, people 
could not communicate to each other” (Interviewee 30, May 28, 2009:39). There was also 
a follow up question forwarded to the individual and the person avoided answering the 
question directly. The implication of such answers and conversations in the arena of 
media credibility inclinations to forward the crisis of media credibility in the lack of trust 
among the informants.  
 6.6.2. Audience political views/political ideology and media credibility 
 
In analysing media consumption and media credibility, political views and ideological 
orientation of members of the public are significant in understanding media consumption 
patterns and individual perception of media credibility. Political ideas and believes of the 
206 
 
public are reflected in their day-to-day life and perceptions of media credibility. People 
are naturally inclined to politics. In reference to this, Heywood aptly noted that “All 
people are political thinkers. Whether they know it or not, people use political ideas and 
concepts whenever they express their opinions or speak their mind” (Heywood, 2013:1).  
 
Individual political orientation, views and ideas have enormous influence on decisions 
people make.  For instance, if one is a conservative, he or she will most likely support 
decisions of a conservative political party based on his or her commitment to ensuring its 
continued stay in power. In the USA, for example, Fox News conducted an on-line poll 
on its News website on January 28, 2018. It posed the question: “Should Donald Trump 
be impeached?” and requested respondents to choose “Yes”, “No” or “Not sure”. A total 
of 96,516 people voted. Results were 9 per cent ‘Yes’, 90 per cent ‘No’ and 1 per cent 
‘Not sure’. These responses are likely to evoke questions such as are they exaggerated or 
understated? Would answers be the same if the same question were posted on other news 
media websites such as CNN, New York Times, The Washington Post or, indeed, The 
Wall Street Journal? It is difficult to say but the fact is respondents were heavily 
influenced by their political leaning towards the President’s political party, the 
Republican Party.   
 
According to a 2012 survey by the Pew Research Center (2014), 60 per cent of Fox News 
viewers described themselves as conservative, compared to 23 per cent who said they 
were moderate and 10 per cent who said they were liberal. In contrast, the ideological 
make-up of CNN viewers was 32 per cent conservative, 30 per cent moderate and 30 per 
cent liberal. MSNBC viewers were far more mixed with the score of 32 per cent 
conservative, 23 per cent moderate and 36 per cent liberal.  The ideological make-up of 
Wall Street Journal was 32 per cent conservative, 41 per cent moderate and 21 per cent 
liberal (Pew Research Center, 2014). This scenario was largely responsible for the 
political polarisation that was experienced during the 2016 presidential elections 
(Doherty, 2017). It could also be used to explain the overwhelming 90 per cent ‘No’ 
response in the e-poll of Fox News.  Similarly, assessment of media credibility within the 
context of a given polity will most likely reflect the political orientation of the 
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respondent. Indeed, there is often a strong association between political or ideological 
views and how one assesses the credibility of one news medium against others.  
  
In Ethiopia, it is not easy to realistically assess public perceptions of media credibility 
without contextualising the assessment within the country’s political party architecture. 
This is especially true given the multiplicity of and interfacing between and among 
political parties along ideological and philosophical lines. Equally important is the fact 
that there is often ideological fluidity, or vagueness, in ideological standing and 
orientation of some political parties.  However, in order to get some clear sense of these 
challenges, I discuss in the following sections the historical derivation of political party 
ideologies and philosophies in Ethiopia.  
 
Some scholars believe that there are two major political ideologies, i.e. liberalism and 
revolutionary democracy in the country (Isaw, 2010). According to Isaw, the former is 
promoted by opposition parties. Specifically, he said that “Almost all Ethiopian political 
parties except EPRDF adopt liberalism as their political ideology.  And these political 
parties are looking forward to put liberalism at work, if and when they’re endowed with 
the political power to do so.” (Isaw, 2010:1). Nevertheless, some leaders of opposition 
political parties have come up with different versions of liberalism. For instance, 
Professor Beyene Petros, President of the Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum 
(Medrek), said that “Social Democracy is a golden option for Ethiopia”.  Meanwhile, 
Kebede Chane (Dr.), President of the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDEPA), advocated 
for the adoption of liberal democracy, a combination of socialism and conservatism, as a 
viable ideology for Ethiopia (Etana, 2015).  
 
The stated ideology of the Ethiopian ruling party is revolutionary democracy which is 
espoused on the back of a strong belief in a state bureaucracy driven by the ambition to 
not only promote economic growth but also to protect national interests (Cai, 2010). The 
genesis of the ideology of revolutionary democracy can be traced to the establishment of 
the federalist system of government comprising multiple political parties. Various 
political parties have fairly strong influence on their members with respect to how they 
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individually and collectively perceive media credibility. EPRDF’s revolutionary ideology 
and its version of democracy are founded on Marxist-Leninist principles of party 
organisation and mobilisation and coloured by ethnic nationalism (Asnake, 2013). 
Traditionally, most political ideologies tend to end with isms and it had often been 
speculated that the EPRDF’s revolutionary ideology could eventually end up being called 
Melesism due to the fact that the late Prime Minister Meles was the pioneer of the 
thought. EPRDF promotes the centralisation of power around the ‘vanguard’ dominant 
one-party system but TPLF inspired it to adopt federalism as a governance approach. The 
establishment of regional administrations, or federal state, with various political parties 
sharing regional powers, was informed and guided by the ideology of revolutionary 
democracy. The ideology is derived from Leninism and infused with some democratic 
principles and applied within the context of the ethnic diversity of Ethiopia (Abbink, 
2011:602).   
 
EPRDF established the federal system of government after seizing power in the early 
1990s with revolutionary democracy as its approach to managing the country. The federal 
system of government comprised regional administrations reflecting the country’s ethnic 
diversity and ideological architecture. While the federal system worked to some extent, 
some sections of the population were aggrieved and resorted to various forms of protest 
to register their displeasure. Issues of national identity and nationality, for instance, were 
the key factors behind the Ethiopian students’ uprising and movement (Merera, 2002; 
Asnake, 2013: 62). Most of the political movements and activism were ethno-nationalist 
in nature. These included the Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF), Eritrean People 
Liberation Front (EPLF), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Afar Liberation Front 
(ALF).    
 
Later, the country underwent a restructuring process which ended in the creation of 14 
regional administrations along ethno-linguistic lines (Office of the Prime Minister, 1995). 
Ethiopia pursued a multi-tiered approach to territorial autonomy according to which 
bigger ethnic groups (the ‘nations’) such as Afar, Tigray, Amhara, Oromo and Somali 
were given regions in which they constituted the majority of the population and the 
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regions were accordingly named after their own ethnonyms (Asnake, 2013). Several 
ethnic groups, nationalities and peoples (regions 7 to 11) were, eventually, amalgamated 
to create ‘multi-ethnic’ regions called the Southern Nation, Nationalities and People 
Region (SNNPR). Other multi-ethnic regions were Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz. 
Even in such multi-ethnic regions, there are many ethnic groups which have own sub-
regional administrative structures called zones, Wereda or special-Wereda. The core 
premise was that it would be a pain-staking task to address particular ethnic grievances 
which were championed by ethno-regional insurgent movements in the country within a 
shared political agenda (Abbink, 2011:597). According to Abbink: 
apart from the concept of ethnic-based federalism […] ethnicity is the 
dominant rhetorical figure in political discourse in Ethiopia and has 
permeated people’s identities and daily politics, whether they like it or not. It 
has inspired the governance model, the division and administration of the 
regional states, educational-linguistic policies and party politics (Abbink, 
2011: 597).  
To some extent, the formation of ethno-federalism and ethnically-inclined political 
parties has, in certain cases, worked to mutual benefit of all parties. The TPLF was 
initially a movement which fought for the liberation of the Tigray people. However, the 
impulsive changes at national and international levels, its unexpected victory at the war 
front and its success in resource mobilisation, including other favourable circumstances 
that took place towards the end of the 1980s, caused it to re-evaluate its future role in 
national politics. The re-evaluation allowed it to expand from a narrow and local 
constituency to a ‘pan-Ethiopian political’ body (Asnake, 2013). Subsequently, the TPLF 
established a front coalition of ethnic organisations under its control. In 1989, it created 
the EPRDF with membership of the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM) 
and established a nationwide Marxist-Leninist party. TPLF gave its full attention to 
consolidating the EPRDF in 1990 and formed the Oromo People Democratic 
Organization (OPDO) from prisoners of war captured from the Ethiopian army.  
 
In 1994, the EPRDF established the SEPDF, a new coalition of ethnic parties for the 
southern region. In the same year, the EPDM changed from a multi-ethnic organisation to 
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an ethnic political movement to ‘represent’ the previously dominant Amhara ethnic group 
and adopted the new name of Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) under 
EPRDF. Similarly, the TPLF/EPRDF created several subordinate parties which were put 
in charge of the newly-created peripheral regions of the country. Being the dominant 
political party, the EPRDF provides political leadership and direction to all ethnic regions 
either through its member organisations or its affiliates. However, each region is 
managed by a political party, i.e. Addis Ababa is run by EPRDF, an umbrella party, while 
Oromia, Amhara and Tigray are run by OPDO, ANDM and TPLF, respectively.  
 
Following the controversial 2005 national elections, the ideological diversity of the 
country somewhat changed as some people thought that there was need for a dominant 
political party, or Awra party in Amharic. This shift was precipitated by the realisation 
that liberal democracy cannot work in a developing country like Ethiopia. According to 
Meles, revolutionary democracy should have a positive and cooperative goal which 
should be informed and guided by autonomous, self-help and purpose-oriented civic 
associations. These should be organized establishments meant for societal empowerment 
and social transformation. In this regard, political parties, civil societies and the media 
should all work in support of the dominant party’s efforts to achieve structural 
transformation goals.  
 
Historically, at the beginning of the 1990s, two camps of partisan media briskly emerged 
in tandem with political developments in the country. The first to emerge were the 
public-owned media and semi-private pro-EPRDF media which were strongly tied to the 
Government. The second was the private press (mainly newspapers and magazines) as 
advocates of opposition political parties vis-à-vis ruling parties (Stalker, 2008).  
Regardless of whether they were pro or anti-government, the media tended to leverage 
ethnic loyalty to support their ideological leanings. Incidentally, the influence of the 
private press somewhat weakened following the ideological and tactical shift by the 
EPRDF after the 2005 election crisis. 
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The ruling party often vigorously uses national and aligned media houses to promote 
ideas that are consistent with its doctrine and ideology. It does this through the delivery 
of systematically-organised and arranged information and messages. The information and 
messages are meant to convince people that supporting the party are the same as 
supporting development, peace, democracy, well-being and security of the county. 
Conversely, not doing so is labelled as anti-peace, anti-development and anti-democracy 
and unpatriotic (Quora.com). In addition, EPRDF’s ideology of revolutionary democracy 
strongly emphasises the social structure as the most decisive foundation and centre of 
gravity for any political theory. This understanding is based on the fact that Ethiopia is 
dominantly a traditional, agrarian and hand-to-mouth social structure.  
 
Ideologically, Meles argued that neo-liberalism was never born out of a traditional 
agrarian social structure, while revolutionary democracy was never born out of an 
industrialised, urbanised and individualistic society (Meles, 2010).  Consequently, 
solutions to challenges that face agrarian, traditional and egalitarian social structures are 
inherently located within social structures themselves. Meles further argued that the 
ideology of revolutionary democracy has the vast peasantry class as its social foundation 
and is organically linked to it. In contrast, liberal democracy’s social foundation is the 
vast and wealthy middle class that enjoys high standards of living and urban-based and 
industrialised. Ethiopia has no such wealthy and dynamic population which makes liberal 
democracy inappropriate as a governance ideology. Meles justified his arguments by 
saying that Ethiopia is founded on rural peasants which should, invariably, constitute the 
social basis and backbone for revolutionary democracy not by choice but by realities of 
the nature of the country’s society. Democracy, therefore, will mean nothing without this 
broadest social class at its centre not only as the beneficiary but also as its maker (Tareke, 
1991).  
 
The EPRDF heavily emphasised class distinction as its fundamental socio-political 
approach to national governance with the Ethiopian peasantry as a distinct class. 
EPRDF’s intention was to create and strengthen traditional social bonds as a catalyst for 
total social transformation and creation of a vast and wealthy middle class with high 
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standards of living, urban-based and industrialised (Meles, 2010). EPRDF’s attachment 
to the peasantry is the source of its energy which can never be obtained from any other 
class (Meles, 2010). The bases of the ideology of revolutionary democracy are 
traditional, agrarian, rural-based, uneducated and hand-to-mouth populations living on 
low incomes. It is expected that wealthy middle class, urban-based and highly-educated 
populations may not fully side with the ideology of revolutionary democracy. 
  
In cognizance of the above-mentioned facts, the bond of the four regional administrations 
and the political orientation demonstrated in figure 6.13. The proportion of the 
respondent’s regional states and their political affiliation is varied among regions. For 
example, the Tigray region as expected had the highest number of respondents who 
reported that they were associated with the ruling party with the score of 90 per cent. 
Addis Ababa had the least number of people, 35 per cent, who said they were supporters 
of the EPRDF, the ruling party. In contrast, Oromia and Amhara region which, like 
Tigray, are rural areas, each scored slightly more than 70 per cent of respondents who 
said they were supporters of the ruling party. Similarly, the Tigray region recorded the 
least number of respondents, one per cent, who said they were associated opposition 
political parties. Mass support of the ruling political party by rural populations, people 
with no formal education, black collar workers and other less privileged people, is 
manifest in their support for ruling party-oriented media such as Ethiopian Radio and 
Ethiopian Television. These groups of people intrinsically feel obliged to support the 
ruling party and its “friendly” media largely because they contributed to its assumption of 
governmental power.  Lt. General Tsadkan G. Tensay, former member of the top 
leadership of the TPLF and former Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian Armed Forces, put it 
bluntly when he said that “I cannot say that the Tigray people has not been thinking that 
they have brought the existing system in Ethiopia and we are the one who should protect 
and keep it moving forward” (Reporter, February 11, 2018).  
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The Addis Ababa had the highest number of respondents who said they were associated 
with opposition political parties with slightly more than 10 per cent. Oromia and Amhara 
had 2.3 per cent and 4.1 per cent of respondents who said they were aligned to opposition 
political parties. The proportion of politically-neutral respondents was highest in Addis 
Ababa (43 per cent) and lowest in Tigray (8 per cent). One fifth of respondents in 
Amhara and Oromia either said they were neutral or independent. The high number of 
respondents who said they were affiliated to political parties was reflected in the low 
numbers of those in the “Don’t know” response category, 5.3 per cent and 4.7 per cent 
for Oromia and Amhara regions, respectively. All in all, respondents who were affiliated 
to the ruling party showed the highest trust in the media which aligned to and served to 
promote the mission and objectives of the ruling party, EPRDF. Conversely, respondents 
who were associated with opposition political parties and neutrals reported the most trust 
in the news media which were perceived not to be   fully in support of the ruling party.  
 
This statistical data and the social foundation of TPLF/EPRDF’s revolutionary 
democracy ideology can be easily reflected in the staying areas of the respondents being 
urban, semi-urban and rural residents, income levels of the respondents, age group of the 
respondents and educational level of the respondents. Respondents of Tigray, semi-urban 
and rural respondents, middle and old peoples, low income individuals and respondents 
with low education level are more likely associated to EPRDF than respondents of Addis 
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Ababa, urban dwellers, middle and high income individuals and highly educated 
individuals. Respondents of Amhara and Oromia also most likely aligned to the ruling 
parties through mass ideological indoctrination and dissemination of news and 
information favourable to the ruling party in feeding the public with news and 
information favourable to the ruling elite. Members of the public will live in an 
environment that is not amenable to free expressions of thoughts, opinions and ideas.  
The outcome of the level of trust in media was the replication of the political ideology 
and political views of the society. The political views and stands of the individuals 
symmetrically displayed in the perception of media credibility. Individuals who affiliated 
with the ruling parties showed the highest trust the media which aligned and served as a 
means to promote the missions and objectives of the ruling parties, EPRDF. Meanwhile, 
respondents who associated with opposition parties or neutral reported the most trust to 
the news media which were not fully side with the ruling parties. In most discussions 
during the study, this conclusion was corroborated mostly by respondents affiliated to the 
ruling party, the lowly-educated, people with no formal education, low income people, 
women and respondents in rural areas. This pattern, as might be expected, is not strange 
since mass ideological indoctrination easily resonate with these groups of people.    
 
Respondents who supported the ruling party based their allegiance on what they said the 
party had done for the country.  One respondent, for instance, said:  
We sometimes think what will happen after this government, because 
everybody including the farmer is benefiting from the government. There 
are also some who have a negative attitude towards the government but, we 
say to them that we have passed through a hard time; and different regimes 
but, the incumbent is better (Interviewee 4, May 14, 2009: 14).   
Members of the TPLF, a government coalition partner, are also supportive of the EPRDF. 
One of its members, for example, strongly said that: 
I have been the member of the TPLF party since 1972. I participated in the 
struggle against the Durg regime. In my opinion, therefore, we have 
achieved what we have fought for. Glory to our struggle and the direction of 
the country is now completely shifted towards development. This always 
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makes me happy of the fact that there are many other parties has an 
advantage because it strengthens the ruling party; and it encourages hard 
working due to competition. But sometimes there are movements by some 
political parties that threaten the country and people are not happy by the 
fact that the government takes too much time to control this (Interviewee 5, 
May 14, 2009: 22)  
Another respondent added that:   
The current government has granted the equality of every citizen, nations 
and nationalities of the country and the nations of Amhara, Oromo and the 
Afar to live together in harmony. Thus, we have to use this opportunity but, 
I would like to say that we do not have to be fooled by opposition parties. 
Especially the Tigraines shall remember the bad times they have passed 
throughout the different regimes and to enjoy the current freedom they have 
gained (Interviewee 7, May 14, 2009: 29).   
People who are members and supporters affiliated of the ruling coalition, therefore, 
naturally support media such as Ethiopian Radio, Ethiopian Television and Addis Zemen 
that are amenable and user-friendly to the government. Conversely, BBC, CNN, VOA 
and Deutsch Welle, and in some cases private newspapers, were the most trusted among 
respondents in Addis Ababa, males, urban residents, the young, middle and high-income 
groups, diploma and degree holders and respondents associated with opposition political 
parties and independents. The media will most likely be dominated by news and 
information favourable to the ruling party. Journalists will, on their part, be forced to feed 
the public with news and information favourable to the ruling elite. Members of the 
public will live in an environment that is not amenable to free expressions of thoughts, 
opinions and ideas. Suppression of free speech will, invariably, adversely affect the 
extent to which people will objectively assess media credibility. In the end, the inherent 
ability of people to participate in leveraging the country’s political and governance 
agenda will be thwarted, if not completely destroyed.   
6.7. Conclusion  
 
Public perceptions of trust in the media varied across independent variables. According to 
the majority of respondents television was highly rated and preferred to other forms of 
media because of its ability to synchronise image and sound. The synchronisation of 
216 
 
image and sound makes television more believable, credible and interesting to watch. The 
second most preferred media system was the radio and followed by newspaper. National 
radio and national television had the most trust among local and international radio and 
television stations. Similarly, Ethiopian Radio and Ethiopian Television had the highest 
trust among other radio and television stations. The comparison of the level of trust in 
media houses and the judgement of respondents on the ten dimension of media credibility 
revealed that there were no major differences between the perception of the individuals 
on media credibility and their judgement on the ten dimensions of media credibility for 
radio broadcasting for obtaining news and information. 
The level of trust in media was dependant on a number of demographic, socio-economic, 
ideological and political factors. The national media like Ethiopian Radio, Ethiopian 
Television and Addis Zemen were the most trusted media among respondents of Tigrai, 
female respondents, semi-urban and rural residents, middle and old age peoples, low 
income respondents, respondents of no formal education and with primary and high 
school level as well as with respondents affiliated with EPRDF as source of information 
and news 
In contrast, foreign media such as the VOA, CNN and Deutsch Welle Radio were 
perceived by supporters of the ruling party to be intrinsically biased against the 
government. They were, specifically, accused of peddling falsehoods and ignoring the 
developmental economic and social achievements by the government. Interestingly, 
however, foreign media scored highly among respondents with diplomas and degrees, 
urban residents (especially in Addis Ababa) and the middle-income group as sources of 
credible news and information. This could, perhaps, be attributed to the fact that these 
groups are, by dint of their education, more well-disposed to getting news and 
information regarding global events than the less educated, people with no formal 
education, low income and people in rural areas.  
The low social structure of the society, rural residents, low income group of society and 
low educational background society have the most trust in pro EPRDF media. This 
attachment will be continued as the movement of EPRDF and revolutionary democracy 
ideology ensures the promises to the targeted social structure. If it falls to deliver the 
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promises and deliverables, the working-class and lower-middle-class not only losses trust 
in media associated with the ruling parties but also they challenge the concurrence of the 
party and the revolutionary democracy ideology. As Meles predicted that if the 
organizational decay (betraying the Ethiopian peasant to corruptively ally with the urban 
‘parasite capital owner’) continued unchecked, the peasant mass would finally rise up 
against EPRDF and revolutionary democracy ideology. The partisanship bond between 
the low socio structure community and TPLF led EPRDF would be broken in both 
practical and rhetorical terms.   
In conclusion, the findings on the media have shown that media system and house had 
different levels of trust and believe in connection to the demographic factors and political 
views of the individuals.  
Next is chapter seven. Chapter seven focuses on respondent perceptions of social trust, 
political trust and media credibility. I begin by examining the level of social trust and 
make comparisons between particularized and generalized trust in order to get a sense of 
the type of people who express social trust and distrust. I then use the institutional 
performance theory to ascertain levels of public trust and confidence in public institutions 
to operate in the best interest of the public. I also analyze relationships between and 
among social trust, political trust and media credibility within different variables. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: ACQUAINTANCES BETWEEN SOCIAL TRUST, POLITICAL TRUST AND MEDIA 
CREDIBILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF ETHIOPIA (WITH DIFFERENT VARIABLES)  
 
 
Weapons and full bellies can secure compliance, but trust between rulers and followers is 
a more effective and efficient way of holding on to political power.  
(Kenneth Newton, Dietlind Stolle, and Sonja Zmerli, 2001) 
 
7.1. Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I assess respondent perceptions of social trust, political trust and media 
credibility. I examine the level of social trust in the context of social clusters, including 
trust in family members, trust in neighbours, trust in Ethiopians in general and trust in 
foreigners. This is with a view to establishing comparative trust levels between 
particularized and generalized trust in order to provide evidence with respect to what 
types of people express social trust and distrust. I, further, examine social trust in line 
with the social and cultural theory approach, and especially the voluntary organizational 
theory. The voluntary organizational theory relates to public participation in religious 
organizations, mass associations, political organizations, professional associations, clubs 
and societies on voluntary bases. The theory is helpful in getting a sense of the influence 
of involvement and active participation in the arena as a proxy for social trust.  
 
Regarding political trust, I assess it on the basis of the social and cultural theory and the 
institutional performance theory as a way of determining the reciprocity of social trust 
and political trust. In this regard, I evaluate respondents’ levels of trust in institutions to 
operate in the best interest of society based on four response categories, i.e. a lot of trust, 
some trust, not much trust and no trust at all. Regarding organizations and institutions, I 
assess levels of public trust on the basis of the following response categories: excellence 
and intelligence; work efficiency and effectiveness; upholding of public interest; justness 
and sincerity; and devotion and dedication to duty. 
 
It is expected that these response categories will assist in getting a clear sense of the 
linkage between institutional trust and institutional performance.  Further, I assess the 
219 
 
respondents’ levels of social trust, political trust and institutional performance and the 
links of these expressions of trust or mistrust based on independent variables, i.e. 
respondents’ regions of residence and area, gender, age group, income level, educational 
attainment and political affiliation.  
 
In order to analyze the accessibility and flow of information into the public domain, I will 
examine the frequency of getting/receiving information from different media 
organizations. This chapter also discusses the extent to which the environment permits 
airing suggestions, complaints, free expression of opinions and the main vehicles used to 
do the same. In the case of restricted airing of suggestions and free expressions of 
opinions, the chapter discusses precipitative factors. My discussion of findings in this 
chapter is with a view to establishing the extent to which there is a link between and 
among social trust, political trust and media credibility. This will assist in figuring out 
whether or not social trust, political/institutional trust and media credibility in Ethiopia 
are entwined with reciprocal interrelationships and dependencies.  
7.2. Social Trust/particularized and generalized social trust  
 
Social trust is a belief in other people; it is interpersonal trust. It is a “faith in people” 
(Pew Research Center, 2007). It helps to figure out who trusts whom. Based on this 
definition of social trust, respondents were asked to indicate their levels of social trust in 
the following social clusters: family members; neighbours; Ethiopians in general; and 
foreigners.  
 
Responses by these categories are meant to assist in understanding the difference between 
generalized and particularized trust. Generalized trust is the belief that most people can 
be trusted without depending upon individual characteristics or attachments. It was 
measured by the survey question, "Generally speaking, do you believe that most people 
can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" In contrast, 
particularized trust refers to trusting people you know or know something about. 
Particularized trust is the belief that only specific individuals or individuals associated 
with certain network or group characteristics can be trusted. For example, trust is 
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particularized if it is identity-based and includes "…only people one knows personally, as 
well as those who fit into a certain social identity that one holds" (Stolle, 2001, p. 205). 
7.2.1. Levels of Social trust 
 
Respondents were asked to indicate whether or not most people can be trusted, cannot be 
trusted or be careful with them. About 1,816 respondents were targeted out of which 
1,520, or 83.7 per cent, were effectively reached. Slightly over 32.0 per cent indicated 
that most people could be trusted against approximately 68 per cent who said that most 
people could not be trusted. About one-third of the respondents said that they trusted 
people in general, while slightly more than two-thirds said they did not trust people. 
In trying to ascertain the strength of trust between and among Ethiopians in general and 
foreigners, views were sought from 1,709, or 94 per cent, of the targeted population. 
Nearly 8 per cent of them said they had insignificant trust in foreigners as compared to 
almost 92 per cent who said they had more trust in Ethiopians. This reveals that 
foreigners are the least trusted in this category of social groupings. 
 
In relation to trust in neighbours, 1,613 respondents responded to the question. About 
56.0 per cent had trust in their neighbours, whereas an estimated 43.0 per cent had 
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modest trust. In regard to trust in family members, a total of 1,583 respondents, or 87.2 
per cent, responded to the question. Almost 80 per cent had trust in family members as 
compared to about 20 per cent who did not.   
Generally, in all the social groupings, respondents had their highest trust in family 
members, while the least trusted social group was that of foreigners. Trust in neighbours 
and Ethiopians in general came out second and third, respectively, which indicates that 
respondents showed more particularized trust than generalized trust. The ‘thick’, or 
personal, trust was stronger than the ‘thin’, or impersonal or generalized, trust.   
7.2.2. Levels of Social Trust within different variables  
 
As Table 7.2 and Figure 7.2 indicate, respondents were asked to rate the level of trust in 
social groupings in relation within different variables, i.e. region of residence, gender, 
residential area, age and income level. The other two variables were level of education 
and political affiliation. Table 7.2 and Figure 7.2 show that there were variations in social 
trust within independent variables, but trust in family members was the highest and trust 
in foreigners was the lowest across all variables. All the four regions had their highest 
trust in family members and lowest in foreigners. The region with the highest trust in 
family members was Tigray with almost 95.0 per cent against nearly 3.0 per cent for 
foreigners. Oromia had the highest trust in neighbours, while Tigray scored the least at 
74.8 per cent and 31.7 per cent for family members and foreigners, respectively. Addis 
Ababa recorded 68.7 per cent and Amhara 54.7 per cent with respect to having trust in 
neighbours. Oromia scored 45.0 per cent trust in Ethiopians as against respondents in 
Amhara who scored the lowest at 16.0 per cent. Respondents in Addis Ababa and Tigray 
scored trust in Ethiopians at 34.0 and 32.0 per cent, respectively.  
It was further discovered that male respondents had more trust than females in all 
categories of social trust, i.e. trust in family members, trust in Ethiopians in general, trust 
in neighbours and trust in foreigners. Trust in family members among male and female 
respondents was recorded at 81.0 per cent and 79.0 per cent, respectively. The lowest 
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percentage was trust in foreigners which was recorded at 8.0 per cent and 6.0 per cent for 
male and female respondents, respectively.  
Urban respondents had the highest percentage scores compared to semi-urban and rural 
residents with respect to trusting Ethiopians in general, foreigners and neighbours. It was 
further observed that there was a trend of decreasing trust as one moved from urban to 
semi-urban and rural areas. For instance, percentages for trust in citizens in general was 
36.0 per cent, 30.4 per cent and 26.8 per cent for urban, semi-urban and rural 
respondents, respectively. Conversely, trust in family members in rural areas was scored 
highly at almost 90 per cent compared to 78 per cent and 74 per cent for semi-urban and 
urban respondents, respectively. Rural respondents had more trust in family members 
relative to foreigners for whom they scored at a paltry 5 per cent trust. 
Regarding the age variable, trust in family members was scored highly in all categories of 
social trust across all the three age groups, while trust in foreigners had the lowest 
percentage score. Trust in neighbours ranked second, while trust in Ethiopians in general 
came third in all the three age groups. According to Figure 7.2, nearly nine out of ten, or 
87.2 per cent, of adults aged 60 and above said that they had trust in family members. 
About eight out of ten respondents aged between 40 and 59, and nearly three quarters of 
respondents aged between 18 and 39, said that they had trust in family members. 
Respondents aged between 18 and 39 years scored the highest, 58.9 per cent, with respect 
to trust in Ethiopians in general, while those aged between 40 and 59 years scored the 
least trust with a score of slightly over 50.0 per cent. Trust in foreigners was the least 
rated, 8.6 per cent, by respondents aged between 18 and 39 years.  Respondents aged 60 
years and above also scored the least percentage in terms of trust in foreigners.  
High-income respondents scored the highest in terms of trust in neighbours, while low-
income and middle-income respondents had the highest trust in family members. 
Percentage scores for trust in family members were 79.7 per cent, 77.6 per cent and 75.0 
per cent for low-income, middle-income and high-income respondents, respectively. 
Scores for trust in neighbours were 47.2 per cent, 67.3 per cent and 78.4 per cent for low-
income, middle-income and high-income respondents, respectively. Trust in foreigners 
was scored the least among all the three income groups. For instance, middle-income 
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respondents scored 10.1per cent, while high-income respondents scored of 5.6 per cent 
and the low-income respondents scored 6.8 per cent trust in foreigners.     
 
With regard to educational levels, trust in family members scored the highest among all 
levels followed by trust in neighbours. Trust in Ethiopians and foreigners came third and 
fourth, respectively. Respondents with primary and high school education scored the 
highest trust in family members, nearly 90 per cent, while respondents with first degrees 
and above scored the least at 71.7 per cent. Respondents with no formal education and 
those with certificates and diplomas scored 83.3 per cent and 76.6 per cent, respectively.  
Regarding trust in foreigners, respondents with first degrees and above scored the highest 
at 11.9 per cent against respondents with no formal education who scored the least at 3.1 
per cent. A similar pattern was mirrored with respect to trust in Ethiopians in general. 
Respondents with first degrees and above, at 47 per cent, had the highest trust in 
Ethiopians in general. Percentages of trust decreased as the educational level of 
respondents decreased (Figure 7.2). Respondents with certificates and diplomas had 
almost 33 per cent trust in Ethiopians in general as against 30.6 per cent for respondents 
with primary and high school certificates. Respondents with no formal education trailed 
behind with just 28.0 per cent. 
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All in all, trust in family members was scored highest among respondents with political 
affiliations followed by neighbours. Trust in Ethiopians in general came third, while trust 
in foreigners was least scored (Figure 7.2). Respondents affiliated to the ruling political 
party had the highest trust in family members at 80.6 percent, while respondents in the 
“Don’t know” response category had the least score at 65.0 per cent. Almost a third of 
respondents affiliated to the ruling political party and neutral respondents said that they 
had trust in Ethiopians in general, while a fifth of respondents aligned to opposition 
political parties and respondents in the “Don’t know” response category had trust for 
Ethiopians in general. 
Respondents affiliated to the ruling party had more trust in family members and 
Ethiopian in general than respondents aligned to opposition political parties. For instance, 
eight out of ten respondents affiliated to the ruling party reported that they had trust in 
family members, while only seven out of ten respondents aligned to opposition political 
parties said that they had trust in family members. In contrast, respondents affiliated to 
opposition parties showed more trust in neighbours and foreigners than respondents 
associated with the ruling party. Percentage scores for trust in neighbours were 68.1 per 
cent for respondents associated with opposition political parties and 54.1 per cent for 
respondents of associated with the ruling party.  
Generally speaking, trust in family members recorded the highest score across all forms 
of social trust within all socio-demographic factors, except for high-income respondents. 
Trust in foreigners had the lowest percentage score within all variables. The highest 
percentage score for trust in neighbours was recorded among high-income respondents. 
Trust in neighbours was ranked second in almost all variables, except for respondents in 
Tigray. Trust in Ethiopians in general came third within almost all variables.  In Tigray, 
trust in Ethiopians in general and trust in neighbours were ranked second and third, 
respectively.  
Respondents in Tigray, male respondents, rural respondents, respondents aged 60 and 
above, low-income respondents, respondents with primary and secondary school 
education and respondents affiliated to the ruling party had the highest trust in family 
members. In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, female 
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respondents, respondents younger than 40 years, high- income respondents, respondents 
with high levels of education and neutral respondents scored the lowest trust in family 
members. Trust in neighbours was highest among respondents in Oromia, male and urban 
respondents, respondents aged between 18 and 39, high-income respondents, high 
education level respondents and respondents aligned to opposition political parties. The 
lowest percentages with respect to trust in neighbours were scored among respondents in 
Tigray, female respondents, rural respondents, middle-age group respondents, low-
income respondents, respondents with no formal education and respondents associated 
with the ruling party. Regarding trust in Ethiopians in general, the highest scores were 
reported among respondents in Oromia, male respondents, urban respondents, 
respondents aged 60 and above, high-income respondents, respondents with high 
education levels and those associated with the ruling party. Respondents in Amhara, 
female and rural respondents, respondents aged between 40 and 59, low-income 
respondents, respondents with no formal education and respondents affiliated to 
opposition political parties had the least trust in Ethiopians in general.  
The level of trust in foreigners also varied across variables. Respondents in Addis Ababa, 
male respondents, urban respondents, respondents younger than 40, middle-income 
respondents, high level education respondents and respondents in the ‘Don’t know’ 
response category and those with political affiliations scored the highest scores with 
respect to trust in foreigners. Respondent in Tigray, female respondents, rural 
respondents, older respondents, high-income respondents, respondents with no formal 
education and respondents aligned to the ruling political party reported the least trust in 
foreigners. 
7.3. Participation in voluntary organizations 
 
People establish organizations and associations to bring together individual and collective 
efforts to overcome perceived or actual challenges or issues. Operation of organizations 
requires voluntary work and active participation of all members. Voluntary participation 
is one way patriotic citizens give back to their country and contribute to the well-being of 
communities. Volunteerism can be done by all age groups and various professionals who 
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are ready to give their time to community activities that are targeted at improving lives of 
the people.   
7.3.1. Levels of participation in voluntary organizations  
 
Respondents were asked about their voluntary participation in religious organizations, 
mass associations, political organizations, professional associations, clubs and societies 
and further requested to rank their membership as active member, inactive member and 
don’t belong. A total of 1,194 respondents responded to the question regarding 
participation in social clubs, while a total of 1,410 respondents responded to the question 
regarding participation in religious organizations.  Participation in religious organizations 
was highly recorded among respondents.  
 
As can be seen from Figure 7.3, membership of faith-based organizations scored the 
highest with 44.0 per cent of active members and 33.2 per cent of inactive members. This 
demonstrates that most respondents preferred membership of religious organisations to 
other organizations. Participation in residents’ associations (urban and rural) came second 
with 50.6 per cent followed by mass associations with 47.5 per cent.  
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Participation of respondents in political organizations was ranked at 42.5 per cent after 
participation in mass associations.  Membership or participation in arts, music and 
cultural clubs had the least number of respondents with three out of ten respondents who 
reported active or inactive membership. More than 60 per cent of respondents said that 
they did not belong to any recreation organization or association, art/culture club, trade 
union, charitable organization, professional association, school council, group dedicated 
to some course or social club. This contrasted with religious organizations and residents’ 
associations who scored slightly over 50 per cent membership. The multiple response 
variation analysis indicated that only about 40 per cent of respondents were engaged in 
activities of associations (Table 7.4 and Figure 7.4). 
 
Table 7.4: Respondents’ level of participation in voluntary organizations (in 
multiple response analysis) 
 
 
 
60.10%
21.80%
18.10%
Figure 7.4: Respondents' participation in voluntary organizations 
and associations  (percentage in multiple responses)
Not member
Inactive member
Active member
 Response 
Number  Per cent 
Not member 7660 60.1% 
Inactive member 2772 21.8% 
Active member 2312 18.1% 
Total  12744 100.0% 
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7.3.2. Levels of participation in voluntary organizations within different variables  
 
Table 7.5 and Figure 7.5a -7.5l show percentages of respondents’ involvement in 
voluntary organizations in terms of regions, gender, residential areas, age groups, income 
levels, educational attainment and political affiliations. Participation in faith-based 
organizations was highly scored across different variables. For instance, more than half of 
respondents in the four regions (51.3 per cent to 92.1 per cent), more than three-quarters 
of male and female respondents (76.5 per cent to 79.6 per cent) and more than half of 
respondents with different educational attainments (54.5 per cent to 86.5 per cent) were 
members of religious organizations. In terms of residential areas, more than two-thirds of 
respondents (66.7 per cent to 88.3 per cent) said they were members of religious 
organizations, while more than three quarters of respondents in various age groups (76.1 
per cent to 79.5 per cent), more than six out of ten respondents with various income 
levels (60.4 per cent to 81.9 per cent) and nearly six out of ten respondents with political 
affiliations (59.0 per cent to 83.5 per cent) said the same.  More than nine out of ten (92.1 
percent) respondents in Tigray reported that they were active or inactive members of 
faith-based organizations, while slightly more than five out of ten respondents (51.3 
percent) in Addis Ababa said they were members of same organizations.  
 
Involvement of male and female respondents in faith-based organizations was recorded at 
76.1 per cent and 79.6 per cent, respectively. Respondents in various age groups similarly 
scored high percentages, 76.1 per cent to 79.5 per cent, in terms of involvement in faith-
based organizations. More than 80 per cent of rural respondents said that they 
participated in faith-based organizations (Table 7.5a). Urban respondents, with a score of 
66.7 per cent, recorded the least participation in faith-based organisations.  Participation 
in faith-based organizations decreased as levels of income and educational attainment 
increased. Low-income respondents had the highest involvement, 81.9 per cent, in faith-
based organizations, while high-income respondents, at 60.4 per cent, scored the least 
involvement. Like low-income respondents, respondents with no formal education scored 
highly, 86.5 per cent, in terms of participation in faith-based organizations compared to 
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the 54.5 per cent scored by respondents with first degrees and above. Respondents 
affiliated to EPRDF (the ruling party) scored over 80 per cent which was the highest 
score among all politically-affiliated respondents. Corresponding percentages for 
respondents aligned to opposition political parties followed with a score of 71.9 per cent, 
while respondents in the “Don’t know” response category, at 59.0 per cent, had the least 
score.  
 
 
 
In regard to regions, respondents in the Tigray region scored the highest participation 
rate, over 65 per cent, in different organizations and associations. The Addis Ababa 
region had the least number of respondents who reported that they were involved in 
various organizations. Respondents in Oromia ranked second with respect to participation 
in most organizations and associations, while respondents in Amhara had the second 
highest involvement in political parties, residents’ associations and charitable 
organizations. Participations by respondents in charitable organizations were 72.9 per 
cent, 52.5 per cent, 38.3 per cent, and 34.1 per cent in Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and Addis 
Ababa, respectively. In terms of participation by respondents in mass associations, scores 
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were 78.6 per cent for Tigray, 50.8 per cent for Oromia, 35.4 per cent for Amhara and 
15.5 per cent for the Addis Ababa region.  
 
Respondents in the Tigray region showed the highest active or inactive membership in all 
organizations and associations (Table 7.5 and Figures 7.5a -7.5l). More than half of 
respondents in Tigray reported their involvement in organizations as voluntary. The 
highest involvement was in religious organizations with the score of 92.1 per cent, while 
the least percentage was for involvement in arts, music or cultural clubs which were 
scored at 51.2 per cent. Involvement by respondents in Oromia in religious organizations, 
sport or recreation organizations, arts, music or cultural clubs, trade unions, mass 
associations, school councils, groups dedicated to some course and social clubs was 
second highest among all regions. Respondents in Amhara had the second highest 
participation rate with respect to political parties, residents’ associations and charitable 
organizations. On average, respondents in Addis Ababa had the least participation rate in 
organizations among respondents in all the four regions. Participation by Addis Ababa 
respondents in faith-based organizations was highly rated at 51.3 per cent, while 
participation in groups dedicated to some course was lowly scored at 13.3 per cent.   
 
With regard to gender, the involvement of male and female respondents varied across 
voluntary organizations. Male respondents showed more involvement than female 
respondents in almost all organizations.  The involvement of women was higher than men 
in only three organizations, i.e. religious organizations, arts, music or cultural 
organizations and mass associations. In contrast, participation in political parties was 43.9 
per cent and 40.7 per cent for men and female respondents, respectively. Participation in 
charitable organizations was 39.8 per cent for men and 36.0 per cent for women. Female 
respondents put their participation in faith-based organisations at 79.6 per cent compared 
to male respondents who put it at 76.5 per cent.   
 
In regard to residential areas, respondents in rural areas showed the highest involvement 
in religious organizations, mass associations and political parties. Participation rates in 
mass organizations were 34.2 per cent for urban, 53.4 per cent for semi-urban and 59.5 
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per cent for rural respondents. Urban respondents had the least participation rate in 
almost all organizations except arts, music or cultural organizations and charitable 
organizations. For instance, participation in political parties among urban, semi-urban 
and rural respondents was 35.1 per cent, 46.4 per cent and 48.7 per cent, respectively. 
Semi-urban respondents had the highest participation rate across almost all voluntary 
organizations. Participation rates in groups dedicated to some course were 47.1 per cent, 
45.9 per cent and 31 per cent for semi-urban, rural and urban respondents, respectively.  
 
Regarding age groups, respondents aged between 8 and 39 reported the highest 
involvement in sport or recreation organizations, arts, music or cultural clubs, trade 
unions, political parties, charitable organizations, groups dedicated to some course and 
social clubs.  Respondents aged between 40 and 59 registered the highest participation 
rate with regard to participation in faith-based organizations, residents’ associations, 
professional associations, mass associations and school councils. Involvement in sports or 
recreation organization, arts, music or cultural clubs, trade unions, political parties, 
charitable organizations, groups dedicated to some course and social clubs decreased as 
age increased. Participation by respondents in social clubs was 37.6 per cent, 31.8 per 
cent and 15.4 per cent for young, middle-aged and elderly respondents, respectively. 
Percentages for participation in mass associations were 46.9 per cent for respondents 
aged between18 and 39, 49.7 per cent for those aged between 40 and 59 and 40.6 per cent 
for those aged 60 and above. However, respondents aged 60 and above scored the least in 
terms of active or inactive membership across all organizations, except faith-based 
organizations. Scores for participation in faith-based organizations were 76.1 per cent, 
79.5 per cent and 78.7 per cent for young, middle-aged and elderly respondents, 
respectively.  
  
In terms of income levels, respondents in the low-income category scored the highest 
involvement rate with respect to most organizations, except political parties, charitable 
organizations and professional associations. High-income respondents recorded the 
lowest voluntary participation with respect to all organizations, except charitable 
organizations. Participation in these organizations decreased as the income level of 
232 
 
respondents increased. Middle-income respondents scored the highest participation rate 
in political parties, charitable organizations and professional associations. For instance, 
their participation in mass associations was rated at 50.2 per cent against 40 per cent and 
25 per cent for low-income and high-income respondents, respectively. Active or inactive 
membership of professional associations was recorded at 38.7 per, 42.5 per cent and 29.5 
per cent for low-income, middle-income and high-income respondents, respectively.   
 
Participation by respondents in different organizations varied with levels of education 
(Table 7.5 and Figures 7.5a to 7.5l).  Respondents with no formal education reported the 
highest participation rate in faith-based organizations, trade unions, residents’ 
associations, mass associations and school councils, while respondents with primary and 
high school qualifications scored the highest participation rates in sports or recreation 
organizations, arts, music or cultural clubs, political parties and groups dedicated to some 
course. Respondents with certificates and diplomas also scored the highest involvement 
in professional associations and social clubs, while respondents with first degrees and 
above scored the highest involvement in only one organization category, i.e. charitable 
organizations. Participation by respondents in residents’ associations was 54.4 per cent 
for respondents with no formal education, 50.4 per cent for respondents with primary and 
secondary qualifications, 49.5 per cent for respondents with certificates and diplomas and 
39.1 per cent for respondents with first degrees and above.  Respondents with first 
degrees and above scored the lowest participation rates in religious organizations, trade 
unions, political parties, residents’ associations, mass associations, school councils and 
groups dedicated to some course. Respondents with no formal education reported the 
least involvement in sports or recreation organizations, arts, music or cultural clubs and 
social clubs, while respondents with primary and secondary school qualifications scored 
the least participation in charitable and professional associations.  
 
Active and inactive membership in all organizations and associations was scored the 
highest by respondents affiliated to the ruling political party. For instance, percentages 
for participation in political parties were 53.2 per cent for respondents aligned to the 
EPRDF, 37.9 per cent for respondents associated with opposition political parties, 11.9 
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per cent for respondents not aligned to any political party and 21.4 per cent for 
respondents in the “Don’t know” response category. All in all, respondents associated 
with opposition political parties had the least participation in arts, music or cultural clubs, 
trade unions, professional associations, mass associations, school councils and social 
clubs. Neutral respondents scored the least involvement, less than one third, in sports or 
recreation organizations, political parties, charitable organizations and groups dedicated 
to some course. Respondents in the “Don’t know” response category reported the least 
involvement in faith-based organizations and residents’ associations. 
 
Respondents in Tigray, and those affiliated to ruling political parties, reported that they 
were highly active or inactive members of all organisations. Rural respondents, male 
respondents, respondents younger than age 40, low-income respondents, and respondents 
with low education levels, had also the highest participation in most organizations. 
Respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, respondents older than 60, high-income 
respondents and respondents with high education levels, reported the least involvement in 
most organizations.  
Multiple response cross-tabulation analysis was used to assess the cumulative/aggregate 
involvement of individuals in all or some organizations and associations rather than their 
participation in specific organizations. Table 7.6 and Figure 7.6 indicate that participation 
of respondents in voluntary organizations varied across different variables. Slightly more 
than one-fifth of respondents in Addis Ababa, more than one-third in Amhara, nearly half 
in Oromia and two-thirds in Tigray reported that they were active or inactive members of 
selected organizations.  Overall, respondents in Tigray scored the highest participation 
rate in various organisational categories, while respondents in Addis Ababa scored the 
least. Less than half of male and female respondents were involved in voluntary 
organizations with participation rates of 44.6 per cent and 41.3 per cent, respectively. 
Half of respondents in semi-urban areas, about half of respondents in rural areas and 
nearly a quarter of urban respondents reported that they were involved in voluntary 
organizations. All in all, participation in organisations and groups was very high among 
respondents younger than 40 with an average of 44.4 per cent and decreased to 42.7 per 
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cent for respondents aged between 40 and 59 years. It further declined to 28 per cent for 
respondents older than 60 years.  A similar pattern was observed with regard to income 
and educational levels of respondents. Low-income respondents, for instance, scored 44.5 
per cent compared to 41.9 per cent and 31.4 per cent for middle-income to high-income 
respondents, respectively. Respondents with low education levels scored the highest rate 
for being active or inactive members of voluntary organizations, while the lowest score 
was recorded among respondents with high levels of education. Percentages were 45.4 
per cent each for respondents with no formal, primary and secondary education, 43.1 per 
cent for respondents with certificates and diplomas and 35.8 per cent for respondents with 
degree holders.  
Regarding political orientation, respondents affiliated to ruling political parties scored 
highly with respect to participation in civic organizations and mass associations with a 
score  of about 50 per cent, while almost one-third of respondents affiliated to opposition 
political parties, the neutrals and those in the “Don’t know” response category said they 
were involved in organizations or associations.  
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Respondents in Tigray, semi-urban areas, male respondents, respondents younger than 40 
years, low-income respondents, lowly-educated respondents and respondents associated 
with ruling parties, had the highest involvement in voluntary organizations. Respondents 
in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, respondents older than 60, high-income respondents, 
respondents with high education levels and independent respondents had the least 
participation in organizations and associations. Participation by respondents in voluntary 
organizations and associations decreased as the age, income and educational level 
increased. 
7.4. Political/institutional trust 
 
Political trust, or institutional trust, focuses on citizens’ trust in government/executive, 
parliament, judiciary and political parties in regard to their ability to discharge their 
mandates and functions in a transparent, accountable and responsible manner. It refers to 
trust and confidence in the core institutions of government, including the core institutions 
of liberal democracy such as parliament, executive bodies and the justice system,  as well 
as the civil service, the Police and the military (Zmeril and Tom, 2017:8). Public trust 
also concerns public confidence in public and private institutions such as major 
companies, banks and other financial institutions, the press, television, radio and labour 
unions. In this regard, “political trust is fundamentally relational and institutional” (Van 
der Meer, Tom W. G., and Sonja Zmerli, 2017:5).  Political trust is relational in the sense 
that it involves the subject who trusts and the object who is trusted. The relational feature 
of political trust is discussed in sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2. 
According to Hardin, political trust is expressed as ‘A trusts B to do X’ (Hardin 2000:26). 
In line with assumption, respondents were asked to rate the trust they had in various 
organizations to efficiently and effectively perform and deliver required services. The 
institutional feature of political trust is discussed in sections 7.4.3. 
7.4.1. Level of political trust 
Respondents were asked to rate their trust in institutions and organizations to operate in 
the best interest of society. Responses were categorized in four categories, i.e. a lot of 
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trust, some trust, not much trust and no trust at all. Findings are summarized in Table 7.7 
and Figure 7.7.  
 Table 7.7: Respondents’ trust in institutions to operate in the best interest of society 
in percentages 
 Name of institution A lot of 
trust 
Some 
trust 
Not much 
trust 
No trust at 
all 
Courts/legal system 36.5 41.0 15.5 7.0 
House of Representative 36.1 34.5 18.0 11.4 
Police 34.9 39.7 17.6 7.8 
Health care system 49.9 35.8 9.3 5.0 
Federal Government (Cabinet ministries) 39.1 31.4 16.5 13.0 
Regional/local government 33.8 32.5 20.8 12.8 
Municipal executive board/city council 25.4 36.1 23.2 15.2 
Primary school system 54.3 31.1 9.5 5.1 
University 45.6 33.7 12.9 7.9 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church 57.8 21.0 8.8 12.4 
Ethiopian Islamic Council 26.0 24.6 13.8 35.7 
Ethiopian Catholic Church 20.4 23.1 15.8 40.7 
Trade union 19.2 34.4 24.8 21.6 
Professional association 23.0 39.4 22.0 15.6 
Ruling party 37.6 29.2 16.5 16.8 
Opposition parties 14.3 21.3 24.7 39.7 
Armed forces 39.8 27.1 16.4 16.7 
Banks and financial institutions 45.8 33.0 11.5 9.7 
Civil service 31.6 39.3 18.1 11.1 
Major companies 25.4 37.6 22.4 14.7 
Radio 35.1 36.7 16.2 11.9 
Television 28.1 36.0 20.6 15.3 
Newspapers 21.2 39.9 23.9 15.0 
African Union  21.1 34.3 24.4 20.3 
NGOs 19.2 36.5 27.2 17.1 
Cooperatives  22.5 38.9 24.9 13.7 
Mass associations 26.8 36.4 23.7 13.0 
 
About 60 per cent respondents reported that they had a lot of trust in the Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church which they believed operated in the best interest of society. The 
primary school system came second with a score of 54.3 per cent, while the health care 
system came third with a score of 49.9 per cent.  Banks and other financial institutions 
and universities scored 45.8 per cent and 45.6 per cent, respectively. Above a third of 
237 
 
respondents, 39.8 per cent, said that they had a lot of trust in the armed forces with 
respect to operating in the public interest. Corresponding scores were 39 per cent for the 
federal government, 37.6 per cent for the ruling political party, 36.5 per cent for 
courts/legal system and 36.1 per cent for the House of Representatives. Others were 35.1 
per cent for radio, 34.9 per cent for the Police and 33.8 per cent for regional and local 
governments. In contrast, opposition political parties had the lowest trust in public 
institutions with regard to working in the best interest of society. In regard to non-
governmental organizations and trade unions, 19.2 per cent said that they operated in the 
best interest of society. The court/legal system scored the highest at 41.0 percent, while 
the Police and professional associations scored 39.7 per cent and 39.4 per cent, 
respectively. Just above a fifth (21 per cent) of respondents said that they had some trust 
in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, while 21.3 per cent said that they had some trust in 
opposition political parties.  
Non-governmental organizations were rated at 27.2 per cent with respect to working in 
the best interest of society, while trade unions and opposition political parties followed 
with nearly 25 per cent.  
 
The Ethiopian Catholic Church was rated at 40.7 per cent with respect to working in the 
best interest of society (Table 7.7 and Figure 7.7. Opposition political parties and the 
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Ethiopian Islamic Council were rated at 39.7 per cent and 35.7 per cent, respectively. In 
the case of trade unions, slightly more than one-fifth of respondents said that they had no 
trust at all in terms of working in the best interest of society. The House of 
Representatives, federal government, regional/local governments, city councils, 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church, professional associations, ruling party, civil service, armed 
forces, major trading companies, radio stations, television stations, newspapers, NGOs, 
cooperatives and mass associations all scored within the range of 10 to 20 per cent. The 
court/legal system, Police, universities, banks and other financial institutions were 
generally lowly-rated in terms of working in the best interest of society. Regarding the 
African Union, 20.3 per cent of respondents said that it works in the best interest of 
society. The health care system and the primary education system scored 5.0 per cent and 
5.1 per cent, respectively.  
Political trust was calculated based on the mean as shown in Figure 7.8. The primary 
education system and the health care system scored means of 3.35 and 3.31, respectively. 
The Ethiopian Orthodox Church and universities scored 3.24 and 3.17, respectively. The 
House of Representatives, federal government, regional states and municipalities scored 
in the range of 2.70 and 3.0. Trust in mass associations, cooperatives, professional 
associations and trade unions ranged between 2.5 and 2.77. Opposition political parties 
scored the least with just 2.1 score.  
 
The Ethiopian Catholic Church and the Ethiopian Islamic Council were almost level at 
2.23 and 2.41, respectively. The level of political trust in religious organizations varied 
with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church scoring the highest rate against the Ethiopian 
Catholic Church and the Ethiopian Islamic Council which scored the least. The multi-
faceted religious complexion of Ethiopia had an effect on responses with respect to 
political trust in various organisations and associations. It is also significant to note that 
most respondents had more trust and confidence in the federal government and House of 
Representatives than in local/regional governments and city councils.  
 
239 
 
 
7.4.2. Political trust by different variables 
 
Table 7.9a and Figure 7.9a show the cross-tabulation of respondents’ trust in institutions 
with respect to operating in the best interest of society on the scale of a lot of trust, some 
trust, not much trust and no trust at all. Regionally, four regions had trust in different 
institutions.  In the Tigray region, 73.10 per cent of respondents said that they had a lot of 
trust in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. At 67.10 per cent, respondents in Amhara also 
said that they had a lot of trust in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.  In contrast, 
respondents in Oromia, with a score of 52.9 per cent said they had a lot of trust in the 
health care system. On their part, respondents in Addis Ababa, with a score of 41.3 per 
cent, had a lot of trust in banks and other financial institutions. The primary education 
system scored 62.5 per cent, 60.7 per cent and 52.2 per cent trust levels in Tigray, 
Amhara and Oromia regions, respectively. Respondents in Addis Ababa reported that 
they had a lot of trust, 39.8 per cent, in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in terms of their 
working in the best interest of society.   
 
In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa, Tigray and Amhara had the least trust in 
opposition political parties with respect to their working in the best interest of society. 
Trust levels were 11.9 per cent, 15.3 per cent and 13.9 per cent for Addis Ababa, Tigray 
and Amhara, respectively.  In regard to cooperatives, only 14.6 per cent of respondents in 
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Figure 7.8: Respondents’ trust in institutions to operate in the best interest 
of the society (mean scores)
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Oromia said that they had a lot of trust. Regional and local governments scored 13.2 per 
cent, the Ethiopian Catholic Church, 18.6 per cent in Tigray, non-governmental 
organizations, 16.7 per cent in Amhara and newspapers, 15.1 per cent in Oromia.  
 
Regarding gender, male and female respondents scored 55.8 per cent and 62 per cent, 
respectively, with regard to trust in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Table 7.9a and 
Figure 7.9a illustrate that female respondents had more trust in most institutions than 
their male counterparts. For instance, trust levels in the health care system were 49.0 per 
cent for males and 52.1 per cent for females. Similarly, trust levels in the ruling political 
party were 36.4 per cent and 40.1 per cent for males and females, respectively. A similar 
pattern was shown with respect to trust in in mass organizations for which men scored 
26.6 per cent against 27.7 per cent by females. Conversely, male respondents had more 
trust in the armed forces and radio than female respondents. For example, males scored 
40.5 per cent trust level against 38.4 per cent for females. In regard to radio, male 
respondents scored 36.1 per cent against 34.4 per cent for female respondents.      
 
It is evident from Table 7.9a, that opposition political parties were rated the least in terms 
of operating in the best interest of the society with scores of 14.5 per cent and 14 per cent 
by males and females, respectively. Males scored 19.3 per cent trust in NGOs compared 
to 20.0 per cent for females. In terms of residential areas, most respondents in all areas 
said that they had a lot of trust in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the primary school 
system. Trust levels for the Ethiopian Orthodox Church were 45.4 per cent in urban 
areas, 65.0 per cent in semi-urban areas and 71.5 per cent in rural areas. There was a 
general pattern, except for the African Union, financial institutions, the Ethiopian 
Catholic Church and universities, which indicated an increase in trust levels as one 
moved from urban and semi-urban areas to rural areas. Urban and semi-urban 
respondents had the least trust in opposition political parties with trust levels of 10.4 per 
cent and 11.4 per cent, respectively.  
 
Trust levels in organisations and associations were also sought on the basis of the age of 
respondents. Respondents aged between 18 and 39 and respondents aged 60 and above 
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said that they had a lot of trust in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church with scores of 57 per 
cent and 65.3 per cent, respectively. The same age group scored 51.7 per cent and 60.0 
per cent, respectively, in terms of having trust in the primary school system.   On their 
part, respondents aged between 40 and 59 scored the highest, nearly 60 per cent, in terms 
of having trust in the primary school system which was followed by the Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church with a score of 57.9 per cent. Respondents aged between 18 and 39 and 
those aged between 40 and 59 had trust in opposition political parties, while respondents 
aged 60 and above scored the least trust in the African Union.  
 
Low income and high-income respondents scored 64.8 per cent and 45.7 per cent, 
respectively, in terms of their trust in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, while middle-
income respondents scored 48.3 per cent. Opposition political parties had the least trust 
among low-income respondents, while middle-income respondents had the least trust for 
opposition political parties. High-income respondents scored a trust level of 12.5 per cent 
for newspapers.  
 
Figure 7.9a and Table 7.9a show that respondents with no formal education had a trust 
level of 70.5 per cent for the Ethiopian Orthodox Church compared to 60.0 per cent and 
50.9 per cent for respondents with primary and secondary education, respectively. It was 
observed that levels of trust decreased as the level of education of the respondents 
increased. Respondents with first degrees and above scored a trust level of 35.2 per cent 
in the primary school system. The primary school system was rated at 66.0 per cent by 
respondents with no formal education compared to 46.6 per cent for respondents with 
certificates and diplomas. Trust in the health care system was rated at 58.2 per cent by 
respondents with primary and secondary education, while respondents with first degrees 
and above reported that they had a trust level of 36.1 per cent in banks and other financial 
institutions. There was, again, a pattern that showed that trust in organizations such as 
cooperatives, mass associations, universities, city councils, the legal system, health care 
system, primary education system and television with respect to working in the best 
interest of society decreased as the educational level of respondents increased. 
Respondents with no formal education, respondents with primary and secondary school 
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education and respondents with certificates and diplomas had the least scores in terms of 
trust for opposition political parties with scores of 20.3 per cent, 10.2 per cent and 11.1 
per cent, respectively. On the other hand, respondents with first degrees and above had 
the least trust, 8.1 per cent, in newspapers.   
 
 
 
Political trust levels were also sought on the basis of political party affiliations. 
Respondents affiliated to EPRDF and respondents in the “Don’t know” response category 
scored 64.9 per cent and 56.5 per cent, respectively, in terms of trust in the Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church. Opposition political party-affiliated respondents had a trust level of 
41.5 per cent in the health care system, while neutral respondents said they had 45.4 per 
cent trust in the primary school system. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church was rated 
second highest by respondents affiliated to opposition political parties. Just over 60.1 per 
cent and 44.9 per cent of ruling party respondents and those in the “Don’t know” 
response category, respectively, said they had trust in the health care system. 
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Ruling party-affiliated respondents reported a 15.9 per cent trust level in opposition 
political parties in regard to their working in the best interest of society. This was in 
comparison with 9.2 per cent and 7.1 per cent for independent respondents and 
respondents in the “Don’t know” response category, respectively. City councils were 
least trusted, 3.5 per cent, by respondents aligned to opposition political parties. Slightly 
less than half of respondents, 48.6 per cent, associated with opposition political parties 
had a lot of trust in the EPRDF, the ruling party. Similarly, 20 per cent of respondents 
associated with opposition parties showed a lot of in the parties in which they were more 
linked and about 12 per cent of respondents linked to opposition parties had a lot of trust 
in the ruling party.  
 
Slightly more than 13 per cent of neutral respondents and 12.5 per cent of respondents in 
the “Don’t know” response category said they had a lot of trust in opposition political 
parties. From the foregoing, it is evident that the majority of respondents did not have a 
lot of trust in either ruling parties or opposition parties with respect to operating in the 
best interest of society.   
 
All in all, between 10 and 50 per cent of respondents by region, gender, residential area, 
age group and political inclination had some trust in all institutions and organizations. 
This contrasted with between 10 and 60 per cent of respondents with different income 
and educational levels who reported that they had some trust in all institutions and 
organizations (Table 7.9b and Figure 7.9b). By respondent categories of region, gender, 
age group and income level, there was some consistency in responses in terms of trust in 
institutions and organisations (Table 7.9c and Figure 7.9c). Between 5 and 30 per cent of 
respondents in these categories said they did not have much trust in institutions and 
organizations. Between 3.0 and 33.00 per cent of respondents with different educational 
levels reported that they did not have much trust in organizations with respect to 
functioning in the best interest of society. On their part, between 4.0 and 41.0 per cent of 
politically-affiliated respondents said that they did not have much trust in all institutions 
and organizations.  
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Table 7.9d and Figure 7.9d indicate percentages of respondents who expressed no trust at 
all in all institutions and organisations with respect to working in the best interest of 
society within different cross-tabulated variables. Slightly over 28.2 per cent of 
respondents in Addis Ababa expressed no trust at all in the ruling party with respect to 
working in the best interest of society. About 50 per cent of respondents in Tigray 
registered no trust at all in opposition political parties. In Amhara and Oromia, 55.8 per 
cent and 36.7 per cent, respectively, said that they had no trust at all in the Ethiopian 
Catholic Church with respect to functioning in the best interest of the public. Opposition 
political parties were the second least rated in terms of having no trust at all among 
respondents in Amhara and Oromia with scores of 43.9 per cent and 36.1 percent, 
respectively. The Ethiopian Catholic Church was rated second highest among 
respondents in Tigray with a score of 43.4 per cent. Trust in trade unions was scored at 
26.7 per cent by respondents in Addis Ababa followed by the Ethiopian Islamic Council 
at 26.6 per cent.  
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Male respondents, 39.0 per cent, and female respondents, 44.2 per cent, reported that they 
had no trust at all in the Ethiopian Catholic Church.  Respondents from rural areas, 
respondents of low incomes, respondents with no formal education, respondents with 
primary and secondary school education and respondents in the “Don’t know” response 
category scored the highest rate  in terms of having no trust at all in the Ethiopian 
Catholic Church. This contrasted with 57.3 per cent for respondents in rural areas, 48.2 
per cent for low-income respondents and 53.7 per cent for no formal education 
respondents. On the other hand, the Ethiopian Islamic Council was the second highest 
among rural respondents at 57.0 per cent. Low-income respondents, 42.2 per cent, and 
respondents with first degrees and above, 19.3 per cent, reported that they had no trust at 
all in the Ethiopian Islamic Council in terms of working in the best interest of society. 
According to Table 7.9d and Figure 7.9d, the health care system and the primary school 
system had the least percentages in terms of not being trusted with respect to operating in 
the best interest of society.   
 
In addition to the cross-tabulation of responses regarding political trust, means were 
calculated with a view to having a clear sense of confidence levels of respondents 
(Figures 7.10). Figure 7.10 indicates that respondents in the Tigray region had the highest 
trust in most organisations and institutions such as the House of Representatives, Police, 
health care system, federal government, regional/local governments, municipality/city 
councils, primary school system, universities, Ethiopian Orthodox Church, professional 
associations, ruling party, trade unions, banks and other financial institutions, civil 
service, major trading companies, mainstream media, cooperatives and mass associations. 
The Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church, opposition political parties 
and NGOs were highly scored by respondents in Addis Ababa in terms of trust, while 
courts, Police and armed forces had highest trust levels among respondents in Oromia. 
For instance, mean scores for regional/local governments were 2.35 for Addis Ababa, 
2.75 for Amhara, 2.96 for Oromia and 3.30 for Tigray. Trust mean scores for opposition 
political parties were 1.95 for Tigray, 2.05 for Amhara, 2.18 for Oromia and 2.29 for 
Addis Ababa.  Means for the Police were 2.79, 2.89, 3.09 and 3.26 for respondents in 
Addis Ababa, Amhara, Tigray and Oromia, respectively. On average, all the four regions 
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scored greater than 3 points in respect of trust in the health care system, primary 
education system and universities. 
  
Levels of trust in institutions and organizations varied across regions. In Addis Ababa, 
the least trusted organizations were regional/local administrations, 2.35, opposition 
political parties in Tigray, 1.95, and Oromia, 2.18.  The Ethiopian Catholic Church 
scored 1.97 in Amhara. With a mean of 2.5, the House of Representatives, federal 
government, television, opposition political parties, the ruling party and trade unions 
were among the least trusted institutions among respondents in Addis Ababa. 
Respondents in Tigray scored a mean of 2.75 for trade unions, armed forces, Ethiopian 
Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church and NGOs, while respondents in Amhara 
scored a mean of 2.5 for the Ethiopian Islamic Council, trade unions, opposition political 
parties, mass associations, NGOs and newspapers. In Oromia, respondents scored 2.7 for 
the Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church, trade unions, professional 
associations, newspapers and cooperatives.    
 
Perceptions of institutional trust by male and female respondents varied across 
organizations and were calculated based on mean scores (Figure 7.10).  Female 
respondents had more trust in courts/legal system, House of Representatives, Police, 
health care system, regional/local governments, city councils, primary school system, 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church, universities, trade unions, professional associations and the 
ruling political party. In contrast, male respondents had more trust in the federal 
government, opposition political parties, armed forces, Ethiopian Islamic Council, 
Ethiopian Catholic Church, banks and other financial institutions, civil service, major 
trading companies, news media, NGOs, cooperatives and mass associations. Female 
respondents, for instance, scored a mean of 3.08 against 2.98 for male respondents. 
Regarding the civil service, females scored a mean of 2.93 against 2.86 for male 
respondents. Both male and female respondents had the highest trust in the primary 
education system with scores of 3.34 and 3.38, respectively. The least trusted 
organizations were opposition political parties which were scored at 2.07 by female 
respondents and 2.19 by male respondents.      
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Figure 7.10 shows that political trust varied across respondent’s residential areas. Urban 
respondents showed the least trust in all organizations and institutions except for 
opposition political parties, Ethiopian Catholic Church and NGOs. Semi-urban 
respondents had the highest trust in courts/legal system, municipal executive boards, city 
councils, primary school system, universities, Ethiopian Orthodox Church, Ethiopian 
Islamic Council, trade unions, professional associations, armed forces, banks and other 
financial institutions, civil service, major trading companies, news media, cooperatives 
and mass associations. Most respondents in rural areas said that they had the highest trust 
in the House of Representatives, Police, health care system, federal government, regional 
and local governments and ruling political parties. Mean trust levels for the federal 
government were 2.75, 2.93 and 3.25 for semi-urban and rural respondents, respectively. 
Trust scores in regard to the Ethiopian Catholic Church were 2.49 for urban, 2.15 for 
semi-urban and 1.97 for rural respondents.   
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Respondents aged between 18 and 39 years had the highest trust in the Ethiopian Islamic 
Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church, trade unions, professional associations, opposition 
political parties, major trading companies, news media, NGOs, cooperatives and mass 
associations (Figure 7.10). On their part, respondents aged between 40 and 59 years 
showed the highest trust in the court/legal system, city councils, House of 
Representatives, regional governments, federal government, the ruling political party and 
armed forces. Respondents aged 60 and above expressed the highest trust in the Police, 
health care system, primary education system and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. 
Regional governments had a mean of 2.84 among young respondents compared to 2.96 
among the middle-aged respondents and 2.78 among those aged 60 and above.  
 
The level of political trust also varied according to income levels of the respondents 
(Figure 7.10). Low-income respondents expressed the highest trust in the court/legal 
system, House of Representatives, Police, health care system, regional and local 
governments, city councils, primary school system, Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the 
ruling party. On their part, middle-income respondents registered the highest trust in the 
Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church, banks and other financial 
institutions and universities. High-income respondents said that they had high trust in the 
federal government, opposition political parties, armed forces, professional associations, 
major trading companies, NGOs, mass associations and cooperatives. Respondents in the 
low-income category showed the highest trust in government institutions, while middle-
income respondents scored the highest trust in religious organizations. High-income 
respondents expressed high trust in the federal government and mass and voluntary 
organizations. Based on income levels, the health care system, primary education system, 
universities, Ethiopian Orthodox Church, banks and other financial institutions were rated 
between 3.04 and 3.35 mean trust levels. Opposition political parties were the least 
trusted among all respondents within various income categories.  
   
Political trust also varied across educational levels of respondents (Figure 7.10). Among 
all levels of education, respondents said that they had the highest trust in the primary 
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education and health care systems for which they scored at 3.2 and above. The level of 
political trust in some organizations such as House of Representatives, Police, the ruling 
party and regional governments declined as the level of education increased, while trust 
in some organizations such as the Ethiopian Islamic Council and Ethiopian Catholic 
Church increased as the levels of education increased. Trust levels for the House of 
Representatives were 3.16 among respondents with no formal education, 3.08 among 
respondents with primary and high school education, 2.81 among respondents with 
certificates and diplomas and 2.67 among respondents with degrees and diplomas. The 
Ethiopian Catholic Church was the least trusted among respondents with no formal 
education, while opposition political parties were the least trusted among respondents 
with primary and high school education and those with degrees and diplomas.  
It was also found out that political inclinations had a bearing on levels of political trust 
(Figure 7.10). Respondents affiliated to the ruling party, for instance, reported high 
degrees of confidence and trust in the three branches of government entities, i.e. 
executive, judiciary/court system and Parliament, including federal and regional 
executive bodies, political institutions and mass and professional associations. On the 
contrary, respondents affiliated to opposition political parties had the least trust in these 
institutions and organizations. The level of trust for the judicial/court system was 3.22 for 
respondents associated with the ruling party, 2.88 for respondents in the “Don’t know” 
response category, 2.80 for independent respondents and 2.42 for respondents affiliated 
to opposition political parties. All in all, the ruling party was the least trusted entity 
among respondents affiliated to opposition political parties, while opposition political 
parties were the least trusted among other respondents with various political inclinations. 
  
7.4.3. Perception of respondents regarding the performance of institutions and 
organizations 
 
Levels of performance of institutions and organizations were assessed based on the 
following ratings: excellence and intelligence; work efficiently and effectively; uphold 
the public interest; justness and sincerity; and devotion and dedication to duty. From the 
total study population, about 80 per cent of respondents responded to questions relating to 
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religious organizations, while 60 per cent responded to questions relating to trade unions.  
Table 7.11 and Figure 7.11 show that slightly over half of respondents said that they were 
a lot of excellence and intelligence in the performance of duties by religious 
organizations. This was followed by universities with a response rating of generally over 
50 per cent. Over a third of respondents reported that there were a lot of excellence and 
intelligence in the performance of duties by the House of Representatives.  Above a third 
of respondents said that professional associations, the Police and the legal system 
exhibited a lot of excellence and intelligence in their performance of duties. City councils 
were rated the lowest followed by trade unions and the civil society at 26.8 per cent and 
28.3 per cent, respectively.   
 
Trade unions had the highest score, almost 60 per cent, among respondents who said their 
performance exhibited a little excellence and intelligence. This was closely followed by 
the courts, the civil service and the civil society.  The performance by universities was 
highly rated. For instance, they had the least number of respondents who said they 
performed with a little excellence and intelligence. City councils got the highest poor 
rating in terms of performance. For example, about a quarter of respondents said that they 
did not exhibit excellence and intelligence in their organizational performance. The 
House of Representatives followed with nearly a fifth of respondents who said that its 
performance did not exhibit excellence and intelligence. This was in contrast with 
religious organizations which had the lowest number of respondents who said they did 
not exhibit excellence and intelligence in their work.  In fact, religious organizations were 
said to be among the most excellent and intelligent with a score of 55 per cent. Ratings 
for trade unions, courts, civil society, civil service, professional organizations, mass 
organizations and the Police all fell below 50 per cent.  
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Table 7.11: Respondents’ perception on the performance of 
institutions/organizations (in percentage) 
Institutions/organization  Performance parameter  A lot A little Not at all 
Courts/legal system Excellent and intelligence 34.2 54.6 11.2 
 Work efficiently and 
effectively 
32.1 56.8 11.2 
 Uphold the public interest 31.3 53.8 15.0 
 Act justness and sincerity 33.7 51.3 18.5 
 Devotion and dedication to 
duty 
30.0 51.5 18.5 
     
House of Representative Excellence and intelligence 38.4 41.6 19.9 
 Work efficiently and 
effectively  
37.2 44.0 18.8 
 Uphold the public interest  38.2 42.0 19.9 
 Act justness and sincerity 35.9 44.5 19.6 
 Devotion and dedication to 
duty 
35.2 42.0 22.9 
     
Police Excellence and intelligence 34.3 51.4 14.4 
Work efficiently and 
effectively  
34.4 53.2 12.4 
Uphold the public interest  33.0 52.2 14.8 
Act justness and sincerity 29.3 54.7 16.0 
Devotion and dedication to 
duty 
34.9 48.8 16.3 
    
City councils  Excellence and intelligence 22.0 52.9 25.1 
Work efficiently and 
effectively  
20.3 54.6 25.1 
Uphold the public interest  21.2 51.2 27.6 
Act justness and sincerity 19.5 52.5 28.0 
Devotion and dedication to 
duty 
19.0 51.4 29.6 
    
Civil services  Excellence and intelligence 34.6 54.2 11.1 
Work efficiently and 
effectively  
32.1 58.1 9.9 
Uphold the public interest  31.5 54.8 13.7 
Act justness and sincerity 31.3 55.4 13.3 
Devotion and dedication to 
duty 
31.6 53.3 15.1 
    
Universities   Excellence and intelligence 51.2 36.7 12.2 
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Institutions/organization  Performance parameter  A lot A little Not at all 
Work efficiently and 
effectively  
45.3 41.9 12.8 
Uphold the public interest  38.3 45.0 16.6 
Act justness and sincerity 39.1 44.2 16.7 
Devotion and dedication to 
duty 
39.9 41.5 18.6 
    
Religious organizations  Excellence and intelligence 54.6 37.3 8.1 
Work efficiently and 
effectively  
52.1 38.9 8.9 
Uphold the public interest  52.0 37.8 10.1 
Act justness and sincerity 51.5 37.9 10.5 
Devotion and dedication to 
duty 
51.3 38.4 10.3 
    
Trade Union Excellence and intelligence 26.8 56.5 16.7 
Work efficiently and 
effectively  
25.3 59.0 15.7 
Uphold the public interest  23.0 59.0 18.1 
Act justness and sincerity 23.9 58.0 18.1 
Devotion and dedication to 
duty 
25.3 55.7 19.0 
    
Civic society Excellence and intelligence 28.3 54.2 17.5 
Work efficiently and 
effectively  
26.7 57.4 15.9 
Uphold the public interest  27.7 55.2 17.1 
Act justness and sincerity 26.2 55.8 18.0 
Devotion and dedication to 
duty 
27.6 52.9 19.5 
    
Professional associations Excellence and intelligence 34.3 52.4 13.3 
Work efficiently and 
effectively  
32.3 55.0 12.6 
Uphold the public interest  32.0 52.5 15.5 
Act justness and sincerity 29.4 54.8 15.8 
Devotion and dedication to 
duty 
31.8 52.1 16.1 
    
Cooperatives Excellence and intelligence 32.9 52.9 14.2 
Work efficiently and 
effectively  
31.1 56.8 12.1 
Uphold the public interest  32.8 54.0 13.2 
Act justness and sincerity 30.0 56.0 14.0 
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Institutions/organization  Performance parameter  A lot A little Not at all 
Devotion and dedication to 
duty 
30.9 54.0 15.1 
Mass organizations     
Excellence and intelligence 32.9 52.9 14.2 
Work efficiently and 
effectively  
31.1 56.8 12.1 
Uphold the public interest  32.8 54.0 13.2 
Act justness and sincerity 30.4 56.0 13.6 
Devotion and dedication to 
duty 
31.0 53.1 15.9 
 
Respondents were further asked to rate the level of performance of institutions and 
organisations in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. Table 7.11 shows that slightly over 
half of respondents believed that there was a lot of operational efficiency and 
effectiveness in performance by religious organizations. Religious organisations were 
followed by universities and the House of Representatives with 45 per cent and 37 
percent, respectively. Slightly above a third of respondents reported that courts, Police, 
civil service, professional associations, cooperatives and mass organizations exhibited a 
lot of efficiency and effectiveness in their work. City councils had the least number of 
respondents who said they exhibited efficiency and effectiveness in their work and were 
followed by trade unions and the civil society which scored slightly above a quarter each.  
About 60 per cent of respondents said that trade unions showed a little efficiency and 
effectiveness in their work. The civil service closely followed, while the civil society, co-
operatives, mass organizations and courts had over 55 per cent of respondents who said 
that trade they exhibited a little efficiency and effectiveness in their work. Less than a 
tenth of respondents said that religious organizations were not exhibiting efficiency and 
effectiveness in their work. In a more general sense, religious organizations were said to 
show a lot of efficiency and effectiveness in the performance of their work with a score 
of 50 per cent.   
In addition, respondents were asked to rate the level of commitment of institutions and 
organisations to upholding the public interest in their work. Table 7.11 shows that barely 
over half of respondents believed that religious organizations are committed to upholding 
the public interest in their work.  About 40 per cent said that the House of 
254 
 
Representatives and universities are committed to upholding the public interest in their 
work.  All in all, over a third of respondents were satisfied that institutions and 
organisations, except for the city councils, are committed to upholding the public interest 
in their work. Close to 60 per cent of respondents indicated that trade unions had little 
commitment to upholding public interest in their work. The court/ legal system, civil 
society, Police, civil service, city councils, professional associations and mass 
organizations followed with a 50 per cent rating.  In contrast, the House of 
Representatives had the least number of respondents who said it exhibited little 
commitment to upholding public interest in its work. The highest number of respondents, 
almost a third, said that city councils exhibited no commitment to upholding public 
interest in their work. In regard to religious organizations, barely a tenth said they did not 
exhibit commitment to upholding public interest in their work. . 
Respondents were also asked to rate justness and sincerity among institutions and 
organizations. Table 7.11 shows that just over 50 per cent of respondents said that 
religious organizations exhibited a lot of justness and sincerity in the performance of their 
work. Universities came in second with almost 40 per cent. Other institutions and 
organisations had rates ranging between a third and a quarter of a percentage. City 
councils had the lowest score, 19.5 percent, with respect to working with justness and 
sincerity. About 60 per cent of respondents said trade unions worked with a little of 
justness and sincerity, while cooperatives and mass organizations came second with 
slightly over 55 per cent. In the case of religious organizations, about 38 per cent said 
they operated with a little of justness and sincerity, while less than half and 44.0 per cent 
of respondents said that universities and the House of Representatives, respectively, 
operated with a little of justness and sincerity. Over a quarter of respondents, 28.0 per 
cent reported that city councils showed no justness and sincerity at all. The House of 
Representatives followed with 19.6 per cent. Most respondents agreed that religious 
organizations worked with justness and sincerity. For instance, only 10.5 per cent of 
respondents said religious organisations did not work with justness and sincerity.  
Respondents were asked to further indicate the level of performance with particular 
regard to devotion and dedication to duty. Table 7.11 shows that religious organizations 
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had the highest score, 51.3 per cent of respondents, in terms of devotion and dedication to 
duty.  Universities followed with about 40 per cent, while the House of Representatives 
and the Police were third and fourth with scoring 35.2 per cent and 34.9 per cent, 
respectively. City councils recorded the least rating with under a fifth of respondents who 
agreed that they worked with devotion and dedication to duty. Trade unions followed 
with a quarter of respondents who said that they worked with devotion and dedication to 
duty. Trade unions were reported by 55.7 per cent of respondents to show a little 
devotion and dedication to duty, while cooperatives and the civil service were scored at 
54.0 per cent and 53.3 per cent, respectively. Other organizations were scored in the 
neighbourhood of 50 per cent, while religious organizations were rated at 38 per cent and 
the Police at 48.8 percent. 
City councils had the highest number of respondents, 29.6 per cent, who said they 
showed no devotion and dedication to duty at all. The House of Representatives followed 
with 22.9 per cent.  Over half of the respondents said religious organisations exhibited a 
lot of devotion and dedication to duty. Universities, the House of Representatives and the 
Police were scored in the neighbourhood of 35 per cent. Just like they were highly scored 
in terms of devotion and dedication to duty, religious organisations were also said to 
exhibit excellence and intelligence, efficiency and effectiveness in discharging their 
duties. They were also highly rated in regard to upholding public interest, justness and 
sincerity, including devotion and dedication to duty by over half of respondents. City 
Councils were rated between 19 per cent and 22 per cent in terms of exhibiting a lot of 
excellence and intelligence, work efficiency and effectiveness, upholding the public 
interest, justness and sincerity, including devotion and dedication to duty. Trade unions 
and the civic society came second and third in all measures of organizational 
performance.  
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Figure 7.11 indicates that levels of performance of organizations based on parameters of 
excellence and intelligence, work efficiency, and effectiveness, upholding of the public 
interest, justness and sincerity, including devotion and dedication to duty, varied across 
independent variables in cross-tabulation of average means. Religious organizations and 
universities had the highest trust means within all variables. They had the highest rating 
among respondents in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regions, male and female respondents, 
urban and rural respondents, all age groups and low and high-income respondents. 
Respondents across all educational levels, respondents associated with the ruling party 
and those in the “Don’t know” response category also highly rated religious organisations 
and universities. Universities were further highly rated by respondents in Addis Ababa, 
middle- income earners, respondents aligned to opposition political parties and neutral 
respondents. City councils were the least trusted in terms of excellence and intelligence, 
work efficiency and effectiveness, upholding of the public interest, justness and sincerity, 
including devotion and dedication to duty by all respondents except respondents in Addis 
Ababa and respondents associated with the opposition political parties. Respondents in 
Addis Ababa, however, poorly rated the House of Representatives in regard to excellence 
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and intelligence, work efficiency effectiveness, upholding of the public interest, justness 
and sincerity, including devotion and dedication to duty varied.   
 
Generally speaking, respondents in Oromia, female respondents, rural residents, low-
income respondents, low education level respondents and respondents affiliated to ruling 
political parties had the highest trust in most of institutions and organizations. 
Conversely, respondents in Addis Ababa, male respondents, urban respondents, middle-
income respondents, holders of degrees and diplomas and those aligned to opposition 
political parties had the least trust in the performance of institutions and organizations, 
especially government institutions such as the legal system, Parliament, Police and the 
civil service.  
7.5. Receiving information from different organizations  
 
Respondents were asked to rate the frequency of getting/receiving information from 
different organizations. Of the total of study population, between 1,252 (68.9 per cent) 
and 1,445 (79.6 per cent) respondents responded to the questionnaire.  Table 7.12 and 
Figure 7.12 show that the highest number of respondents, 43.3 percent, regularly/often 
received information from the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. The primary school system 
and the health care system followed with scores of 41.1 per cent and 37.6 per cent, 
respectively. About one fifth of respondents said they often obtain information from the 
Police, universities, banks and other financial institutions.  One out of ten respondents 
reported that they regularly receive information from the Ethiopian Catholic Church. Less 
than 20 per cent of respondents reported that they regularly receive information from 
courts, House of Representatives, cabinet ministries, city councils and political parties. 
Non-governmental organizations were scored at 10.7 per cent.  
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 Almost 64.8 per cent of respondents said they never regularly receive information from 
the Ethiopian Catholic Church, while the Ethiopian Islamic Council came second with 
about 60 per cent. Other institutions and organisations were scored between 40 per cent 
and 50 per cent. The health care system had the least number of respondents, 18.3 per 
cent, who reported that they regularly received information from it, while the primary 
school system and the Police scored 21.0 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively.  
The regularity of receipt of information from different institutions and organizations was 
assessed in terms regions, gender, residential areas, age groups, income levels, 
educational attainment and political affiliations. Figure 7.13 and Table 7.13 show that 
respondents in the Tigray region reported the highest frequency, between 62.1 per cent 
and 90.0 per cent, of receipt of information from institutions and organizations such as 
trade unions and the health care system. Other organisations and institutions from which 
respondents said they received information were courts/legal system, House of 
Representatives, Police, government officials, the Cabinet, city councils, primary schools, 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church, professional associations, armed forces, cooperatives and 
mass associations.  
Receipt of information from health institutions was said to be particularly high, 90 per 
cent, in Tigray. The second highest organization was the Police which was followed by 
the primary education system with a score of 89 per cent. About 88 per cent of t 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
C
o
u
rt
s
H
o
u
se
 o
f…
P
o
lic
e
H
ea
lt
h
 c
ar
e
G
o
ve
rn
m
e
n
t…
M
u
n
ic
ip
al
…
P
ri
m
ar
y 
sc
h
o
o
l…
U
n
iv
er
si
ty
Et
h
io
p
ia
n
…
Et
h
io
p
ia
n
…
Et
h
io
p
ia
n
…
Tr
ad
e
 u
n
io
n
P
ro
fe
ss
io
n
al
…
P
o
lit
ic
al
 p
ar
ti
e
s
A
rm
ed
 f
o
rc
es
B
an
ks
 a
n
d
…
A
fr
ic
an
 U
n
io
n
N
G
O
s
C
o
o
p
e
ra
ti
ve
s
M
as
s 
as
so
ci
at
io
n
s
P
e
rc
e
n
t
Figure 7.12: Frequency of receiving information from different 
organizations  (in percentage)
Never
Sometimes
Often
259 
 
respondents in the same region reported that they often or sometimes receive information 
from the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. The Ethiopian Catholic Church scored the lowest 
percentage, 38.7 per cent, among respondents in Tigray, while the Ethiopian Islamic 
Council and NGOs scored 39.5 per cent and 58.9 per cent, respectively.  
In Addis Ababa, receipt of information by respondents from banks and other financial 
institutions, universities, political parties, Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic 
Church and NGOs was scored between 55.10 per cent and 75.10 per cent. The highest 
ranking, 75.10 per cent, was for banks and other financial institutions and the lowest, 
55.10 per cent, was the Ethiopian Catholic Church. In the Oromia region, 13.7 per cent 
and 68.3 per cent of respondents said they often or sometimes receive information from 
the Ethiopian Catholic Church and health institutions, respectively.  
Respondents in the Amhara region came third in terms of regularly or often receiving 
information from most institutions. They, however, ranked third highest, with scores of 
between 40.0 per cent and 85.7 per cent, in respect of receipt of information from the 
court/legal system, health care system, city councils, primary schools, universities, faith-
based organizations, Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church and Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church and armed forces.  With regard to gender, more than seven out of ten 
male and female respondents reported that they regularly or often receive information 
from primary schools, health care facilities, Police and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. 
Male respondents received more information than female respondents from most 
institutions and organizations. For instance, 69.3 per cent of male and 62.0 per cent 
female respondents said that they regularly or often receive information from courts. The 
frequency of receipt of information from the House of Representatives was scored at 57.4 
per cent and 51.6 per cent by males and females, respectively.  In contrast, female, rather 
than male, respondents reported that they regularly or often receive information from the 
health care system, universities, Ethiopian Orthodox Church, Ethiopian Catholic Church, 
professional associations and trade unions. For instance, 82.6 per cent of female 
respondents regularly or often received information from the health care system 
compared to 81.4 per cent of male respondents. Similarly, 72.1 per cent of female 
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respondents regularly or often received information from the Ethiopian Orthodox Church 
compared to 70.8 per cent of male respondents.  
Respondents were further asked to indicate their receipt of information from different 
institutions and organisations by their residential area (Figure 7.13 and Table 7.13) show 
that urban respondents had highest scores in terms of obtaining information from various 
institutions and organizations. This was, especially, true with respect to banks and other 
financial institutions, political parties and the Ethiopian Islamic Council. Regular receipt 
of information from banks and other financial institutions was rated at 66.6 per cent by 
urban respondents, 59.2 per cent by semi-urban respondents and 41.9 per cent by 
respondents in rural areas. Respondents in semi-urban areas scored highest percentage in 
terms of obtaining information from courts, health care system, city councils and the 
primary education system. For instance, receipt of information was rated at 66.7 per cent, 
68.9 per cent and 65.3 per cent by respondents in urban, semi-urban and rural areas, 
respectively. Similarly, 84.5 per cent, 86.6 per cent and 76.7 per cent of urban, semi-
urban and rural respondents, respectively, regularly or often received information from 
the health care system. 
 
Table 7.13 and Figure 7.13 show that respondents aged between 18 and 39 years 
represented the highest number of recipients of information from institutions and 
organizations. Receipt of information from health institutions by respondents aged 
between 18 and 39, 40 and 59 and those aged 60 was rated at 83.3 per cent, 78.6 per cent 
and 75 per cent, respectively. Receipt of information from courts, House of 
Representatives and government officials was the highest rated by respondents aged 
between 18 and 39 years. For instance, 60.2 per cent of respondents aged between 40 and 
59, 59.4 per cent of respondents aged between 18 and 39 and 44.5 per cent of respondents 
aged 60 and above reported said that they received information from the House of 
Representatives. Overall, respondents aged 60 years and above were the least recipients 
of information from all institutions and organizations.  Receipt of information from the 
health care system was rated at 83.3 per cent, 78.6 per cent and 75 per cent by 
respondents aged between 18 and 39, 40 and 59 and those aged between 18 and 39, 
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respectively.  Respondents aged 60 and above scored 44.5 per cent in terms of receipt of 
news from courts, House of Representatives and government officials.    
Regarding income levels, high-income respondents scored the highest percentage with 
respect to receiving information from the courts, House of Representatives, Police, health 
care system, government offices, city councils, trade unions and professional 
associations. Receipt of information from city councils was rated at 74.4 per cent, 67.0 
per cent and 58.1 per cent for high-income, middle-income and for low-income 
respondents, respectively. Middle-income respondents also scored the highest 
information recipient rate for the Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church, 
primary schools, universities, armed forces and political parties. On their part, low-
income respondents scored the highest information recipient rate for NGOs, cooperatives, 
mass associations and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. About 85 per cent of middle-
income respondents, 80 per cent of low-income and 78.6 per cent of high-income 
respondents reported that they regularly or often receive information from primary 
schools. Information recipient rates for the Ethiopian Orthodox Church were 78.3 per 
cent, 74.6 per cent and 68.3 per cent for low, middle and high income respondents, 
respectively.  
In terms of educational levels of respondents, a positive association was observed 
between the level of education and the frequency of receipt of information from 
institutions and organizations. It was, specifically, observed that the more the educational 
level of respondents increased, the more respondents reported that they received 
information from various institutions and organisations and vice versa. This relationship 
was, however, not observed in the case of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, House of 
Representatives, court/legal system, trade unions and armed forces. Respondents with 
first degrees and above scored the highest rate in terms of receiving information from all 
institutions and organisations, except the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Respondents with 
no formal education were the least information recipients from all institutions and 
organizations, except the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. For instance, 68.0 per cent of 
respondents with no formal education, 64.5 per cent of respondents with primary and 
high school education, 76.1 per cent of respondents with certificates and diplomas and 
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74.1 per cent of respondents with first degrees and above reported that they received 
information from the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Receipt of information from political 
parties was rated at 43.3 per cent, 49.1 per cent, 58.6 per cent and 74 per cent by 
respondents with no formal education, respondents with primary and high school 
education, respondents with certificates and diplomas and respondents with first degrees 
and above, respectively. 
 
It was further discovered that rates of receipt of information varied accordance with 
political party affiliation. Respondents affiliated to the ruling party scored the highest rate 
in terms of receiving information from courts, House of Representatives, city councils 
and government offices. In contrast, respondents aligned to opposition political parties 
scored highest information recipient rates for banks and other financial institutions, 
armed forces, Police, universities, political parties, NGOs, Ethiopian Orthodox Church 
and the Ethiopian Catholic Church. Neutral respondents scored highest rates for health 
institutions, the primary school system and professional associations. Rates for 
information receipt from courts were 69.0 per cent for respondents affiliated with the 
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Figure 7. 13: Respondents who often and sometimes receive 
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ruling party, 54.1 per cent for respondents aligned to opposition political parties, 63.9 per 
cent for neutral respondents and 57.6 per cent for respondents in the ‘Don’t know’ 
response category.  
 
Receipt of information from health care institutions was  rated at 83.0 per cent by neutral 
respondents, 78.10 per cent by respondents affiliated to the ruling party, 76.30 per cent by  
respondents aligned to opposition political parties and 73.2 per cent by respondents in the 
‘Don’t know’ response category. Respondents in the ‘Don’t know’ response category had 
least scores in terms of obtaining information from the House of Representatives, Police, 
government departments and city councils. City councils were rated at 58.4 per cent by 
respondents affiliated to the ruling party, 48.2 per cent by opposition political party 
respondents, 58.1 per cent by neutral respondents and 42.6 per cent by respondents in the 
‘Don’t know’ response category. Respondents aligned to the ruling party expressed more 
interest in receiving information from Parliament, executive and judicial bodies, while 
respondents aligned to opposition political parties preferred faith-based organizations, 
banks and other financial institutions, armed and Police forces. On their part, neutral 
respondents preferred information from social service providers such as health care 
facilities and the primary education system.  
  
In terms of never obtaining information from institutions and organizations, more than 
two-thirds of respondents in the Oromia region reported that they had never received any 
information from the House of Representatives, city councils, universities, Ethiopian 
Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church, trade unions, political parties, professional 
associations, banks and other financial institutions, armed forces, NGOs, cooperatives 
and mass associations. This was the converse of situations in other regions. Percentages 
of respondents who reported that they never received information from the House of 
Representatives, city councils, universities, Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian 
Catholic Church, trade unions, political parties, professional associations, banks and other 
financial institutions, armed forces, NGOs, cooperatives and mass associations were 77.7 
for respondents in Oromia, 43.1 per cent for respondents in Amhara, 21.0 per cent for 
respondents in Tigray and 36.5 per cent for respondents in Addis Ababa. More than four 
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out of ten male and female respondents said they did not obtain information from the 
House of Representatives, city councils, universities, Ethiopian Islamic Council, 
Ethiopian Catholic Church, trade unions, professional associations, political parties, 
armed forces, banks and other financial institutions, NGOs, cooperatives and mass 
associations. Over half of respondents in rural areas reported that they never receive 
information from most institutions an organizations, except the legal system, Police, 
health care system, primary schools, government offices and the Ethiopian Orthodox 
Church. Similarly, more than half of respondents aged 60 years and above said that they 
never receive information from most institutions and organizations, except the legal 
system, Police, health care system, primary schools and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.  
 
In terms of income levels and educational attainment, more than 40 per cent low-income 
respondents and respondents with no formal education said that they had never obtained 
any information from the House of Representatives, government offices, city councils, 
Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church, trade unions, political parties, 
professional associations, banks and other financial institutions, armed forces, NGOs, 
cooperatives and mass associations. Similarly, more than four out of ten political party-
affiliated respondents reported that they had never obtained information from the House 
of Representatives, city councils, Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church, 
trade unions, professional associations, armed forces, cooperatives and mass associations. 
7.6. Free airing of suggestions and complaints and expression of opinions 
 
Respondents were also asked to explain how they communicate their suggestions and 
complaints and express their opinions to local, regional and federal states. Of the total 
study population of 1,816, 1,482, or 82 per cent, responded to the questionnaire, while a 
total of 334, or 18 per cent, did not.  Figure 7.14 indicates that 551 respondents, 37.2 per 
cent, reported that they freely communicated with administrations, while the remaining 
931 respondents, or 62.8 per cent, said they did not. Slightly more than six out of ten 
respondents reported that they did not freely express their suggestions, complaints and 
opinions to government bodies.  
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Figure 7.15 summarizes findings with respect to free expression of suggestions, 
complaints and opinions within various variables. Taken by residential areas, respondents 
in Tigray scored the highest percentage, 57 per cent, in terms of free expression of 
suggestions, complaints and opinions to government officials, compared to 23 per cent of 
respondents in the Oromia region. Respondents in the Amhara region and those in Addis 
Ababa recorded 37 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively. Male respondents more openly 
and strongly expressed their feelings and views, 39 per cent, than their female 
counterparts at 35 per cent.  In terms of residential areas, the percentage for free 
expression of suggestions, complaints and opinions to government officials increased as 
one moved from urban and semi-urban areas to rural areas. For instance, respondents in 
rural areas scored 44 per cent against 33 per cent for urban and 39 per cent for semi-
urban respondents. In regard to age, 40 per cent of middle-aged respondents, 37 per cent 
of young respondents and 24.0 per cent of the aged said they freely expressed their 
suggestions, complaints and opinions to government officials.  
 
In terms of income levels, high-income respondents scored the highest percentage with 
49 per cent who said they freely expressed their suggestions, complaints and opinions to 
government officials. This compared with 39 per cent and 36 per cent of low-income and 
middle-income respondents, respectively, who said they freely expressed their 
suggestions, complaints and opinions to government officials. Regarding educational 
levels, no formal education respondents registered the highest percentage with a score of 
37.2
62.8
Figure 7.14: Respondents who aired their 
suggestions, complaints and opinions (in 
Percentage)  
Yes
No
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43.0 per cent, while certificate and diploma holders scored 32.0 per cent. Respondents 
with primary and high school education and respondents with first degrees and above 
diplomas scored 40.0 per cent and 37.0 per cent, respectively. On their part, respondents 
affiliated to the ruling party (EPRDF) scored the highest percentage, 43.0 per cent, while 
those aligned to opposition political parties, with 21.0 per cent, recorded the lowest in 
terms of freely expressing their suggestions, complaints and opinions to government 
officials. The high percentage score by respondents aligned to the ruling party was 
expected as they were more likely to be partisan, supportive and closer to government 
officials than respondents affiliated to opposition political parties. Neutral respondents 
and those in the ‘Don’t know’ response category scored 27.0 per cent and 25.0 per cent, 
respectively.  
 
 
 
7.6.1. Methods/means of expression of opinions 
 
It is widely accepted that “Freedom of opinion and freedom of expression are 
indispensable conditions for the full development of the person and are essential for any 
society” (Benhadji, 2003: 11). Freedom of expression can be considered as the 
foundation stone for every free and democratic society (Human Rights Committee, 
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2011). Besides, governments, whether democratic or dictatorial, need to know what the 
people are thinking.  V.O. Key said, “Governments must concern themselves with the 
opinions of their citizens, if only to provide a basis for repression of disaffection” (Key, 
1961: 3). The public use different ways/means such as mass media, letters, discussion 
fora, suggestion boxes, and meetings to air its views to the administration and 
government officials (Brooker, 2010). Ordinarily, citizens look to the media to 
understand the views of the public. Media, such as radio, television, newspapers and 
magazines are important in understanding people’s opinions and feelings because they 
choose and portray/project contemporary issues in the public domain. In other words, the 
media contribute to determining the political agenda (what people in the government are 
thinking about or planning to do) and to framing and interpreting issues (how the issues 
are being considered in the public domain). One of the important roles of the mass media 
in contemporary societies is communicating the public opinion and providing a forum for 
the expression of opinions and views of the public. Policy and decision-makers, 
government leaders and politicians may use various means to get information regarding 
what people are thinking about public matters, but they “…remain largely reliant on the 
media to inform them about what the society at large is thinking” (Mutz, 1998; Cited in 
Francis L.F. Lee. 2014). 
 
Radio and television use talk-shows to air views of audiences regarding specific topics or 
issues. Effective public participation is indispensable to delivering various views during 
talk-shows. Similarly, important is the need for the public to freely and objectively air 
their thoughts, views and opinions. This is extremely important because “Although the 
21st century can be regarded as the age of the new media, traditional radio talk-show still 
plays a very significant role in formulating public opinion” (So, 2017:2).  
 
The Ethiopian Radio, 98.1 FM Radio, Radio Fana and Shegre FM use phone-in or call-
in programmes during which viewers or listeners are invited to air their live comments by 
telephone. In order to streamline and formalise discussions, broadcasting stations pre-
select specific topics for discussion.  The print media are also important as conduits for 
opinions from editorialists, columnists and ordinary people who write letters to the editor. 
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Newspapers also print letters to the editor that give ordinary people the power to express 
practically any sort of opinion. In this regard, “The press acts as an important link 
between the people and the government.” (Kabir, 2013:3). Letters and telephone calls are 
another important means of expression of opinions. People use letters and telephone calls 
to express their feelings and opinions to government officials and decision-makers. They 
use letters and telephone calls to convey their specific personal problems and concerns.  
 
Public meetings are also an important means for expressing opinions. The government 
and opposition political parties frequently conduct public gatherings and meetings at 
national, regional and local levels. Government officials such as ministers and governors, 
including opposition political parties, also use public meetings to explain and criticise 
government policies, respectively. The use of meetings by the public, government 
officials, opposition political parties and other stakeholders can, however, only be 
meaningful and useful in an environment that is free of intimidation and oppression of 
free speech.  Suggestion boxes are one of the most common vehicles for expression of 
views, complaints and opinions. This is, especially, true with respect to the provision of 
social services. A suggestion box is the most basic and traditional form of communicating 
opinions, suggestions, views, complaints and similar others. It is user-friendly and does 
not have the limitations of the ballot box which is strictly monitored and, possibly, 
subject to contestation. Suggestion boxes can either be for collection of public (external) 
opinions, suggestions, views and complaints or organisational (internal) opinions, 
suggestions, views and complaints.  
7.6.2. Methods/means of expression of opinions within different variables 
 
Respondents were asked to indicate the means of communication/conversation they used 
to express their opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. As 
figure 7.14 indicates only 37.2 per cent of study population reported for airing their views 
through different ways and means. The most commonly-used media were the mass 
media, letters, discussion fora, suggestion boxes and meetings. Table 7.16 shows that 392 
out of 547 respondents, or 72 per cent, reported that they used meetings to communicate 
their opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. In regard to 
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the mass media, 129 out of 548 respondents, 24 per cent, said they use it for 
communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. 
Mass media were the main source of the information for the respondents, but they were 
not the main means of expression of opininons and suggestions by respondents. Out of 
546 respondents, 357, or 24 per cent, said they use discussion fora for communicating 
opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. Suggestion boxes 
were said to be used by 203 of the 546 respondents, or 37 per cent, while 181 out of 546 
respondents, or 33 per cent, reported that they use letters.   
 
Table 7.16: Means of communication respondents used to communicate their 
suggestions and complaints to local, regional or federal state administration  
 
Means  Number of respondents  Of the total  Valid Per cent  
Mass media  129 7.1 23.5 
Letter  181 10.0 33.2 
Discussion forum 357 19.7 65.4 
Suggestion box 203 11.2 37.2 
Meeting  392 21.6 71.7 
 
Figure 7.16 shows that public meetings, or gatherings, were the most popular means for 
communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials 
among respondents across regions, gender, residential areas, age, income levels, 
educational attainment and political party affiliations. The second highest were 
discussion fora. For instance, eight out ten respondents in Tigray and Oromia regions, 
about seven out of ten respondents in the Amhara region and five out of ten respondents 
in Addis Ababa, all reported that they use public meetings, or gatherings, for 
communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. 
Public meeting, or gatherings, were also preferred by about 61.0 per cent of high- 
income, 66.0 per cent of middle-income and 73.0 per cent of low-income respondents.  In 
regard to regions, respondents in Tigray scored the highest percentage with respect to use 
of meetings, 79.0 per cent, and discussion fora, 76.0 per cent, while respondents in Addis 
Ababa scored 47.0 per cent. Respondents in Tigray scored the lowest percentage with 
respect to using the mass media for communicating opinions, suggestions, views and 
complaints to government officials compared to 30.0 per cent of Addis Ababa 
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respondents who said the same.  In the Amhara and Oromia regions, 29.0 per cent and 
28.0 per cent of respondents, respectively, said they use the mass media for 
communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials.  
 
In terms of use of all five means for communicating opinions, suggestions, views and 
complaints to government officials, male respondents scored higher than female 
respondents. For instance, about 73.0 per cent of male respondents preferred meetings for 
expression of feelings, while 69.0 per cent of female reported the same. Usage of the 
mass media by male and female respondents was scored at 26 per cent and 18 per cent, 
respectively. About 39.0 per cent of male and 34.0 per cent of female respondents used 
suggestion boxes for communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to 
government officials. Regionally, use of various means of communications varied across 
age groups. Use of meetings for communicating opinions, suggestions, views and 
complaints to government officials was scored at 71.0 per cent by respondents aged 
between 18 and39 years, 74.0 per cent by respondents aged between 40 and 59 years and 
75.0 per cent by respondents aged 60 and above.  Percentages for use of discussion fora 
were 64.0 per cent for the young, 66.0 per cent for adults and 75.0 per cent for the 
elderly. Use of the mass media, letters and suggestion boxes decreased as the age of 
respondents increased. For instance, use of the mass media for communicating opinions, 
suggestions, views and complaints to government officials was scored at 27.0 per cent by 
the young, 18 per cent by adults and 6.0 per cent by the elderly. Percentage use of letters 
was 35.0 per cent, 31.0 per cent and 6.0 per cent for the young, adults and the elderly, 
respectively. Young people preferred mass media, letters and suggestion boxes rather 
than meetings and discussion fora for communicating opinions, suggestions, views and 
complaints to government officials, while the elderly preferred meetings and discussion 
fora.  
 
Income levels of respondents also had a bearing on the extent to which respondents opted 
to use all or some of the five means of communicating opinions, suggestions, views and 
complaints to government officials. Figure 7.16 shows choices of media of 
communication by respondents based on income levels. Low-income respondents 
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preferred to use meetings, discussion fora and suggestion boxes, while high-income 
respondents preferred letters and the mass media. For example, percentages for use of 
suggestion boxes for communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to 
government officials were 41.0 per cent for low-income, 36.0 per cent for middle-income 
and 13.0 per cent for high-income respondents. Mass media percentage use was 22.0 per 
cent for low-income, 27.0 per cent for middle- income and 35.0 per cent for high-income 
respondents.  
 
 
 
When viewed against educational levels, meetings and discussion fora were the most 
preferred means of communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to 
government officials among all categories of educational attainment. However, public 
meetings were preferred, 82.0 per cent, by respondents with no formal education, while 
respondents with certificates and diplomas, 62.6 per cent, preferred the same. The pattern 
was somewhat similar with respect to the use of discussion fora. Respondents with no 
formal education scored the highest, 76.0 per cent, while respondents with certificates 
and diplomas recorded 54.0 per cent. Letters and suggestion boxes were the most 
preferred means for communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to 
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Figure 7. 16: Means of communication used to express suggestions and 
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government officials among certificate and diploma holders compared to respondents 
with no formal education who scored the least. For example, scores were 48.0 per cent 
for certificate and diploma holders and 23.0 per cent for respondents with no formal 
education. Respondents with first degrees and above preferred the mass media, 35.0 per 
cent, whereas 17.0 per cent of certificate and diploma holders said the same.  
 
Figure 7.16 shows that respondents affiliated to the ruling party scored the highest 
percentages for using public meetings, 75.0 per cent, and discussion fora, 71.0 per cent, 
as means of communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government 
officials, while respondents aligned to opposition political parties scored 42.0 per cent 
and neutral respondents 52.0 per cent. The mass media, letters and suggestion boxes were 
preferred by respondents in the “Don’t know” response category and less preferred by 
respondents associated with the ruling party. For instance, preferences for the mass media 
among respondents in the “Don’t know” response category and respondents associated 
with the ruling party were 44.0 per cent and 21.0 per cent, respectively.  
7.6.3. Reasons for not freely expressing opinions   
 
Respondents were asked to indicate reasons for not freely communicating their 
suggestions and complaints to government officials. Among reasons given were lack of 
appropriate fora, shyness, discomfort, fear of intimidation and, simply, choice to remain 
silent. Figure 7.14 indicates that about 63.0 per cent of respondents did not express their 
feelings and opinions to government officials. Lack of fora was the highest rated, 55.5 
per cent, among reasons for not expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints 
to government officials (Figure 7.17). Shyness and discomfort were scored at 34.0 per 
cent and 30.0 per cent, respectively.  About 32.0 per cent of respondents said that they 
were afraid of intimidation, while 35.0 per cent said they preferred to remain silent.   
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Figure 7.18 summarizes findings regarding reasons for not expressing opinions, 
suggestions, views and complaints to government officials within various variables. Lack 
of fora was the most cited reason across regions, gender, residential areas, age groups, 
income and educational levels. Lack of fora was rated at 67.0 per cent in the Amhara 
region and 37.0 per cent in Tigray.  Corresponding percentages were 56.5 per cent for 
Addis Ababa and 57.4 per cent and for the Oromia region. Respondents in the Tigray 
region scored the least in terms of discomfort as a reason for not freely expressing 
opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. For instance, the 
score for discomfort in Tigray was 12.3 per cent compared to 30.5 per cent for 
respondents in Addis Ababa, 47.7 per cent for respondents in Amhara and 19.6 per cent 
for respondents in Oromia.  Fear of intimidation was scored at 42.4 per cent, 12.3 per 
cent, 48.6 per cent and 16.2 per cent in Addis Ababa, Tigray, Amhara and Oromia, 
respectively.  
 
In the case of gender, the least chosen reason by female respondents was fear of 
intimidation which was scored at 31 per cent, while for male respondents it was 
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discomfort which was scored at 26 per cent. Both male and female respondents, 57.0 per 
cent and 53.0 per cent, respectively, cited lack of discussion fora as one of the reasons for 
not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government 
officials.  Compared to male respondents, female respondents cited discomfort and 
shyness as among reasons for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and 
complaints to government officials. Most women respondents also said that they 
preferred to remain silent.  On their part, male respondents were afraid of intimidation.  
 
In terms of residential areas, lack of discussion fora was said to be among the chief 
reasons for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to 
government officials.  Percentage scores were 53.0 per cent for urban, 68.4 per cent for 
semi-urban and 49.5 per cent for rural respondents. Respondents in urban and rural areas 
scored 31.0 per cent and 29.4 per cent, respectively, for discomfort as the least reason for 
not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government 
officials.  Semi-urban respondents, 26.1 per cent, cited fear of intimidation as the one of 
the reasons for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to 
government officials.   
 
Figure 7.18 indicates that lack of discussion fora was also cited by all age groups as one 
of the reasons for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to 
government officials. It was rated at 54.9 per cent by young respondents, 58.9 per cent by 
the middle-aged respondents and 45.9 per cent by elderly respondents. Young and elderly 
respondents scored 29.8 per cent and 36.8 per cent, respectively, for fear of intimidation 
as one of the reasons for freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to 
government officials. The middle-aged, 26.2 per cent, said discomfort was one of the 
reasons for freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government 
officials. Among all reasons for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and 
complaints to government officials, lack of discussion fora had the highest percentage 
score across all the three income levels. Percentages were 58.0 per cent, 57.0per cent and 
58.0 per cent for low, middle and high-income respondents, respectively.  Discomfort as 
the reason for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to 
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government officials was rated at 24.0 per cent and 25.0 per cent by middle-income and 
high-income respondents, respectively. Preference for remaining silent and fear of 
intimidation were both scored at 35.0 per cent.  
 
Among the four educational levels, lack of discussion fora was highly cited as one of the 
reasons for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to 
government officials. Scores were 52.0 per cent for no formal education respondents, 
57.0 per cent for respondents with primary and high school education, 58.0 per cent for 
certificate and diploma holders and 53.0 per cent for holders of first degrees and above. 
Scores for shyness were 40.0 per cent for respondents with no formal education and 41.0 
per cent for respondents with primary and high school education. The corresponding rate 
for preference to remain silent was 34.0 per cent for certificate and diploma holders, 
while holders of first degrees and above, 44.0 per cent, cited fear of intimidation. 
Discomfort as the reason for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and 
complaints to government officials was rated at 28.0 per cent and 25.0 per cent by 
holders of certificates and diplomas and holders of first degrees and above, respectively. 
Fear of intimidation was scored at 34.0 per cent and 26.0 per cent of respondents with no 
formal education and those with primary and high school education.  
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 In terms of political affiliations, respondents affiliated to opposition political parties said 
fear of intimidation was one of the reasons for not freely expressing opinions, 
suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. Respondents aligned to the 
ruling party, neutral respondents and those in the “Don’t know” response category, 
instead, highly rated lack of fora for discussion as the reason for not freely expressing 
opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. Fear of intimidation 
was rated at 58.0 per cent by respondents affiliated to opposition political parties, 26.0 
per cent by respondents aligned to the ruling party, 38.0 per cent by neutral respondents 
and 44.0 per cent by respondents in the “Don’t know” response category. Lack of 
discussion fora as a reason for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and 
complaints to government officials was scored at 53.0 per cent by respondents affiliated 
to opposition political parties, 56.0 per cent by respondents aligned to the ruling party, 
59.0 per cent by neutral respondents and 58.0 per cent by respondents (Figure 7.18). 
Generally speaking, fear of intimidation, though lowly-rated, was cited across all 
respondent categories as one of reasons for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, 
views and complaints to government officials. For example, 26.0 per cent of respondents 
aligned to the ruling party, 36.0 per cent of those who preferred to remain silent, 30.0 per 
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cent of those in the “Don’t know” response category and 29.0 per cent of neutral 
respondents, admitted that fear was the reason for not freely expressing opinions, 
suggestions, views and complaints to government officials.  
7.6.4. Intimidation and coercion 
 
Respondents were further asked to indicate whether they have been adversely affected for 
criticising the government. From the population of 1,775, 97.9 per cent responded to the 
questionnaire. Figure 7.19 shows that 172, or 9.7 per cent, indicated that they were 
adversely affected as a consequence of their criticism of government officials at local, 
regional or federal levels. However, nine out of ten respondents reported that they were 
not intimidated for airing their views.  
 
     
 
Figure 7.20 shows that intimidation of critics of the government varied across variables. 
In terms of regional states, respondents in Amhara and Oromia were the most highly 
intimidated/affected for criticizing the government, while respondents in Tigray were the 
least intimidated/affected.  Percentages were 11.5 per cent for Oromia, 11.2 per cent for 
Amhara, 10.10 per cent for Addis Ababa and 5.9 per cent for Tigray.   
 
In regard to gender, male respondents, 10.9 per cent, were more highly affected than 
female respondents who scored 8.4 per cent.  Respondents in rural areas said they were 
the least intimidated/affected in comparison with urban and semi-urban respondents. For 
example, scores were 11.3 per cent for urban, 11.4 per cent for semi-urban and 6.6 per 
cent for rural respondents. Reports of intimidation also varied across age groups. 
9.70%
90.30%
Figure7.19: Respondents who reported for being  
affected as a resut of their criticism of the 
government  (in percentage)
Yes
  No
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Respondents aged between 18 and39 years said they were the most attacked/intimidated, 
while other age groups scored 10.6 per cent on average. Those aged 60 years and above 
and those aged between 40 and 59 scored 6.9 per cent and 8.1 per cent, respectively.  
 
 
 
Regarding educational levels, percentages of intimidation increased as the educational 
level of respondents increased.  Those with first degrees and above were most highly 
affected, 13.9 per cent, compared to respondents with no formal education who scored 
6.20 per cent. Percentages for respondents with certificates and diplomas and respondents 
with primary and secondary school education were 12.1 per cent and 8.9 per cent, 
respectively. Respondents aligned to opposition political parties said they were most 
highly intimidated, 26.3 per cent, compared to those affiliated to the ruling party who 
recorded a score of 7.0 per cent.  Neutral respondents and those in the ‘Don’t know’ 
response category scored 13.10 per cent and 14.0 per cent, respectively with respect to 
intimidation as a reason for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and 
complaints to government officials.   
7.7. Relationship among social trust, political trust and media credibility 
In this section, I discuss the relationship among social trust, political trust and media 
credibility.  In the first part of the section, I discuss the relationship between generalized 
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trust and particularized social trust and then the association between voluntary 
participation in organizations and social trust. Finally, I discuss the relationship between 
social trust and institutional trust and media credibility. 
7.7.1. Relationship between particularized trust and generalized trust 
Social trust refers to trust between and among citizens. It is interpersonal or horizontal 
trust rather than vertical or political trust between citizens and political elites, or citizens’ 
confidence in political institutions. Social trust is a belief in the honesty, integrity and 
reliability of others. Social trust is vital for daily life for economic, political, social and 
democratic endeavours.  
 
The level of social trust varies around the world as generalized or particularized trust is 
linked to the dynamics of economic development (Ortiz-Ospina and Roser, 2014). In the 
World Value Survey, developed countries such as Norway, United States of America, 
Sweden and Finland, more than 60.0 per cent of respondents believed that people could 
be trusted whereas in developing countries such as Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru, 
less than 10.0 per cent said the same. A social trust study in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Latin America reported that citizens of both regions exhibited very low levels of 
horizontal and generalized interpersonal trust (Mattes and Moreno, 2018: 357). Similarly, 
“Cross-national surveys have found that the highest levels of social trust are in 
homogeneous, egalitarian, well-to-do countries of Scandinavia, while the lowest levels of 
trust tend to be found in South America, Africa and parts of Asia” Pew Research Center, 
2007: 3).  The two regions of South America and Africa are among the least trusting 
societies in the world and both are rated low in terms of “bridging” trust, and both also 
have high degrees of particularized “bonding” trust (Mattes and Moreno, 2018: 357).  
 
Ethiopia is one of the least developed countries and the findings indicated that 
respondents had low social trust in general. Respondents showed more particularized 
trust than generalized trust. The ‘thick’, or personal trust, was stronger than the ‘thin’ or 
impersonal, or generalized trust. So, bonding trust was higher than bridging trust. 
Individuals have strong ties among family members and with neighbours and share 
experiences, cultural norms and information between and among homogenous groups. 
280 
 
Low level of bridging trust can be a hindrance for building social networks between and 
among socially-heterogeneous groups with respect to sharing and exchanging 
information, ideas and innovation, including building consensus among groups 
representing diverse interests (Panth, 2010). In the case of bonding trust, the ‘radius of 
trust’ is often narrow unlike bridging trust (Fukuyama).   
 
Trust is willingness to depend on somebody, or something, to act honestly in any 
situation and it involves a degree of risk, i.e. placing one's interests and well-being in the 
hands of another person or other persons. The better off are more trusting than the less 
successful as their success in life may give them a more optimistic, trusting, and bright 
temperament than the poor who might be more cynical, distrusting and suspicious of 
others (Newton, 2007). The social condition of being better off or poor is measured in 
terms of money, status, levels of education and job and life satisfaction. Social trust is 
more common among the “winners” such as those with high education, high- incomes 
and high social status. Conversely, distrust is more common among losers such as those 
with poor education, low incomes and low social status. Putman in fact, poignantly stated 
that “…have-nots…' are less trusting than 'haves', probably because haves are treated by 
others with more honesty and respect” (Putman 2000: 138).  
 
In the case of Ethiopia, the level of social trust varied across different variables. Trust in 
family members and neighbours was higher than trust in Ethiopians and foreigners in 
general. Respondents in Tigray, male respondents, rural respondents, elderly respondents, 
low-income respondents, respondents with primary education and holders of certificates 
and respondents affiliated to the ruling party, for instance, all said they had highest trust 
in family members.  In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, female 
respondents, respondents younger than 40, high-income respondents, respondents with 
high educational levels and neutral respondents, scored the lowest trust in family 
members. Trust in neighbours was highest among respondents in Oromia, male and urban 
respondents, respondents aged between 18 and 39, high-income respondents, those with 
high educational levels and respondents aligned to opposition political parties. The lowest 
percentages in trusting neighbours were scored by respondents in Tigray, female 
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respondents, rural respondents, the middle-aged, low-income respondents, those with no 
formal education and respondents associated with the ruling party.  
 
Regarding believing Ethiopians in general, the highest scores were reported by 
respondents in Oromia, male respondents, urban respondents, respondents aged 60 and 
above, high-income respondents, respondents with high levels of education and 
respondents associated with the ruling party. Respondents in Amhara, female and rural 
respondents, respondents aged between 40 and 59, those with low incomes, respondents 
with no formal education and respondents affiliated to opposition political parties, had 
the least trust in Ethiopians in general. Levels of trust in foreigners varied across 
respondents in Addis Ababa, male respondents, urban respondents, respondents younger 
than 40, middle-income respondents, those with high levels of education and respondents 
who did not know their political orientation. However, all scored high rates in terms of 
believing in foreigners. Conversely, respondents in Tigray, female respondents, rural 
respondents, aged respondents, high-income respondents, respondents with no formal 
education and respondents aligned to the ruling party reported the least trust in foreigners. 
 
Particularized trust is more significant than the generalized trust. Individuals like to have 
confidence in people close to them rather than having bonds with and faith in strangers. It 
was, therefore, discovered that there was a strong attachment between identity and trust. 
The willingness to trust others depends on identification and relationship with others. As 
Messick and Kramer argued, “We trust and help people with whom we are familiar, with 
whom we have frequent contact, whom we believe to be similar to ourselves, and for 
whom we have positive regard” (Messick and Kramer, 2001:100). 
 
During the study, some respondents alluded to the importance of identity in trusting other 
people. They said that factors such as knowledge of the work place and character of the 
persons targeted for trust play a major role in trusting other people. One of the informants 
in the Ilu Aba Bora Zone, for instance, specifically, said:  
Yes, every citizen in this country has equal right, equal respect and equal 
dignity. Every citizen has to have equal acceptance and equal respect. This is 
written in the Bible too. I believe in that. There is no difference between 
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human beings. We only make difference depending on his/her work. Then in 
relation to their work, it is difficult to trust all citizens equally. Until you see 
their work, it is a must to make a decision based on that. It is very difficult to 
trust people equally without knowing their identity. For me, without 
knowing their work, without knowing their identity and without knowing 
their place of living it is very difficult for me to trust them (Interviewee 21, 
May 27 2009: 8). 
Another informant also stated that “I can trust them but I’m reluctant in most cases. I 
need information about the person, if he is not known I will be suspicious of him’’ 
(Interviewee 22, May 27 2009:12). Apart from just knowing the person targeted for trust, 
some respondents said it is also important to understand and evaluate the individual 
before trusting and creating a relationship with them. In this regard, one of the 
respondents said that: 
There is no reason why I don’t trust. If I come across an individual whom I 
suspect, I will evaluate how he talks and I will stay far from him if I see 
something wrong in him. I know how to handle this as I’m old enough. I 
have to clearly understand people before I establish relationship 
(Interviewee 24, May 27, 2009: 19).  
Another respondent in Addis Ababa said that “I have to see his/her background first and 
assess the purpose of his/her approach…. If someone were to come and asked me if I 
knew somebody else’s house, I would not tell him even if I knew the house. I don’t know 
the mission or intention of this person, so I would say ‘I don’t know’” (Interviewee 16, 
May 21 2009: 23).  
Similarly, another informant asserted that “I don’t trust. I don’t simply accept and believe 
you unless you tell me who you are. How do I know who you are? I trust you as a human 
being but I don’t know your inside. Unless the person tells me about himself/herself, so 
how do I trust?” (Interviewee 25, May 27, 2009: 23). A young male respondent in 
Amhara said “I trust those I know, but not others” (Interviewee 35, June 3, 2009: 5). 
Several respondents expressed similar views across all regions.  
Some respondents noted that they did not believe people in general as each human being 
was different.  One informant in Oromia, specifically, said that: 
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It is difficult to trust citizens as a whole. For instance, as is the case with 
animals one may hurt the other. One may be good, the other may be a bad 
person. One may need peace, the other may be violent. Human beings differ 
in many regards. Hence, it is very difficult to trust as a whole (Interviewee 
26, May 27, 2009: 27).  
Another female respondent in Tigray asked “How could you believe all the people? Two 
brothers may even have different tempers. You cannot believe all the people totally” 
(Interviewee 3, May 14, 2009: 12). Another added that “I cannot believe all Ethiopian 
citizens. There is a great variation among them…the majority can be trusted but, there are 
few minorities that I cannot trust” (Interviewee 4, May 14, 2009: 18). Similarly, a 
respondent in Oromia argued that: 
I don’t believe or trust all of them. You know why? All have different points 
of view, all have different lives, all have different economy and different 
work. That is why I say all are different. All are depressed and it is 
impossible for all to be the same. But you look around, choose the one with 
whom you fit and with whom you agree and form your relation” 
(Interviewee 31, May 28, 2009: 47).  
Some respondents explained the issue of social trust within the context of nationalism 
and tribalism. They, specifically, said that people are sometimes suspicious because of 
tribalism. In reference to the same, a respondent in Addis Ababa said that: “There is what 
we call nationalism or tribalism when we talk of politics. This is a recent phenomenon.  
Previously, people embraced each other, regardless of whether one is Amhara and the 
other a Tigre or Oromo. Nowadays people are suspicious of one another” (Interviewee 
14, May 20, 2009: 9). 
 
Another said “You know, we now find ourselves in a situation where every political 
group, whether ruling or opposition, promotes its own political interests. Each mistrusts 
the other” (Interviewee 16, May 21 2009: 24). It was also observed that there was mutual 
suspicion among the people. For instance, a male respondent in Addis Ababa observed 
that: 
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People have realized that there are spies who are bent on getting information from 
you for some reasons. These spies then turn the information they get from you 
into politics and you suffer the consequence so people choose to keep silent 
instead of talking to anybody freely and then landing in trouble (Interviewee 18, 
May 21, 2009:39).  
Similar views were aired by respondents in Amhara where one female respondent said 
that “I trusted all Ethiopians. I had all confidence in them, especially men. I especially 
trusted all Gonderes. But nowadays, it is hard to trust people. Well, people take offence at 
the views you express. They may hurt you when the opportunity arises. I don’t trust 
especially women” (Interviewee 36, June 3, 2009: 12). Another respondent said fear was 
among reasons for mistrust. She added that “There are those you can trust, but not all.  
There are those I avoid. …There is fear and suspicion to trust people” (Interviewee 40, 
June 5, 2009: 31).  Still another said “Well, a merchant is always suspicious. We question 
somebody’s ability to own money without working. So we suspect such people or 
merchants. So, I do not trust all people” (Interviewee 45, June 8 2009: 57).   
Box 3: A dialogue between me and a female informant from Amhara region:  
Question:  How much do you trust fellow Ethiopians? 
Answer:  I don’t believe those I don’t have intimacy with. I don’t easily believe some people 
even if they are of the same locality as I am.  I don’t especially believe those outside my 
association or those I have not lived with for long. 
Question:  Why? 
Answer:  I just don’t trust that is all 
Question:  What if such a person asks you a question?  Do you give him answers? 
Answer:  I would if I know the answer.  What I don’t know, I would tell him as such. 
Question:  Why do you mistrust people? 
Answer:  Ethiopians are not good. 
Question:  How do you mean? 
Answer:  You can’t tell their heart.  They turn around and plan to destroy you. So better keep 
away. 
Question:  What is the case? 
Answer:  If they see you work, then they conspire with all neighbors to destroy.  First they pose 
as friends.  They don’t show their enmity but try to kill you alive (Interviewee 38, June 5, 2009: 
23).  
 
 
285 
 
Some respondents reported that they stopped trusting some people after they betrayed 
them. A female respondent, specifically, said that “I don’t trust people. Trusting people 
had once exposed me to a problem. My female friend who I trusted once went and 
exposed my secret to my boyfriend.  I was petrified and left totally unconscious when my 
boyfriend opened this to me” (Interviewee 17, May 22 2009:30). Another added “I do not 
trust at all. Well, my up bring and personal experience have taught me the lesson of 
taking good care in social relations by all means.  I mean it is not good to spread 
confidential matters to others hastily. People may use the information they get from you 
for subversive ends” (Interviewee 18, May 21, 2009: 39).  
It was, however, also observed that some respondents trusted Ethiopians and other people 
in general regardless of their religion, ethnicity or political affiliation. A male respondent 
from Addis Ababa, for instance, said that: 
I don’t know about others, but personally I have trust in fellow citizens.  I 
know we differ by nationality, religion or whatever. And this is good 
because someone is member of a certain nationality group before he is 
Ethiopian.  For instance, I am an orthodox adherent by faith.  But I have full 
respect for all Ethiopians regardless of their nationality or religious 
backgrounds (Interviewee 19, May 22, 2009: 45).  
A female respondent in Tigray stated that “I believe all of the people” (Interviewee 1, 
May 13, 2009: 8) and another in Amhara said that “Yes I trust, she/he is Ethiopian 
national” (Interviewee 37, June 5, 2009:17). Generally, most of the respondents were 
more comfortable with particularized trust rather than generalized trust. They said that 
they were more likely to trust people they know, people they have information about. 
These views corroborate with the observation by Messick and Kramer that “Without 
generalized trust, individuals tend to limit their interactions to those about whom they 
have information and with whom they have long-term relationships” (2012:29).  
7.7.2. Links between social trust and participation in voluntary organizations 
During the last couple of decades, there have been studies of relationships between social 
trust and membership in voluntary associations. The social and cultural theory of trust 
argues that participation in voluntary associations increases levels of social trust. 
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Similarly, various studies such as Putnam’s analysis of trust in Italy, his diagnosis of the 
current US culture, Fukuyama’s study of major industrial economies, current work on 
social capital (Dasgupta and Serageldin 1999, Halpern 1999) Newton and Zmerli (2011) 
and series analysis in Nordic and European countries, including other researchers such as 
Anheier and Kendall (2002),  Paxton and Ressler (2018), all demonstrate a significant 
relationship between and among voluntary associations and trust. Voluntary associations 
form part of the social infrastructure of society that makes the generation of trust possible 
and makes it easier for trusting relationships and trusting attitudes to develop and to 
mutually re-enforce themselves. The relationship between interpersonal trust and 
membership in voluntary associations is dynamic and, therefore, constantly under 
research (Newton, 2013).  
Participation in a large and varied range of voluntary associations and organisations is 
likely to generate high levels of trust. Participation in voluntary organisations creates 
‘habits of the heart’ (Newton, 2013:7) for interaction and understanding others, even 
though the others may belong to a different social background in terms of social class, 
ethnic group, gender, age, or religion. Newton further stated that “Voluntary 
organisations also draw people into the community, engage them socially, and teach them 
the art of organising, co-operating and compromising with others in order to achieve 
collective goals. In short, voluntary associations are said to encourage trust, reciprocity 
and political understanding and skills” (Newton, 2013: 7). Putnam (2000) looked at 
participation in voluntary associations in the United States and argued that a dramatic 
decline in both membership rates and other forms of civil engagement led to lower levels 
of trust in society and increment in social ills.  
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Ethiopia has a long history of mutual self-help organizations and community groups. 
However, they have been weak and marked by adversarial relationships with the State in 
different regimes. In 2009, there were 2,275 national NGOs, which included 2,000 NGOs 
across sectors, 150 professional organizations and 125 civic advocacy organizations. 
Figure 7.21 shows the relationship between social trust and participation in voluntary 
organizations. The cross-tabulation indicates that respondents’ levels of trust and their 
participation in voluntary organizations and associations varied from organization to 
organization. Levels of social trust were higher among respondents who were active or 
inactive members of religious organizations, sports and recreation clubs, arts, music or 
cultural clubs, trade unions, political organizations, charitable organizations, social 
councils and groups dedicated to some course rather than respondents who were not 
members of organizations and associations. Participation of respondents in these 
voluntary associations and organizations was to increase levels of social trust. For 
instance, percentages of social trust for members of religious organizations and non-
members of religious organizations were 34.0 per cent and 28.7 per cent, respectively. In 
contrast, respondents, who were not members of residents’ associations, professional 
associations, mass organizations and social clubs had more social trust than respondents 
who were active or non-active members of these organizations and associations. For 
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Figure 7.21: Respondents’ level of social trust and participation in 
voluntary organizations in cross-tabulation (in percentage) 
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example, percentages of social trust for members of members of religious organizations 
and non-members of residents’ associations were 32.3 per cent and 33.9 per cent, 
respectively. 
The relationship between social trust and participation in organizations and associations 
shows that social trust was positively associated with participation in religious 
organizations, sports and recreation clubs, arts, music or cultural clubs, trade unions, 
political organizations, charitable organizations, social councils and groups dedicated to 
some course. Conversely, social trust was negatively associated with the participation of 
respondents in residents’ associations, professional associations, mass organizations and 
social clubs. From Figure 7.21, it is evident that social trust was not always positively 
associated with participation in associations and organisations. Social trust between and 
among members of a voluntary association is usually anchored on shared norms, attitudes 
and behaviours which drive their commitment to working together for purposes of 
attaining specific goals (Paxton and Ressler, 2018: 150). As Putnam succinctly argued, 
agreed norms of cooperation and trust, invariably, spread in associations (Putnam, 2000). 
Social trust is generally thought to be learned through repeated interaction among 
members of an organization (Paxton and Ressler, 2018: 151). Participation and 
interaction in voluntary association was not only increase trust among members of a 
group but also lead to trust in those outside the association.  
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Figure 7.22: Respondents’ level of social trust and participation 
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The depth and resilience of social trust also depend on active or passive membership and 
amount of time and energy spent by members on activities of the association (Paxton and 
Ressler, 2018: 151). They also depend on the type of the association and the 
establishment/setup of the association/organization, i.e. whether free and independent or 
not.  Active and involved membership provides more interaction with members and 
others and can lead to more trust among the members of the group and people outside it. 
Previous research and literature on the distinctive contribution of active and inactive 
membership revealed mixed propositions. For instance, Howard and Gilbert (2008) found 
out that active involvement creates more trust in the United States and Europe. 
Conversely, research in Norway and Europe found no differences in trust between active 
and inactive members (Wollebaek and Stromsnes, 2008; van der Meer and van Ingen, 
2009). As Figure 7.22 indicates, the influence of associational and organisational 
membership on social trust varied across associations and organizations. Respondents 
who were active members of religious organizations and political parties exhibited more 
social trust than respondents who were inactive/passive members these organizations. For 
instance, the level of social trust was higher, 42.8 per cent, for active members of 
political parties than inactive members of political parties who scored 30.4 per cent. 
However, active members of arts, music or cultural clubs, trade unions, charitable 
organizations, social councils and groups dedicated to some course, residents’ 
associations, professional associations, mass organizations and social clubs reported that 
they had less social trust than respondents who were passive members of organizations. 
Trust levels were 27.6 per cent for active members and 36.6 per cent for inactive 
members of professional associations. 
The setup of a voluntary organization is also another critical determinant of the 
relationship between participation in voluntary organizations and social trust. In this 
regard, Paxton and Ressler (2018:165) emphasized the importance of taking into account 
multi-dimensional influences such as community and nation characteristics and 
institutions and policies that may influence trust through associations.  Institutional and 
operational independence from the State are part of the fundamental hallmarks and pillars 
of effective civil society organizations. Unfortunately, Ethiopian civil society 
organizations and associations are said not to have the requisite institutional and 
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operational independence from the State (TECS, 2012; The Strathink Editorial Team, 
2017; Brechenmacher, 2017). Brechenmacher, specifically, argued that Ethiopian civil 
society organisations: “…tend to collaborate closely with sector ministries and bureaus, 
and government bodies often view them as implementing agencies rather than 
independent actors that represent the interests of their members” (Brechenmacher, 2017: 
11).  
This reflects the complex nature of the relationship between civil society activities, state 
institutions and trust (Rivetti and Cavatorta, 2017:63). Restriction of civil society 
organizations hinders their ability to interact and to freely communicate and cultivate 
trust among themselves and extend the same to others.  
The association of social trust and participation in voluntary organizations varied across 
organizations, associations and regions. Expressions of social trust were higher in some 
organizations and lower in others. Secondly, in some cases, it was difficult to associate 
higher levels of social trust with membership of voluntary associations and organizations 
or lower social trust with non-membership of the same.  
7.7.3 Links between social trust, political trust and media credibility 
 
The link between social and political trust, is one of the challenging questions among 
socio-political researchers and different methods have been used to unravel it. Newton 
and Norris (2000) outlined three perspectives and approaches, i.e. social and cultural 
theory, institutional performance theory and socio-psychological theory. However, the 
social and cultural theory and institutional performance theory are more appropriate for 
this thesis. The social and cultural theory focuses on social experiences and socialization 
as roots for social trust. The theory argues that:  
the ability to trust others and sustain cooperative relations is the product of 
social experiences and socialisation, especially those found in the sorts of 
voluntary association of modern society that bring different social types 
together to achieve a common goal” (Newton and Norris, 2000:6). 
People learn to trust each other through connecting with and participation in voluntary 
activities.  In this regard, existence of grass-roots voluntary organisations, and other 
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localised manifestations of civil society, is a necessary condition for widespread 
development of generalised social trust. Participation in voluntary organisations appears 
first and social trust and political trust/good governance develop as consequences of 
grassroots organisation of civic activities. As Grootaert argued, “a cohesive association 
creates trust” (Grootaert, 1998:5).  Associations reduce opportunistic behaviour by 
creating repeated interaction among individuals, which enhances trust (Dasgupta, 1988).  
 
This social and cultural theory essentially suggests that trust appears ‘from the bottom 
up’. Political trust is an extension of interpersonal trust, learned early in life, which is 
then, much later, transferred onto political institutions (Inglehart, 1997; Putnam, 1993). 
Political trust is based on attitudes and values that are learned early in life and are 
transmitted from generation to generation (Inglehart, 1997; Putnam, 2000). Values and 
attitudes are acquired early in life, and then persist into adult years in which individuals 
tend to either trust or distrust across all fields of social activity whether they involve 
family, friends, work colleagues, strangers, or political life or institutions.  
 
In contrast, institutional performance theory focuses on the confidence in institutions to 
foster trust and cooperation among citizens. The theory argues that “because all citizens 
are exposed to government actions, confidence in political institutions is likely to be 
randomly distributed amongst various personality types and different cultural and social 
types” (Levi (1998). Levi argued that governments generate trust only if citizens consider 
the State itself to be trustworthy (Levi, 1998: 86). The notion of effective government 
enables social trust and association membership to appear and is shared by many scholars 
and political scientists (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2006, Delhey & Newton, 2005; Newton, 
1997; Newton & Norris, 2000).    
 
Good government is the most essential feature for both generating trust and creating 
space for voluntary organisations to flourish. Essentially, good government appears first 
and encourages generalized social trust which, in turn creates space for the creation of 
volunteer associations and groups. Rothstein and Stolle argued that institutional trust: 
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is the degree of perceived fairness and impartiality in the institutions 
responsible for the implementation of public policies which serves as an 
important foundation for the building and maintenance of high institutional 
trust, which in its turn spills over to influence generalized trust in others 
(2001:3).  
The institutional performance theory essentially suggests that trust appears ‘from the top- 
down’. Institutional effectiveness is often mirrored in improved trust and cooperation 
among citizens and strangers, including in their ability to live side by side. Consequently, 
Stolle and Zmerli, observed that: “state institutions and government policies can help to 
create or undermine the circumstances in which social and political trust can help to grow 
or decay” (Newton, Stolle and Zmerli, 2018:39).  
 
The top-down approach argues that social and political trust is likely to be widespread 
and positively associated in countries where good governance, national wealth, economic 
equality, and cooperative social relations are found. Inefficient government, poverty and 
income inequality, and a society divided by social cleavages are likely, according to this 
view, to trigger low trust across the board (Newton, Stolle and Zmerli, 2018:39).  In 
developing countries, and during the communist era in Central and Eastern Europe, 
citizens trusted the small circle of people they knew well and were distrustful of others 
and of government (Mishler and Rose, 2001; Sztomka, 2000), while the small, wealthy 
and homogenous welfare states of the Nordic region and parts of Northern Europe 
registered high levels of social and political trust (Newton, Stolle and Zmerli, 2018:39).  
 
Various studies have examined the relationships between social trust, political trust and 
civic participation and diverse results have been observed. Putnam (Putnam, 2000) found 
out that both trust and membership of civil societies are in decline in the United States of 
America. He further argued that a decline in participation in voluntary organizations 
firstly leads to declining social trust and later political trust. Newton and Norris (2000) 
examined relations between social trust and political trust using the WVS and found out 
that confidence in government is correlated with generalised social trust. The link 
between trust and sustenance of voluntary institutions is much weaker.  Delhey and 
293 
 
Newton (2005) also found out that government matters, that the quality of government is 
positively correlated with social trust, whilst membership levels in voluntary 
organisations is not.  
 
In contrast, Dag Wollebaek and Per Selle (2000) concluded their national study in 
Norway with the finding that passive membership is just as effective as active 
membership for creating generalized trust and that there seems to be no real need for 
face-to-face interaction between members of associations for generalized trust and 
political trust to thrive. 
 
The socio-demographic variables are also used to examine links between trusting and 
membership of voluntary organizations. As Allum, Roger, Sanna and Patrick (2010: 5) 
argued, that social and demographic variables affect both trust and participation in the 
analysis of perceptions of the public at local, regional and country levels.  
 
In the case of Ethiopia, study results show that trust in family members and trust in 
neighbours, or particularized trust, scored higher than generalized trust across all socio-
demographic factors. General/generalized trust varied across independent variables. 
Respondents in Oromia had the highest generalized trust in terms of residential areas, 
while respondents in Amhara scored 44.8 per cent and 15.9 per cent for particularised 
trust and generalised trust, respectively. Male respondents had higher trust, 32.8 per cent, 
than female respondents, 31.2 per cent. Urban, elderly, high-income and high education 
level respondents, including respondents associated with the ruling party, scored the 
highest percentages in terms of having trust in people. For instance, trust levels for 
generalized trust were 27.0 per cent for low-income, 39.1 per cent for middle-income and 
46.8 per cent for high-income respondents.  Scores in terms of residential areas increased 
as one moved from urban and semi-urban areas to rural areas. For instance, scores were 
26.8 per cent, 30.4 per cent and 36.0 per cent for urban, semi-urban and rural 
respondents, respectively. Generalized trust increased as the level of urbanization, age, 
income and educational attainment increased. Similarly, there was a positive correlation 
between generalized trust and socio-economic status.  
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With regard to particularized trust, respondents in Tigray, male respondents, rural 
respondents, respondents age 60 and above, low-income respondents, respondents with 
primary and secondary school certificates and respondents affiliated to the ruling party 
had the highest trust in family members. In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa, urban 
respondents, female respondents, respondents younger than 40 years, high-income 
respondents, respondents with high levels of education and neutral respondents scored the 
lowest trust in family members. Particularised trust was highly rated by respondents in 
Tigray, male respondents, rural respondents, respondents aged 60 and above, low-income 
respondents, respondents with primary and secondary school certificates and respondents 
affiliated to the ruling party.  
  
In Ethiopia, as was expected, the level of generalized trust and political trust were low. 
This could, perhaps, be attributed to the extent to which the population trusts the 
government organizations and institutions. Normally, public perceptions of State 
institutions and government policies, in general, have the potential to influence, or 
undermine social and political trust. In this regard, the low level of generalised trust may 
be a consequence of the revolutionary ideologies of the government that have tended to 
compromise and stifle democratic participation in governance institutions and civil 
society organisations. For instance, the presence and ascendance of strongman politics 
might have bred a culture of fear and resentment among the people which could hardly be 
expected to spur and nurture political and social trust. The vicious circle of governmental 
inefficiencies, poverty, poor household incomes, inequality and generally low education 
attainment, have continued to fertilise political and social distrust among the population. 
This dynamic has, invariably, resulted in a disconnect between the people and institutions 
of governance. Participation in voluntary organizations and associations have somewhat 
also suffered as consequence of this dynamic. Social trust and political trust were further 
analysed within socio-demographic factors/variables. These included residential areas, 
regions, gender, age groups, income levels, educational attainment and political party 
affiliations.  
 
295 
 
The level of generalized trust and political trust varied across regions. Particularized trust 
was highest among people in Tigray and the least was among respondents in Addis 
Ababa. Oromia and Amhara ranked second and third, respectively. Respondents in 
Oromia had the highest generalized trust in terms of regions of respondents. Respondents 
in Tigray and Amhara were more likely to have personal trust within small, face-to-face 
communities where people knew each other well and interacted closely on a daily basis. 
Respondents in Oromia seemed to have more interaction with strangers too.  
 
With regard to political trust, respondents in Tigray had the highest confidence levels, 
while respondents in Addis Ababa had the least confidence in institutions such as courts, 
Parliament, Police, regional and federal governments, city councils and political parties 
with mean scores of between 3.04 and 2.59. Respondents in Oromia and Amhara 
recorded average mean scores of 2.98 and 2.70, respectively.  
 
Regarding media credibility, respondents in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regions reported 
the most trust in the national television, national radio and government newspapers. In 
contrast, private newspapers were the least trusted media among respondents in Tigray 
and Oromia, while in Amhara the least trusted media was the local radio. Respondents in 
Addis Ababa had the highest trust in international radio, international television and 
private newspapers, while local newspapers were the least trusted.  
 
There was no consistent pattern in terms of ratings for particularized trust, generalized 
trust, political trust and media credibility among respondents in the four regions. 
Respondents in Tigray had highest rating for particularized trust, political trust and trust 
in national news media. Conversely, respondents in Oromia had highest generalized trust 
and trust in the national news media.  Respondents in Addis Ababa had the least 
particularized trust, political trust and confidence in national news media, while 
respondents in Amhara had the least generalized trust. The study also observed that there 
was a positive relationship between political trust and credibility of national news media, 
especially among respondents in Tigray and Addis Ababa. However, respondents in 
Addis Ababa had the least political trust in and credibility rating for the national media, 
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while respondents in Tigray had the highest political trust and believability in the national 
news media.   
 
Gender is a curiously under-researched variable in relation to social and political trust 
and participation in voluntary organizations (Golan, 2010; Allum, Patulny and Sturgis, 
2007:10). Looking at cross-sectional data, it seems there are weak and inconsistent 
relationships between trust and gender, particularly cross-nationally. Hogan and Owen 
(2000: 91), Stone and Hughes (2002) and Leigh (2006) found out that women in 
Australia, for example, experience more generalised trust, while Glaeser et. al. (Glaeser, 
Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter, 1999) and Patterson (Patterson, 1999) found out that 
women in the United States experience less generalised trust. However, Claibourn and 
Martin (2000) found out that, using a cross-lagged panel model, being female in the 
United States, positively predicted trust amongst the student sample. On the contrary, 
Stolle and Hooghe found no relationship between gender and trust. In the United 
Kingdom (Britian), Li et. al. had a contrary result to that of Claibourn and Martin, i.e. 
British men are more likely than women to trust others. 
 
Social trust and political trust between male and female respondents varied in a dramatic 
manner. Both particularised trust and generalized trust were higher among male than 
female respondents. Men had more trust in familiar and stranger people than women.  In 
contrast, female respondents had higher political trust than male respondents, especially 
with respect to having confidence in political institutions. Women had higher confidence 
in courts, Parliament, Police, regional and federal governments, city councils and 
political parties in regard to operating in the best interest of the public. More male than 
female respondents had more trust in all media systems, especially with respect to getting 
news and information. International television, national television and national radio, in 
this order, were the most trusted media by male respondents. On their part, female 
respondents had the most trust in the national radio, national television and international 
television, in this order. Private newspapers had the least number of male and female 
respondents who said they had a lot of trust or some trust in them. Generally speaking, 
particularised trust, generalized trust and media credibility in national news media were 
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highly rated by male respondents than by female respondents. However, female 
respondents had higher ratings than male respondents with regard to having confidence in 
main political institutions. 
 
It was further discovered that residential areas of respondents also had a relative and 
determinant influence on ratings of institutional trust. Urban respondents had the highest 
ratings in terms of trusting people in general, while respondents in rural areas had the 
least generalized trust. Another finding was that levels of generalized trust increased as 
one moved from rural areas to semi-urban and urban areas. This implies a positive 
association between generalized trust and urbanization.  
 
Regarding particularized trust, respondents in rural areas had the highest trust in family 
members. This could be explained by the fact that people in rural areas prefer to trust 
people they know well and interact closely with on a daily basis. In contrast, urban 
respondents had the lowest ratings for particularized trust. Interestingly, people in urban 
areas seem to have more interaction with strangers than their rural counterparts. 
Regarding political trust, rural people had the highest confidence in government 
institutions and organizations such as courts, House of Representatives, Police, regional 
governments, federal government, city councils, civil service and political parties, while 
urban respondents had the least confidence in the same. The level of confidence in 
political institutions declined as one moved from rural to semi-urban and urban areas. 
This was similar with media credibility pattern especially with the national news media. 
The level of trust for national news media declined moving from rural to semi-urban and 
then urban areas. Respondents those residing in rural and semi-urban areas had most trust 
for national television and national radio while urban dwellers had most trust for 
international radio and international television. Private newspapers were the least trusted 
among the three staying areas residents. Respondents of rural area reported the highest 
lack of trust in all media systems.  
 
Age is generally reported to have an effect on generalized social trust. Social trust is 
found to increase with age, i.e. as age increases so does the level of social trust.  In this 
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regard, Putnam (2000) argued that trust declines as a ‘long civic’ generation of people 
who are more trusting is being replaced by generations that are less trusting. Similarly, 
other reports indicate that generalised social trust appears to increase over the course of 
life (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 1999; Patterson, 1999; Pennant, 2005; 
Stone & Hughes, 2002a). Using household panel data, Stolle and Hooghe found out that 
parents tend to trust more than their children (Stolle & Hooghe, 2004).   
 
More elderly than middle-aged respondents highly and lowly rated generalized trust, 
respectively. With regard to particularized trust, respondents aged 60 and above had the 
highest trust in family members. In contrast, respondents younger than 40 years scored 
the least trust in family members. And elders scored the highest rate. So, it was found out 
that there was an association between particularized trust and age of respondents. Middle-
aged respondents had the highest confidence rates in political institutions such as courts, 
House of Representatives, Police, regional governments, federal government, city 
councils, civil service and political parties compared to elderly respondents who had the 
least trust in these institutions. The young aged group had higher political trust than the 
elders group of the respondents. This political trust in age groups was not coincided with 
the finding of some researchers on generational attitudes in political trust (Rivetti and 
Cavatorta, 2017). According to the researchers, younger generations are often much more 
critical and distrust towards political institutions than their parents (adults older than 40 
and above years old). This is true in China (Wang, 2005b), Dominican Republic (Espinal 
et al., 2006) and Arab uprisings (Hoffiman and Jamal, 2012). There was positive 
relationship between age groups and levels of political trust. As the age group increased, 
political trust was also increased. Older people trusted/believed more than the youth.    
 
However, the youth were most trusting of different media compared to all age groups. Of 
all media systems, national radio and national television were the highest rated in terms 
of trust and confidence, while private newspapers were the least trusted by all age groups. 
The level of media credibility declined as age increased. Trust levels for particularized 
trust, generalized trust, political trust and media credibility varied across the three age 
groups. Elderly respondents had the highest trust in both particularized and generalized 
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trust; middle-aged respondents had the highest trust in political institutions, while young 
respondents scored the highest credibility rates for the media. Trust in the neutrality and 
impartiality of institutions of the State was very low among young and elderly 
respondents.  
 
Many studies have discovered that income is a predictor of trust and associational and 
organisational membership. Recent empirical studies have found out that trust is higher 
amongst higher-income earners (Inglehart, 1999) and trust positively links to income in 
regression analysis (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 
1999; Inglehart, 1999). However, Clairbourn and Martin (2001), Stolle and Hooghe 
(2004) and Li et. al. (2005) found out that present income does not predict future levels of 
trust. The level of social trust and political trust varied across income levels of 
respondents. With regard to particularized trust, low-income respondents had the highest 
trust, while high-income respondents had the least trust in family members. The level of 
particularized trust decreased as the level of income of the respondents increased; which 
meant that there was a negative association between particularized trust and income 
levels of individuals. In contrast, generalized trust was highly rated by high-income 
respondents which meant that generalized trust increased as the levels of income 
increased.  
 
The level of political trust also varied across income levels of respondents. Low-income 
respondents scored the highest rates for particularized and political trust, while high- 
income respondents had the highest trust rate in generalized trust. Regarding media 
credibility, high-income respondents had more trust in national television and 
international television, while middle-income respondents had more trust in international 
television stations and international radio stations. Low-income respondents had the 
highest trust rate for the national radio and national television. The least trusted media by 
respondents within all three income categories were private newspapers. High-income 
respondents had no confidence in national media and trust in the neutrality and 
impartiality of institutions of the State such as courts, Police, civil service and armed 
forces. The highest political trust ratings for these institutions were by low-income rather 
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than middle-income respondents. Some research revealed that there was a U-shaped 
relationship between socioeconomic status and political trust (Rivetti and Cavatorta, 
2017). Low income and high income respondents had high trust in government 
institutions while the middle income group had the least political trust. This trend was 
more or less reflected in the Ethiopian situation as the poorest and wealthiest trusted 
governments’ institutions more than middle income group of people. 
 
According to studies in the United States, education is the most consistent and powerful 
predictor of generalised trust (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 1999, La Porta, 
1997, Patterson, 1999, Temple, 2001), in the UK (Li, Pickles, & Savage, 2005, Pennant, 
2005), in Australia (Hughes, Bellamy, & Black, 2000, Stone & Hughes, 2002b), and 
cross-nationally (Inglehart, 1999, Leigh, 2006). While cross-sectional data are 
unambiguous in demonstrating a positive correlation between education and trust, 
introducing a temporal element produces mixed results. For instance, Brehm and Rahn 
(1997) found out that education positively predicts contemporaneous trust. On their part, 
Clairbourn and Martin (2001) and Stolle and Hooghe (2004) found out that education 
does not predict future levels of trust. It would appear, therefore, that the possibility 
remains that the apparent relationship observed contemporaneously between education 
and trust is due to unobserved common causes.  
 
In the context of Ethiopia, educational background had some impact on particularized 
trust and generalized trust. Respondents with primary and high school education scored 
the highest for particularized trust, while those with high levels of education scored the 
least. Generalized trust increased as individual levels of education increased. 
Respondents who had low levels of education scored the least in terms of having trust in 
people in general, while respondents with high education levels had the highest 
generalized social trust. There was positive relationship between generalized trust and 
educational attainment.  
 
Respondents’ mean confidence in political institutions varied across educational levels. 
The average mean indicated that respondents with low educational levels had the highest 
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trust rate in most of government organizations and institutions such as courts, Parliament, 
Police, federal government, regional governments, city councils, political parties and the 
civil service, while people with high levels of education had the least confidence in the 
same organizations.  Political trust decreased as the level of education increased which 
means that there was an inverse correlation between political trust and level of education. 
Similarly, media credibility ratings varied across levels of educational attainment. 
Respondents with the lowest education levels (no formal education and those with only 
primary and high school education), national radio and national television were the most 
trusted media, while respondents with certificates and diplomas, international radio and 
national television were the most trusted media. Respondents with first degrees and 
higher, had the most trust in international television stations and international radio. 
Respondents with low educational attainment scored the highest rate in terms of 
particularized trust, political trust and high confidence in national news media, while 
respondents with high educational attainment had the highest rating for generalized trust 
with respect to confidence in international news media for obtaining news and 
information.  
 
Political partisanship remains a powerful influence on political behaviour within 
developed and developing democracies (Huddy and Bankert, 2017:1). Social trust and 
political trust varied across respondents with different political affiliations. Respondents 
associated with the ruling party scored the highest in terms of trusting people in general, 
while respondents affiliated to opposition political parties had the least generalized trust. 
With regard to particularized trust, respondents affiliated to the ruling party had highest 
trust rating, while neutral respondents scored the lowest trust rate in family members. 
Particularised trust and generalized trust were highly scored by respondents associated 
with the ruling party. Similarly, respondents linked to the ruling party expressed high 
confidence in government institutions and organizations such as courts, Parliament, 
Police, federal government, regional governments, city councils, political parties and the 
civil service. Respondents affiliated to various political parties also scored differently 
with regard to media credibility. Opposition political party-affiliated respondents, neutral 
respondents and those in the “Don’t know” response category had more trust in private 
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newspapers, international radio and international television. These groups of respondents 
had one similarity, i.e. they both had government newspapers and local newspapers 
among the least trusted media. Respondents affiliated to ruling parties had the highest 
trust in national radio, national television and government newspapers. Private media was 
the least trusted by respondents aligned with EPRDF. People associated with the ruling 
party scored the highest rate for particularized trust, generalized trust, political trust and 
had the highest confidence in national media. On their part, respondents linked to 
opposition political parties, politically-independent respondents and respondents in the 
“Don’t know” response category, scored lowest in terms of generalized trust, 
particularized trust and political trust. Respondents who were aligned to opposition 
political parties scored the highest credibility rating for international radio and television 
stations. Opposition political party-aligned respondents scored the least in terms of trust 
in and talking to strangers.  
 
Generally speaking, relationships between and among social trust, political trust and 
media credibility within different variables proved difficult to establish in a conclusive 
manner. However, it was easy to ascertain certain patterns with respect to rating trust 
across urban, high-income, elderly, ruling political party-affiliated and highly-educated 
respondents who had scored the highest rates for trusting people in general. It was also 
easy to ascertain a pattern that showed the least generalized trust among rural, middle-
aged, low-income, lowly-educated and opposition party-affiliated respondents. 
Generalized trust increased as the level of urbanization, age, income and educational 
attainment increased. It was also noted that there was a positive correlation between 
generalized trust and socio-economic status. With regard to particularized trust, 
respondents in Tigray, male respondents, rural respondents, respondents aged 60 and 
above, low-income respondents, respondents with primary and secondary school 
education and respondents affiliated to the ruling party, had the highest trust in family 
members. In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, female 
respondents, respondents younger than 40 years, high-income respondents, respondents 
with high levels of education and neutral respondents scored the lowest trust in people 
close to them.  
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Political trust was scored the highest by respondents in Tigray, female respondents, rural 
respondents, middle-aged, low-income and no formal education respondents. 
Respondents affiliated to the ruling party also scored highly for political trust. Similarly, 
these groups of respondents had great trust in courts, Parliament, Police, federal 
government, regional governments, city councils, political parties and the civil service. 
On their part, respondents in Addis Ababa, male, urban, elderly and middle-income 
respondents, including respondents with high educational levels and those in the “Don’t 
know” response category expressed the least political trust in these institutions.  
 
Regarding media credibility, respondents in Tigray, female respondents, rural residents, 
all age groups, low-income respondents, respondents with the lowest educational 
attainment, no formal education and those with only primary and high school education, 
including respondents affiliated to ruling parties, had the highest confidence in national 
news media for obtaining current news and information. In contrast, respondents in Addis 
Ababa, urban respondents, male respondents, middle-income respondents and those with 
high levels of education, had the most trust in international television stations and 
international radio for obtaining information and news. On their part, respondents 
affiliated to opposition political parties had the most trust in private newspapers and 
international radio. Respondents in Addis Ababa had the least trust in local newspapers. 
Male respondents, young and urban respondents had more trust in all media systems for 
getting news and information than other respondent categories. Respondents in rural 
areas reported the highest lack of trust in all media systems. Young respondents were, 
generally, more trusting of different media than their aged counterparts.  
 
Findings from the study suggest a polarization and flexibility of political opinions and 
preferences with respect to trust and confidence in social, institutional and news media 
outlets. Lee’s research findings provide support for the argument that “political trust, 
ideology, and partisanship are associated with consumers’ trust in the news media.” 
(Tien-Tsung Lee, 2010: 3). For instance, respondents in Tigray, rural respondents, low-
income respondents, respondents with low educational levels and respondents affiliated 
to the ruling party had the highest particularized trust rating. Conversely, all these 
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respondent groups had the least generalized trust. Similarly, these groups preferred to 
trust and have confidence in people they knew personally than strangers. These groups, 
including respondents in Oromo, also had the greatest political trust in public institutions 
such as courts, Parliament, Police, federal government, regional governments, city 
councils, political parties and the civil service. As expected, trust in various associations 
and institutions were a proxy manifestation of respondent perceived satisfaction with 
their performance (Figure 7.23).  Respondent trust was, specifically, with assessed with 
regard to excellence and intelligence, work efficiency and effectiveness, upholding of the 
public interest, justness and sincerity in the discharge of institutional and organisational 
mandates, including devotion and dedication to work.  
   
 
 
The study found out that rating of trust levels was, invariably, influenced by political 
partisanship, ideologies and beliefs. This was, of course, expected as people tend to 
promote and defend their political parties, ideologies and beliefs. Consciously or 
unconsciously, respondents manifested this in their unquestioning/blind support for the 
performance of their political parties and institutions and organisations which they 
perceived were amenable to their personal and collective political, social and economic 
agenda. People are motivated to belief their party and defend their party’s positions and 
status through biased processing of information. “When someone engages in motivated 
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reasoning, they downgrade the quality of an argument that contradicts their view, 
scrutinize a contrary message to a far greater degree than one that is congenial in order to 
refute it, evaluate supportive arguments as stronger than contrary ones, and seek out 
information that confirms their view” (Kunda, 1990; Taber & Lodge, 2006 cited in 
Feldman and Huddy, 2018:171-2). For instance, one businessman strongly said: 
I have been 40 years in business beginning with the Haile Selassie 
Government, then the Derge.  I trust this government because there is 
change.  Of course, there are problems like inflation. Food prices are 
becoming unaffordable.  So people have every reason to complain.  
Otherwise, I have full trust (Interviewee 45, June 8 2009: 54). 
Another respondent said that “I have full trust both in the federal and regional 
governments” (Interviewee 44, June 8 2009: 49). Yet another added that “I have 
confidence in government organizations which facilitate government policy. I trust them, 
because these organizations are bringing change to the development of the country, they 
are showing rights of the people and are good for the people” (Interviewee 23, May 27, 
2009: 14).   
 
Box 4: Views by a respondent in the Tigray region 
 
I am the member of the TPLF party since 1972 and still I am. I participated in the 
struggle against the Derg regime. In my opinion, therefore, we have achieved what we 
have fought for. Glory to our struggle the direction of the country is now completely 
shifted towards development. This always makes me happy the fact that there are 
many other parties has an advantage because it strengthens the ruling party; and it 
encourages hard working due to competition. But sometimes there are movements by 
some political parties that treat the country. People are not happy by the fact that the 
government takes too much time to control this. Despite it is the winning party that 
rules the country, I do not really support the attempt done in 1997 E.C to achieve 
power by raising huge controversy. Apart from this, I love EPRDF. I support it today 
and will support it tomorrow. This is because it is the best party in Ethiopia ever. 
Today our country is developing alarmingly. There is vast construction of roads and 
buildings. The government has shifted its attention to development and wanted to 
resolve conflicts through negotiations (Interviewee 5, May 14, 2009, 22-23). 
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In response to the question “What degree of trust do you have in the federal 
government, regional governments, Addis Ababa Administration or Kebele?”, one 
respondent categorically said “I have no confidence, if any, it’s minimal” 
(Interviewee 17, May 22 2009: 29). Similarly, an interviewee in the Tigray region 
poignantly said: 
I do not trust them. There is a problem. That is partly why we do not trust 
all. This is because there is a problem of discriminations, especially here in 
our region. The children of the rich have every access to education and job 
but not for children of the poor like us (Interviewee 3, May 14, 2009: 11).   
A number of high-ranking government officials sometimes admitted that they had 
challenges in regard to the implementation of development policies, programmes and 
projects.  This was corroborated by some respondents who said that, while they had 
confidence in government policies, they were worried about their non-implementation, 
especially in districts and grassroots communities. Similarly, a respondent in Addis 
Ababa said that: “Well, everything that the government does at the level of its vision or 
policy is most welcome. It is very encouraging and supportable, but when you come to 
the implementation stage, problems occur whether due to lack of capacity or otherwise” 
(Interviewee 18, May 21, 2009; 37).  
  
Yet another noted that “Well, there is much complaint here. People say the government is 
issuing the right directives, but its implementation is hampered by local administrations” 
(Interviewee 45, June 8 2009:55).  The following interview is an example of the 
cautiousness with which some respondents took certain study questions:  
Question:  Now let me take you to political parties. Do you trust the ruling party? 
Answer:  Yes, I have full trust. 
Question:  Why is that? 
Answer:  First of all, it is the only political party I know.  I don’t know the others.  I did 
not know the Derg, because I was a child then. 
Question:  How about opposition political organization? 
Answer:  I don’t know them.  I cannot trust them or admire them (Interviewee 44, June 8 
2009: 49).  
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According to the theory of institutional trust, trust or distrust in individuals can influence 
institutional performance. Similarly, political trust or distrust can influence generalized 
social trust reciprocity. To a great extent, political trust and generalized trust can be 
mutually-re-enforcing, i.e. when confidence in political institutions is high, generalised 
trust is also high. Political trust is contingent upon the performance of institutions and 
organizations vis-à-vis public expectations. Incidence of generalized trust equally relies 
on a number of confidence parameters such as impartiality, justness, fairness, efficiency 
and effectiveness of institutions and organisations charged with the responsibility of 
implementing public policies and programmes. The other significant observation is that, 
in newly-established democracies, citizens tend to believe in particularised trust. This is 
what Letki meant when he said that: “citizens in new democracies tend to rely on 
particularized trust, which is partly a legacy of the authoritarian past and partly a product 
of transition to democracy and market economy” (2018: 337).  
 
Most citizens of newly-established democracies, indeed, view State governance 
institutions with suspicion on account of the legacy of authoritarianism. This is 
particularly true with respect with to courts, Police, the armed forces and the civil service 
who may not be perceived to act in the best interest of society. Quite often, these 
institutions are perceived to act in ways that promote partisan interests of the current 
government and the ruling party. Lack of public trust in institutions and organisations has 
a direct bearing on citizens’ behaviour and levels of political and social trust. In certain 
instances, individuals, or citizens, who may have been directly, or indirectly, treated 
unfairly and dishonestly by some institutions or organisations tend to transfer their 
distrust to other people and strangers. Like political trust and generalized trust, social 
trust and political trust as well as media credibility mutually reinforce each other. For 
instance, people who distrust political institutions do not often get involved in voluntary 
organizations. Generally, study findings indicated that there are some demographic and 
political parameters that have little or no determinant influence on levels of social and 
political trust. For instance, male, female, young, middle-aged and elderly respondents 
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had roughly similar levels of social trust, political trust and confidence in the 
performance of institutions and organisations.  
 
The current low levels of trust in citizen in general and governance institutions and the 
dilemma of media credibility in Ethiopia has a genuine risk of compromising the process 
of building and consolidating democratic governance in the country. In this regard, the 
existential challenge that the Ethiopian government faces is that of raising public levels 
of trust in governance institutions and its national governance architecture in general. 
Similarly, both public and private media should strive to revise their news reporting 
paradigms with a view to building public confidence and trust in them as sources of 
credible news and information.  
7.8 Conclusion  
 
In this Chapter, I have discussed and assessed respondent perceptions of social and 
political trust and media credibility. Assessment of social trust was particularly with 
respect to family members, neighbours, the public and strangers. Particularised trust was 
found to be prevalent among respondents in rural areas, while generalised trust was 
prevalent among urban respondents and those with high levels of education. This may be 
explained by the fact that people in rural areas live and operate within very limited social 
settings which do not allow them the opportunity and space to mingle with and live in 
multi-cultural and multi-ethnic communities. It is this limitation that locks them in only 
trusting members of their families and people they know very well.  
 
The high generalised trust among urban respondents and those with high levels of 
education could be due to exposure to people from multi-cultural and multi-ethnic 
backgrounds and information. The other significant finding was that, on average, nearly 
all respondents had trust and confidence in religious organisations than in political and 
government institutions. This was, particularly, true with respect to the Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church, the Ethiopian Catholic Church and the Ethiopian Islamic Council. 
Among all religious organisations, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church enjoyed the highest 
trust rating. This could, perhaps, be attributed to the fact that it has the longest footprint 
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in the country in comparison with other religious organisations. Indications of trust by 
respondents was largely determined by the perception of services provided by various 
institutions and associations.  
 
In this regard, government institutions, local councils, courts and Parliament were 
generally lowly-rated in terms of trust, justness, efficiency, effectiveness, dedication and 
commitment to work, including working in the best interest of the public. However, 
almost all respondents affiliated to the ruling political party had the highest trust in 
government institutions such as the executive, courts, Parliament, local councils, armed 
forces and the Police. This was expected as the mere existence of these institutions under 
their party guaranteed their hold on power and mandate to rule the country. On the 
contrary, opposition party-affiliated respondents had very low trust in government 
institutions. Again, this was not strange as opposition parties anywhere in the world are 
for keeping the ruling party in check.  The majority of respondents also poorly rated the 
government and its institutions in terms of providing an enabling policy and legal 
framework for the free expression of opinions, complaints and offering suggestions to 
government officials. Fear of intimidation was higher among opposition political party-
affiliated respondents than among ruling party-affiliated respondents. This can, perhaps, 
be attributed to the history repression and stifling of free speech and constrained popular 
participation in setting and leveraging the country’s governance agenda under the Derge 
regime.   
 
Opposition political party-affiliated respondents and middle and high-income 
respondents, including urban respondents in general, had more trust in international print 
and electric media than in local media. Conversely, respondents affiliated to the ruling 
party had high trust in local rather than foreign media. This could be explained by the fact 
that foreign media tend to be more circumspect and critical of the government and its 
institutions which hardly goes down well with members of the ruling political party. In 
light of the foregoing, the existential challenge that the Ethiopian government faces is 
that of raising public levels of trust in its governance institutions and national governance 
architecture in general. Similarly, both public and private media should strive to revise 
310 
 
their news reporting paradigms with a view to building public confidence and trust in 
them as sources of credible news and information. 
 
Next is chapter eight. In chapter eight, I make conclusions and recommendations based 
on my research findings and analysis. It has two sections. In the conclusions section, I 
discuss my insights and analysis within conceptual and theoretical frameworks. In the 
recommendations section, I offer what I consider as probable and actionable 
recommendations for media practitioners, government officials and politicians. In the 
case, of media practitioners, the recommendations are meant to, inter alia, help them to 
sharpen and broaden their information-gathering and reporting skills, including their 
ability to attune their reporting to public media needs and preferences. Regarding 
government officials and politicians, the recommendations are meant to enable them to 
recalibrate their public policy-making processes and improve their appreciation of the 
critical role that the media plays in fostering sustainable and inclusive national 
development. Lastly, the recommendations are supposed to contribute to further studies 
and research in social and political trust, news media credibility, and media access and 
usage. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
8.1. Introduction  
 
In this Chapter, I have provided conclusions and recommendations based on research 
findings and analysis. In the conclusions section, I discuss my insights regarding study 
findings and analysis in line with conceptual and theoretical frameworks. I, subsequently, 
present two sets of recommendations. The first set is directed at media practitioners, 
government officials and politicians. The second set is directed at professionals with 
interest in pursuing further studies and research with a view to contributing to the 
broadening of frontiers of knowledge regarding social, political and news media trust or 
mistrust.   
8.2. Conclusions 
8.2.1. The Concept and significance of the integrated model of audience choice 
 
Audiences are necessary for the existence and viability of the media and its products.   
Audiences are also important for the assessment and determination of media consumption 
patterns by the public through analysis of the extent to which it is accessible and 
trustworthy. The integrated model of audience choice, which is the new version of the 
media uses and gratifications theory, has been found to be helpful in examining the 
relationship between media exposure and consumption in the social context (Webster and 
Wakshlag, 1983; McQuail, 2000; 2005). It is a paradigm shift from the one that 
considered audiences as a passive recipient to one that considers audiences as active 
consumers who vigorously and consciously choose what they want to read to satisfy their 
needs for news, information and entertainment. The paradigm encompasses a number of 
factors concerning media exposure and use patterns and helps to critically focus the 
analysis of media use from both audience and media perspectives. I have limited my 
analysis to the audience side of the media with particular focus on personal attributes and 
socio-demographic background parameters (age, gender, educational attainment, level of 
income, political orientation, etc.) and availability and affordability of media, motives for 
media use and the social context of media use. Socio-demographic factors were used as 
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independent variables, while availability and affordability of media, main sources of 
information, motives for media use and trends of media socialization/social context were 
used as dependent variables in testing public media exposure and consumption patterns.   
The extent to which households access and afford domestic media hardware such as 
radios, televisions, tape players, satellite dishes, computers, land line and mobile phones, 
has an impact on media exposure and consumption. In terms of media accessibility and 
affordability at both study sample and country levels, the most dominant domestic media 
hardware was radio. The tape player and television came second and third, respectively. 
However, not all homes that were included in the study sample had radio sets. In terms of 
television, more than half of respondents had none in their homes. The levels of 
respondents’ access to media varied across regions, gender, income levels and 
educational attainment.  Most of hardware media were highly concentrated in the Addis 
Ababa region and urban areas and significantly varied across the other three regional 
administrations. However, there was very low association between ownership of radios, 
tape players, free-to-air satellite dishes and desktop and laptop computers and regions of 
respondents. In contrast, there was a significant association between regions and 
ownership of televisions and land line and cell phones. Similarly, there was a 
substantially significant association between ownership of televisions and land line and 
cell phones and residence in urban, semi-urban and rural areas. It was further found that a 
typical urban home had one television set, one radio, one desktop and one land line 
telephone. The proportion of males who had televisions, tape players, satellite dishes, 
free-air satellite dishes, desktop and laptop computers and land line phones was not 
significantly different from the proportion of female respondents. This could mean that 
gender is an insignificant determinant in as far as access to and ownership of radios and 
cell phones are concerned.  
Across all age groups, young people aged between 18 and 39 had the highest possession 
of cell phones, laptop and desk top computers.  However, there was a very low 
association between respondents’ age and ownership of radios, televisions, tape players 
and cell phones, including land lines.  The availability of all media hardware, except 
satellite dishes, was highest among high-income respondents and declined as the level of 
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income decreased. However, there was no 100 per cent media ownership among all 
income groups. There was very low, or almost negligible, association between radio 
availability and educational attainment which meant that radio ownership was not widely 
dependent on the level of education of the respondents. Similarly, there was a low 
association between ownership of free-air satellite dishes, desktop computers and land 
lines and educational attainment. In contrast, there was a substantially significant 
relationship between ownership of televisions, tape players and cell phones and 
educational attainment.  
The relationship between ownership of various media hardware varied across 
respondents’ political affiliations. There was, for instance, a low association between 
ownership of radios, television sets, tape players, land lines and cell phones and 
membership of political parties. In light of the foregoing, it is evident that ownership of 
various media hardware could not be attributed to any single factor such as income level, 
gender, residential area, educational level or political affiliation. On the contrary, 
ownership of media hardware was influenced by a combination of multiple factors. 
Ownership of one type of media hardware or the other could be determined by, for 
instance, level of education, level of income, availability of communication 
networks/infrastructure, suitability of one type of media hardware against others, or a 
combination of all these. Some respondents, for example, said they did not have 
televisions, radio sets and other domestic media because they did not have the money to 
acquire them. In contrast, some respondents, especially in semi-urban and rural areas, 
said that they had the financial capacity to buy and own certain media hardware but were 
constrained by the lack of media infrastructure in their areas. A number of respondents in 
certain residential areas said that they were not encouraged to own television sets either 
because of poor network or simply because the network did not reach them. Lack of 
electricity was also said to be another major reason for not owning television sets. In the 
event, those who could afford and were eager to watch television used generators.  
In Addis Ababa, Shire Inda Selassie, Mutu and Debre Tabor, public officials, influential 
businessmen and eminent professionals predominated in regard to ownership of 
television sets, land line phones, cell phones, desktop and laptop computers. Access to 
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and ownership of radios, televisions and telephones were found not to be generally 
prevalent among lower and uneducated households in cities and towns of Mutu, Huka, 
Indabaguna, Irob Gebeya and Debre Tabor. Similarly, people in rural and remote parts of 
Astigde Tsimbla, Halu and Tachi Gayint districts, including the socially and 
economically-poor, live without access to modern communication and technology 
facilities. The possession of modern household media, as Abdul Qadeer (2006) noted, 
follows socio-cluster lines, i.e. from upper to lower class, from high and middle-income 
to working class, from urban and moderns to rural areas and peasants, from young to old 
and from men to women.  
 
The possession of modern household media hardware facilitates access to information 
and knowledge in general. Access and availability of household media hardware have 
directly or indirectly impacted everyone in society. As the most dominant domestic 
media hardware, the radio was said to be predominantly used for getting news and 
information, while browsing the internet was nominal. On average, most respondents said 
they listened to the radio, watched television, read the print media and surf the Internet 
for news and current affairs in their daily lives. However, only about 3 per cent of the 
sample population used all the four mass media, i.e. radio, television, newspapers and 
magazines and browsed the Internet. A considerable number of respondents reported that 
they used other persons as sources of news and information. This indicated the 
significance of verbal communication as a source of news and information which is 
common in most less industrialised countries.  
 
Use of media was varied by regional administrations, residential areas, gender, income 
levels, educational attainment and political affiliations. Respondents in Addis Ababa and 
other urban respondents, males, the young, high-income respondents and respondents 
with first degrees and above, scored the highest percentages with respect to using 
television, newspapers and magazines, the Internet and other persons as sources of news 
and information. In contrast, female respondents, respondents from rural areas, those 
aged 60 and above, low-income groups and respondents with no formal education 
315 
 
reported the least percentages in terms of access to and usage of all media channels, 
including use of other people as sources of news and information.  
 
The practice of oral communication, or using other persons as sources of news and 
information, inversely declined with the level of print media and television availability 
and consumption. In other words, the more newspapers, television and the Internet were 
available, the less was oral communication used as a form of obtaining news and 
information. It was, nevertheless, discovered that, despite variations in the use of oral 
communication as a form of obtaining news and information, it still remained the most 
naturally-preferred form of social engagement. This fact was also collaborated by Eaman 
who said that “Face-to-face communication is still important in any occasion and any 
place. It is also essential for creating connection, trust and loyalty (Eaman, 2010). Verbal 
face-to-face communication is emotionally engaging and promotes a sense of belonging 
and social inclusion. However, multiple factors can inhibit effective verbal 
communication. One of them is being uncomfortable to share information with others out 
of distrust. For example, one study reported that “The reticence of most Ethiopians to 
speak their mind openly in the presence of people who they do not know and trust has 
served to weaken traditional communications networks that operate through community 
structures” (Electoral Reform International Services and Ward with Ayalew, 2011). This 
apt observation was corroborated by a number of respondents who also said that some 
people do not feel comfortable to communicate with people they do not know. Study 
results showed that the higher the socio-economic status of respondents, the higher the 
likelihood that they will use other persons as sources of news and information and vice 
versa. This was also reflected in the level of social trust, especially generalized social 
trust.  
 
In my study, the relationship between ownership of household media hardware and media 
usage were addressed with a view to assessing how respondents either only use own 
media or other people’s media, or both, whether possession of more than one media 
hardware encouraged use of multiple media as sources of news and information, 
including how people who did not have media hardware got news and information. 
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Results indicated that, although the strength of relationships varied, there was a fairly 
strong association between media hardware ownership and media usage in most cases. 
People who had laptop computers, for instance, scored the highest percentage for usage 
of other media such as radio, television, newspapers, the Internet and oral 
communication. However, those who only had radios scored least percentages in terms of 
usage of other mass media hardware. Some respondents who reported that they owned 
more than one media hardware said that they used them in a flexible manner without 
preferring one over others. A number of persons, however, said that they preferred 
watching television rather than listening to the radio.  
 
The integrated model of audience media choice contextualizes media usage within the 
social context. This refers to where people use media, how they use media and whether or 
not they use media alone or with other people, including who makes decisions as to 
which programmes to watch or listen to in the case of television and the radio, 
respectively.  Most of people said they watched television at home, while others said that 
they watched it in different places such as restaurants, cafes, bars, in ‘tejj bet’, workplace, 
clubs and/or in their neighbours’ homes.  There was a high social television-watching 
pattern in urban and semi-urban areas but, in all, places where people watched television 
varied across socio-economic status. Watching television at home was relatively high 
among the high socio-economic class with the percentage increasing proportionately with 
the level of income and education status. However, there was no significant difference 
among age groups with respect to watching television at home or other places. The 
proportion of social television-watching varied by region, sex, age, residential area and 
other variables. Watching television with family members scored the highest among 
respondents. 
 
In social television watching, making decisions as to which programme(s) to watch is a 
good proxy indicator of the nature and quality of news and information that television 
viewers’ access. The study discovered that all family members, friends and neighbours 
had variously made decisions regarding which programme(s) to watch. However, due to 
the dominance of the patriarchal system in the Ethiopian society, the highest numbers of 
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decisions were made by fathers or husbands. Although the majority of respondents 
reported that they listened to radio at home, others also listened to radio at workplaces, in 
restaurants, in cars and in their neighbours’ homes. Respondents in urban areas mostly 
listened to radio at workplaces during week-days, while those in rural areas mostly 
listened to radio on week-ends and holidays largely in the flat-topped mountains (field 
and farm lands) with their friends. In Ethiopia, it is a practice to listen to the radio while 
holding it on the shoulder when one is walking along a street or in the field. Listening to 
the radio in the field is particularly popular in rural areas. Another popular tradition, 
especially in rural areas, is social-listening to radio in the evening, during holidays and 
week-ends.  
 
Though the number of newspapers, copies in circulation and the pattern of distribution 
are very limited, people still read newspapers from multiple locations such as homes, 
offices, inside cars and coffee houses. The practice of reading newspapers in coffee 
houses, especially by men while drinking coffee, tea, or caputuno in the morning, is very 
common in towns and cities. Readers pay a fee to read a newspaper. This is an unwritten 
mutual agreement between and among readers and newspaper vendors who have regular 
and specific customers. After one has finished reading a newspaper, the vendor collects 
and passes it on to another reader. This kind of readership arrangement has a positive 
multiplier effect regarding the number of newspaper readers and helps in ensuring that 
even those who may not be able to buy newspapers have access to them. 
 
The newspaper-reading forum is an established practice in Ethiopia and is dominant, 
especially in rural areas of the country. The practice of newspaper-reading is, at times, 
used for generating debate around current affairs and is very popular among members of 
the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Republic Forum (EPRDF). The newspapers of the 
party are distributed to party members and the members meet regularly to discuss topics 
selected by high-ranking officials of the party. Forum-reading of newspapers by 
respective political party members is also designed to build and consolidate internal 
democracy with respect to topical social, economic and political issues. During forum 
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newspaper-reading, members are expected to discuss and take stands on identified issue 
areas. 
 
 The next question that was interrogated in the study was why people use the mass 
media? The integrated model of audience choice, or media uses and gratifications theory, 
helps to explain how individuals use mass communication to gratify their needs and to 
discover underlying motives for individuals’ media use. It assumes that individuals have 
power over their media usage, rather than positioning individuals as passive consumers of 
media (McQuail, 2000; 2004). The theory explores how individuals deliberately seek 
which media to satisfy their needs such as information, personal identity, socialisation 
and entertainment. It is a tool for understanding how individuals connect with 
technologies around them and how they use them. For instance, people seek a number of 
gratifications from their radio or television set which might include affection, diversion, 
relaxation, social interaction, value reinforcement, cultural satisfaction, entertainment, 
mobility, recognition, passing time, information/surveillance, arousal, escape and similar 
others.  
 
The findings indicate that the proportion of usage of media for news and information was 
highest across all three news media, i.e. television, radio and newspaper. Using 
newspapers for getting news, information and current affairs scored the highest, while 
television scored the least. Meanwhile, using television for entertainment such as 
relaxation, aesthetic enjoyment, filling time, sexual arousal and emotional relief, was 
scored highly relative to the other three types of media. Use of television, radio and 
newspapers for getting news and information was fairly high across all variables 
irrespective of region, gender, residence, age, income level, educational attainment and 
political orientation. There were, nevertheless, some variations within variables. It was 
further observed that there was strong integral relationship between and among 
audiences, media and the social context. People depend on media to meet certain needs 
and to achieve certain goals but they do not always equally depend on all media. 
Individuals were, for instance, found to depend more on media that were accessible and 
readily available to meet most of their specific needs than those that met just a few needs. 
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Previous research evidence suggests that individuals with higher incomes and higher 
education qualifications are more likely to read newspapers, whereas individuals who are 
less well-off and have lower levels of education are more likely to use television news 
sources (Schoenbach, Lauf, McLeod and Scheufele, 1999; Pew Research Center for the 
People and the Press, 2011; Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2012). 
However, this was not directly reflected in the study findings. It is, nevertheless, 
hypothetically true that individuals with high incomes and educational levels are more 
likely to access and read newspapers for news and information than individuals with low 
incomes and low educational attainment.  
 
In terms of television, there is, again, the issue of affordability. People with low incomes 
have to think twice before spending the little they have on buying a television set; and 
this fact partially explains the low scores among low-income groups relative to high-
income groups with respect to television ownership and use. There are clear trends that 
education, income and mature age are positively related to the general tendency to prefer 
news over entertainment, while the young prefer entertainment over news (Pew Research 
Center, 2004). In terms of ideology, liberals are more likely to watch left-leaning 
programmes and conservatives are more likely to watch right-leaning programmes 
(Stroud, 2011). However, these general trends of media uses and gratifications were not 
explicitly reflected in the Ethiopian media consumption patterns. Theoretically, needs of 
audiences should be considered as critical determinant factors for media choice. 
According to McQuail et. al., “Explaining media consumption as a function of individual 
needs has been the hallmark of uses and gratifications research. Despite the intuitive 
appeal of this approach, viewer needs alone seem inadequate for predicting specific 
programme choice’’ (McQuail et. al., 1972). Webster and Washlag added that “We 
would argue that needs are not a direct determinant of choice but rather operated through 
a number of intervening variables to affect choice behavior” (Webster and Washlag, 
1983: 439). 
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Both individual and societal patterns of media use change over time due to innovations in 
information and communications technology and the development of news media. 
Improvements and innovations in radio, television and other modern communication 
products have had a strong impact in changing modes of information dissemination and 
ways of consumption. The three modes of information dissemination and media 
consumption, i.e. ‘communal narration’ of news or information exchange, social 
narration of news and personal/individualized access to news and information, have been 
adopted and adapted in the Ethiopian context.  
 
In ‘communal narration’ of news and information, people gather around the community 
leader’s or some other influential person’s radio set or television set for news and 
information. In certain cases, they also gather in tea houses, coffee houses, bars, Tejj 
houses (Tejj bet) or local beer houses to listen to radio and to watch television. People 
also gather to listen to radio in squares/open grounds in towns and cities where 
microphones are conveniently placed to distribute sound. Social narration of news and 
information through social television-watching, social radio-listening and social-reading 
of newspapers and magazines are also popular in Ethiopia, especially among low-income 
populations. Social television-watching is predominant and popular in Ethiopia for 
multiple reasons. It is a powerful cultural source of news and information and public 
debate on matters of national and international importance. Social narration of news and 
information can function to solidify community bonds and improve capacities.  It can 
also reinforce and nurture the much-needed social capital that has the incredible potential 
to underpin and ring-fence sustainable people-level development. However, social 
television-watching, social radio-listening and social newspaper-reading fora might have 
two negative consequences.  
 
Firstly, they have the potential to challenge the notion of selective exposure to and 
selective perception of news and information by active audiences. Ideally, audiences are 
expected to select and decide the type of media, the type of programme or article to 
follow or read. Unfortunately, social television-watching, social radio-listening and social 
newspaper-reading fora do not give opportunities for audiences to decide which station or 
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programme to watch and listen to or which newspaper or article to read. The selection of 
specific television channels and programmes or newspaper and article is not, therefore, a 
free and independent decision that is made by a single individual. In this regard, it was 
discovered that respondents who watched television and listened to radio from 
neighbours or with other persons did not have any say over the selection of channels or 
programmes. Rather, they watched what others were watching or listening to. Listening 
to radio or watching television under such conditions is, therefore, a matter of ‘follow it 
or leave it’. 
 
The second challenge relates to the invasion of media user’s personal space. An audience 
needs to watch television, listen to radio or read a newspaper within specific and 
convenient time, space and place without the interference of others. However, given 
current practices in social television watching, social radio-listening and newspaper 
forum-reading, opportunities for consideration of personal convenience and space are 
extremely limited. Individualization of news and information, or personalised access to 
news and information, has tended to displace communal and social narration of news and 
information in the country. This trend has the potential to irretrievably and negatively 
affect the age-old inherent ability of communities to grow and sustain community bonds 
and relations. It also has the potential to socially-exclude certain community members, 
especially those with no financial capacity to buy news and information media hardware, 
from accessing news and information. Fortunately, in the case of Ethiopia, 
individualization of news and information, or personalised access to news and 
information, is not yet dominant. Individualization of news and information, or 
personalised access to news and information, is assisted by individual ownership and use 
of household media hardware, especially radio, television and, above all, cell phones, 
tablets and other mobile communication gadgets.  
 
In the modern way of life, families sit in lounges but, instead of conversing with each 
other, everyone is busy using her/his mobile phone or laptop computer. This, invariably, 
compromises the ability of families to share news and information. In certain households, 
some family members do not collectively depend on one media hardware such as a 
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television set or a radio set but, rather, on a number of television sets, radio sets and other 
devises which they use according to their felt individual needs. However, this practice is 
not widely common in Ethiopia largely due to high poverty levels and limited availability 
of media hardware in some areas. Improved access to media presents rare opportunities 
for Ethiopia’s drive to attain all-round, inclusive and sustainable human development. 
This is especially true given the fact that, in contemporary human development dynamics, 
timely access to the rapidly-changing information and communications technologies 
plays a key role in availing key knowledge and information to mass populations. In this 
regard, the Government of Ethiopia will do well to create an enabling policy and legal 
environment for the acquisition, development and provision of the necessary information 
and communication technologies to as many of its citizens as possible. 
8.2.2. The Concept and significance of media credibility  
 
The concept of media credibility is complex and multidimensional. Media credibility has 
three main dimensions, i.e. source credibility, message credibility and medium 
credibility. The focus of this thesis is on news media credibility which deals with the 
comparative public perception and attitudes towards radio, television and newspapers as 
believable, trustworthy, and competent in delivering information and facts. Mass media 
play a central role in the working of democracy in developed countries and in developing 
countries like Ethiopia, media also play a significant role in nation-building and political 
transformation. The mass media are critical in the economic and political transitions 
through shaping and reflecting relations between the state and society, the elites and the 
public. The success of the mass media, therefore, depends upon mass media being 
credible and believable and worthy of public trust and confidence (Garrison, 1992). News 
media credibility is, in addition, considered as an essential element of effective 
communication.  
Assessment of public perception of news media credibility in the quest to obtain news 
and information fully, accurately and fairly, has two major components. The first one 
focuses on news media system credibility comparisons of print media, radio and 
television within parameters of ownership (private or public) and geographical setup 
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(local, national or international). The second component of the assessment is the level of 
public confidence in media houses. Comparative assessments of media credibility among 
television, radio and newspapers indicated that television was reported as the most 
credible source of news and information, followed by radio and newspapers. The main 
characteristics of the medium itself have a strong influence on the perception of media 
credibility by the public. A number of respondents highly rated television for providing 
colourful visual images accompanied by sound which makes it preferable from among 
other forms of media for getting news and information. In fact, people find television 
more credible than newspapers because “seeing is believing” (West, 1994). The national 
radio was, however, was generally said to be the most trusted source of news and 
information. The national television and international television closely followed, while 
international radio, local radio, commercial radio and local newspapers trailed behind. 
Private newspapers were the least trusted as sources of credible news and information.  
The level of trust in news media system was further analysed within independent 
variables. It was found that there were variations in levels of trust in news media in terms 
of respondents’ region, sex, residential area, age, income, educational attainment and 
political affiliation. Among the four regions, national television, national radio and 
government newspapers were the most trusted media by respondents in Tigray, Amhara 
and Oromia. In contrast, private newspapers were the least trusted media among 
respondents in Tigray and Oromia, while the least trusted media were local radio stations 
in the case of respondents in Amhara. Respondents in Addis Ababa had the highest trust 
in international radio, international television and private newspapers. Local newspapers 
were the least trusted media among respondents in Addis Ababa.  
Male respondents had more trust in all media systems for getting news and information 
than their female counterparts. International television, national television and national 
radio stations, in this order, were the most trusted media by male respondents, while the 
national radio, national television and international television, in this order, were the most 
trusted media by female respondents. Private newspapers had the least percentage scores 
among both male and female respondents in terms of having a lot of trust or some trust. 
Regarding residential areas, respondents residing in semi-urban areas had most trust in 
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national television and national radio, while urban respondents had most trust in 
international radio and international television. On their part, respondents in rural areas 
had most trust in national radio and government newspapers. Private newspapers were 
the least trusted in urban, semi-urban and rural areas. All in all, respondents in rural areas 
reported the highest lack of trust in all media systems. 
 
Among all age groups, the youth were most trusting of different types of media. 
However, out of all the different media, national radio and national television were highly 
trusted by the youth, while private newspapers were the least trusted by respondents in all 
age groups. Aged respondents scored the highest in terms of having no trust at all in the 
media but scores declined with decreasing age for all media systems except government 
newspapers. Regarding income levels of respondents, national television, national radio, 
international radio and international television were highly trusted by different income 
groups. High-income respondents had more trust in national television and international 
television, while middle-income respondents trusted international television stations and 
international radio. Low-income respondents had the highest trust in national radio 
stations and national television. The least trusted media among all three income groups 
were private newspapers.  
 
Trust in media systems varied across the four levels of educational attainment. 
Respondents with the lowest education levels, those with no formal education and those 
with only primary and high school education, national radio was the most trusted media 
followed by national television. For respondents with certificates and diplomas, 
international radio and national television were the most trusted media. Respondents with 
first degrees or higher, international television stations and international radio stations 
were the most trusted, while newspapers were the least trusted.  Respondents affiliated to 
different political parties varied in their levels of trust in different media systems. 
Respondents categorised under opposition political parties, neutrals and respondents in 
the “Don’t know” response category, had the most trust in private newspapers, 
international radio stations and international television. These groups of respondents had 
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one similarity, i.e. they all had government newspapers and local newspapers among the 
least trusted media.  
 
Respondents affiliated to the ruling political party had the highest trust in national radio, 
national television and government newspapers. Private newspapers were the least trusted 
media among respondents aligned to the EPRDF. Respondents in Tigray, Amhara and 
Oromia regions, female respondents, respondents with the lowest education levels, those 
with no formal education and those with only primary and high school education, had 
more trust in national radio stations and national television. Respondents in Addis Ababa, 
male respondents, respondents with the highest education levels and independent 
respondents had the most trust in international television and radio stations. Meanwhile, 
respondents affiliated to opposition political parties had the most trust in private 
newspapers and international radio stations.  
 
Findings relating to media credibility further showed that, among all television stations, 
the Ethiopia Television which has nation-wide coverage, was the most trusted, while 
Zami Connections was the least trusted. For radio stations, the most trusted was 
Ethiopian Radio and the least trusted was FM 96.1. Among all newspapers, the most 
trusted was Addis Admass, while Capital was the least trusted newspaper in the country. 
However, the level of credibility in media houses varied across region, sex, area of 
residence, age, income level, education level and political party affiliation. Ethiopian 
Television was the most trusted television station among respondents in Tigray, female 
respondents, semi-urban and rural respondents, including middle-aged, old and low-
income respondents. Trust in the Ethiopian Television was also very high among 
respondents with no formal education and those with primary and high school education, 
as well as respondents affiliated to the EPRDF. This group of respondents also had the 
highest trust in the Ethiopian Radio and the Addis Zemen newspaper. However, the 
Ethiopian Television was the least trusted among respondents in Addis Ababa, higher 
degree holders, respondents affiliated to opposition political parties and independent 
respondents. Meanwhile, the BBC and CNN were the most trusted television stations by 
Addis Ababa respondents, male, urban, young, non-low income respondents, holders of 
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diplomas and degrees and respondents not associated with ruling political parties. These 
groups also had the highest trust in BBC radio and the VOA for obtaining news and 
information.  
  
Over the years, there has been a shift in the modality of studying media credibility from 
uni-dimensional to multi-dimensional measures and approaches (Gaziano and McGrath, 
1986; Metzger et al., 2003). One of the approaches for assessing public perceptions of 
media credibility involves the shift from characteristics of individuals and personal 
sources to characteristics of media behaviours. This approach permits the analysis of 
perceived media credibility based on judgments within dimensions of media credibility, 
i.e. accuracy, believability, lack of bias, completeness, clarity and neutrality.    
Comparisons of levels of trust in radio stations in terms of general perception of 
credibility and judgement based on the ten dimensions of media credibility revealed no 
major differences. Once again, the Ethiopian Radio had the highest trust among 
respondents within the ten dimensions of media credibility. Meanwhile, Deutsch Welle 
Radio was the least trusted international radio station and scored the lowest average in 
most dimensions of media credibility. Similar results were observed among independent 
variables with respect to radio stations credibility. The Ethiopian Radio was the most 
trustworthy radio station in almost all of the ten dimensions of media credibility among 
respondents in Tigray, rural areas, low-income respondents, the elderly and respondents 
affiliated to ruling political parties. Respondents in Addis Ababa and Amhara, urban 
respondents, middle and high-income respondents, high education level respondents, and 
respondents who were not affiliated to ruling political parties, variously rated BBC 
Radio, or VOA as the most trusted within the ten dimensions of media credibility. This 
pattern was reflected in most respondent perceptions of media credibility of radio 
broadcasting with respect to obtaining credible news and information. 
In analysing media consumption and media credibility, political views and ideological 
orientation of members of the public are significant. Political ideas and beliefs of the 
public are reflected in their day-to-day life and affect their assessment of media 
credibility. This is as expected since people are naturally inclined to politics. In reference 
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to this, Heywood aptly noted that “All people are political thinkers. Whether they know it 
or not, people use political ideas and concepts whenever they express their opinions or 
speak their mind” (Heywood, 2013:1).  
 
Individual political orientation, views and ideas have enormous influence on decisions 
people make. Though political ideologies and philosophies in Ethiopia are complicated, 
there are two major political ideologies, i.e. liberalism and revolutionary democracy. The 
former is espoused and promoted by opposition political parties and the latter by the 
EPRDF. The ideology of revolutionary democracy can be traced back to ethnic-based 
federalism. Ethnicity is the most dominant rhetorical feature in political discourse in 
Ethiopia and forms the basis of the establishment of the federalist system of government. 
The TPLF/EPRDF’s revolutionary ideology runs deep in the country and especially in 
Addis Ababa, Amhara, Oromia and Tigray regions. Respondents in Tigray, semi-urban 
and rural respondents, the middle-aged, the elderly, low-income individuals and 
respondents with low education levels, were found to be more likely to be associated with 
the EPRDF than respondents in Addis Ababa and other urban areas and middle and high-
income and highly educated respondents.  Respondents in Amhara and Oromia said that 
they were most likely to be aligned to ruling political parties. This was, probably, due to 
the mass ideological indoctrination that the regions have been subjected to. In some 
cases, trust in media was a reflection of the political ideology and political views. 
Political views and stands of individuals were, for example, symmetrically reflected in 
perceptions of media credibility. Individuals who were affiliated to ruling political parties 
showed the highest trust in media which seemed to be aligned to their parties and to serve 
as vehicles for promoting their missions and objectives.   
Meanwhile, respondents who were associated with opposition political parties, or who 
were neutral, reported the most trust in news media which were not in full support of 
ruling political parties. In contrast, respondents affiliated to ruling political parties, the 
lowly-educated, people with no formal education, low-income respondents, women and 
respondents in rural areas, expressed high levels of trust and confidence in news media 
that they perceived as supportive of the ruling political party. This pattern was as 
expected since mass ideological indoctrination easily resonates with these groups of 
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people.  Generally speaking, respondents who said they were members or supporters of 
ruling political parties naturally supported national media such as the Ethiopian Radio, 
Ethiopian Television and Addis Zemen that are amenable and user-friendly to the 
government. Conversely, BBC, CNN, VOA and Deutsch Welle, and in some cases, 
private newspapers, were the most trusted among respondents in Addis Ababa, males, 
urban residents, the young, middle and high-income groups, diploma and degree holders, 
respondents associated with opposition political parties and independents. Again, this was 
not surprising as urban populations, the young, middle and high-income groups and 
highly-educated individuals tend to be well informed about political and social goings-on 
in the country.    
The relationship between media consumption and media credibility is one of the critical 
issues in media credibility discourse and challenges public media consumption patterns. 
Study findings indicated that one out five persons, or 20 per cent, had stopped using a 
specific media due to loss of trust and confidence (see Figure 3.5). Cessation of use of 
specific media on account of loss of trust and confidence varied across socio-
demographic variables. Respondents in Tigray, female respondents, rural respondents, 
the elderly, low and high-income respondents, those with no formal education and 
respondents affiliated to ruling political parties, however, accounted for the least 
percentage of those who cited loss of trust and confidence as a reason for stopping use of 
certain media. Stoppage of use of certain media on account of loss of trust and confidence 
was highest among respondents in Addis Ababa, semi-urban respondents, the young, the 
middle-income group, the highly educated and respondents affiliated to opposition 
political parties.  
There was a relationship between residential areas, age, educational attainment and the 
proportion of respondents who were prone to stopping usage of certain media on account 
of loss of trust and confidence.  Stopping use of certain media due to mistrust was highest 
among urban respondents and declined as one moved from urban and semi-urban to rural 
areas. In contrast, there was no relationship between age and stoppage of use of certain 
media due to loss of trust and confidence. In fact, as age increased, the proportion of 
respondents stopping use of certain media reduced. There was, however, a positive 
329 
 
relationship between educational attainment and the proportion of respondents who said 
they stopped using a specific media because of loss of credibility. For example, as the 
level of education increased, the proportion of respondents stopping use a specific media 
due to loss of trust also increased.  
Stoppage of use of certain media may be temporary. For instance, use of a certain media 
outlet may be temporary because of a specific programme that a viewer may not like and 
may resume when it is over. This will, therefore, not amount to a permanent 
abandonment of the affected media outlet. In other cases, some viewers fail to abandon a 
certain type of media outlet despite losing trust and confidence because of lack of 
alternatives. In such cases, viewers will still continue using the affected media outlet as a 
source of news and information.       
8.2.3. The concept and significance of the social and cultural theory  
 
Social and cultural theory is helpful in examining levels of social trust in the context of 
social clusters, including trust in family members, trust in neighbours, trust in citizens 
and trust in foreigners. It is also helpful in establishing comparative trust levels between 
particularized and generalized trust. Social trust refers to trust between and among 
individuals. It is interpersonal and horizontal trust, rather than vertical or political trust 
between citizens and political elites, or citizens’ confidence in political institutions. 
Social trust is a belief in the honesty, integrity and reliability of others. Social trust is vital 
for daily life and for economic, political, social and democratic endeavours.  
 
Levels of social trust vary around the world as generalized or particularized social trust is 
linked to the state of socio-economic development. For example, social trust, especially 
generalized social trust, is higher in developed countries than in developing countries. 
South America and Africa are among the least trusting societies in the world and both are 
rated low in terms of “bridging” trust, and both also have high degrees of particularized 
“bonding” trust (Mattes and Moreno, 2018: 357).  
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Ethiopia is one of the least developed countries and the findings indicated that 
respondents had low social trust in general. Respondents showed more particularized 
trust than generalized trust. The ‘thick’, or personal trust, was stronger than the ‘thin’ or 
impersonal, or generalized trust. Individuals have strong ties within families and with 
neighbours and share experiences, cultural norms and information between and among 
homogenous groups. Low levels of bridging trust can be a hindrance to building social 
networks between and among socially-heterogeneous groups with respect to sharing and 
exchanging information, ideas and innovation, including building consensus among 
groups representing diverse interests (Panth, 2010). In the case of bonding trust, the 
‘radius of trust’ is often narrow unlike bridging trust (Fukuyama).   
 
Social trust is more common among the “winners” such as those with high educational 
attainment, high- incomes and high social status. Conversely, distrust is more common 
among “losers” such as those with poor educational attainment, low incomes and low 
social status. Putman in fact, poignantly stated that “…have-nots…' are less trusting than 
'haves', probably because haves are treated by others with more honesty and respect” 
(Putman 2000: 138). In the case of Ethiopia, the level of social trust varied across 
different variables. Trust in family members and neighbours was higher than trust in 
Ethiopians and foreigners in general. Respondents in Tigray, male respondents, rural 
respondents, elderly respondents, low-income respondents, respondents with primary 
education and holders of certificates and respondents affiliated to the ruling political 
party, for instance, all said they had highest trust in family members.  In contrast, 
respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, female respondents, respondents 
younger than 40, high-income respondents, respondents with high educational levels and 
neutral respondents, scored the lowest trust in family members. Trust in neighbours was 
highest among respondents in Oromia, male and urban respondents, respondents aged 
between 18 and 39, high-income respondents, those with high educational levels and 
respondents aligned to opposition political parties. The lowest percentages in trusting 
neighbours were scored by respondents in Tigray, female respondents, rural respondents, 
the middle-aged, low-income respondents, those with no formal education and 
respondents associated with ruling political parties.   
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Regarding trusting Ethiopians in general, the highest scores were reported by respondents 
in Oromia, male respondents, urban respondents, respondents aged 60 and above, high-
income respondents, respondents with high levels of education and respondents 
associated with ruling political parties. Respondents in Amhara, female and rural 
respondents, respondents aged between 40 and 59, those with low incomes, respondents 
with no formal education and respondents affiliated to opposition political parties, had 
the least trust in Ethiopians in general.  
 
Particularized trust is more significant than generalized trust. Individuals like to have 
confidence in people close to them, rather than having bonds with and faith in strangers. 
It was, therefore, discovered that there was a strong relationship between identity and 
trust. In effect, the willingness to trust others depends on identification and relationship 
with others. As Messick and Kramer argued, “We trust and help people with whom we 
are familiar, with whom we have frequent contact, whom we believe to be similar to 
ourselves, and for whom we have positive regard” (Messick and Kramer, 2001:100). 
 
During the study, some respondents alluded to the role that identity plays in trusting other 
people. They, specifically, said that factors such as knowledge of the work place and 
character of the persons targeted for trust play a major role in generating trust.  Apart 
from just knowing the person targeted for trust, some respondents said it is also important 
to understand and evaluate the individual before trusting and creating a relationship with 
him or her. Some people addressed social trust within the context of nationalism and 
tribalism. They, specifically, said that people are sometimes suspicious because of 
tribalism politics. One respondent, for instance, said that “Nowadays people are 
suspicious of one another” (Interviewee 14, May 20, 2009: 9). Generally speaking, most 
respondents were more comfortable with particularized trust rather than generalized trust. 
They said that they were more likely to trust people they know and have information 
about. These views corroborate with the observation by Messick and Kramer that 
“Without generalized trust, individuals tend to limit their interactions to those about 
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whom they have information and with whom they have long-term relationships” 
(2012:29).  
 
People establish voluntary organizations and associations to bring together individual and 
collective efforts to overcome perceived or actual challenges or issues. Operation of 
organizations requires voluntary work and active participation by all members. Ethiopia 
has a long history of mutual self-help organizations and community groups. However, 
they have been weak and marked by adversarial relationships with the State during 
various regimes. The ssocial and cultural theoretical approach, especially the voluntary 
organizational theory, helps to assess public participation in religious organizations, mass 
associations, political organizations, professional associations, clubs and societies as a 
proxy for social trust. Respondents’ voluntary participation varied from organization to 
organization and across socio-demographic variables. The multiple response variation 
analysis indicated that only about 40 per cent of respondents were engaged in activities of 
voluntary associations. Participation in religious organizations, as active or inactive 
membership, was highly recorded among respondents. This demonstrates that most 
respondents preferred membership of religious organisations to membership of other 
organizations. Most individuals said they did not belong to any recreation organization or 
association, art/culture club, trade union, charitable organization, professional 
association, school council, social club or group dedicated to some course.  
Participation in voluntary associations or organisations varied across socio-demographic 
variables. Respondents in Tigray, semi-urban areas, male respondents, respondents 
younger than 40 years, low-income respondents, lowly-educated respondents and 
respondents associated with ruling political parties, for instance, accounted for the 
highest involvement in voluntary organizations. On their part, respondents in Addis 
Ababa, urban respondents, respondents older than 60, high-income respondents, 
respondents with high education levels and independent respondents had the least 
participation in voluntary organizations and associations. Participation by respondents in 
voluntary organizations and associations decreased as the age, income and educational 
level increased. 
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The social and cultural theory of trust argues that participation in voluntary associations 
increases levels of social trust. Similarly, various studies such as Putnam’s analysis of 
trust in Italy, his diagnosis of the current US culture, Fukuyama’s study of major 
industrial economies, current work on social capital (Dasgupta and Serageldin 1999, 
Halpern 1999) Newton and Zmerli (2011) and series analysis in Nordic and European 
countries, including other researchers such as Anheier and Kendall (2002),  Paxton and 
Ressler (2018), all demonstrate a significant relationship between and among voluntary 
associations and trust. Voluntary associations form part of the social infrastructure and 
social capital of society that make the generation of trust possible and make it easier for 
trusting relationships and trusting attitudes towards development to mutually re-enforce 
themselves.  
Participation in voluntary organisations creates ‘habits of the heart’ (Newton, 2013:7) for 
interaction and understanding others, even though the others may belong to a different 
social background in terms of social class, ethnic group, gender, age or religion. Newton 
further stated that “Voluntary organisations also draw people into the community, engage 
them socially and teach them the art of organising, co-operating and compromising with 
others in order to achieve collective goals. In short, voluntary associations are said to 
encourage trust, reciprocity and political understanding and skills” (Newton, 2013: 7). 
Putnam (2000) analysed participation in voluntary associations in the United States and 
argued that a dramatic decline in both membership rates and other forms of civil 
engagement led to lower levels of trust in society and increment in social ills.  
The cross-tabulation of the relationship between social trust and participation in 
voluntary organizations indicates that respondents’ levels of trust and their participation 
in voluntary organizations and associations varied from organization to organization. 
Levels of social trust were higher among respondents who were active or inactive 
members of religious organizations, sports and recreation clubs, arts, music or cultural 
clubs, trade unions, political organizations, charitable organizations, social councils and 
groups dedicated to some course, rather than respondents who were not members of any 
organizations and associations. Participation by respondents in these voluntary 
334 
 
associations and organizations was said to increase levels of social trust. In contrast, 
respondents, who were not members of residents’ associations, professional associations, 
mass organizations and social clubs had less social trust than respondents who were 
active or non-active members of the same.   
A number of factors have contributed to ascertaining the relationship between social trust 
and participation in voluntary organizations. The depth and resilience of social trust also 
depend on active or passive membership and amount of time and energy spent by 
members on activities of the organisation. They also depend on the type of association 
and its status, i.e. whether free and independent or not.  Active and involved membership 
of an association or organisation increases trust and interaction between and among 
members and other people external to it. For instance, respondents who were active 
members of religious organizations and political parties exhibited more social trust than 
respondents who were inactive/passive members of these organizations.  
The setup, or nature, of a voluntary organization also has a determinant effect on the 
relationship between participation in voluntary organizations and social trust. In this 
regard, Paxton and Ressler (2018:165) emphasized the importance of taking into account 
multi-dimensional influences, such as community and nation characteristics and 
institutions and policies that may influence trust through associations. Institutional and 
operational independence from the State are part of the fundamental hallmarks and pillars 
of effective civil society organizations. Unfortunately, Ethiopian civil society 
organizations and associations are said not to have the requisite institutional and 
operational independence, or autonomy, from the State (TECS, 2012; The Strathink 
Editorial Team, 2017; Brechenmacher, 2017). Brechenmacher, in fact, argued that 
Ethiopian civil society organisations: “…tend to collaborate closely with sector ministries 
and bureaus, and government bodies often view them as implementing agencies rather 
than independent actors that represent the interests of their members” (Brechenmacher, 
2017: 11).  
This reflects the complex nature of the relationship between and among the civil society, 
state institutions and trust (Rivetti and Cavatorta, 2017:63). Restriction of civil society 
organizations hinders their ability to interact and to freely communicate and cultivate 
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trust among themselves and extend the same to others. The association of social trust and 
participation in voluntary organizations varied across organizations, associations and 
regions. Expressions of social trust were higher in some organizations and lower in 
others. Secondly, in some cases, it was difficult to associate higher levels of social trust 
with membership of voluntary associations and organizations or lower social trust with 
non-membership of the same.  
8.2.4. The concept and significance of the institutional performance theory 
 
The study also interrogated and assessed the aspect of political trust, or institutional trust, 
which focuses on citizens’ trust in government/executive, parliament, judiciary and 
political parties in regard to their ability to discharge their mandates and functions in a 
transparent, accountable and responsible manner. The institutional performance theory 
focuses on confidence in institutions to foster trust and cooperation among citizens. It 
argues that confidence in political institutions is likely to create an enabling environment 
to generate social trust and association membership (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2006, Delhey 
& Newton, 2005; Newton, 1997; Newton & Norris, 2000).  Good government is the most 
essential feature for both generating trust and creating space for voluntary organisations 
to flourish. Essentially, good government appears first and encourages generalized social 
trust which, in turn creates space for the creation of volunteer associations and groups. 
 
Findings of the study indicated that, among all institutions and organizations, people had 
the highest trust in the primary education system and the health care system.  Opposition 
political parties were the least trusted by the public. The level of political trust in 
religious organizations varied with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church scoring the highest 
rate against the Ethiopian Catholic Church and the Ethiopian Islamic Council which 
scored the least. The multi-faceted religious complexion of Ethiopia had an effect on 
responses with respect to political trust in various organisations and associations. 
Respondents had more trust and confidence in the federal government and House of 
Representatives than in local/regional governments and city councils.  
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However, political trust varied across respondents and within different variables. For 
instance, regionally, four regions had trust in different institutions. In the Tigray and 
Amhara regions, respondents said that they had a lot of trust in the Ethiopian Orthodox 
Church. In contrast, respondents in Oromia said they had a lot of trust in the health care 
system, while respondents in Addis Ababa had a lot of trust in banks and other financial 
institutions. The least trusted organizations were regional/local administrations in Addis 
Ababa, opposition political parties in Tigray and Oromia, and the Ethiopian Catholic 
Church in Amhara. People in the Tigray region, female respondents, rural respondents, 
middle-aged respondents, low-income respondents, respondents with low education 
levels and respondents affiliated to ruling political parties, had the highest trust in most 
organisations and institutions such as the House of Representatives, Police, federal 
government, regional/local governments and city councils.  
 As Figure 3.5 indicates relationships between and among social trust, political trust and 
media credibility was further analysed within socio-demographic variables. These 
included residential area, regions, gender, age group, income level, educational 
attainment and political party affiliation. There was no consistent pattern in terms of 
ratings for particularized trust, generalized trust, political trust and media credibility 
across these variables. Levels of triangular trust and mistrust varied across regions. 
Respondents in Tigray, for instance, had highest rating for particularized trust, political 
trust and trust in national news media. Conversely, respondents in Oromia had highest 
generalized trust in the national news media. Respondents in Addis Ababa had the least 
particularized trust, political trust and confidence in national news media, while 
respondents in Amhara had the least generalized trust. The study also observed that there 
was a positive relationship between political trust and credibility of national news media, 
especially among respondents in Tigray and Addis Ababa. However, respondents in 
Addis Ababa had the least political trust in and credibility rating for the national news 
media, while respondents in Tigray had the highest political trust and believability in the 
national news media.   
 
Ratings for social trust, political trust and media credibility by male and female 
respondents varied in a dramatic manner. Both particularised trust and generalized trust 
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were higher among male than female respondents. Men had more trust in families and 
strangers than women.  In contrast, female respondents had higher political trust than 
male respondents, especially with respect to political institutions. More male than female 
respondents had more trust in all media systems, especially with respect to getting news 
and information. International television, national television and national radio, in this 
order, were the most trusted media by male respondents in urban areas. On their part, 
female respondents had the most trust in the national radio, national television and 
international television, in this order. Generally speaking, particularised trust, generalized 
trust and media credibility in national news media were highly rated by male respondents 
than by female respondents. However, female respondents had higher ratings than male 
respondents with regard to having trust and confidence in main political institutions. 
 
It was further discovered that residential areas of respondents also had a relative and 
determinant influence on ratings of trust. Urban respondents had the highest ratings in 
terms of trusting people in general, while respondents in rural areas had the least 
generalized trust. Another finding was that levels of generalized trust increased as one 
moved from rural areas to semi-urban and urban areas. This implies a positive association 
between generalized trust and urbanization. Regarding particularized trust, respondents in 
rural areas had the highest trust in family members. This could be explained by the fact 
that people in rural areas prefer to trust people they know well and interact closely with 
on a daily basis. In contrast, urban respondents had the lowest ratings for particularized 
trust. Interestingly, people in urban areas seem to have more interaction with strangers 
than their rural counterparts which causes them to have more generalised trust than their 
rural counterparts who rarely come into contact with strangers. This was also reflected in 
oral communication patterns of the respondents.  
 
Regarding political trust, respondents in rural areas had the highest trust and confidence 
in government institutions and organizations such as courts, House of Representatives, 
Police, regional governments, federal government, city councils, civil service and 
political parties, while urban respondents had the least trust and confidence in the same. 
The level of trust and confidence in political institutions declined as one moved from 
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rural to semi-urban and urban areas. This pattern was similar to that of media credibility, 
especially with the national news media. The level of trust for national news media 
declined as one moved from rural to semi-urban and urban areas. Respondents residing in 
rural and semi-urban areas had most trust in the national television and national radio 
(Ethiopian Television and Ethiopian Radio respectively), while urban respondents had 
most trust in international radio and international television. Private newspapers were the 
least trusted by respondents in rural, semi-urban and urban areas. Remarkably, 
respondents in rural areas reported the highest lack of trust in all media systems.  
 
Generally, age has an effect on generalized social trust and political trust. In fact, various 
studies have indicated that generalised social trust appears to increase over the course of 
life (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 1999; Patterson, 1999; Putnam, 2000; 
Pennant, 2005; Stone & Hughes, 2002a). Specifically, generalized social trust has been 
found to increase with age, i.e. as age increases, so does the level of social generalized 
trust. Some researchers have studied the role of generational attitudes in building political 
trust (Wang, 2005b; Espinal et al., 2006; Hoffiman and Jamal, 2012; Rivetti and 
Cavatorta, 2017). Young people, for example, are often more critical and distrustful of 
political institutions than the aged.  There is a positive relationship between age groups 
and levels of political trust. In other words, as the age group increased, so did political 
trust.   
 
This pattern was not generally reflected in my study across the three age groups. Trust 
levels for particularized trust, generalized trust, political trust and media credibility varied 
across the three age groups. More elderly than middle-aged respondents highly and lowly 
rated generalized trust, respectively. Respondents aged 60 and above scored the highest 
percentage in terms of particularized trust, while respondents younger than 40 years 
scored the least trust in family members. This meant that there was an association 
between particularized trust and age of respondents. It was, however, discovered that this 
did not apply to generalized trust. For instance, middle-aged respondents had the highest 
trust and confidence rates in political institutions such as courts, House of 
Representatives, Police, regional governments, federal government, city councils and 
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civil service compared to respondents aged 60 and above who had the least trust in these 
institutions. The young had higher political trust than the elderly and were most trusting 
of different media compared to all age groups. Of all media systems, national radio and 
national television were the highest rated in terms of trust and confidence, while private 
newspapers were the least trusted by all age groups.  
 
 Elderly respondents had the highest trust in both particularized and generalized trust and 
middle-aged respondents had the highest trust in political institutions, while young 
respondents scored the highest credibility rates for the media. Meanwhile, middle-aged 
respondents had the least trust in generalized trust, while young respondents had the least 
trust in particularized trust and elderly respondents had the least confidence in political 
institutions and media. Inter-generational trust depends on the establishment of strong 
State institutions and organizations.   
 
Strong and credible institutions and organisations ensure and underpin systems for 
transferring trust and confidence to successive generations. This has, however, not been 
possible in Ethiopia largely due to the fact that each political party that assumes 
governmental power establishes its new governance systems for sustaining its stay in 
power. Upon loss of governmental power, the victorious political party often discards 
systems established by the previous political party. This, invariably, results in lack of 
continuity and causes the public to always recalibrate their trust and confidence in 
governance institutions.  
 
Some studies have discovered that trust is positively linked to income (Brehm & Rahn, 
1997; Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 1999; Inglehart, 1999). However, 
Clairbourn and Martin (2001), Stolle and Hooghe (2004) and Li et. al. (2005) found out 
that present income does not predict future levels of trust. In the case of Ethiopia, the 
level of social trust, political trust and media credibility varied across income levels of 
respondents. With regard to particularized trust, low-income respondents had the highest 
trust, while high-income respondents had the least trust in family members. The level of 
particularized trust decreased as the level of income of respondents increased; which 
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meant that there was a negative association between particularized trust and income 
levels of individuals.  
 
In contrast, generalized trust was highly rated by high-income respondents but was 
poorly rated by low-income respondents. Low-income respondents scored the highest and 
middle-income respondents scored the least rates for political trust, while high-income 
respondents had scores approximating those of low-income respondents. Some 
researchers have discovered a U-shaped relationship between socio-economic 
status/income and political trust (Rivetti and Cavatorta, 2017). Low and high-income 
respondents had high trust in government institutions, while middle-income respondents 
had the least political trust. This trend was, more or less, reflected in the Ethiopian 
scenario as the poorest and wealthiest trusted governments’ institutions more than 
middle-income respondents. Regarding media credibility, high-income respondents had 
more trust in national television and international television, while middle-income 
respondents had more trust in international television stations and international radio 
stations. Low-income respondents had the highest trust rate for both national radio and 
national television. 
 
Education is considered as one of the socio-economic status symbol and is related to 
social trust, especially generalised trust (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 1999, 
La Porta, 1997, Patterson, 1999, Temple, 2001; Leigh, 2006). In the context of Ethiopia, 
educational attainment had some impact on particularized trust and generalized trust. 
Respondents with primary and high school education, for instance, scored the highest in 
terms of particularized trust, while those with high levels of education scored the least. 
Respondents who had low levels of education scored the least in terms of having trust in 
people in general, while respondents with high education levels had the highest 
generalized social trust. There was, therefore, a positive relationship between generalized 
trust and educational attainment. It was also found out that generalized trust increased as 
individual levels of education increased. In contrast, respondents with low education 
levels had the highest political trust, while people with high levels of education had the 
least trust and confidence in political parties. Political trust decreased as the level of 
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education increased, which means that there was an inverse correlation between political 
trust and level of education. Similarly, media credibility ratings varied across levels of 
educational attainment.  
 
Among respondents with no or lowest education levels (no formal education and those 
with only primary and high school education), national radio and national television were 
the most trusted media, while respondents with certificates and diplomas, international 
radio and national television were the most trusted media. Respondents with first degrees 
and higher had the most trust in international television stations and international radio. 
On their part, respondents with low educational attainment scored the highest rate in 
terms of particularized trust, political trust and high confidence in national news media, 
while respondents with high educational attainment had the highest rating for generalized 
trust and confidence in international news media for obtaining news and information.  
 
Political partisanship and views may bring to bear a powerful influence on political 
behaviour in both developed and developing democracies (Huddy and Bankert, 2017:1). 
Similarly, the study found out that ratings of trust levels were, invariably, influenced by 
political partisanship, affiliations, ideologies and beliefs. This was, of course, expected as 
people tend to promote and defend their political parties, ideologies and beliefs. 
Consciously or unconsciously, respondents manifested this trait in their 
unquestioning/blind assessment of the performance of their political parties. This inherent 
bias causes members of political parties to select and process pieces of news and 
information in a biased manner.  
 
Social trust, political trust and media credibility varied across respondents with different 
political affiliations. Respondents associated with the ruling political parties scored the 
highest in terms of particularized trust and generalized trust, while neutral respondents 
scored the lowest. On their part, respondents affiliated to opposition political parties had 
the least generalized trust. Respondents linked to ruling political parties expressed high 
trust and confidence in government institutions and organizations, while respondents 
affiliated to opposition political parties expressed the least political trust.  
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Opposition political party-affiliated respondents, neutral respondents and those in the 
“Don’t know” response category had more trust in private newspapers, international radio 
and international television. These groups of respondents had one similarity, i.e. they 
both had government newspapers and local newspapers among the least trusted media. 
Respondents affiliated to ruling political parties had the highest trust in national radio, 
national television and government newspapers. People associated with ruling political 
parties scored the highest rate for particularized trust, generalized trust, political trust and 
had the highest confidence in national media. On their part, respondents linked to 
opposition political parties, politically-independent respondents and respondents in the 
“Don’t know” response category, scored lowest in terms of generalized trust, 
particularized trust and political trust. Respondents who were aligned to opposition 
political parties scored the highest credibility rating for international radio and television 
stations, while respondents associated with ruling political parties had the highest trust in 
national radio and television.   
 
Generally speaking, relationships between and among social trust, political trust and 
media credibility within different variables proved difficult to establish in a conclusive 
manner. However, it was easy to ascertain certain patterns with respect to rating trust 
across urban, high-income, elderly, ruling political party-affiliated and highly-educated 
respondents who had scored the highest rates for trusting people in general. It was also 
easy to ascertain a pattern that showed the least generalized trust among rural, middle-
aged, low-income, lowly-educated and opposition party-affiliated respondents. 
Generalized trust increased as the level of urbanization, age, income and educational 
attainment increased. It was also noted that there was a positive association between 
generalized trust and socio-economic status. With regard to particularized trust, 
respondents in Tigray, male respondents, rural respondents, respondents aged 60 and 
above, low-income respondents, respondents with primary and secondary school 
education and respondents affiliated to ruling political parties, had the highest trust in 
family members. In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, 
respondents younger than 40 years, high-income respondents, respondents with high 
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levels of education and neutral respondents, scored the lowest trust in people close to 
them. 
  
Political trust was scored the highest by respondents in Tigray, female respondents, rural 
respondents, middle-aged, low-income and respondents with no formal education. 
Political party-affiliated respondents also scored highly for political trust. Similarly, these 
groups of respondents had great trust in courts, Parliament, Police, federal government, 
regional governments, city councils, political parties and the civil service. On their part, 
respondents in Addis Ababa, male, urban, elderly and middle-income respondents, 
including respondents with high educational levels and those in the “Don’t know” 
response category, expressed the least political trust in these institutions.  
 
Regarding media credibility, respondents in Tigray, female respondents, rural residents, 
all age groups, low-income respondents, respondents with the lowest educational 
attainment, those with no formal education and those with only primary and high school 
education, including respondents affiliated to ruling political parties, had the highest 
confidence in national news media for obtaining current news and information. In 
contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, male respondents, middle-
income respondents and those with high levels of education, had the most trust in 
international television stations and international radio for obtaining news and 
information.  
Another important point in the relationships of social trust, political trust and media 
credibility or in the arena of media and society is media hegemony. Gramsci’s hegemonic 
ideology is based on the fact that the ‘dominant social group in a society have the 
capacity to exercise intellectual and moral direction over society at large and to build a 
new system of social alliances to support its aims’ (Thussu, 2000:68). Media hegemony 
is that the ideas of the ruling class become ruling ideas in society. Accordingly, the 
dominant party, TPLF/EPRDF controls and runs the mass media especially the national 
news media as a vehicle for exerting control over the rest of society. The dominant class 
develops and upholds its hegemony in the society not only through news but also through 
unions, political parties, schools, the church, and other voluntary associations and social 
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groups. Mass media, political institutions, civic organizations and mass associations have 
common ground to facilitate inculcating in the mind of the society the democratic 
revolutionary ideology and building peace and development rhetoric. This trend can 
reciprocally contribute for social and institutional trusting or mistrusting among the two 
groups of the society.  
Findings from the study further suggest polarization and flexibility of political opinions 
and preferences with respect to trust and confidence in institutions and news media 
outlets. Lee’s research findings provide support for the argument that political trust, 
ideology, and partisanship are associated with consumers’ trust in the news media.” 
(Tien-Tsung Lee, 2010: 3).  
 
In Ethiopia, as was expected, the level of generalized trust and political trust were low. 
This could, perhaps, be attributed to the extent to which the population trusts the 
government organizations and its institutions. Normally, public perceptions of State 
institutions and government policies, in general, have the potential to influence or 
undermine social and political trust. In this regard, the low level of generalised trust may 
be a consequence of the revolutionary ideologies of the government that have tended to 
compromise and stifle democratic participation and discourse in governance institutions 
and civil society organisations. For instance, the presence and ascendance of strong-man 
politics might have bred a culture of fear and resentment among the people which could 
hardly be expected to spur and nurture political and social trust. The vicious circle of 
governmental inefficiencies, poverty, poor household incomes, inequality and generally 
low education attainment, have continued to fertilise political and social distrust among 
the population. This dynamic has, invariably, resulted in a disconnect between the people 
and institutions of governance. Participation in voluntary organizations and associations 
has somewhat also suffered as consequence of this dynamic.  
 
 
 
345 
 
8.5. Recommendations 
 
Recommendations are divided into two sections. The first section presents a set of 
recommendations to decision-makers and media practitioners and directors. The second 
section offers a set of recommendations for future research in media trust and credibility. 
   
8.5.1. Recommendations to decision-makers and media practitioners and directors 
 
In order to improve access and ownership of household media hardware, to build media 
trust and credibility and to strengthen the positive relationship between and among social 
trust, political trust and media credibility, the following are recommended:  
▪ Expand information and communication networks and infrastructure in semi-
urban and rural areas; 
▪ Extend electric power services to rural areas; 
▪ Improve public access to and ownership of household media hardware through, 
among others, exemption and/or reduction of customs duties and taxes on 
household media hardware; 
▪ Reduce import taxes on newsprint, printing machines, equipment and repairs;  
▪ Create enabling policy, legal and regulatory environment for all types of media; 
▪ Explore mechanisms for making newspapers broadly affordable across the 
country;  
▪ Create low-cost distribution facilities for newspaper in urban, semi-urban and 
rural areas;  
▪ Establish mechanisms for building and enhancing public trust and confidence in 
public institutions such as courts, Parliament, Police, federal government, regional 
governments, city councils and the civil service;  
▪ Establish mechanisms for improving the collection, collation and 
printing/broadcasting credible news and information as a way of increasing public 
trust and confidence in the media; and 
▪ Ensure improved media training curricula in both public and private institutions. 
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8.5.2. Recommendations for further research  
 
One of the key findings of my study is that there has been no critical study one the 
triangulation of trust and mistrust in Ethiopia with the result that there is hardly any 
credible body of evidence-based data and information regarding the extent to which the 
Ethiopian media enjoys public trust and confidence. In light of this, the following are 
recommended:  
▪ Conduct a detailed research on access and affordability of household media 
hardware with a view to understanding the number and type of media hardware 
available at household level;  
▪ Undertake a detailed research on media product production, circulation and 
accessibility;  
▪ Conduct a detailed study of the practice and merits of oral communication as a 
means of getting news and information;   
▪ Conduct research on the viability and sustainability of social narration of news, 
social television-watching, , social  radio-listening and forum newspaper-reading;  
▪ Undertake in-depth study of reasons why some people lose trust and confidence in 
certain media and, eventually, stop using them;  
▪ Further explore the correlation between and among social trust, political trust and 
media credibility; and 
▪ Undertake a study of the role of the civil society in fostering credible and 
trustworthy media in Ethiopia. 
 
In this chapter, I made conclusions and recommendations based on my research findings 
and analysis. In the conclusions section, I discussed my insights and analysis within 
conceptual and theoretical frameworks. In the recommendations section, I suggested what 
I consider as probable and actionable recommendations for media practitioners, 
government officials, politicians and researchers.  
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Annexures     
Annexure 2.1: List of Organizations and Institutions 
 
The Primary respondents will be: 
 
• Government Officials and civil servants  
• Civil Society 
• Media practitioners  
• General Public (urban and rural dwellers) 
 
 Name of organization and institution Distributed Collected Remarks 
 Government offices    
 Department of Capacity Building    
 Department of Information    
 Department of Trade and Industry    
 Department of Finance and Economic Development     
 Department of Health    
 Department of Education    
 Department of Water resources    
 Department of Agriculture and Rural development    
 Department of Mines and Energy    
 Department of Labour and Social Affairs    
 Department of Youth and Sports    
 Department of Justice    
 Department of Revenue    
 Department of Transport and Communications    
 Department of Women’s Affairs    
 Department of Culture and Tourism    
 HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Office    
 Municipal executive board/city council    
 High schools     
 University/college    
 Hospitals/clinics    
     
 Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation, District Office    
 Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation    
     
 Political parties/organizations    
 Ruling party      
       EPRDF (TPLF, ODF, ANDF, …)    
 Opposition parties    
      Kinijit (CUDP)    
     ENUPF    
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     ESO     
    OFDU    
    UEDF    
     
 Financial and insurance organizations    
 Commercial Bank of Ethiopia    
 Development Bank of Ethiopia    
 Construction and Business Bank    
 Awash International Bank    
 Abyssinia Bank     
 Dashin Bank    
 Wogagen Bank    
 Ethiopian Insurance Cooperation    
 Awash International Insurance    
 Saving and credit Institution     
     
 Religious organizations    
 Ethiopian Orthodox Church    
 Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council    
 Ethiopian Catholic Church    
 Ethiopian Apostolic Church    
 Evangelical Churches Fellowship of Ethiopia    
     
     
     
 Civic societies/associations    
 Trade/labour union    
 Professional association    
 Mass associations    
 Women’s association    
 Youth association     
 NGOs    
 Cooperatives    
     
 News media organizations     
 Radio    
 Ethiopian Radio    
 Radio Fana    
 FM Addis 97.1    
 Fana FM 98.1    
 Regional radio station    
     
 Television    
 Ethiopian Television     
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 Channel 2 (Addis Ababa Mass Media Agency)    
 BNT    
 Regional TV station    
 Newspapers    
 News agencies     
 Walta    
 ENA    
     
 Major companies (Private/commercial)    
     
     
 Dwellers     
 Urban (towns) dwellers    
 Sub-urban (Small towns) dwellers    
 Rural dwellers    
     
 
 
{  }  Tigray National Regional State 
{  }  Amhara National Regional State 
{  }  Oromiya National Regional State 
{  }  Addis Ababa City Administrative  Council (Kolfe Keraniyo Sub-city) 
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Annexure 2.2: List of news media outlets 
 
 
No. Name of  Media Organization Distributed Collected Remarks 
 Radio stations    
 Ethiopian Radio    
 Radio Fana    
 FM Addis 97.1    
 Fana FM 98.1    
 FM 96.3    
 Sheger FM     
     
 Television Stations     
 ZAMI Publics Connections    
 Ethiopian Television    
 Ethiopian Television Channel 2  (AAMMA)    
     
     
 Newspaper publishing    
 Addis Zemen    
 The Ethiopian Herald    
 AlAlem    
 Barrissaa    
 The Reporter    
 Fortune    
 Capital    
 Addis Admas    
 Medical    
 Eftin    
 Sendek    
 Ethio-Sport    
 World-Sport    
 Addis Lisan    
     
 News agencies    
 Walta    
 ENA    
     
 
 
 
376 
 
Annexure 2.3: Questionnaire (December 2007)  
 
‘Triangular trust or mistrust?’: Social trust, political trust and news media credibility in 
Ethiopia Questionnaire (December 2007) 
Introduction 
This survey covers media credibility and public trust issues for which I would like to 
obtain your perception and attitudes. A number of issues are covered in the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire has been developed for a research entitled 
‘Triangular trust or mistrust?’: Social trust, political trust and news media 
Credibility in Ethiopia Your perception and opinion is important in this research. 
The information you provide will be treated as confidential.  
Your reliable information is vital. So, please answer the questions as honestly as 
possible. 
(In order to make easier the tabbing, please, choose just ONE answer by circling the 
number, except when indicated another way or give a written reply where 
applicable) 
1. Demographic Data 
1.1 Regional states 
and Addis Ababa 
Administration 
1 Addis Ababa 
2 Tigray Regional State 
3 Amhara Regional State 
4 Oromoia Regional State 
 
1.2 Zone Woreda Kebele 
    
 
1.3 In which area do you stay? Town 
 
Small 
town 
 
Rural 
area 
 
  1 2 3 
 
1.4 Respondent ‘s gender Male Femal
e 
  1 2 
       
1.5 What is your age range?    
  1 18-24 yrs 
  2 25-29 yrs 
  3 30-34 yrs 
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  4 35-39 yrs 
  5 40-44 yrs 
  6 45-49 yrs 
  7 50-54 yrs 
  8 55-59 yrs 
  9 60-64 yrs 
  10 Above 65 yrs 
 
1.6 What is your marital 
status? 
[ONLY ONE response 
possible]   
1 Married  
2 Not married  
3 Single  
4 Widow / widower / divorced / separated 
5 Other [specify]  PLEASE WRITE IN 
 
1.7 What is 
your ethnic 
group?   
Amhara 
1 
Oromo 
2 
Tigrei 
3 
Gurag
e 
4 
Other  
(PLEASE 
WRITE IN) 
5 
   
 
1.8 What language/s do you use 
in communication? (MORE 
THAN ONE ANSWER 
POSSIBLE) 
  
  1 Amharic 
  2 Oromiffa 
  3 Tigrigna 
  4 English 
  5 French 
  6 Arabic 
  7 Other (PLEASE WRITE IN) 
 
1.9 Education 1 No formal education  
2 Primary school 
3 Some high school 
4 High school completed 
5 Diploma 
6 First degree 
7 Post graduate 
8 Other (PLEASE WRITE IN) 
 
 1.10 What is your religion? 1 Orthodox  
2 Catholic 
3 Protestant 
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4 Muslim 
5 Traditional 
  6 Other 
 
1.11 Are you in employment? 1 Yes 
2 No 
3 Student 
4 Retired 
  
 1.12 If yes, in which 
profession/occupation do 
you work? 
  
1 Banking/financial services 
2 Construction/building 
3 Education 
4 Engineering 
5 Agricultural 
6 Economics 
7 Health/medical 
8 Management and administration 
9 Legal 
10 Clerk and secretary  
11 Business service 
12 Hospitality/tourism 
13 Information technology 
14 Mining and quarrying 
15 Communication and media  
16 Performing arts 
17 Armed forces, security 
18 Informal sector 
19 Self employed 
  20 Other (SPECIFY) 
 
1.13 In which income group are you 
categorized? (per month) 
1 Below 500 Birr 
  2 501 -750 Birr 
  3 701-1000 Birr 
  4 1001-1500 Birr 
  5 1501-2000 Birr 
  6 2001-2500 Birr 
  7 2501-3000 Birr 
  8 3001-4000 Birr 
  9 4001-5000 Birr 
  10 5001-10000 Birr 
  11 Above 10000 Birr 
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1.14 In politics, as of today, do you lean 
more to the EPRDF, EDFU, 
Kinijit, or an independent? 
  
  1 EPRDF  
2 EDFU  
3  Kinijit  
4 Independent  
  5 Other (SPECIFY) 
 
2. Media Exposure and consumption 
 
2.1 What kind of media do you have in your home? Yes No  
a. Radio 1 2 
b. Television set 1 2 
c. Tape recorder 1 2 
d. Video cassette recorder 1 2 
e. DVD Player 1 2 
f. Satellite Dish (DSTV) 1 2 
g. Satellite Dish (Free air time) 1 2 
h. Desk top computer 1 2 
i. Lap top 1 2 
j. Telephone  1 2 
k. A cell phone 1 2 
 
2.2 How much do you use the 
following media in obtaining 
news and information? 
Frequentl
y 
Sometim
es 
Rarel
y 
Neve
r 
a. Radio 1 2 3 4 
b. TV 1 2 3 4 
c. Newspapers 1 2 3 4 
d. Magazines 1 2 3 4 
e. Internet 1 2 3 4 
f. Brochures, pamphlets, & posters 1 2 3 4 
g. Other people 1 2 3 4 
 
2.3 
 
How often do you watch the 
following TV stations? [If you 
say never, skip to 2.5] 
Regularl
y 
 
 
Some-
times 
Hardl
y ever 
Nev
er 
Don’t 
know 
a. ETV 1 2 3 3 5 
b. ETV2 (AAMMA) 1 2 3 3 5 
c. ZAMI Connections 1 2 3 3 5 
d. BBC TV 1 2 3 3 5 
e. CNN 1 2 3 3 5 
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f. Al Jezeera 1 2 3 3 5 
g. DSTV 1 2 3 4 5 
h. Other (please specify)      
 
2.4 If you say yes, where do you watch television? 
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE] 
Yes No 
a. At home 1 2 
b. At work 1 2 
c. In Restaurants 1 2 
d. In clubs 1 2 
e. In neighbours 1 2 
 
2.5 How often do you listen to the 
following radio stations? 
Regul
arly 
 
Someti
mes 
Hardly 
ever 
Never 
a. Radio Ethiopia 1 2 3 4 
b. Radio Fana 1 2 3 4 
c. FM Addis 97.1 1 2 3 4 
d. FM Fana 98.1 1 2 3 4 
e. FM 96.1 (AAMMA) 1 2 3 4 
f. BBC Radio 1 2 3 4 
g. VOA 1 2 3 4 
h. Dutch Welle 1 2 3 4 
 Other (please specify)     
 
2.6 
 
 Do you have a favourite radio station that you 
prefer to listen to most of the time? [If you say no 
go to 2.8] 
Yes 
1 
No 
2 
 
2.7 If yes, which one? [TICK ONE OPTION ONLY]  
a. Ethiopian Radio 1 
b. Radio Fana 2 
c. FM Addis 97.1 3 
d. FM Fana 98.1 4 
e. FM 96.1 (AAMMA) 5 
f. BBC Radio 6 
g. VOA 7 
h. Dutch Welle 8 
i. Other (please indicate)  
2.8  Do you have a favourite TV station that you prefer to 
watch most of the time? 
Yes No 
  1 2 
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2.9 If yes, which one? (TICK ONE OPTION ONLY)  
a. Ethiopian Television 1 
b. ETV2 (AAMMA) 2 
c. ZAMI Connections 3 
d. BBC TV 4 
e. CNN 5 
f. Al Jezeera 6 
g. DSTV 7 
h. Other (please indicate)  
 
2.10 What are the reasons for preferring the 
television or radio station? [MULTIPLE 
RESPONSES POSSIBLE] 
TV station Radio 
station 
  Yes No Yes No 
a. It broadcasts in indigenous languages 1 2 1 2 
b. It carries educational programmes 1 2 1 2 
c. It has different forms programmes 1 2 1 2 
d. It presents traditional music 1 2 1 2 
e. It presents modern music 1 2 1 2 
f. It brings interesting programmes 1 2 1 2 
g. It presents current affairs 1 2 1 2 
h. Other (indicate)     
 
2.11 What are your favourite TV or radio 
programmes that you watch or listen to? 
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE] 
TV Radio 
  Yes No Yes No 
a. News programme 1 2 1 2 
b. Music  1 2 1 2 
c. Drama 1 2 1 2 
d. Economic  1 2 1 2 
e. Health 1 2 1 2 
f. Environmental 1 2 1 2 
g. Agricultural 1 2 1 2 
h. Legal and justices   1 2 1 2 
i. Political 1 2 1 2 
j. Science and technology 1 2 1 2 
k. Talk show 1 2 1 2 
 
2.12 What are your reasons for watching TV 
or listening to radio programs? 
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES APPLY] 
TV Radio 
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  Yes No Yes No 
a. Seeking information  1 2 1 2 
b. Learning; self-education 1 2 1 2 
c. Guidance and advice 1 2 1 2 
d. Diversion and relaxation 1 2 1 2 
e. Social contact 1 2 1 2 
f. Value reinforcement 1 2 1 2 
g. Cultural satisfaction 1 2 1 2 
h. Emotional release 1 2 1 2 
i. Identity formation and confirmation 1 2 1 2 
j. Lifestyle expression 1 2 1 2 
k. Security and reassurance 1 2 1 2 
l. Sexual arousal 1 2 1 2 
m. Filling time 1 2 1 2 
 
2.13 About how much time, if any, 
did you spend listening to any 
news on the radio yesterday? 
< 15 
min 
15-29 
min 
 
30-59 
min 
 
> 60 
min 
 
 
Don’t 
know 
  1 2 3 4 5 
 
2.14 About how much time, if any, 
did you spend watching any 
news or programs on the 
television yesterday? 
< 15 
min 
15-29 
min 
 
30-59 
min 
 
> 60 
min 
 
 
Don’t 
know 
  1 2 3 4 5 
 
2.15 Do you usually watch alone or with others? Yes No 
a. Alone 1 2 
b. 
 
With others  [If no, go to 2.17] 
1 2 
      Family 1 2 
      Friends 1 2 
      Neighbours 1 2 
      Others [Specify]   
 
2.16 If you watch with others, who mostly decides what 
you watch? 
Yes No 
a. Father 1 2 
b. Mother 1 2 
c. Elder brother 1 2 
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d. Elder sister 1 2 
e. Husband 1 2 
f. Wife 1 2 
g. Children 1 2 
h. Friends  1 2 
i. Neighbours 1 2 
j. Other (specify)   
 
2.1
7 
 
How often do you read 
newspapers? 
[If never, go to 2.23]  
Regularl
y 
Sometime
s 
Hardly 
ever 
Never 
  1 2 3 4 
 
2.18 Which newspapers do you read? [Multiple 
responses apply] 
Yes No 
a. Addis Zemen 1 2 
b. The Ethiopian Herald 1 2 
c. Birriisa 1 2 
d. Reporter 1 2 
e. Fortune 1 2 
f. Capital 1 2 
g. Addis Admas 1 2 
h. Medical 1 2 
h. Other [specify]  
 
2.1
9 
Where do you read newspapers?  [Multiple 
responses apply] 
Yes No 
a. At office 1 2 
b. At home 1 2 
c. At school/college 1 2 
d. At the library 1 2 
e. Coffee house 1 2 
f. On the street 1 2 
g. Inside the car/on the journey 1 2 
 
2.2
0 
How often do you buy newspapers? Alwa
ys 
Most of 
the 
time  
Sometim
es 
Neve
r 
  1 2 3 4 
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2.2
1 
What kinds of stories do you usually read in 
newspapers? [Multiple responses apply] 
Yes No 
a.  1 2 
b.  1 2 
c.  1 2 
d.  1 2 
e.  1 2 
f.  1 2 
 
2.2
2 
Why do you read newspapers? [MULTIPLE 
RESPONSES POSSIBLE] 
Yes No 
a. Seeking information 1 2 
b. Learning; self-education 1 2 
c. Guidance and advice 1 2 
d. Diversion and relaxation 1 2 
e. Social contact 1 2 
f. Value reinforcement 1 2 
g. Cultural satisfaction 1 2 
h. Emotional release 1 2 
i. Identity formation and confirmation 1 2 
j. Lifestyle expression 1 2 
k. Security and reassurance 1 2 
l. Sexual arousal 1 2 
m. Filling time 1 2 
 
2.2
3 
Why don’t you read newspapers? 
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE] 
Yes No 
a. Lack of time 1 2 
b. Lack of interest 1 2 
c. Unable to read 1 2 
d. Unable to get in my area 1 2 
e. Unable to buy 1 2 
f. Other (specify) 1 2 
 
 
2.2
4 
 
Do you ever go online to access the Internet 
or World Wide Web or to send and receive 
email? 
Yes 
 
No 
 
  1 2 
 
 
2.2
5 
Do you browse the Internet or world wide web 
for obtaining news and information? 
Yes 
 
No 
 
385 
 
 
  
1 
2 [Skip to 
2.32] 
 
 
 
2.2
6 
 
If you say yes, where do you get online access? Yes No 
a. Workplace 1 2 
b. At school/college 1 2 
c. At home 1 2 
d. Internet café 1 2 
e. Anywhere else    
f. Other (specify) 1 2 
 
2.2
7 
What are the main sites that you access? Yes No 
a. yahoo.com 1 2 
b. google.com 1 2 
c. bbcnews.uk.com 1 2 
d. Aljezeera.com 1 2 
e. Other (specify)   
 
2.2
8 
What are the main reasons for accessing these 
sites?[MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE] 
Yes 
 
No 
 
a. For news and information 1 2 
b. To make purchases 1 2 
c. To sale services and products 1 2 
d. To communicate with friends/families  1 2 
e. To download music 1 2 
f. To watch video clips 1 2 
g. For entertainment 1 2 
h. Other (specify)   
 
2.2
9 
How often do you brows the following 
websites, online newspapers, opinion sites 
and blogs for news and information? 
Regula
rly 
Sometim
es 
Hardly 
ever 
Nev
er 
a. Walta 1 2 3 4 
b. ENA 1 2 3 4 
c. Herald/Addis Zemen 1 2 3 4 
d. EPRDF 1 2 3 4 
e. Ethiozena 1 2 3 4 
f. Reporter 1 2 3 4 
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g. Fortune 1 2 3 4 
h. Capital 1 2 3 4 
i. Addis Admas 1 2 3 4 
j. Kinijit (CUDP) 1 2 3 4 
k. ENUPF 1 2 3 4 
l. EPRP 1 2 3 4 
m. OLF 1 2 3 4 
n. UEDF 1 2 3 4 
o. Ethiomedia 1 2 3 4 
p. Ethiomedia 1 2 3 4 
q. Ethiozagol 1 2 3 4 
r. Nazret.com 1 2 3 4 
s. EthioIndex 1 2 3 4 
t. Ethiopian Review 1 2 3 4 
u. Aigaforum 1 2 3 4 
v. Dekialula 1 2 3 4 
 
 
2.3
0 
How frequently do you access online especially to get news? 
[ONLY ONE RESPONSE]  
 
a. Everyday 1 
b. 3-5 days /week 2 
c. 1-2 days/week 3 
d. Once a week 4 
e. Once every few weeks 5 
f. No/Never 6 
g. Don’t know/Refused 7 
 
2.3
1 
About how much time do you spend reading news online? 
[ONLY ONE RESPONSE] 
 
a. Less  than 10 minutes 1 
b. 10-14 minutes 2 
c. 15-24 minutes 3 
d. 25-34 minutes 4 
e. 35-60 minutes 5 
f. More than one hour 6 
g. Don’t know/Refused 7 
 
2.3
2 
Why don’t you use the Internet? [MULTIPLE 
RESPONSES POSSIBLE] 
Yes No 
a. Not available in your area 1 2 
b. Expensive 1 2 
c. You don’t know how to use the Internet 1 2 
d. Lack of interest 1 2 
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e. Other (specify) 1 2 
 
2.3
3 
Please tell me how closely you follow 
the following types of news either in 
the newspaper, on television, or on 
radio..very closely, somewhat closely, 
not very closely, or not at all closely? 
Very 
closely 
Some
what 
closely 
Not 
very 
closely 
Not at all 
 Newspaper     
a. Political news 1 2 3 4 
b. Crime news 1 2 3 4 
c. Health news 1 2 3 4 
d. National news and current affairs 1 2 3 4 
e. Local news 1 2 3 4 
f. International news and current affairs  1 2 3 4 
g. Religion 1 2 3 4 
h. Science and technology  1 2 3 4 
i. Business and finance  1 2 3 4 
j. Sports  1 2 3 4 
k. Culture and arts  1 2 3 4 
 Radio     
l. Political news 1 2 3 4 
m. Crime news 1 2 3 4 
n. Health news 1 2 3 4 
o. National news and current affairs 1 2 3 4 
p. Local news 1 2 3 4 
q. International news and current affairs  1 2 3 4 
r. Religion 1 2 3 4 
s. Science and technology  1 2 3 4 
t. Business and finance  1 2 3 4 
u. Sports  1 2 3 4 
v. Culture and arts  1 2 3 4 
 Television     
w. Political news 1 2 3 4 
x. Crime news 1 2 3 4 
y. Health news 1 2 3 4 
z. National news and current affairs 1 2 3 4 
aa. Local news 1 2 3 4 
ab. International news and current affairs  1 2 3 4 
ac. Religion 1 2 3 4 
ad. Science and technology  1 2 3 4 
ae. Business and finance  1 2 3 4 
af. Sports  1 2 3 4 
ag. Culture and arts  1 2 3 4 
 News websites     
ah. Political news 1 2 3 4 
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ai. Crime news 1 2 3 4 
aj. Health news 1 2 3 4 
ak. National news and current affairs 1 2 3 4 
al. Local news 1 2 3 4 
am. International news and current affairs  1 2 3 4 
an. Religion 1 2 3 4 
ao. Science and technology  1 2 3 4 
ap. Business and finance  1 2 3 4 
aq. Sports  1 2 3 4 
ar. Culture and arts  1 2 3 4 
 
2.3
4 
Which media do you prefer to 
follow the following list of different 
kinds of information? 
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES 
POSSIBLE]  
Televisi
on 
 
 
Rad
io 
 
Newspap
ers 
 
 
Onlin
e 
 
 
Famil
y & 
friend
s 
a. News and current affairs 1 2 3 4 5 
b. Educational issues 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Entertainment 1 2 3 4 5 
d. Sports 1 2 3 4 5 
e. Culture and the arts 1 2 3 4 5 
 
2.3
5 
If you don’t follow news, what are the reasons for 
not following news and current affairs? 
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE] 
Yes No 
a. Don’t have enough background information to follow 1 2 
b. Too busy to keep up with the news 1 2 
c. Watching and reading the news often depressed me 1 2 
d. Don’t trust what news media  say 1 2 
e. Lack of interest 1 2 
 
2.36 Do you provide information or your opinion to 
journalists when they approach you? [If you say yes, 
skip to 3.1] 
Yes No 
  1 2 
 
2.37 If you say  no, what are the reasons for not providing 
information or your opinion to the journalists? 
 
 
1.   
2.   
3.   
 
3. Media credibility  
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3.1 How much would you say you trust 
each of the following media sources 
to provide you with the news and 
information you want on Ethiopian 
current affairs?  
A lot of 
trust 
Som
e 
trust 
Not much 
trust 
No trust at all 
a. National television 1 2 3 4 
b. Government newspapers 1 2 3 4 
c. Private newspapers 1 2 3 4 
d. Local/regional newspapers 1 2 3 4 
e. International newspapers 1 2 3 4 
f. National radio 1 2 3 4 
g. Regional radio     
h. Commercial radio 1 2 3 4 
i. International/satellite TV 1 2 3 4 
j. International broadcast radio 1 2 3 4 
k. News websites 1 2 3 4 
l. Internet blogs/web blogs 1 2 3 4 
m. Friends, family and colleagues 1 2 3 4 
 
3.2 Please rate how much you 
can believe/trust each media 
house/outlet [A scale of 4 to 
1]? 
Believ
e all 
Believ
e most 
Believe 
with 
reservatio
n 
Can’t believe 
a. Ethiopian Television 1 2 3 4 
b. ETV2 (AAMMA) 1 2 3 4 
c. ZAMI Connections 1 2 3 4 
d. BBC TV 1 2 3 4 
e. CNN 1 2 3 4 
f. Al Jezeera 1 2 3 4 
g. DSTV 1 2 3 4 
h. Ethiopian Radio 1 2 3 4 
i. Radio Fana 1 2 3 4 
j. FM Addis 97.1 1 2 3 4 
k. FM Fana 98.1 1 2 3 4 
l. FM 96.1 (AAMMA) 1 2 3 4 
m. BBC Radio 1 2 3 4 
n. VOA 1 2 3 4 
o. Dutch Welle     
p. Addis Zemen 1 2 3 4 
q. The Ethiopian Herald 1 2 3 4 
r. Reporter 1 2 3 4 
s. Fortune 1 2 3 4 
t. Capital 1 2 3 4 
u. Addis Admas 1 2 3 4 
v. Ethiomedia 1 2 3 4 
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w. Ethiozagol 1 2 3 4 
x. Nazret.com 1 2 3 4 
y. EthioIndex 1 2 3 4 
x. Ethiopian Review 1 2 3 4 
aa. Aigaforum 1 2 3 4 
ab. Dekialula 1 2 3 4 
 
3.3 Which of the media outlets (television, radio, newspapers 
or magazines) in the country do you, personally, find to 
be the most biased in covering issues about Ethiopia? 
[Only one response for each category] 
 
 Television stations  
1 Ethiopian Television  
2 ETV2 (AAMMA)  
3 ZAMI Connections  
4 BBC TV  
5 CNN  
6 Al Jezeera  
7 DSTV  
 Radio stations  
1 Ethiopian Radio  
2 Radio Fana  
3 FM Addis 97.1  
4 FM Fana 98.1  
5 FM 96.1 (AAMMA)  
6 BBC Radio  
7 VOA  
8 Dutch Welle  
 Newspapers  
1 Addis Zemen  
2 The Ethiopian Herald  
3 Reporter  
4 Fortune  
5 Capital  
6 Addis Admas  
7 Efitin  
 Websites and Online news  
1 Ethiomedia  
2 Ethiozagol  
3 Nazret.com  
4 EthioIndex  
5 Ethiopian Review  
6 Aigaforum  
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7 Dekialula  
   
 
3.4 Please rate how much you can believe/trust 
each media type in 10 dimensions of 
credibility? 
Very 
high 
High Fair Poor Very 
poor 
       
a. Ethiopian Radio      
   Accurate 1 2 3 4 5 
   Balanced 1 2 3 4 5 
   Thoroughly researched  1 2 3 4 5 
   Critical  1 2 3 4 5 
   Neutral 1 2 3 4 5 
   Clear  1 2 3 4 5 
   Trustworthy  1 2 3 4 5 
   Factual 1 2 3 4 5 
   Completeness 1 2 3 4 5 
   Watch public interest 1 2 3 4 5 
       
b. Radio Fana 1 2 3 4 5 
   Accurate 1 2 3 4 5 
   Balanced  1 2 3 4 5 
   Thoroughly researched  1 2 3 4 5 
   Critical  1 2 3 4 5 
   Neutral 1 2 3 4 5 
   Clear  1 2 3 4 5 
   Trustworthy  1 2 3 4 5 
   Factual 1 2 3 4 5 
   Completeness 1 2 3 4 5 
   Watch public interest 1 2 3 4 5 
  1 2 3 4 5 
c. BBC Radio 1 2 3 4 5 
   Accurate 1 2 3 4 5 
   Balanced 1 2 3 4 5 
   Thoroughly researched  1 2 3 4 5 
   Critical  1 2 3 4 5 
   Neutral 1 2 3 4 5 
   Clear  1 2 3 4 5 
   Trustworthy  1 2 3 4 5 
   Factual 1 2 3 4 5 
   Completeness 1 2 3 4 5 
   Watch public interest 1 2 3 4 5 
       
d. VOA      
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   Accurate 1 2 3 4 5 
   Balanced 1 2 3 4 5 
   Thoroughly researched  1 2 3 4 5 
   Critical  1 2 3 4 5 
   Neutral 1 2 3 4 5 
   Clear  1 2 3 4 5 
   Trustworthy  1 2 3 4 5 
   Factual 1 2 3 4 5 
   Completeness 1 2 3 4 5 
   Watch public interest 1 2 3 4 5 
       
e. Dutch Welle      
   Accurate 1 2 3 4 5 
   Balanced 1 2 3 4 5 
   Thoroughly researched  1 2 3 4 5 
   Critical  1 2 3 4 5 
   Neutral 1 2 3 4 5 
   Clear  1 2 3 4 5 
   Trustworthy  1 2 3 4 5 
   Factual 1 2 3 4 5 
   Completeness 1 2 3 4 5 
   Watch public interest 1 2 3 4 5 
       
f. Ethiopian Television      
   Accurate 1 2 3 4 5 
   Balanced 1 2 3 4 5 
   Thoroughly researched  1 2 3 4 5 
   Critical  1 2 3 4 5 
   Neutral 1 2 3 4 5 
   Clear  1 2 3 4 5 
   Trustworthy  1 2 3 4 5 
   Factual 1 2 3 4 5 
   Completeness 1 2 3 4 5 
   Watch public interest 1 2 3 4 5 
       
g. ETV 2 (AAMMA)      
   Accurate 1 2 3 4 5 
   Balanced 1 2 3 4 5 
   Thoroughly researched  1 2 3 4 5 
   Critical  1 2 3 4 5 
   Neutral 1 2 3 4 5 
   Clear  1 2 3 4 5 
   Trustworthy  1 2 3 4 5 
   Factual 1 2 3 4 5 
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   Completeness 1 2 3 4 5 
   Watch public interest 1 2 3 4 5 
       
h. ZAMI Connections      
   Accurate 1 2 3 4 5 
   Balanced 1 2 3 4 5 
   Thoroughly researched  1 2 3 4 5 
   Critical  1 2 3 4 5 
   Neutral 1 2 3 4 5 
   Clear  1 2 3 4 5 
   Trustworthy  1 2 3 4 5 
   Factual 1 2 3 4 5 
   Completeness 1 2 3 4 5 
   Watch public interest 1 2 3 4 5 
       
i.  International TV stations      
   Accurate 1 2 3 4 5 
   Balanced 1 2 3 4 5 
   Thoroughly researched  1 2 3 4 5 
   Critical  1 2 3 4 5 
   Neutral 1 2 3 4 5 
   Clear  1 2 3 4 5 
   Trustworthy  1 2 3 4 5 
   Factual 1 2 3 4 5 
   Completeness 1 2 3 4 5 
   Watch public interest 1 2 3 4 5 
j. Government owned newspapers      
   Accurate 1 2 3 4 5 
   Balanced 1 2 3 4 5 
   Thoroughly researched  1 2 3 4 5 
   Critical  1 2 3 4 5 
   Neutral 1 2 3 4 5 
   Clear  1 2 3 4 5 
   Trustworthy  1 2 3 4 5 
   Factual 1 2 3 4 5 
   Completeness 1 2 3 4 5 
   Watch public interest 1 2 3 4 5 
k. Private newspapers      
   Accurate 1 2 3 4 5 
   Balanced 1 2 3 4 5 
   Thoroughly researched  1 2 3 4 5 
   Critical  1 2 3 4 5 
   Neutral 1 2 3 4 5 
   Clear  1 2 3 4 5 
394 
 
   Trustworthy  1 2 3 4 5 
   Factual 1 2 3 4 5 
   Completeness 1 2 3 4 5 
   Watch public interest 1 2 3 4 5 
l. News websites      
   Accurate 1 2 3 4 5 
   Balanced 1 2 3 4 5 
   Thoroughly researched  1 2 3 4 5 
   Critical  1 2 3 4 5 
   Neutral 1 2 3 4 5 
   Clear  1 2 3 4 5 
   Trustworthy  1 2 3 4 5 
   Factual 1 2 3 4 5 
   Completeness 1 2 3 4 5 
   Watch public interest 1 2 3 4 5 
 
3.5 
 
Did you find factual errors (names, figures…) in 
the media?  [If no, please go to 3.7] 
Yes 
 
No 
 
  1 2 
 
3.6 If yes, how often would you find 
mistakes? 
  
Almost 
everyday 
Once a 
week 
A few 
times a 
month 
A few 
times a 
year 
  1 2 3 4 
 
3.7 How much have you been 
exposed/faced with the following 
kinds of media credibility in your 
life? 
Frequentl
y 
Often Occasi
onally 
A very 
few  
Nev
er 
a. Presumed credibility (You believe 
someone or something because of 
general assumptions and stereotypes in 
your mind) 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
b. Reputed credibility (You believe 
someone or something because of what 
the third parties have reported to you) 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 
c. Surface credibility (You believe 
someone or something based on simple 
inspection or observation 
automatically) 
1 
 
2 
3 4 5 
d. Experienced credibility (You believe 
someone or something based on first-
hand experience) 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 
 
3.8 Have you been affected by unethical, unfair or Yes No 
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 inaccurate media coverage? [If no, go to 3.10]  
  1 2 
 
3.9 If you say yes, what kind of damage have you faced? 
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE] 
Yes No 
a. Psychological damage 1 2 
b. Family breakdown 1 2 
c. Job suspension 1 2 
d. Job loss 1 2 
e. Other (specify)   
 
3.1
0 
 
Do you have an experience of a person who’s life has 
been affected by unfair, inaccurate media coverage? 
[If no, go to 3.13]  
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
   1 2 
 
3.1
1 
If you say yes, what kind of damage has she/he 
faced? 
Yes No 
a. Psychological damage 1 2 
b. Family breakdown 1 2 
c. Job suspension 1 2 
d. Job loss 1 2 
e. Other (specify)   
 
3.1
2 
What is your relationship with the person? [ONLY ONE 
RESPONSE] 
 
a. Family 1 
b. Friend 2 
c. Neighbour 3 
d. Unfamiliar  4 
 
3.1
3 
What kind of interaction do you have with the media? 
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE] 
Yes No 
a. Listen to radio 1 2 
b. Watch TV 1 2 
c. Read newspapers/magazines 1 2 
d. Answer questions  1 2 
e. Write articles for newspapers 1 2 
f. Participate in talk shows 1 2 
g. Provide information  1 2 
h. Others (specify)   
 
3.1 Have you stopped using a specific media source for losing Yes No 
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4 trust? [If no, go to 4.1]  
 
   1 2 
 
3.1
5 
If you say yes, mention the name of the media?  
1   
2   
 
4. Public trust and confidence  
 
4.1 Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted, or that you can’t be too careful [TRANSLATION: = 
‘have to be very careful’] in dealing with the people? [ONLY 
ONE RESPONSE] 
 
a. Most people can be trusted 1 
b. Can’t be too careful [TRANSLATION: = ‘have to be very 
careful’] in dealing with the people 
2 
 
4.2 Do you trust foreigners more than Ethiopians? Yes No 
  1 2 
 
4.3 In your opinion, to what extent 
do you trust neighbour? 
Very 
great 
Fairly 
great  
Neither 
great 
nor 
little 
Rather 
little 
Very 
little 
  1 2 3 4 5 
 
4.4 Generally how much trust do you 
have in your family members?  
Very 
great 
Fairly 
great  
Neither 
great 
nor 
little 
Rather 
little 
Very 
little 
  1 2 3 4 5 
 
4.5 How much trust do you have in the 
following institutions to operate in the 
best interest of the society? 
A lot of 
trust 
Some 
trust 
Not 
much 
trust 
No trust at 
all 
a. Courts/legal system 1 2 3 4 
b. House of Representative 1 2 3 4 
d. Police 1 2 3 4 
e. Health care system 1 2 3 4 
f. Federal Government (Cabinet ministries) 1 2 3 4 
g. Regional/local government 1 2 3 4 
h. Municipal executive board/city council 1 2 3 4 
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i. Primary school system 1 2 3 4 
j. University 1 2 3 4 
k. Ethiopian Orthodox Church 1 2 3 4 
l. Ethiopian Islamic Council 1 2 3 4 
m. Ethiopian Catholic Church 1 2 3 4 
n. Trade union 1 2 3 4 
o. Professional association 1 2 3 4 
p. Ruling party 1 2 3 4 
q. Opposition parties 1 2 3 4 
r. Armed forces 1 2 3 4 
s. Banks and financial institutions 1 2 3 4 
t. Civil service 1 2 3 4 
u. Major companies 1 2 3 4 
v. Radio 1 2 3 4 
w. Television 1 2 3 4 
x. Newspapers 1 2 3 4 
y. NGOs 1 2 3 4 
z. Cooperatives  1 2 3 4 
aa. Mass associations 1 2 3 4 
 
4.6 Would you say that the courts are A lot A little Not at all 
a. Highest degree of excellence and intelligence 1 2 3 
b. Work efficiently and effectively  1 2 3 
c. Uphold the public interest  1 2 3 
d. Act justness and sincerity 1 2 3 
e. Devotion and dedication to duty 1 2 3 
     
 
4.7 Would you say that the House of Representative 
is 
A lot A little Not at all 
a. Highest degree of excellence and intelligence 1 2 3 
b. Work efficiently and effectively  1 2 3 
c. Uphold the public interest  1 2 3 
d. Act justness and sincerity 1 2 3 
e. Devotion and dedication to duty 1 2 3 
     
 
4.8 Would you say that the police is A lot A little Not at all 
a. Highest degree of excellence and intelligence 1 2 3 
b. Work efficiently and effectively  1 2 3 
c. Uphold the public interest  1 2 3 
d. Act justness and sincerity 1 2 3 
e. Devotion and dedication to duty 1 2 3 
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4.9 Would you say that the city council is  A lot A little Not at all 
a. Highest degree of excellence and intelligence 1 2 3 
b. Work efficiently and effectively  1 2 3 
c. Uphold the public interest  1 2 3 
d. Act justness and sincerity 1 2 3 
e. Devotion and dedication to duty 1 2 3 
 
4.10 Would you say that civil services are A lot A little Not at all 
a. Highest degree of excellence and intelligence 1 2 3 
b. Work efficiently and effectively  1 2 3 
c. Uphold the public interest  1 2 3 
d. Act justness and sincerity 1 2 3 
e. Devotion and dedication to duty 1 2 3 
 
4.11 Would you say that the university is A lot A little No
t 
at 
all 
a. Highest degree of excellence and intelligence 1 2 3 
b. Work efficiently and effectively  1 2 3 
c. Uphold the public interest  1 2 3 
d. Act justness and sincerity 1 2 3 
e. Devotion and dedication to duty 1 2 3 
 
4.1
2 
Would you say that the religious institutions 
such as the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the 
Ethiopian Islamic Council, the Ethiopian 
Catholic Church, are 
A lot A little Not at 
all 
a. Highest degree of excellence and intelligence 1 2 3 
b. Work efficiently and effectively  1 2 3 
c. Uphold the public interest  1 2 3 
d. Act justness and sincerity 1 2 3 
e. Devotion and dedication to duty 1 2 3 
 
4.1
3 
Would you say that the trade union is A lot A little Not at all 
a. Highest degree of excellence and intelligence 1 2 3 
b. Work efficiently and effectively  1 2 3 
c. Uphold the public interest  1 2 3 
d. Act justness and sincerity 1 2 3 
e. Devotion and dedication to duty 1 2 3 
 
4.1 Would you say that civic associations are A lot A little Not at all 
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4 
a. Highest degree of excellence and intelligence 1 2 3 
b. Work efficiently and effectively  1 2 3 
c. Uphold the public interest  1 2 3 
d. Act justness and sincerity 1 2 3 
e. Devotion and dedication to duty 1 2 3 
 
4.1
5 
Would you say that the professional 
associations are 
A lot A little Not at all 
a. Highest degree of excellence and intelligence 1 2 3 
b. Work efficiently and effectively  1 2 3 
c. Uphold the public interest  1 2 3 
d. Act justness and sincerity 1 2 3 
e. Devotion and dedication to duty 1 2 3 
 
4.1
6 
Would you say that mass associations are A lot A little Not at all 
a. Highest degree of excellence and intelligence 1 2 3 
b. Work efficiently and effectively  1 2 3 
c. Uphold the public interest  1 2 3 
d. Act justness and sincerity 1 2 3 
e. Devotion and dedication to duty 1 2 3 
 
4.1
7 
Would you say that cooperatives are A lot A little Not at all 
a. Highest degree of excellence and intelligence 1 2 3 
b. Work efficiently and effectively  1 2 3 
c. Uphold the public interest  1 2 3 
d. Act justness and sincerity 1 2 3 
e. Devotion and dedication to duty 1 2 3 
 
4.1
8 
How often do you receive information from 
the following organizations? 
Often Someti
mes 
Never 
a. Courts 1 2 3 
b. House of Representatives 1 2 3 
d. Police 1 2 3 
e. Health care 1 2 3 
f. Government (Cabinet ministries) 1 2 3 
g. Municipal executive board/city council 1 2 3 
h. Primary school system 1 2 3 
i. University 1 2 3 
j. Ethiopian Orthodox Church 1 2 3 
k. Ethiopian Islamic Council 1 2 3 
l. Ethiopian Catholic Church 1 2 3 
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m. Trade union 1 2 3 
n. Professional association 1 2 3 
o. Political parties 1 2 3 
p. Armed forces 1 2 3 
q. Banks and financial institutions 1 2 3 
r. African Union 1 2 3 
s. NGOs 1 2 3 
t. Cooperatives  1 2 3 
u. Mass associations 1 2 3 
 
4.1
9 
How would you rate the 
following professions or 
occupations for honesty and 
ethical standards? 
Very 
great 
Fairly 
great  
Neither 
great nor 
little 
Rathe
r little 
Very 
little 
a. Judges 1 2 3 4 5 
b. Federal member of parliaments 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Regional state member of 
parliaments 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
d. The police 1 2 3 4 5 
e. Doctors and health officers 1 2 3 4 5 
f. Government ministers 1 2 3 4 5 
g. Teachers 1 2 3 4 5 
h. Professors 1 2 3 4 5 
i. Clergy men/priests or Sheiks 1 2 3 4 5 
j. Trade union officials 1 2 3 4 5 
k. Civil servants 1 2 3 4 5 
l. Politicians generally 1 2 3 4 5 
m. Business persons  1 2 3 4 5 
n. Scholars 1 2 3 4 5 
o. Athletes 1 2 3 4 5 
p. Entertainers 1 2 3 4 5 
q. Journalists 1 2 3 4 5 
r. Community leaders 1 2 3 4 5 
s. The ordinary man/woman in the 
street 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
t. Neighbour or member of 
community 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
 
4.2
0 
Please tell me the 
stage of trust you 
have in the 
following 
Perfe
ct 
trust 
Damage
d Trust 
Restore
d Trust 
Guard
ed 
trust 
Conditio
nal trust 
Select
ive 
trust 
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institutions: 
a. Federal Government 1 2 3 4 5 6 
b. Regional/local 
government 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
6 
c. Parliament 1 2 3 4 5 6 
d. Municipal executive 
boards 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
6 
e. Police 1 2 3 4 5 6 
f. Health care system 1 2 3 4 5 6 
g. Armed forces 1 2 3 4 5 6 
h. Primary school 
system 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
6 
i. University  1 2 3 4 5 6 
j. Courts/legal system 1 2 3 4 5 6 
k. Public services 1 2 3 4 5 6 
l. Civic society 1 2 3 4 5 6 
m. Major companies  1 2 3 4 5 6 
n. Press and media  1 2 3 4 5 6 
o. Bank and  financial 
institutions 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
6 
 
4.2
1 
If you say perfect rust, mention the main reasons? 
[Multiple responses possible] 
Yes No 
a. Informing vital information 1 2 
b. Truthful 1 2 
c. Giving you uniform messages 1 2 
d. Keeping promises 1 2 
e. Accepting to negotiate 1 2 
f. Other (specify)   
 
4.2
2 
If you say damaged trust and others, mention the 
main reasons? 
Yes No 
a. Withholding vital information 1 2 
b. Lying 1 2 
c. Giving you mixed messages 1 2 
d. Not keeping promises 1 2 
e. Refusing to negotiate 1 2 
f. Other (specify)   
 
4.2
3 
Would you please tell me whether you are an 
active member, an inactive member or not a 
member of the following voluntary of 
organization?? 
Active  
membe
r 
Inactive  
member 
Don’t  
belong 
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a. Religious organizations 1 2 3 
b. Sport or recreation organization 1 2 3 
c. Arts, music or cultural club 1 2 3 
d. Trade union 1 2 3 
e. Political parties 1 2 3 
f. Resident’s association 1 2 3 
g. Charitable organization 1 2 3 
h. Professional associations 1 2 3 
i. Mass association (farmers, women, youth, ) 1 2 3 
j. School council  1 2 3 
k. Group dedicated to some cause (eg. Environment, 
consumer protection, ) 
1 2 3 
l. Social club 1 2 3 
m. Service club (Rotary. Lions, etc. )  1 2 3 
     
 
4.2
4 
How often do you discuss your problems 
and interests in the following 
institutions? 
Very 
often 
Often Seldo
m 
Not at 
all 
a. Schools 1 2 3 4 
b. Churches 1 2 3 4 
c. Mosques 1 2 3 4 
d. Political organizations 1 2 3 4 
e. Trade unions 1 2 3 4 
f. Mass associations 1 2 3 4 
g. Mass media 1 2 3 4 
h. Other (specify)     
 
4.2
5 
 
Do you freely communicate your suggestions and 
complaints to local, regional or federal state 
administration? [If no, go to 4.27] 
Yes No 
  1 2 
  
4.2
6 
If yes, what kind of media do you use to communicate 
your suggestions and complaints to local, regional or 
federal state administration? [MULTIPLE 
RESPONSES POSSIBLE] 
Yes No 
a. Mass media  1 2 
b. Letter  1 2 
c. Discussion forum 1 2 
d. Suggestion box 1 2 
e. Meeting  1 2 
 
4.2 If no, what are the reasons for you don’t Yes No 
403 
 
7 communicate your suggestions and complaints to 
local, regional or federal state administration? 
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE] 
a. Luck of  forum for discussion 1 2 
b. Shy to share your view to the community 1 2 
c. Don’t fell comfortable to air your view in public 1 2 
d. Afraid of any intimidation from the opposition  1 2 
e. Prefer to be silent  1 2 
 
4.2
8 
 
Have you been affected by criticizing the 
government? [If no, go to 4.30] 
Yes No 
  1 2 
 
4.2
9 
If you say yes, what kind of damage have you faced? 
[OPEN ENDED QUESTION] 
 
1   
2   
 
4.3
0 
 
Do you have in your culture/language positive 
statements that encourage public trust? [If no, go to 
4.32] 
Yes No 
  1 2 
 
 
4.3
1 
If yes, mention them [OPEN ENDED QUESTION]  
1   
2   
3   
 
4.3
2 
 
Do you have in your culture/language negative 
statements that affect public trust? [If no, go to 
4.34] 
Yes No 
  1 2 
 
4.3
3 
If yes, mention them [OPEN ENDED QUESTION]  
1   
2   
 
4.3
4 
Name a well-known figure/institution that has 
recently earned your trust. [OPEN ENDED 
QUESTION] 
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1   
2   
3   
 
4.3
5 
Give the reasons to earn your trust [OPEN ENDED 
QUESTION] 
 
1   
2   
3   
 
4.3
6 
Name a well-known figure/institution that has 
recently lost your trust. [OPEN ENDED 
QUESTION] 
 
1   
2   
3   
 
4.3
7 
Give the reasons to lose your trust [OPEN ENDED 
QUESTION] 
 
1   
2   
3   
 
5. Statements  
5.1 How much do you agree with 
the following statements? 
[READ OUT ALL] 
Strongl
y agree 
Agre
e 
 
Neithe
r agree 
nor 
disagr
ee  
Disagre
e 
Strongly 
disagree 
a.  Private newspapers in Ethiopia 
reflect the interests and concerns 
of the public 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
b. Government owned media in 
Ethiopia reflect the interests and 
concerns of all the people in 
Ethiopia  
1 
 
2 
3 4 5 
c. Private newspapers in Ethiopia 
disseminate information that it 
believes to be discredit the 
government 
1 
 
2 
3 4 5 
d. Private newspapers support the 
opposition parties 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
e. The bulk of private print media 
has set itself up as a force opposed 
to government 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 
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f. Private newspapers which are 
published now usually support the 
ruling party/government. 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
g. Government owned media report 
on society in a balanced way 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
h. International media in Ethiopia 
reflect the negative side of  
Ethiopia 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
i. Most audiences don’t like 
balanced stories 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
j. Many officials are not willing to 
provide information to media 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
k. The Ethiopian media have done 
their responsibility in covering the 
general election 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
l. Generally speaking, the public is 
not ready to provide their feelings  
and opinions to the media openly 
and freely 
1 
 
2 
3 4 5 
m. Society has a negative perception 
of journalists and the work they 
produce 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
n. The government interferes too 
much in the media in our country 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
o. The media covers too many bad 
news stories 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
p. Government media covers too 
many flattering news stories on 
government  
1 
2 
3 4 5 
q. Private newspapers are too critical 
of government and business 
leaders in our country 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
r. I trust the international media 
more than the national media in 
our country 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
s. Newspapers invade people’s 
privacy unnecessarily 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
t. Journalists are influential in 
changing public opinion in 
Ethiopia 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
u. Most journalists are politically 
biased 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
v. I trust most people in my 
community 
1 
2 
3 4 5 
w. Most private media are more of 
sensational and politically loaded 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
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x. Some government media 
journalists tend to look 
opportunist out of fear of losing 
job if reporting against the wish of 
govt. 
1 
 
2 
3 4 5 
y. I prefer to check several sources 
of news rather than rely on just 
one. 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 
z. In the past year I have stopped 
using a specific media source 
because it lost my trust 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 
aa. Most private newspapers were 
committed themselves to treason 
and endangering national security. 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 
 
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS SURVEY! 
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Annexure 2.4: Variables and questions for trust and confidence in the analysis  
 
Variable Statements and questions (agree or disagree) Measure 
Social trust 
(Particularized or 
generalized trust) 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people 
can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful [‘have 
to be very careful’] in dealing with the people? 
Most people can be trusted / You can't be too careful.  
0 to 10 (0 to 
1) 
 Do you trust foreigners more than Ethiopians?  
 Generally how much trust do you have in your family 
members? 
1 to 5 
 In your opinion, to what extent do you trust 
neighbour? 
 
Membership/Enga
gement  in 
Voluntary 
organizations 
Are you an active member, an inactive member, or 
not a member of religious, community, professional 
and political organizations and associations?  
1 to 3 
Institutional 
confidence 
How much trust do you have in the following 
institutions to operate in the best interest of the 
society? A lot of trust, Some trust, Not much trust, 
No trust at all 
1 to 4 
 Representative institutions tend to be trustworthy. 1 to 4 
 Implementing institutions tend to be trustworthy. 1 to 4 
 Checking and control institutions tend to be 
trustworthy. 
1 to 4 
Government 
trust 
 
Generally how much trust do you have in federal 
government? Very great, Fairly great, Neither great 
nor little, Rather little, Very little 
1 to 5 
Media 
consumption 
How often do you use news media? Regularly, 
Sometimes, Hardly ever, Never 
1 to 4 
Gratifications of 
media use 
Why do you read newspapers, listen to radio and 
watch television? Information, personal identity, 
integration and social interaction or entertainment 
0 or 1 
Media credibility Please rate how much you can believe/trust each 
media type in 10 dimensions of credibility? Very 
high, high, fair, poor, very poor. 
1 to 5 
Media outlet Please rate how much you can believe each media 
house/outlet, believe all, believe most, Believe with 
reservation, can’t believe 
1 to 4 
Socio-
demographic 
factors  
  
Ethnicity/region What is your ethnic group? What is your staying 
region? 
 
Education What is the highest level of education you have 
completed? 1= No formal schooling, 2 = Some 
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primary schooling, 3 = Primary school completed, 4 
= Some secondary school, 5 = Secondary school 
completed, 6 = Tertiary qualifications, other than 
university, 7 = One university degree completed 8 = 
university education completed, 9 = Post-graduate 
10. 
Income  Roughly how much money do you (and your spouse 
together) earn per month?  
 
Political 
leaning/proximity  
Do you feel close to any particular political party or 
political organization? If so, which party or 
organization is that?  
 
 
Gender Respondent’s gender, male or female   
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Annexure 2.5: List of interviewees for in-depth interviews (May 13 to June 8, 2009) 
 
Code  Region Zone/sub-
city 
Site Sex Age Occupation Education Income Date of 
interview  Woreda Urban Rural 
Interviewee 1 Tigray North 
Western 
Tigray Zone 
Astigde 
Tsimbla 
 Birhan M 62 Farmer Illiterate 600 May 13, 2009 
Interviewee 2 Tigray North 
Western 
Tigray Zone 
Astigde 
Tsimbla 
 Birhan F 30 Farmer Illiterate 200 May 13, 2009 
Interviewee 3 Tigray North 
Western 
Tigray Zone 
Astigde 
Tsimbla 
 Maysewhi F 45 Farmer Illiterate 400 May 14, 2009 
Interviewee 4 Tigray North 
Western 
Tigray Zone 
Astigde 
Tsimbla 
 Maysewhi M 48 Farmer Primary 500 May 14, 2009 
Interviewee 5 Tigray North 
Western 
Tigray Zone 
Astigde 
Tsimbla 
Inda Aba 
Guna, Kebele 
02 
 M 50 Businessman Grade 10 1500 May 14, 2009 
Interviewee 6 Tigray North 
Western 
Tigray Zone 
Astigde 
Tsimbla 
Inda Aba 
Guna, Kebele 
02 
 F 46 Informal 
service, 
retailer 
Primary 
school 
300 May 14, 2009 
Interviewee 7 Tigray North 
Western 
Tigray Zone 
Astigde 
Tsimbla 
Inda Aba 
Guna, Kebele 
02 
 M 32 Daily labourer Primary 
school 
400 May 14, 2009 
Interviewee 8 Tigray North 
Western 
Tigray Zone 
Shire 
Endaslasie 
Kebele 05  F 40 Retailer Illiterate 800 May 15, 2009 
Interviewee 9 Tigray North 
Western 
Shire 
Endaslasie 
Kebele 05  M 40 Retailer Primary 
School 
600 May 15, 2009 
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Tigray Zone 
Interviewee 10 Tigray North 
Western 
Tigray Zone 
Shire 
Endaslasie 
Kebele 05  M 51 Carpenter Primary 
school 
500 May 15, 2009 
Interviewee 11 Tigray North 
Western 
Tigray Zone 
Shire 
Endaslasie 
Kebele 05  M 38 Board Militia Grade nine 
complete 
400 May 15, 2009 
Interviewee 12 Tigray North 
Western 
Tigray Zone 
Shire 
Endaslasie 
Section of 
professional 
& 
occupational  
 M 50 Engineer BSC 2200 May 15, 2009 
Interviewee 13 Tigray North 
Western 
Tigray Zone 
Shire 
Endaslasie 
Section of 
professional 
& 
occupational 
 F 32 Accountant BA 1750 May 15, 2009 
Interviewee 14 Addis 
Ababa 
Kolfie-
Keranio  
 Kebele 12 
(Kolfie) 
 M 33 Engineer Diploma 1500 May 20, 2009 
Interviewee 15 Addis 
Ababa 
Kolfie-
Keranio  
 Kebele 12 
(Kolfie) 
 M 78 Pensioner 8+ 600 May 21, 2009 
Interviewee 16 Addis 
Ababa 
Kolfie-
Keranio  
 Kebele 12 
(Kolfie) 
 F 33 Retailer 8+ 150 May 21, 2009 
Interviewee 17 Addis 
Ababa 
Kolfie-
Keranio  
 Kebele 12 
(Kolfie) 
 F 23 Job seeker 10 
complete 
No 
income 
May 22, 2009 
Interviewee 18 Addis 
Ababa 
Kolfie-
Keranio  
 Section of 
professional 
& 
occupational 
 M 52 Finance and 
economy 
Diploma 1500 May 21 2009 
Interviewee 19 Addis 
Ababa 
Kolfie-
Keranio  
 Section of 
professional 
& 
occupational 
 M 36 Coordinator BA 2000 May 22, 2009 
Interviewee 20 Oromia Ilu Aba Bora  Halu  Abiyu Lemoon F 31 Farmer Primary 300 May 27 2009 
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school 
Interviewee 21 Oromia Ilu Aba Bora  Halu  Abiyu Lemoon M 46 Farmer Primary 
school 
700 May 27, 2009 
Interviewee 22 Oromia Ilu Aba Bora  Halu  KidaneMihret M 28 Farmer Primary 
school 
700 May 27, 2009 
Interviewee 23 Oromia Ilu Aba Bora  Halu  KidaneMihret F 30 Farmer Primary 
school 
150 May 27, 2009 
Interviewee 24 Oromia Ilu Aba Bora  Halu Ukka, Kebele 
01 
 M 61 Merchant 12+ 1000 May 27, 2009 
Interviewee 25 Oromia Ilu Aba Bora  Halu Ukka, Kebele 
01 
 F 37 Retailer Primary 
school 
500 May 27, 2009 
Interviewee 26 Oromia Ilu Aba Bora  Halu Ukka, Kebele 
01 
 M 23 Civil servant 10 300 May 27, 2009 
Interviewee 27 Oromia Ilu Aba Bora  Metu Kebele 01  M 40 Wood worker 12 2000 May 28, 2009 
Interviewee 28 Oromia Ilu Aba Bora  Metu Kebele 01  F 23 House wife 10 200 May 28, 2009 
Interviewee 29 Oromia Ilu Aba Bora  Metu Kebele 01  F 26 Community 
entertainer 
9 350 May 28, 2009 
Interviewee 30 Oromia Ilu Aba Bora  Metu Kebele 01  F 19 Student 10 - May 28, 2009 
Interviewee 31 Oromia Ilu Aba Bora  Metu Section of 
professional 
& 
occupational 
 M 40 Health officer Medical Dr 3000 May 28, 2009 
Interviewee 32 Oromia Ilu Aba Bora  Metu Section of 
professional 
& 
occupational 
 F 23 H. 
Association 
BSc 2500 May 28, 2009 
Interviewee 33 Oromia Ilu Aba Bora  Metu Section of 
professional 
& 
occupational 
 M 40 Information 
Technology 
Diploma 2000 May 29, 2009 
Interviewee 34 Oromia Ilu Aba Bora  Metu Section of 
professional 
 F 24 Youth and 
sports affairs 
Diploma 1500 May 29, 2009 
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& 
occupational 
            
Interviewee 35 Amhara South 
Gonder  
Debre 
Tabor 
Section of 
professional 
& 
occupational 
 M 21 Population & 
Dev’t expert 
BA 1068 June3, 2009 
Interviewee 36 Amhara South 
Gonder  
Debre 
Tabor 
Section of 
professional 
& 
occupational 
 F 24 ICT expert BSc, 
Computer 
science 
1400 June3, 2009 
Interviewee 37 Amhara South 
Gonder  
Tach 
Gayint 
Kebele 01  M 66 Retailer Primary 
school 
300 June 5 2009 
Interviewee 38 Amhara South 
Gonder  
Tach 
Gayint 
Kebele 01  F 22 House wife 8+ 250 June 5 2009 
Interviewee 39 Amhara South 
Gonder  
Tach 
Gayint 
 Zaz F 35 Farmer Primary 
school 
250 June 5 2009 
Interviewee 40 Amhara South 
Gonder  
Tach 
Gayint 
 Zaz M 40 Farmer Primary 
school 
200 June 5 2009 
Interviewee 41 Amhara South 
Gonder  
Tach 
Gayint 
 Agat M 23 Farmer Illiterate 200 June 6 2009 
Interviewee 42 Amhara South 
Gonder  
Tach 
Gayint 
 Agat F 50 Farmer Illiterate 250 June 6 2009 
Interviewee 43 Amhara South 
Gonder  
Tach 
Gayint 
 Agat F 27 Farmer Primary 
school 
150 June 6 2009 
Interviewee 44 Amhara South 
Gonder  
Debre 
Tabor 
Kebele 03  F 35 Secretary 12+2 604 June 8 2009 
Interviewee 45 Amhara South 
Gonder  
Debre 
Tabor 
Kebele 03  M 50 Merchant Primary 
school 
600 June 8 2009 
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Annexure 2.6: In-depth interview guide for general public 
 
1. What kind of media radio, television, newspaper, and satellite dish do you have in your 
home? How do you use them? 
2. From where do you usually get most of the local/national news- from newspaper or radio or 
television or online or talking to people or where? 
3. Which news media have you personally found useful for getting international news? 
4. Do you have a favorite radio station and/or TV station that you listen to and watch 
most of the time? Why? 
5. What kind of programmes do you watch or listen to? What are your reasons for 
watching or listening to these programs? 
6. Which news media do you perceive as most credible or believable as a source of 
information? Has   media credibility changed during the course of time? 
7. Is credibility varied by mass medium among different types of information such as 
political, economic and social issues that sought by audiences? Does the credibility of mass 
media vary from topic to topic? 
8. Does the perception of media credibility affect your media interaction in using media for 
different purposes? 
9. Are the audiences likely to stop watching, listening to or reading the media that they 
perceive lacks credibility and trust? What is the correlation of their perception of media 
credibility vis-à-vis their media use? 
10. How do you perceive the interrelationship of the social, political and civic institution trust 
and media credibility? Is the media credibility divorced from other areas of trust? 
11. Do you freely communicate your suggestions and complaints to local, regional or 
federal state administration? Why? What kind of media do you use to communicate 
your suggestions and complaints to local, regional or federal state administration? 
12. What kind of experience do you have on media credibility? How much have you been 
exposed/faced with media credibility in your life? Have you been affected by malicious, 
unfair or inaccurate interaction with your day to day life with different kinds of institutions? 
13. How much confidence do you have in the  
 
• federal and regional state,  
• political organizations,  
• church institutions,  
• mass organization,  
• government departments, etc?  
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Annexure 2.7: General guideline for assistant researchers  
 
The nature of such kind of research involves a number of respondents and assistants to 
carry out different purposes. Active and full participation of the respondents and team of 
the research is crucial for enhancing the validity of the data collecting process. This 
guideline incorporates two main issues: ethical behaviour of team members of research 
and informed consent of the precedents.  
 
1. Ethical behaviour of assistants 
The survey requires ethical compliance from all the team members of the research. You 
are expected to fulfil among others the following decent and ethical behaviour: 
  
• You have to comprehend the subject matter in general and the questions in 
particular in the language you suppose to handle. 
• You are expected to administrate the questionnaires and to carry out in-depth-
interview without bias, and to accurately record all necessary data. 
• You should completely ask the respondents all the questions to get answers.  
• You should completely fill the responses of the respondents in the questionnaire 
or interview sheet.  
• You shall not fill in a questionnaire or an interview sheet without having asked 
the respondent the questions, such kind of act can not be tolerated. 
• You have to administrate the interview or questionnaire session in private places 
without fear of observation, check the space for privacy, 
• You don’t allow sharing respondent’s interview sheet or questionnaire to 
unauthorized person, it is the researcher’s or field supervisor’s role. 
• You should protect the confidentiality of the research information and the 
anonymity of the respondents. 
• Make sure that you have received/obtained the signed informed consent form that 
reveals the respondent’s name, address, or other identifying features. 
 
 
2. Informed consent  
 
The data should be entirely collected based on the consent of the respondents. We have to 
give due attention for obtaining informed consent from the respondents.  
 
Guarantee of obtaining complete, informed consent from the respondents, 
1. The respondent must be knowledgeable to give consent, 
2. Consent must be voluntary, free from coercion, force, requirements, and so forth, 
3. Respondents must be adequately informed to make a decision, 
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4. Respondents should know the possible outcomes associated with the research. 
 
To safeguard the respondents against discomfort, embarrassment, fear, or loss of privacy, 
we should: 
1. Explain the study benefits, 
2. Explain respondent rights and protections 
3. Obtain informed consent. 
 
To this effect, we should perform the following informed consent procedures.  
 
Informed consent procedures for the survey 
1. Introduce ourselves- interviewer’s name and UKZN and Addis Ababa University, 
2. Briefly describe the survey topic (Perceptions of the public on media credibility, 
social trust and institutional confidence), 
3. Describe the geographic area in which we are collecting data through 
questionnaire and interview (the research sites, Region, Zone and district), 
4. Tell who the sponsor is (Faculty of Journalism and Communications of AAU), 
5. Describe the purpose(s) of the research (attitudes and perception of public on 
media and public organizations’ performance), 
6. Give a “good-faith” estimate of the time required to complete the 
interview/questionnaire (The survey takes about 1:30 hr), 
7. Promise anonymity and confidentiality (whenever deemed necessary), 
8. Tell the respondent the participation is voluntary, 
9. Tell the respondent to provide answers for all questions to obtain key information, 
and tell he/she has a right to refuse to answer any question in the interview or the 
questionnaire,  
10. Ask permission to begin. 
 
(See also the informed consent agreement that is attached as the cover page of the 
questionnaire) 
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Annexure 2.8: Ethical clearance approval letter 2006 
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Annexure 2.9: Ethical clearance approval letter 2017 
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Annexure 2.10: Ethical clearance recertification approval letter 2018 
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Annexure 3.1: Typology of media uses and gratifications 
Denis McQuail (1987:73) offers the following typology of common reasons for media 
use:  
Information  
▪ finding out about relevant events and conditions in immediate surroundings, 
society and the world  
▪ seeking advice on practical matters or opinions which may influence 
decisions  
▪ satisfying curiosity and general interest  
▪ learning; self-education  
▪ gaining a sense of security through knowledge  
Personal Identity  
▪ finding reinforcement for personal values 
▪ finding models of behaviour 
▪ identifying with valued other (in the media)  
▪ gaining insight into oneself 
Integration and Social Interaction  
▪ gaining insight into circumstances of others; social empathy 
▪ identifying with others and gaining a sense of belonging 
▪ finding a basis for conversation and social interaction 
▪ having a substitute for real-life companionship 
▪ helping to carry out social roles 
▪ enabling one to connect with family, friends and society 
Entertainment  
▪ escaping, or being diverted from problems 
▪ relaxing 
▪ getting cultural or aesthetic enjoyment 
▪ filling time 
▪ emotional release 
▪ sexual arousal 
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